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"The Aftermath of Terrorism: The Islamophobic Rhetoric of Donald Trump and Narendra Modi"

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**The Aftermath of Terrorism:
The Islamophobic Rhetoric of
Donald Trump and Narendra Modi**

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Thesis for B.A. in International Studies

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to compare the Islamophobic rhetoric of Trump after the 2015 San Bernardino Attack and the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting with the Islamophobic rhetoric of Modi after the 2016 Uri Attack and the 2019 Pulwama Attack and to analyze how the Anti-Muslim rhetoric of Trump and Modi affected the lives of Muslims within their countries and abroad. I argue that Trump and Modi used Anti-Muslim language in the wake of the four terrorist attacks mentioned above for their own political agendas, which resulted in Anti-Muslim political decisions that affected the lives of many Muslims within their countries and abroad.

Introduction

Terrorism is not an inherently new phenomenon. The terms “terrorist” and “terrorism” actually originated during the French Revolution in the late 18th century (Rapin 165). However, in recent years, the terms “terrorist” and “terrorism” have become conflated with Islam. This is inherently problematic because Islam cannot simply be reduced to a single idea. Islam has existed as a religion for centuries and there are multiple branches and multiple schools of thought of Islam. Nevertheless, there continues to be an increase in links being drawn between terrorism and Islam in the speeches and statements of political leaders and commentators. President Donald Trump of the United States of America and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India are two such political leaders that have linked terrorism and Islam together numerous times. This thesis will explore the Islamophobic rhetoric of Trump after the 2015 San Bernardino Attack and the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting and the Islamophobic rhetoric of Modi after the 2016 Uri Attack and the 2019 Pulwama Attack and analyze how the Anti-Muslim rhetoric of Trump and Modi affected the lives of Muslims within their countries and abroad. I argue that Trump and Modi used Anti-Muslim language in the wake of the four terrorist attacks mentioned above for

their own political agendas, which resulted in Anti-Muslim political decisions that affected the lives of many Muslims within their countries and abroad.

Methodology

Throughout this thesis, I will use quotes from newspapers based in the United States of America and India as well as from speeches and statements given by Donald Trump and Narendra Modi in which they refer to Islam and/or Muslims in the wake of the 2015 San Bernardino Attack, the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting, the 2016 Uri Attack, and the 2019 Pulwama Attack in order to analyze how their Anti-Muslim rhetoric affected the lives of Muslims within their countries and abroad.

Theoretical Framework of the Causes of Terrorism

Martha Crenshaw is an expert in terrorism studies and a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, which is a center of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, a research and education institution at Stanford University (Crenshaw, “Martha”). Crenshaw was one of the pioneers in terrorism studies, and she contributed writings about the various aspects of terrorism (Crenshaw, “Martha”). As a pioneer in terrorism studies, her writing on the causes of terrorism specifically has been cited over a thousand times since it was written in 1981, and I will be citing her ideas here as contributing to the theoretical framework of my thesis. Crenshaw believes that there is no fundamental difference between ‘old’ terrorism and ‘new’ terrorism, so even though her writing about the causes of terrorism was first published in 1981, it continues to be applicable today (Crenshaw, “The Debate” 136).

Crenshaw described four permissive causes of terrorism, which means that these causes provide opportunities for terrorism to happen, and four enabling causes of terrorism, which means that these causes directly inspire and motivate terrorism (Crenshaw, “The Causes” 381).

The Permissive Causes of Terrorism According to Martha Crenshaw

In terms of permissive causes of terrorism, there are four key aspects: modernization, urbanization, social facilitation, and the inability or unwillingness of a government to prevent terrorism.

Modernization, the first permissive cause of terrorism, involves an increased complexity in a society and in an economy, which creates strengths and weaknesses, and networks of transportation and communication, which allow attackers to be mobile and public beings (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 381). Attackers have used trains and planes on multiple occasions to carry out their attacks.

Secondly, urbanization, another permissive cause of terrorism, increases the amount and the availability of targets and methods of terrorist attacks (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 382). Terrorism as an "urban guerrilla warfare" propagated in Latin America in the late 1960s, but as Eric Hobsbawm, a British historian, mentioned, terrorism in cities came about after the urban renewal projects of the late 1850s and 1860s (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 382). P.N. Grabosky, a political scientist, argued that cities cause terrorism because they provide opportunities for potential targets to gather, for audiences to form, for people to maintain some degree of anonymity, and for politicized and unstable inhabitants to meet and be recruited (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 382). Most notable attacks do in fact occur in urban spaces because of the large number of people that could be affected.

Thirdly, social 'facilitation,' another permissive cause of terrorism, brings about civil strife because it involves "social habits and historical traditions" that encourage "the use of violence against the government" through protests, coups, or terrorism (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 382). This is Crenshaw's argument, but I am critical of this view because protests and

demonstrations are viewed by many as a means of participating in democracies. Terrorism became a recognized political practice through myths and traditions (Crenshaw, “The Causes” 382). Attitudes that bring about terrorism are disseminated internationally, and beliefs from one side of the world are able to influence attackers on another side of the world (Crenshaw, “The Causes” 382). Media also plays a part in this because of the way that certain attackers and terrorist organizations are talked about around the world. Information from one side of the world can reach the other side of the world within seconds.

Fourthly, the inability or unwillingness of a government to prevent terrorism is the last permissive cause of terrorism that Crenshaw explains (Crenshaw, “The Causes” 382). The nonexistence of satisfactory police and intelligence teams allow for terrorist ideas to spread unchecked (Crenshaw, “The Causes” 382). This sometimes occurs because the cost of preventing terrorism is often too high for many governments (Crenshaw, “The Causes” 383). Per year, the United States spent about \$25 billion in 2010 dollars before the September 11, 2001 attacks (Mueller 238). Per year, in the decade after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States spent about \$75 billion in 2010 dollars (Mueller 238). Even though the United States spends this much, it still cannot prevent all attacks, and other countries do not even have as much money as the United States to spend on counterterrorism. When the government is unable or unwilling to prevent terrorism, attackers have the upper hand and can use any type of attack to their advantage.

The Enabling Causes of Terrorism According to Martha Crenshaw

In terms of enabling causes of terrorism, there are four key aspects: the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, the lack of

opportunity for political participation, context, and the concept of a precipitating event that immediately precedes outbreaks of terrorism.

The existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population is the first enabling cause of terrorism that Crenshaw explains (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 383). Social movements are born to address complaints, gain equal rights, or create a separate state, and terrorism is a result of an extremist group of the larger social movement (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 383). The existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population is neither necessary nor sufficient for terrorism, but terrorism is a tool that is often chosen when the government is solely blamed for the grief of the subgroup of the larger population (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 383). Attackers often claim allegiance to a larger group, and they often blame the government for the actions that they themselves have taken.

Secondly, the lack of opportunity for political participation is another enabling cause of terrorism because regimes that refuse to provide basic rights and oppress those who oppose them create discontent (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 383). If people are not allowed to speak freely against the government, those people will resort to other measures, such as terrorism.

Thirdly, context is another enabling cause of terrorism when it affects the elite (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 384). Many attackers are young, well educated, and middle class people, but they are often disenchanted with the idea of a changing society and believe that they will not have access to a changing system when they are more privileged than most in the society (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 384). This means that the people who should feel the most connected to society and have the greatest opportunities to better themselves, their livelihoods, and their societies often feel the most disconnected. The attackers that are part of the elite often have political experience and they may act on behalf of the larger populace even when the larger

populace has neither been consulted nor approved of the attackers' actions (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 384). As stated above, attackers often feel disconnected to the society that they are in and as a result they will attack it. The attackers that will be mentioned in the case studies are examples of this.

Fourthly, the concept of a precipitating event that immediately precedes outbreaks of terrorism is the last enabling cause of terrorism that Crenshaw explains (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 384). "Although it is generally thought that precipitants are the most unpredictable of causes, there does seem to be a common pattern of government actions that act as catalysts for terrorism" (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 384). When governments use unanticipated or uncommon means of force in response to protests, attackers often feel compelled to react (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 384). This cause shows that there is a direct chain between a previous event or action mainly undertaken by a government and a subsequent event or action undertaken by attackers.

Analyses of these causes of terrorism are important because they allow people to understand why attackers did what they did and how they took advantage of certain opportunities and breeding grounds that they were provided in order to carry out their actions. The specific settings for terrorism allow different types of terrorist actions to be taken. Not all of the causes mentioned above are prevalent in each terrorist attack, and sometimes a terrorist attack may even be a combination of multiple causes mentioned above.

My Contribution to Martha Crenshaw's Theoretical Framework

Martha Crenshaw believes that "terrorism is the result of an organization's decision that it is a politically useful means to oppose a government" (Crenshaw, "The Causes" 384). Even though attackers do sometimes work through organizations, there are also attackers who work outside of organizations, something that Crenshaw does not address. This thesis will show some

instances of terrorism through an organization with regards to the examples of the 2016 Uri Attack and the 2019 Pulwama Attack in Kashmir, which were both committed by the Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based terrorist group, but this thesis will also show some instances of terrorism through lone wolves with regards to the examples of the 2015 San Bernardino Attack and the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting, which were both committed by people who prepared and committed the terrorist attacks alone without specific help from any outside organization.

Crenshaw also states “[g]overnment reactions that are inconsistent, wavering between tolerance and repression, seem most likely to encourage terrorism” (Crenshaw, “The Causes” 396). In this thesis, I will show how the Trump government and the Modi government discussed these specific terrorist attacks with Anti-Muslim rhetoric in order to further their own political agendas, which aligns with Crenshaw’s statement that the governments were inconsistent and wavered between tolerance and repression. Trump and Modi needed to show forth strength and condemn the terrorist attacks, which can be seen as repression, but they also used the terrorist attacks for their own political agendas, which can be seen as tolerance.

In Terms of “Jihad”: Literature Review About Terrorist Attacks

In the past twenty years, the majority of literature about terrorist attacks include the word “jihad”. According to Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, the Chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America, and Shaykh Seraj Hendricks, the Head Mufti (a Muslim legal expert who can give rulings on religious matters) in Cape Town, South Africa, the Arabic word “jihad” is frequently translated to “holy war”, but linguistically the word “jihad” means struggling or striving, whereas the Arabic word for war is “al-harb” (Kabbani). In the Quran and in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, “jihad” has many meanings, such as internal and

external attempts to be a good Muslim or believer, and working to tell people about Islam (Kabbani).

If military jihad must occur in order to protect Islam from others then it can occur through legal, diplomatic, economic, and political means (Kabbani). Peaceful alternatives should always be used first, but if there is no peaceful alternative, then Islam permits the use of force, but there are strict rules that must be applied, such as the rules that innocents (women, children, or invalids) must never be harmed, and any peaceful propositions from the opposition must be accepted (Kabbani). Military action is only one means of jihad and it is highly infrequent, which can be seen from the quote, “This day we have returned from the minor jihad to the major jihad,” which the Prophet Muhammad said to his followers upon their returning from a battle (Kabbani). The quote means that they were returning from the armed battle (the minor jihad) to the peaceful battle for self-control (the major jihad) (Kabbani).

When military action is the only means necessary, it is important to note that not everyone is allowed to declare jihad (Kabbani). A proper authority figure, who is advised by scholars who say that Islam and Muslims are being threatened and violence is the only way to defend them, is the only person who can declare jihad (Kabbani). Many political and religious groups have appropriated the notion of jihad over the centuries to justify violence, and in most cases Islamic factions have used jihad to fight against established tenets of Islam, which means that the misuse of jihad goes against Islam (Kabbani).

Jihad is not meant to be a violent concept, and it is not a pronouncement of war against other religions (Kabbani). The Quran refers to Jews and Christians as “People of the Book” who should be protected and respected because according to the Quran, Muslims, Jews, and

Christians worship the same God (Kabbani). Islam does not endorse most demands for violent jihad (Kabbani).

Mahmood Mamdani, a Ugandan author and political commentator, has written numerous scholarly articles on jihad and Muslims. One of his articles, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism*, goes into detail about jihad. Mamdani says that jihad is roughly translated as “struggle,” and that there are two different traditions of jihad: *jihad Akbar* (the greater jihad) and *jihad Asgar* (the lesser jihad) (Mamdani 768). The greater jihad is a struggle against self-weaknesses, and it is about living and attaining piety in an unclean world (Mamdani 768). The lesser jihad is about self-preservation and self-defense, and it is this lesser jihad that has become so politically enveloped today (Mamdani 768). Until the 1980s, the Islamic World had not seen armed jihad in over 400 years (Mamdani 770). The United States helped to revive armed jihad, and the CIA did not just fund the jihad, but it also played a key role in training the mujahideen by turning religious madrasas into political schools for training troops (Mamdani 770). The United States reshaped jihad in order to have the people living in the Middle East fight against the Soviet Union (Mamdani 772). “[T]he United States did not accept responsibility for the militarization of civilian and state life in regions where the Cold War was waged with devastating consequences, such as Southeast Asia, southern Africa, Central America and Central Asia; instead, it just walked away” (Mamdani 773). It is in this context that jihad became a big part of the current political situation in the Middle East, the broader continent of Asia, the United States, and other parts of the world (Mamdani 773).

Jihad in the United States Through the Actions of Lone Wolves

The 2015 San Bernardino Attack and the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting in the United States have been discussed in terms of jihad and lone wolves. Before the 2017 Las Vegas

Shooting, the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting was the “deadliest mass shooting” in the history of the United States (Beydoun 1216). Both Stephen Paddock, the shooter involved in the 2017 Las Vegas Shooting, and Omar Mateen, the shooter involved in the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting, took their own lives after opening fire (Beydoun 1216). Both Paddock and Mateen were considered lone wolves by law enforcement and the media, but Paddock was dissociated from terrorism and just called a “lone wolf”, whereas Mateen was called a “lone wolf” of the “radicalized” variety, which associated him with terrorism because Mateen was Afghan-American and Muslim (Beydoun 1215-1216).

Furthermore, the word “local” is used in situations to refute the likelihood of a connection to terrorism and is not used to describe Muslim suspects or perpetrators, whereas the word “homegrown”, a synonym of “local”, is used to describe Muslims suspected of radicalization (Beydoun 1238). If Paddock were Muslim, “the motive of ‘Islamic terrorism’ or ‘jihad’ would likely be immediately assumed, even without any evidence” (Beydoun 1238).

The double standard of lone wolf terrorism affects all Muslim Americans, and “[e]ssentially, “[t]he burden of collateral and collective guilt has become a central component of the modern Muslim American experience,” while the broader white population is never tied to the misdeeds and violence of culprits like Paddock” (Beydoun 1242). The idea that all Muslims are affected by the actions of lone wolves was seen immediately after the 2015 San Bernardino Attack, when Donald Trump, then just a presidential candidate, campaigned for “a complete and total shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” (Beydoun 1242).

Jihad in India Through the Actions of Jaish-e-Muhammad

The 2016 Uri Attack and the 2019 Pulwama Attack in Kashmir have been discussed in terms of jihad and Jaish-e-Muhammad. “Formed in 2000, Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM or Army of

Muhammad) is a Pakistan-based armed group that aims to undermine and overthrow Indian control over Indian-administered Kashmir through attacks on security and government targets” (Hashim). Masood Azhar, who previously fought under the militant organization of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and was linked to al-Qaeda, founded Jaish-e-Muhammad after his release from Indian custody in 1999, which occurred in exchange for over 150 hostages from an Indian Airlines flight that was hijacked and rerouted to Kandahar, Afghanistan (Hashim, Zahid 1).

Azhar has been considered a “jihadi ideologue, propagandist and mentor who has authored several books on extremist ideology and jihad” (Zahid 1-2). Azhar’s jihadist ideology involves *Qital fi Sabeel Allah*, which is fighting for the sake of Allah, which encompasses the killing of *kufar*, who are disbelievers, and *munafiqeen*, who are hypocrites, during jihad (Zahid 2). “In Azhar’s 850-page book, *Fazail-e-Jihad* (Attributes of Jihad), Azhar compares jihad with other forms of worship in Islam” (Zahid 2). In *Fazail-e-Jihad*, Azhar uses many Qur’anic verses and Ahadith that discuss jihad to show that it is a core component of Islam that is favored by Allah based on the “vigour of the *mujahid* (martyr), risks involved, physical and mental fatigue, [and] rewards in this world and the hereafter” (Zahid 2). Azhar declares that jihad is the “First Line of Defense” to protect Islam (Zahid 2).

In 2001, Jaish-e-Muhammad was linked with attacks on the legislative assembly building in Indian-administered Kashmir and on the Indian parliament in New Delhi (Hashim). Pakistani authorities arrested Azhar after these attacks, but he was released after a year due to insufficient evidence (Hashim). In 2002, Pakistan proscribed Jaish-e-Muhammad as a “terrorist organisation,” which incited the group to target Pakistan and try, unsuccessfully, to assassinate then-President Pervez Musharraf on two separate occasions in 2003 (Hashim, Zahid 1).

Within the past five years, Jaish-e-Muhammad has been held responsible for the 2016 Pathankot Attack, which killed at least six people, the 2016 Uri Attack, which killed 19 people, and the 2019 Pulwama Attack, which killed 40 people (Hashim, Zahid 1). A senior police officer, who chose to remain anonymous said, “JeM is not only on a revival mode by carrying out such high-value attacks, but it also nurtures pan India Islamist goals” (Hashim). On May 1, 2019, the United Nations added Masood Azhar to its list of “global terrorists” (Hashim, Zahid 4).

The beliefs surrounding jihad of Masood Azhar and Jaish-e-Muhammad are clearly different and more extreme from those of the Islamic Supreme Council of America and Mahmood Mamdani. Most terrorist groups take jihad to an extreme that is not supported by most Muslims, but nevertheless they have real world repercussions, which can be seen by the fact that Jaish-e-Muhammad’s acts of terrorism have, numerous times, brought India and Pakistan to the edge of war (Zahid 5).

Islamophobic rhetoric is not uncommon after terrorist attacks are connected to Muslims and jihad, and this will be further explored in the next section of this thesis where I further describe the 2015 San Bernardino Attack, the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting, the 2016 Uri Attack, and the 2019 Pulwama Attack and discuss the Anti-Muslim rhetoric of Trump and Modi after these terrorist attacks.

Case Study of The United States of America

The United States of America is a normal case study for my argument because President Donald Trump employed the use of anti-Muslim rhetoric on multiple occasions after the 2015 San Bernardino Attack and the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting.

The September 11, 2001 Attacks: The Trigger of Major United States Initiatives Against Terrorism

On September 11th, 2001, 19 militants associated with al Qaeda, an Islamic terrorist group, hijacked four airplanes in order to carry out attacks in the United States (Gillon). Two of the planes crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, New York, one plane crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and one plane crashed into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania (Gillon). Almost 3,000 people were killed during the terrorist attacks on that day, which resulted in many plans to fight against terrorism by President George W. Bush and others (Gillon).

The 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia (15), the United Arab Emirates (2), Egypt (1), and Lebanon (1) (Gillon). They were reported to have been bankrolled by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda in response to the United States' continuous military presence in the Middle East after the Persian Gulf War (Gillon). Some of the hijackers lived in the United States for more than a year before the terrorist attacks occurred, and they took flying lessons at American flight schools, while others came into the United States months before the terrorist attacks occurred (Gillon). The hijackers brought box-cutters and knives onto the planes and took control of the planes shortly after takeoff, steering them away from their designated destination in California (Gillon).

That night, President George W. Bush delivered a televised address to the nation from the Oval Office. President Bush said, "Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America" (Bush). He also hinted at the eventual military response when he said, "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them" (Bush).

Less than a month later, on October 7th, Operation Enduring Freedom, the American-led international effort to remove the Taliban from governing Afghanistan and crush Osama bin Laden, began (Gillon). The Taliban were removed from power within two months, but Osama bin Laden remained free until May 2, 2011, when United States forces killed him in Pakistan (Gillon).

The 2015 San Bernardino Attack

On December 2nd, 2015, 14 people were killed, and 21 people were injured in a mass shooting and attempted bombing terrorist attack at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California (Hagen). There were approximately 80 people in the room when the shooting began, and they were mostly employees who were there for a holiday party (Hagen). The suspects attended the holiday party, left, and then came back (Hagen). The suspects carried long guns and handguns and fired many rounds of bullets (Hagen). They also wore vests and had three explosive devices on them when they entered the room (Hagen). Furthermore, three pipe bombs were found at the Inland Regional Center, but they did not work (Hagen). The guns were purchased legally, and their SUV was a rental with plates from Utah (Hagen).

Police identified the shooters as Syed Farook, who was 28 years old, and his wife, Tashfeen Malik, who was 27 years old (Hagen). Farook worked as an environmental health specialist in San Bernardino for five years, and he did not have a criminal record (Hagen). Farook was a citizen of the United States, but Malik was in the United States on a K-1 visa (Hagen). A K-1 visa is issued to the fiancé or fiancée of a United States citizen for the fiancé or fiancée to enter the United States (“Nonimmigrant”). The couple must then be married within 90 days of the foreigner’s entry into the United States or the foreigner will be required to leave the United States (“Nonimmigrant”). Farook and Mateen were married in the United States (Hagen).

After the mass shooting and attempted bombing terrorist attack at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, the suspects fled in the SUV and were chased by police until a shootout occurred which killed both Farook and Malik (Hagen). The police fired 380 rounds and the suspects fired 76 rounds (Hagen). At the suspects' home in Redlands, in San Bernardino County, police ended up finding 12 pipe bombs, bomb making tools, and 5,000 rounds of ammunition (Hagen).

FBI Director James Comey said that the investigation had “developed indications of radicalization by the killers and of potential inspiration by foreign terrorist organizations,” but authorities had “no indication that these killers are part of an organized larger group” (Goldman). The investigation eventually discovered a Facebook post by Malik from just after the shooting where she pledged her allegiance to Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Goldman). ISIS has used propaganda to recruit supporters from other countries, and it has called for lone-wolf attacks in countries around the world, which United States officials consider an immediate danger (Goldman). Farook's family lawyer, Mohammad Abuersheid even said, “The family was not that close to him. He was kind of like the lone wolf” (Goldman).

Donald Trump's Response to the San Bernardino Attack

After the San Bernardino Attack, then Republican Presidential frontrunner Donald Trump spoke about the attack (Santucci). He said, “It looks like another case. We've got a lot of bad things going on. Radical Islamic terrorism” (Santucci). He immediately linked the attack to Islam and terrorism and told people “Take a look. I mean, you look at the names, you look at what's happened. You tell me” (Santucci).

Trump also connected the rise in mass shootings to mental health when he said, “It’s mental health, and it’s also really strength. We need strength. We have a weak government” (Santucci). After the November 2015 Paris Attacks, Trump said that attacks could be prevented if more people had guns (Santucci). He said, “[I]f our people had guns, if they were allowed to carry it would have been a much much different situation” (Santucci).

On December 7th, 2015, Trump called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on” (Taylor). At a rally in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, Trump claimed that Muslims all around the world believe that violence against Americans is justified and that American Muslims should live under sharia law, and he mentioned how people can be radicalized online (Taylor). Trump mentioned “closing that Internet up in some way” (Taylor). Trump also called for surveillance on mosques throughout the United States “[b]ecause something is happening in there. Man, there’s anger, and we have to know about it” (Taylor).

The 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting

On June 12th, 2016, 49 people were killed, and 53 people were injured in a mass shooting inside Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida (Ellis). The 2016 Orlando Nightclub shooting was the deadliest mass shooting in the history of the United States and the nation’s worst terror attack since the September 11, 2001 attacks (Ellis). The gunman, Omar Mateen, was 29 years old from Fort Pierce, Florida (Ellis). Mateen, a lone wolf, carried out the attack with an assault rifle and a pistol at 2 a.m., and after a three-hour standoff with people trapped inside the club, Orlando police eventually barged in with an armored vehicle and stun grenades, and they shot and killed Mateen (Ellis).

Mateen was born in New York in 1986 (Ellis). His parents, who were from Afghanistan, mentioned that Mateen was irritated when he saw two men kiss in Miami, but they did not consider him to be religious and they did not know of any link between him and ISIS (Ellis). Mateen was married in 2009 but filed documents to end his marriage in 2011 (Ellis). Mateen's ex-wife, Sitora Yusufiy from Uzbekistan, believed that he was mentally ill even though he was never formally diagnosed (Ellis). According to Yusufiy, Mateen started abusing her after a few months into their marriage (Ellis). Also, according to Yusufiy, Mateen was religious, but Yusufiy did not believe that his religion was a part of his motivation for the attack (Ellis).

The FBI had interviewed Mateen in 2013 and 2014 but did not label him as a threat (Ellis). During the shooting, Mateen called 911, swore allegiance to ISIS, and mentioned the Boston Marathon bombers (Ellis). ISIS sympathizers praised Mateen and the attack on pro-Islamic State forums (Ellis). A message was posted in Arabic on a dark web site linked to the ISIS news agency Amaq, which said, "the armed attack that targeted a gay night club in the city of Orlando in the American state of Florida and that bore more than a 100 killed and wounded was carried out by an Islamic state fighter" (Ellis). However, Salma Abdelaziz from CNN, who translated the message and monitors many ISIS messages, said that the language was inconsistent with past ISIS messages because it did not use the words "luti," the Arabic word for "sodomite," or "lewat," the Arabic word for "sodomy" (Ellis; Stern) ISIS normally uses either of the two words because they consider sodomy to be acts of the people of Lot (Lut in Arabic) (Stern). "According to the Quran, Lot is a prophet whose people were destroyed for transgressing moral norms. Today, same sex relations among men are often associated with the people of Prophet Lot" (Stern). Furthermore, there was also no assertion that ISIS coordinated the attack, just an after-the-fact call involving Mateen swearing allegiance to ISIS (Ellis).

Donald Trump's Response to the Orlando Nightclub Shooting

After the Orlando Nightclub Shooting, Trump tweeted on his Twitter account “Appreciate the congrats for being right on radical Islamic terrorism, I don’t want congrats, I want toughness & vigilance. We must be smart!” and “What has happened in Orlando is just the beginning. Our leadership is weak and ineffective. I called it and asked for the ban. Must be tough” (Trump). Trump praised himself in the wake of the deadliest mass shooting in the history of the United States and continued calling for the Muslim Ban that he had mentioned after the San Bernardino Attack. In New Hampshire, Trump, talking about the Orlando Nightclub Shooting in terms of immigration, said, “Although the pause [ban] is temporary, we must find out what is going on” (Berenson). Trump continued by saying “We have to do it. It will be lifted, this ban, when as a nation we’re in a position to properly and perfectly screen these people coming into our country. They’re pouring in and we don’t know what we’re doing” and “The bottom line is that the only reason the killer was in America in the first place was because we allowed his family to come here” (Berenson).

The Outcome of Donald Trump's Anti-Muslim Rhetoric: Executive Orders and The Muslim Ban

On January 27th, 2017, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 13769, which was titled “Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” (Executive Order 13769). Executive Order 13769 suspended the entry of people from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen into the United States for 90 days (Executive Order 13769). This executive order became known as a “Muslim ban” because Trump had called for the banning of Muslims from the United States of America after the 2015 San Bernardino Attack and the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting and because Iran, Iraq, Libya,

Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen were all countries with a majority Muslim population.

Executive Order 13769 was challenged in federal district court, and the judge placed a temporary restraining order on the enforcement of several provisions, which was upheld by a panel of the Ninth Circuit (“Trump v. Hawaii”). Instead of continuing to litigate on the matter of Executive Order 13769, the government decided to revoke the Executive Order and issue a new one in its place (“Trump v. Hawaii”).

On March 6th, 2017, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 13780, which was titled “Executive Order Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States” (Executive Order 13780). Executive Order 13780 suspended the entry of people from six of the seven countries that were designated in Executive Order 13769 into the United States for 90 days (Executive Order 13780) The six countries were Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (Executive Order 13780). Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen were all countries with a majority Muslim population.

Executive Order 13780 provided brief descriptions taken from the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 (June 2016) of some of the circumstances that would cause nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen to be viewed as risks to the security of the United States of America (Executive Order 13780).

Executive Order 13780 mentioned the different terrorist groups that were involved in Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Because of various terrorist groups like Hizballah, Hamas, and al-Qa’ida, limits were put in place for all people traveling from Iran to the United States (Executive Order 13780). Because of various terrorist groups like ISIS, limits were put in place for all people traveling from Libya to the United States (Executive Order 13780). Because of various terrorist groups like al-Shabaab, limits were put in place for all people

traveling from Somalia to the United States (Executive Order 13780). Because of various terrorist groups like Hizballah, Hamas, al-Qa'ida, and ISIS, limits were put in place for all people traveling from Sudan to the United States (Executive Order 13780). Because of various terrorist groups like ISIS, limits were put in place for all people traveling from Syria to the United States (Executive Order 13780). Lastly, because of various terrorist groups like ISIS, and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, limits were put in place for all people traveling from Sudan to the United States (Executive Order 13780). Executive Order 13780 became the subject of litigation just like Executive Order 13769 ("Trump v. Hawaii").

On September 24th, 2017, the day that Executive Order 13780 was expiring, Trump issued Proclamation 9645, which restricted the entry of people from eight countries; not all eight countries were part of the original list ("Trump v. Hawaii"). Chad, North Korea, and Venezuela were newly added to the list, and Sudan was removed from the list (Proclamation 9645). Proclamation 9645 was also challenged in federal court for exercising a power that neither the United States Congress nor the Constitution of the United States of America had ever conferred upon the President of the United States of America ("Trump v. Hawaii"). The Ninth Circuit ruled to stop the enforcement of Proclamation 9645, and the Supreme Court decided to review Proclamation 9645 ("Trump v. Hawaii").

Trump's rhetoric worked on some of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Proclamation 9645 was "a lawful exercise of the president's statutory authority" and did "not violate the Establishment Clause" ("Trump v. Hawaii"). Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch, five Justices, decided in favor of Trump, and Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, four Justices, decided against Trump ("Trump v. Hawaii"). The majority found that Proclamation 9645 did not favor or disfavor any

specific religion (“Trump v. Hawaii”). Because many predominantly Muslim countries were not affected by the restrictions of Proclamation 9645, and some non-predominantly Muslim countries were affected by the restrictions of Proclamation 9645, the majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court decided that Proclamation 9645 was “based on “a sufficient national security justification” and “not based on anti-Muslim animus” (“Trump v. Hawaii”). Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion in which she stated that Proclamation 9645 should have been ruled against because in Trump’s own terms it was originally and continued to be for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” (“Trump v. Hawaii”).

Executive Order 13769, Executive Order 13780, and Proclamation 9645 were all attempts by Trump to prevent terrorism in the United States, but he was met with opposition because of the divisive nature of these three decisions.

Case Study of India

India is a harder case study than the United States of America for my argument because Prime Minister Narendra Modi employed mostly anti-Pakistan rhetoric on multiple occasions after the 2016 Uri Attack and the 2019 Pulwama Attack, which became interpreted as anti-Muslim rhetoric, especially since he subscribes to Hindu nationalism. Whereas President Donald Trump directly employed the use of anti-Muslim rhetoric on multiple occasions after the 2015 San Bernardino Attack and the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting, Modi’s rhetoric was at times more anti-Pakistan than anti-Muslim, but because Pakistan is a majority Muslim country and because of Modi’s beliefs about Hindu nationalism, any negative rhetoric pertaining to either Pakistan or Islam can be understood as anti-Muslim.

The 1947 Partition of India: Historical Context with Regards to Kashmir

Since 1947, India and Pakistan have been involved in a conflict over Kashmir, the majority-Muslim region in the north of India (Blakemore). Kashmir used to be a princely state, but now it is claimed by both India and Pakistan (Blakemore). For three centuries, from the 17th century to the 20th century, Britain ruled most of the Indian subcontinent through the British East India Company and then from 1858 to 1947 through the British crown (Blakemore). As the centuries went on, Britain's colonial power weakened and a nationalist movement strengthened in the area, which threatened British rule over colonial India (Blakemore).

Britain was afraid of a civil war between India's Hindu majority and India's Muslim minority, but after World War II, Parliament decided that Britain should grant India its independence (Blakemore). Muslims held a minority status in politics under British rule, which caused a Muslim separatist movement to grow in India (Blakemore). Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a politician who led India's Muslim League, called for a separate nation for the Muslims in India in 1945 when he said, "It is high time that the British Government applied their mind definitely to the division of India and the establishment of Pakistan and Hindustan, which means freedom for both" (Blakemore). Fatal religious riots occurred across the Indian subcontinent, which resulted in the formation of the independent Muslim majority nation of Pakistan on August 14th, 1947 and the independent Hindu majority nation of India on August 15th, 1947 (Blakemore).

The Partition occurred rather quickly and over 550 princely states in colonial India that were not directly administered by Britain had to decide whether they would join India, join Pakistan, or remain independent (Blakemore). In 1947, the majority Muslim princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was governed Hindu maharaja Hari Singh (Blakemore). Singh saw other princely states aligning with either India or Pakistan, and he decided that he wanted Kashmir to

remain independent (Blakemore). In an attempt to avoid pressure to join either India or Pakistan, Singh signed an agreement with Pakistan that allowed citizens of Kashmir to continue trading with and travelling to Pakistan, but Singh did not sign a similar agreement with India (Blakemore).

Religious riots continued to plague India and Pakistan, and the government of Pakistan put pressure on Kashmir to join the independent Muslim majority nation, since Kashmir has a majority Muslim population (Blakemore). Pakistan funded Pro-Pakistani insurgents who went into western Kashmir, and Pashtun tribesmen eventually followed the Pro-Pakistani insurgents into western Kashmir (Blakemore). Singh asked India for help with regards to Pakistan's attempt to take control of Kashmir, but India would only provide military assistance if Kashmir became a part of India (Blakemore). Singh agreed to this and signed the Instrument of Accession, which caused Kashmir to become a part of India in October of 1947 (Blakemore). Kashmir was eventually given a special status within the Indian constitution that allowed it to have independence over most of its affairs except for communications, foreign affairs, and defense, but the government of India rescinded this special status in August of 2019 (Blakemore). The decision to make Kashmir a part of India continues to result in years of conflict that even included two wars (Blakemore).

The 2016 Uri Attack

On September 18th, 2016, 13 jawans (soldiers) were burned alive instantaneously and more than 20 were injured in an armed attack of the 12th Brigade of the Indian army in the Uri sector of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (Negi). The attack occurred around 5:15 am while unarmed soldiers were refilling barrels of diesel (Negi). The four attackers threw 17 grenades in a span of three minutes, which resulted in a huge fire in barracks and tents within a

150-meter radius (Negi). After a six-hour gun battle all of the attackers were killed. This was the largest terrorist attack in 26 years on an army camp (Negi).

The Indian army salvaged a map from the dead attackers that revealed their plans (Negi). The map had markings written in the Pashtun language, which is one of the tribal languages spoken in Pakistan, so the Indian army concluded that the attackers were from Pakistan (Negi). The Indian army also found four AK-47 rifles and four under barrel grenade launchers along with other ammunitions (Negi). Early reports from the Director General of Military Operations Lieutenant General Ranbir Singh said that the attackers and their items belonged to the Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist group (Negi). Lieutenant General Singh spoke to Pakistan's Director General of Military Operations and conveyed his "serious concerns" about the situation, however Pakistan's Director General of Military Operations said that Lieutenant General Singh's statement was "unfounded and pre-mature" (Negi).

Narendra Modi's Response to the Uri Attack

On September 24th, 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his first public appearance since the Uri Attack, gave a speech about the attack at the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) National Council Meeting in Kozhikode, Kerala, a state in the south of India. The speech was not given in English, but the quotes will be provided in English since this paper is written in English. During the speech, Modi said, "18 Indian soldiers were killed by terrorists who belonged to Pakistan. India will neither forget nor forgive Uri" and "The country is outraged. 110 terrorists have been killed in the last 17 attempts to spread terror in India" (Modi, "10").

Modi directly criticized Pakistan throughout the entire speech, but it was specifically noteworthy when he said, "There is one country in Asia that does not want the 21st century to belong to us. This country wants bloodshed and is conspiring to kill innocent people" and "Any

attack in the world is followed by the news that the terrorist had either come from or has gone back to Pakistan. India will not be broken by these terrorists” and “India is exporting software, while Pakistan is exporting terror across the world” (Modi, “10”). Modi placed blame directly on Pakistan instead of just on the attackers.

Modi had a lot to say to and about the people of Pakistan. He said, “I want to speak directly to the people of Pakistan. I want to remind them that this was their home before 1947” and “The people of Pakistan should question their government that can’t handle PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir), Gilgit or Balochistan, but wants to talk about Kashmir” (Modi, “10”).

Modi showed his strength through words when he said, “India is ready for war with Pakistan. But let’s fight against poverty, unemployment and illiteracy. Let’s see who wins” and “Let Pakistan’s leaders know this – the sacrifice of our 18 jawans will not go in vain” (Modi, “10”). Modi also said, “India has been successful in isolating Pakistan. And we will intensify our efforts to isolate you globally” (Modi, “10”).

Modi backed up his words with actions on September 28th, 2016 when he sent soldiers from the Indian Army Special Forces across the Line of Control (LoC), the line between the Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of Jammu and Kashmir, to carry out surgical strikes on terrorist camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (Barry). Nevertheless, Pakistan denied claims that the Indian Army Special Forces crossed the Line of Control, and instead said that Indian troops had fired small arms across the LoC, which ended up killing two soldiers and injuring nine soldiers (Barry).



Map by The New York Times

The 2019 Pulwama Attack

On February 14th, 2019, 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel were killed on the Jammu Srinagar National Highway at Lethpora in the Pulwama district of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (“Pulwama”). In the last five years, Jammu and Kashmir has had a 93 percent rise in attacks that have resulted in the deaths of security personnel, with a majority of these attacks occurring in the Pulwama district (“Pulwama”). 1,700 terrorist acts in total have occurred in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir during the last five years (“Pulwama”). The February 14th, 2019 Pulwama Attack was the deadliest terror attack in the Kashmir Valley in the last three decades (“Pulwama”).

The attack occurred around 3:30 pm when a Mahindra Scorpio SUV filled with 350 kilograms of explosives hit into one of the buses in a 78-vehicle procession that was escorting over 2,500 CRPF personnel from Jammu to Srinagar (“Pulwama”). Adil Ahmed Dar, who was 20 years old, carried out the attack (“Pulwama”). According to Dar’s parents, he was supposed to

be taking exams but went missing (“Pulwama”). The Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist group claimed responsibility for the attack, and they released a video of Dar who joined the group one year before the attack took place (“Pulwama”). Pakistan denied any responsibility for the attack, but India sent Pakistan a harsh warning and the United States commanded Pakistan to remove any and all safe havens for “terrorists” (“Pulwama”).

Narendra Modi’s Response to the Pulwama Attack

On February 26th, 2019, Modi ordered India to carry out retaliatory airstrikes near Balakot, Pakistan in response to the February 14th, 2019 Pulwama Attack (Poonam). Modi said that the Balakot airstrike brought Pakistan to its knees because New Delhi took a tough stand against terrorism (Pandit).

On May 23rd, 2019, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won India’s general elections, and Narendra Modi was reelected as Prime Minister (Poonam). As the BJP’s campaign continued, it became more divisive along religious lines (Poonam). In April of 2019, Modi said the word “Hindu” 13 times in one speech, notably saying Hindus have “woken up” and have never engaged in terrorism (Poonam). The week after, the BJP put forward a female candidate who was charged with organizing a terrorist attack that resulted in the deaths of 10 Muslims in 2008 (Poonam).

Hindus make up 80% of India’s constituency, so if they can put aside all differences and vote as Hindus alone then a party that caters to Hindus can stay in power for as long as it desires (Poonam). The BJP has become that party, and it has made nationalism synonymous with Hinduism and has sought to link the country’s largest religious minority, Muslims, who make up 14% of India’s constituency, with India’s national enemy, Pakistan (Poonam).

The news media helped the BJP win because of how they discussed Modi in relation to the February 14th Pulwama Attack and India's retaliatory airstrikes near Balakot, Pakistan on February 26th (Poonam). Modi insisted that young voters dedicate their first vote to the Air Force team that carried out India's retaliatory airstrikes near Balakot, Pakistan (Poonam). At another rally, another prominent BJP leader, Ram Madhav, said, "Your vote on the lotus [the symbol of the BJP] will mean dropping 1,000-kilogram bombs on terrorist camps" (Poonam). Hindus around the nation were mobilized and voted (Poonam).

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Hindu Nationalism

Before discussing the outcome of Modi's anti-Muslim rhetoric, which was the revocation of Article 370 and Article 35A, some context surrounding the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is needed. The BJP is the political party that revoked Article 370 and Article 35A, and the Hindu nationalist position of the BJP can be seen as reasoning for the Revocation of Article 370 and Article 35A, since Jammu and Kashmir is the only Muslim majority state in India.

Before independence, there were differences amongst the Hindu nationalists, Muslims, and liberal Hindus within the Indian National Congress over the subjects of secularism and minority rights (Berglund 1064).

Secularism was nevertheless established because "The national movement was from its early days, fully committed to secularism. Its leadership fought hard to inculcate secular values among the people and opposed the growth of communalism. And, despite the partition of India and the accompanying communal holocaust, it did succeed in enshrining secularism in the Constitution of free India" (Chandra 16).

The disagreement over the Constitution was mainly between the liberals, led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and Hindu nationalists, led by Home Minister Vallabhbhai Patel (Berglund 1064). Because Pakistan was created as an Islamic state, some Hindus claimed that the Indian Constitution should be rooted in Hindu culture. Nevertheless, secularism was adopted because of the gradual acceptance of liberal ideas and the deaths of Mahatma Gandhi and

Vallabhbhai Patel (Berglund 1064).

India gained independence in 1947, but the Constitution became the law of India in 1950 (Berglund 1064). The term ‘secular’ was not mentioned in the original text of the Constitution but was later added, without any definition, in 1976 in relation to amendments (Berglund 1064). Even though the term ‘secular’ was not defined, it was understandable that the Constitution was secular with regards to separation of politics and religion and with regards to equal respect for all religions (Berglund 1064). Indian secularism could thus be defined as “a practice where the state lacks connections to any particular faith but has the responsibility for protection of all religions” (Berglund 1064).

Hindu nationalists have challenged secularism since the formation of the Indian state, and an obvious instance has been with regards to the special status given to Jammu and Kashmir, the only Muslim majority state in India (Berglund 1065). The belief of Hindu nationalists, “Hindutva” (“Hinduness”), is a call for Hindu unity and argues that the Indian subcontinent is the homeland of the Hindus and that Hindu culture should be protected against any foreign, including Muslim and Christian, influences (Berglund 1065). Furthermore, the belief of “Hindutva” declares that there is a common culture shared by all Indians, which is not a combination of Hindu, Muslim, or Christian ideas, but rather a sole Hindu culture (Berglund 1065).

With regards to a Hindu state, the fear of the Muslim minority is that Hindu values and traditions would pervade their ways of life (Berglund 1068). For decades, the Ayodhya Ram Mandir-Babri Masjid dispute has stirred up strife between Hindu nationalists and Muslims (Berglund 1067). The Hindu nationalists believe that a temple for Ram should be on the site that the Babri Masjid was built on since Hindus believe that Ram was born on that very site in

Ayodhya (Berglund 1067). On December 6th, 1992, the BJP arranged a demonstration in Ayodhya that resulted in the demolition of the Babri Masjid (Berglund 1068). The leaders of the BJP denied any responsibility for the destruction of the Babri Masjid, but “the issue was carefully selected to symbolize the unification of the Hindu nation” (Berglund 1068). “To the Hindu nationalist Ram is a national and unifying symbol; to the Muslims he is a Hindu god in whose name scores of Muslims have been killed” (Berglund 1068).

The BJP claimed that the Babri Masjid was a reminder of atrocities committed by Muslim rulers (Berglund 1068). In the “BJP’s White Paper on Ayodhya and The Rama Temple Movement,” it was stated that the “historical background of the Mohamedan [Muslim] invasion and the provocative ocular reminders of that violent and barbaric invasion were completely ignored even after the partition of India. This neglect resulted in the failure to evolve a sound basis for Indian nationalism and durable relationships between Hindus and Muslims” (Berglund 1069). In the above quote and in other texts written by the BJP, “Islam” and “Muslim” were paired with negative adjectives such as “violent” and “barbaric” (Berglund 1069). The BJP often connected violence and Hindu suffering with Islam, and the fate of the Muslim communities in India today can be viewed in connection to the historical injustices that were purportedly done to the Hindus under Muslim rule in previous centuries (Berglund 1069).

The BJP won the 2019 Indian general election, and Modi was reelected as the Prime Minister of India. On May 26th, 2019, Modi claimed that he wanted to protect India’s minorities in his acceptance speech, but his track record shows quite the opposite because in the five years of Modi’s first term in power hate crimes against Muslims increased (Ayyub “What”).

On June 22nd, 2019, less than a month after the election results were published, a viral video circulated on social media in India (Ayyub “What”). In the video, a young Muslim man,

24-year-old Tabrez Ansari, was seen tied up with his hands folded and blood all over his body (“Jharkhand”). Ansari was seen being lynched by a mob that forced him to chant ‘Jai Shri Ram’ (Glory to Lord Ram) and ‘Jai Hanuman’ (Glory to Hanuman) (“Jharkhand”). Ansari was seen crying and begging for mercy (“Jharkhand”). Ansari’s family said that they were threatened a similar fate by police when they begged to have him treated while he was in police custody (Ayyub “What”). Ansari was beaten for hours and died at the hands of the Hindu mob in Jharkhand (Ayyub “What”).

On June 24th, 2019, another young Muslim man, 26-year-old teacher Hafeez Mohammed Haldar, was thrown out of a train in West Bengal (Ayyub “What”). A mob chanted ‘Jai Shri Ram’ and pushed him out of the train, but he survived with only minor injuries (Ayyub “What”).

On June 27th, 2019, yet another young Muslim man, 25-year-old cab driver Faizal Usman Khan, was beaten up at night by a group of men outside Mumbai (Ayyub “What”). He begged for mercy and the men asked him to chant ‘Jai Shri Ram,’ which has become “a rallying cry for Hindu nationalists in the country” (Ayyub “What”).

Indian liberals have witnessed Modi’s misleading political statements and actions in the past. He was silent during the anti-Muslim riots that resulted in the deaths of a thousand Muslims in Gujarat in 2002 because, according to Rana Ayyub who has been reporting on Modi for over a decade and went undercover for eight months in 2010 to talk to bureaucrats working under Modi in order to investigate the responsibility of the state in the 2002 anti-Muslim riots, Modi wanted to be seen as a Hindu leader under attack from Muslims (Ayyub “I’ve”).

After Ansari died, Modi said he was “pained” and called for the “strictest possible punishment to the accused,” but a week before Indian legislators chanted ‘Jai Shri Ram’ and ‘Vande Mataram’ as each Muslim Member of Parliament was sworn in all in the presence of

Modi who remained silent (Ayyub, Siddiqui).

The Outcome of Narendra Modi's Anti-Muslim Rhetoric: Revocation of Article 370 and Article 35A of the Indian Constitution

On August 5th, 2019, the Government of India revoked special statuses given to Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 and Article 35A of the Indian Constitution. Modi was not the only person involved in the act, but since he was serving as Prime Minister during the process, most of the responsibility, praise, and criticism fell on him. Just as Modi's political statements and actions in the past were misleading, the revocation of Article 370 and Article 35A can also be seen as misleading actions.

Article 370 was an article that acknowledged the special status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in terms of its autonomy and its ability to make its own laws for the "permanent residents" of the state (The Constitution). This was agreed upon when Maharaja Hari Singh agreed to have Jammu and Kashmir join India decades ago, but that all changed when Article 370 was revoked.

Article 35A was an article that gave the Jammu and Kashmir state's legislature the power to define who "permanent residents" of the state were and what special rights and privileges the permanent residents of the state were allowed to have (The Constitution). The rights and privileges that the permanent residents of the state were allowed to have included the ability to purchase land and permanent properties, the ability to vote in and contest elections, the ability to seek government employment, and the ability to receive other state benefits such as education and health care (The Constitution). Non-permanent residents of the state were not entitled to the rights and privileges that the permanent residents of the state were allowed to have, even if they were Indian citizens, but that all changed when Article 35A was revoked (The Constitution).

On August 15th, 2019, Modi gave a speech to mark the 73rd Independence Day of India. In his speech, he discussed the revocation of Article 370 and Article 35A. He said, “To revoke Article 370 and 35A within 10 weeks [was] a significant step towards fulfilling the dream of Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel,” the Hindu nationalist home minister who played a role in shaping the Constitution of India (Modi “One”).

Modi rhetorically asked listeners of his speech, “What was the reason behind revocation of Article 370 and 35A” (Modi “One”)?

He then answered by saying, “This is the hallmark of this government. We do not avoid problems, nor do we let them fester. There is no time to delay or neglect problems. The work that was not done in the last 70 years has been accomplished within 70 days after this new government came to power. The abrogation of Article 370 and 35A has been carried out in both Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha by two-thirds majority. This means that everyone wanted this decision, but perhaps they were waiting for somebody to initiate the same and carry it forward. I have come to accomplish the task assigned to me by my countrymen. I work selflessly” (Modi “One”).

Modi believed that everyone wanted Article 370 and Article 35A to be revoked, and he also believed that he was selfless in working towards the revocation of the Articles.

Modi continued his speech by saying, “We are moving forward with re-organization of Jammu and Kashmir. For 70 years every government made efforts to do something. But the desired results were not achieved, and when desired results are not achieved, there is a need to think afresh and take new steps. It is our responsibility to see that the aspirations of the people of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh get fulfilled. It is our collective responsibility to give new wings to their dreams. This responsibility has to be shouldered by all 130 crore of my countrymen. To meet this commitment we have made endeavours to remove whatever hurdles were there in the way” (Modi “One”).

Modi wanted all Indians to share in the responsibility of the reorganization of Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh.

Modi then continued by saying, “The system that prevailed over the past seventy years had aggravated separatism and given birth to terrorism. It had encouraged dynastic rule and in a way strengthened the foundations of corruption and discrimination. We have to make efforts so that the women of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh get their rights. We have to make efforts so that my dalit brothers and sisters living there, get the rights which they have been deprived of so far. The rights enjoyed by the tribal people of India must also be available to my tribal brothers and sisters of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh. There are several such communities, like Gujjars, Bakarwals, Gaddis, Sippies or Balties- all such communities must be empowered with political

rights. It is surprising that in Jammu & Kashmir there were legal restrictions on Safai Karamchari brothers and sisters. Their dreams were trampled upon. Now, we have freed them from such shackles” (Modi “One”).

Modi’s rhetoric basically blamed the way that Jammu and Kashmir were functioning under Article 370 and Article 35A for being breeding grounds for separatism and terrorism. He claimed that now everyone would be empowered and that everyone’s lives would be changed for the better.

Modi stated, “peace and prosperity of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh can be an inspiration for India[, and that t]hey can greatly contribute to India’s development” (Modi “One”). He said that, “We [Indians] need to make efforts to bring back their glorious past” (Modi “One”). This statement was very interesting since Article 370 and Article 35A actually helped preserve some of Kashmir’s past in terms of the way it was ruled.

Modi continued talking about Article 370 and Article 35A by saying, “Concerns about political future kept coming up. For me, the country’s future is everything, political future has no meaning... The exercise towards national integration was a successful one, but some difficulties have been faced because of Article 370 and 35A” (Modi “One”). Modi claimed that he was very concerned about India’s future, and he was very proud to say that “every Indian today can speak of One Nation, One Constitution” now that Article 370 and 35A have been revoked (Modi “One”).

Modi tried to spin the revocation of Article 370 and Article 35A in a positive manner for everyone, but the revocation of the Articles can also be seen as misleading actions to make India more authoritarian, by having the central Indian government take full control of decisions pertaining to Jammu and Kashmir, and more of a Hindu nation, by allowing Hindus from other areas in India to now have the ability to purchase and live on land in Jammu and Kashmir.

There has also been collective punishment towards the people already living in Jammu and

Kashmir. India sent tens of thousands of troops into Jammu and Kashmir and cut off all internet and phone services there before the revocation of Article 370 and Article 35A (Griffiths). Broadband, mobile internet, text messaging, and phone service were all affected in a communications blackout that has forced residents to use old radio sets just to listen to the news (Griffiths). The Indian government can choose when to restore service and it can do so in partial waves, so that not all platforms and not all people regain access at the same time (Griffiths). Not all services have been restored as of December 8th, 2019 (Ashiq).

Analysis Tying Martha Crenshaw's Theoretical Framework to the Lone Wolves and Jaish-e-Mohammed

According to the research done, there were permissive and enabling causes involved in the four terrorist attacks that I have mentioned throughout this paper.

In terms of permissive causes of terrorism, there were four key aspects mentioned: modernization, urbanization, social facilitation, and the inability or unwillingness of a government to prevent terrorism. With regards to modernization, attackers were able to move around with ease in the places that they carried out the terrorist attacks. With regards to urbanization, attackers attacked cities because they provided opportunities for potential targets to gather and for audiences to form and for the attackers to maintain some degree of anonymity. With regards to social facilitation, beliefs from one side of the world were able to influence attackers on another side of the world. Finally, with regards to the inability or unwillingness of a government to prevent terrorism, the nonexistence of satisfactory police and intelligence teams allowed for terrorist ideas to spread unchecked.

In terms of enabling causes of terrorism, there were four key aspects mentioned: the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, the lack

of opportunity for political participation, context, and the concept of a precipitating event that immediately precedes outbreaks of terrorism. With regards to the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, attackers claimed allegiance to a larger group, and they often blamed the government for the actions that they themselves took. With regards to the lack of opportunity for political participation, some people were not allowed to speak freely against the government. With regards to context, the attackers were young, well educated, and middle-class people, but they were often disenchanted with the idea of a changing society. Finally, with regards to the concept of a precipitating event that immediately precedes outbreaks of terrorism, government actions acted as catalysts for terrorism.

The lone wolves and Jaish-e-Mohammed took advantage of the permissive and enabling causes to carry out their respective terrorist attacks. As a result, Trump and Modi took a stand with the goal of stopping terrorism in their respective countries. Trump decided closing borders would be the best decision, and that is why he released Executive Order 13769, Executive Order 13780, and Proclamation 9645. Modi decided consolidating state authority would be the best decision, and that is why he decided to support the revocation of Article 370 and Article 35A.

Nevertheless, even with closing borders as in the case of the United States, lone wolves can still carry out terrorist attacks in the United States because anyone already within the borders could become a lone wolf as seen with the case of Farook and Mateen who were born in the United States and had no familiar connection to any of the countries listed in Executive Order 13769, Executive Order 13780, or Proclamation 9645. Additionally, even with consolidating state authority as in the case of India, Jaish-e-Mohammed can still carry out terrorist attacks in India because there are members of Jaish-e-Mohammed living in Kashmir and Jaish-e-

Mohammed has been able to instigate violence in Kashmir from Pakistan through social media even after the revocation of Article 370 and Article 35A (Swami).

Analysis Pertaining to the Lone Wolves

The predominantly Muslim countries mentioned in the Executive Orders all had terrorist activities occurring within their borders, but for the security of the United States, even people with no connection to terrorists except for the fact that they were fleeing from the named terrorist groups were denied entry into the United States. It is interesting to note that Farook, Malik, and Mateen, the perpetrators of the 2015 San Bernardino Attack and the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting were not born in any of the countries listed in the Executive Orders or the Proclamation. Farook, the male perpetrator of the 2015 San Bernardino Attack was born in Chicago, Illinois. Malik, the female perpetrator of the 2015 San Bernardino Attack was born in Pakistan but lived in both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Mateen, the perpetrator of the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting was born in New Hyde Park, New York.

The countries listed in the Executive Orders and the Proclamation did not have direct influences on Farook, Malik, and Mateen, but instead they could all be considered a part of domestic terrorism, which is often linked to lone wolf terrorism. They may have pledged an allegiance to terrorist organizations involved in the predominantly Muslim countries mentioned in the Executive Orders and the Proclamation, but they never had direct contact with the terrorist organizations because they had no connections to any of the countries that were listed as having the terrorist organizations within their borders.

People who could eventually become “terrorists” can be stopped from entering the United States from the countries listed in the Executive Orders and the Proclamation, but people who have already come into the United States from abroad or people who were born and raised in the

United States could also commit terrorist attacks. The Executive Orders and the Proclamation do not fully tackle the problem of homegrown extremism and lone wolf attacks. The fact that the FBI had interviewed Mateen in 2013 and 2014 but did not label him as a threat even when he turned out to be one shows that there needs to be more insight into the lives of people who could become lone wolves (Ellis). More policies and more reconnaissance could be beneficial, but they need to be written and conducted in non-problematic ways. Safety and security are important, but racism and Islamophobia should never be reasons for policies and reconnaissance.

Analysis Pertaining to Jaish-e-Mohammed

Pakistan took steps against the Jaish-e-Mohammed in April of 2019, but the terrorist group reappeared on social media platforms in August of 2019 (Swami). On August 22nd, 2019, the message “There are people who are silent, but doing a great deal” was written in Urdu over an image of Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists in uniform and was credited to Masood Azhar, the founder and leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed (Swami). Indian intelligence officials said that the reappearance of Jaish-e-Mohammed after four months meant that Pakistan was easing its restraints upon the terrorist group in response to everything that had been going on in Jammu and Kashmir (Swami).

A week before the message stated above, another message that said “Kashmiris need to get out [on the streets]” so that “[t]hen the enemy will beg for peace and negotiation” appeared on jihadist social media feeds in Pakistan (Swami). The message was also credited to Masood Azhar, but unlike the message stated above from August 22nd, 2019, it did not have the emblem of Jaish-e-Mohammed nor of its official publication, al-Qalam. The messages were believed to be targeting Islamists in Kashmir (Swami).

In Srinagar’s Soura area, Islamist-led youth barricaded streets with trees and barbed wire

and protestors have flown the Jaish-e-Mohammed flag (Swami). Soura is one of the areas with fervent support for the secession of Kashmir from India (Swami). During the same week that the statement “Kashmiris need to get out [on the streets]” so that “[t]hen the enemy will beg for peace and negotiation” appeared on jihadist social media feeds in Pakistan, multiple Pakistani muftis called for jihad against India (Swami). Mufti Abdul Qavi, a member of the ruling Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf “Pakistan Movement for Justice” Party said that it was “moral and shari’a-based obligation on Muslims living in India that they support the oppressed Kashmiri Muslims in their jihad” (Swami).

Even with the BJP trying to further consolidate Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of India through the revocation of Article 370 and Article 35A, Jaish-e-Mohammed still has a way of being involved in the area, so the revocation of Article 370 and Article 35A does not do much to tackle the problem of Jaish-e-Mohammed.

Conclusion

Throughout this thesis I have explored the Islamophobic rhetoric of Trump after the 2015 San Bernardino Attack and the 2016 Orlando Nightclub Shooting and the Islamophobic rhetoric of Modi after the 2016 Uri Attack and the 2019 Pulwama Attack in order to analyze how the Anti-Muslim rhetoric of Trump and Modi affected the lives of Muslims within their countries and abroad. I argued that Trump and Modi used Anti-Muslim language in the wake of the four terrorist attacks mentioned above for their own political agendas, which resulted in Anti-Muslim political decisions that affected the lives of many Muslims within their countries and abroad.

More research can be added to this thesis since the case studies, especially the case studies pertaining to India, are so current. Trump and Modi are both still leading their respective countries, and a lot continues to happen in the United States and India with regards to

legislations pertaining to and conversations about Muslims. The current situation in Kashmir has not ended yet, and it will be very interesting to see exactly how it does end. Sadly, I do not doubt that there will be more examples of anti-Muslim rhetoric from Trump and Modi in the future.

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