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WAS HEIßT DAS — DIE BEWANDTNIS?
Retranslating the Categories of Heidegger's Hermeneutics of the Technical

Recent accounts of the historical genesis of logical positivism tie it to the genesis of the analytical-continental split in American philosophy in ways that begin to appreciate why and identify where the "hermeneutic supplement" of continental philosophy is "naturally" evoked in the more recent attempts in philosophy of science to "overcome" positivism. One such account concedes the "interpretative and hermeneutic shallowness of analytic philosophers" due to their "antihistorical approach."[1] Another account, which traces the differing approaches toward "overcoming metaphysics" in Carnap and Heidegger back to their different neo-Kantian roots, couches its philosophical conclusions in a final political contrast, reminding us that neo-Kantianism as such was ultimately a philosophy of culture complete with a *Kulturpolitik*. Carnap's objectivist and universalist concept of philosophy via mathematical logic "best serves the socialist, internationalist, and anti-individualistic aims" of his espoused political philosophy, whereas Heidegger's "particularist, existential-historical conception of philosophy ... based on an explicit rejection of the centrality of logic . . . best serves the neo-conservative and avowedly German-nationalist cultural and political stance" of his would-be Nazism.[2]

The following scrutiny of Heidegger in this context seeks to situate the hermeneutical within his philosophy and its application to the philosophy of science:

1. *A hermeneutic logic.* Carnap's claim that Heidegger rejects the centrality of "logic" must be qualified by the distinction between the formal logic (apophantic "as") so dear to the positivist Carnap and the transcendental logic of *application* to the particular context "*je nach dem*" (hermeneutic "as") that Heidegger, following the tradition from Kant to Emil Lask, sought to develop for his hermeneutical "logic of philosophy." It is the distinction between a logic of judgment and the logic of category formation which, in Kant's terms, shifts the locus of discussion from the generically universal categories of the understanding, imposed judgmentally from above, to the spatial-temporal schematisms of the imagination coming from below that *mediate the application* of the Kantian forms to reality: how e.g. the pure logical form of a categorical judgment becomes the category of substance when it is schematized in the pure temporal representation of permanence, and the form of a hypothetical judgment becomes the category of causality when it is schematized temporally as succession. Michael Friedman rightly identifies the central role played by the neo-Kantian Lask in

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guiding the young Heidegger to his position on a "logic" of category formation. Central to Lask's argument is the rejection of Kant's metaphysical deduction of the categories from the logical forms of judgment, such that transcendental (material) logic is not based on formal logic, but rather the reverse. "For Lask, what is fundamental is the concrete, already categorized real object of experience: the subject matter of formal logic only arises subsequently in an artificial process of abstraction, by which the originally unitary categorized object is broken down into form and matter, subject and predicate, and so on."[3] What the young Heidegger will do is to elaborate this fundament of "the concrete, already categorized [i.e., contextually interpreted] originally unitary object" in more hermeneutical terms than the hybrid Husserlian Lask did. Lask's transcendental material logic has as its "object" [*Sache*] an a priori categorized realm of intentionally structured *meaning* (intelligibility, truth) that he calls the "panarchy of the logos," which Heidegger will transform into a "hermeneutics *of* facticity."

2. *Hermeneutic universals.* Neo-Kantianism divides into two acknowledged schools in its philosophy of science and culture. Carnap takes after the more mathematically minded Marburg school of Cohen, Natorp, and Cassirer, as opposed to the more historically inclined southwest German school of Windelband, Rickert, and Lask, in which Heidegger (1912-1916) was schooled. This distinction between the schools recalls Windelband's famous distinction between the nomothetic and the idiographic types of science. Accordingly, the political contrast made above is in fact not between the universalist and the particularist but more accurately between two types of universals, the abstract generic universal of the "all" with which formal logic traditionally works, and the concrete distributive universal of the "each" that varies according to historical or hermeneutical context. The tradition called these historically instantiating universals the analogical universals of being, which is never a genus. Heidegger will eventually call them the existentials of the temporal ontology of *Da-sein*, of the human situation that is "in each instantiation mine." Heidegger's ontology of Dasein is in fact an ontology of "occasional expressions" subject to the variable of temporally individuating contexts, of what the analytic tradition called "indexicals" (I, here, now, this, even "*es gibt*"). Such indexical existentials are to be shaped and developed by way of a methodology that Heidegger calls "formal indication," the key to his transcendental "logic of philosophy" that seeks to explicate the naturally hermeneutical "logos *of* life" ("panarchy of logos").

3. *Scientific philosophy.* The early Heidegger, following Husserl, regarded his fundamental ontology, oriented toward the being *of* Da-sein and culminating in a temporality *of* be-ing, to be a scientific philosophy. But the first definition of phenomenological philosophy that he gives, "the pretheoretical original science of original experience,"[4] is from the start fraught with paradox. To begin with, such a "pretheoretical science" (is this phrase not a "square circle"?) is an overt and direct challenge to the starting point of the then prevalent neo-Kantian scientific philosophy in the "fact of science" and in the field of the extant sciences. By way of the phenomenological reduction, science is no longer accepted as a given fact, but as a problem that is to be resolved by tracing the eidetic "genesis of the theoretical"[5] from its pretheoretical roots. The first task is to articulate this original pretheoretical domain of the "give" of givenness and objectivity in which the fundamental dynamics of the giving of meaning (*Sinngebung*) takes place. Such a temporal ontology must articulate, by way of a peculiar retracing-of-sense (*Besinnung*: not "reflection," which objectifies

this phenomenological procedure), the protopractical realm of human be-ing that precedes and underlies, and thus "destroys," the customary subject-object structurations of modern metaphysics.

But is this *prote philosophia* of a pretheoretical realm of meaning that lies this side of all theorizing and "transcendent positing" (ZBP 117) of the "real" and "given," of all reification and objectification, still "science"? In WS 1928-29, after a decade of vacillation over this strange pretheoretical primal science so unlike any other science, Heidegger definitively abandons the project of developing philosophy into a strict science. "What science on its part is, resides in philosophy in an original sense. Philosophy is indeed the *origin [Ur-sprung* = "primal leap"] of science, but precisely for that reason it is *not* science, not even the original science" (GA27: 18). He observes that it is not a science not out of lack but rather out of excess, since it springs from the ever superabundant and ebullient "happening of Dasein" itself, the most fundamental dynamic "evidence" of life. Superlatively a science from its abiding intimate friendship (φιλία, GA27: 22) with this comprehensive evidence, "scientific philosophy," much like the formula "round circle," becomes a misleading and even dangerous redundancy, deceiving us into pursuing the wrong tasks in both philosophy and philosophy of science. Philosophy should be regarded in its finite tentative (and so inventive) character as ever "under way," as ever philosophiz*ing* in response to its ever unique situation with its ever unique fundamental evidence. Philosophizing becomes explicit transcending by letting transcendence happen, repeatedly enacting the transition from the preconceptual understanding-of-being to a precursory conceiving of being. In this way, it repeatedly actualizes the ontological difference between be-ing and beings without objectifying be-ing itself. Philosophy in this frenetic transcending nevertheless continues to function as the foundation (now however as a *fundamentum concussum*) that makes sciences and their regional ontologies possible, and moreover in its epochal time and history also accounts for their periodic revolutions (GA27: 16-19, 219ff.).

This genetic-historical conception of the sciences was totally at odds with the logicist conception of the Vienna Circle of logical empiricists. One can imagine how Carnap must have bristled at Heidegger's various remarks on the superior "transcendental" status of philosophy over the sciences in Heidegger's inaugural lecture of 1929, "What is Metaphysics?," such as the following concluding remark:

> Meta-physics [= transcendence] is the ground happening of Da-sein. It is Da-sein itself. Because the truth of metaphysics dwells in this groundless ground, it has as its nearest neighbor the constantly lurking possibility of the most profound error. Accordingly, no amount of scientific rigor ever arrives at the level of seriousness belonging to metaphysics. Philosophy cannot be measured by the standard of the idea of science. (WM 43/112)

In the same year, Carnap and Otto Neurath are proclaiming, under the title "Scientific Worldview," the international socialist political program implied in their technocratic logicism, that would place the rational knowledge of scientific experts at the service of society's needs. The "Program of Unified Science" is an exposition of the collective intersubjective nature of scientific knowledge expressed in a "neutral system of formulae" and in a clear and distinct "symbolism free from the slag of historical languages." Its objectivity is the "ethos of the interchangeable and featureless observer – unmarked by nationality ... or by any other idiosyncrasy that might interfere with the communication, comparison and accumulation of results."[6]   The same scientific ethos of a "transcendental" community of observers is to be found in Husserl's phenomenology. No autonomous genius like Heidegger need apply. This

transcendental commonality of impersonal objectivity stands in marked contrast to Heidegger's factical sense of "objectivity" [*Sachlichkeit*] as access to the intentional evidences of indexical be-ing. Heidegger goes one step further and takes this "evidence" to be ineluctably chiaroscuro and ever in temporal foment, whose uniqueness and mystery tend to disseminate errancy. Against the public and neutral objectivity of the logicists, Heidegger invokes the original temporality of a Da-sein that is in each instance "mine," or "ours" (say, of a particular generation of a people) subject to a peculiarly hermeneutic logic of indexicality and application that varies according to each unique context, "*je nach dem.*"

4. *Overcoming Metaphysics.* Carnap, totally oblivious of this "transcendental logic" of chiaroscuro evidence from the works available to him at the time, attacks Heidegger's "meaningless metaphysical statements" in a talk first given in 1930 and published in late 1932 under the title, "The Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language."[7] Heidegger's deliberately provocative and ambiguous use of the term "Nothing," for what we now know to be the insuperable concealment and eminent questionability of our non-objectifiably finite and temporal be-ing, obviously contributed to the modern-minded Carnap's total incomprehension of Heidegger's grounding "statements" on science, which he cites:

> The purported soberness and superiority of science becomes ridiculous if it does not take the nothing [the unknown of mystery] seriously. Only because the nothing [non-objectifiable be-ing] is manifest can science make what-is itself (beings) into an object of investigation. Only when science exists out of metaphysics [= transcendence from beings to be-ing] can it always regain its essential task anew, which does not consist of amassing and ordering bits of knowledge but in the disclosure, ever in need of new enactment, of the entire expanse of the truth of nature and history. (WM 40f/111)

The restless dynamism that temporal transcendence toward the unknown, in a never-ending disclosure, imparts to science is anathema to Carnap, who approaches science through its clear and distinct context of justification rather than its dynamic context of discovery. Curiously, Heidegger, upon reading Carnap's essay, will in 1936 not only coopt the phrase "Overcoming of Metaphysics" and make it his own task, in a major about-face in direction which completes the "turn" begun in 1928 with the abandonment of "scientific philosophy." He will also take the static positivistic image of science understood as idealized formal systems mapping empirical data, in which logic and scientific method reign supreme over the development of scientific content, as the ultimate metaphysical conception of science in the modern epoch of the "history of be-ing's oblivion" entering its final phase of global dominion of technology and finding its ultimate metaphysical expression in the *Ge-Stell*, the artifactual com-posite of the planet's standing reserve. The "international" program of technocratic logicism proclaimed in 1929 is now exposed as one of the millennial harbingers of this endphase of the history of Western metaphysics.

A HEIDEGGERIAN HERMENEUTICS OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES

Mainstream philosophy of science (Kuhn, Toulmin, Feyerabend, etc.) in mid-century likewise identified the limitations of the positivistic image of science and began to take steps to replace it with a more historical image, in terms quite often suggestive of Heidegger's genetic, hermeneutical, and situational conception of science. Could this "existential conception of science" (SZ 357) with its radical predilections that ground

science in its Other, in a pretheoretical non-scientific origin, provide the radical basis for this historical sense in the philosophy of science? The shortcomings of Karl Popper's "situational analysis" of a scientific discovery, suggestive of an analytic of Da-sein in proposing an "idealized reconstruction of the problem situation in which the creative agent finds himself," lie more in its imperfect amalgam of a Hegelian objective mind (a "third world" storing science's objectivized formulations in a written tradition) with evolutionary epistemology's demand-response dialectic of "natural" selection. But Popper invites the resources of a hermeneutic ontology when he remarks, to underscore the linguistic milieu of the tradition in which science ineluctably operates, that "science, after all, is a branch of literature."[8]

The historical image, simply put, now views science as ongoing *research* in a changing *problem situation* ever *interpreted* and resolved according to the resources of a *particular historical* and *conceptual context*. 1) The scientific problem situation in fact suggests a derivative mode of the Da-sein experience itself, ever caught up in the crisis of transition by way of the challenge of the interrogative mood in which it always finds itself. 2) "Re-search" suggests its dynamic sense of truth *in via*, as an unending historical voyage of discovery. Heidegger thus defines science as "being in the unconcealment of beings for the sake of unconcealment" (GA27: 179).

3) Resolution occurs in the *project of understanding* the problem and *interpreting* it in and according to its finite situation and fallible context. 4) The expository interpretation of meaning is guided by a contextual preunderstanding of its particular "hermeneutic situation" explicated according to the what of its domain (*Vorhabe*); the access routes to this domain, how it is to be approached (*Vorsicht*); the prefiguration of this domain in basic concepts that provisionally interpret the "already categorized" object (*Vorgriff*). Hermeneutically put, it is a something (what) *as* something (how) schematized by the conceptuality developed in this articulated union. 5) This hermeneutic language being applied to a problem situation with an eye toward its resolution is a practical language deeply rooted in the inherited practices of a human "culture." The hermeneutic "as" of practice, which is the very structure of the being of human life (GA21: 150n.), precedes and underlies the apophantic "as" of overt assertions, which is a derivative mode of interpretation. It is by way of the hermeneutic "as" of discursive practice that Dasein first "builds," and so discloses, its *world*. This applies just as much to the laboratory world of the scientist who has cultivated the skills needed to make "theoretical entities" like electrons appear – and only in this way can they appear – within the nexus of the instrumental complex of a carefully crafted experiment.

It is this humanizing dimension of discursive practice that has come to dominate current approaches to the increasingly technicized disciplines and their domains examined by current philosophy of science. To call science a "cultural practice" is virtually the vogue, to approach it by way of "cultural studies" (*Geisteswissenschaften!*) is the current fashion, to do a cultural anthropology of the laboratory world is the current sensation. Even the most theoretical work of a scientist is still a work, a practice, in this case a "conceptual practice" with its own ethos (say algebraic), custom, usage, culture,[9] a point that Heidegger often made in his own accounts of the genesis of the theoretical from the practical (SZ 358).

It is against this background of potential usage in a cultural hermeneutics of the natural sciences that I wish to briefly bring together two of Heidegger's most untranslatable "technical" terms, *Bewandtnis* (implicative appliance) and *Ge-Stell*

(artifactual com-posite), the latter his metaphysical conception, the former his factical and protopractical sense of "technique."

As pretheoretical, factical life is the practical life of simply be-ing, in the world, with others, among things. Taken back to its intentional domain of origin, it is in fact the protopractical life of be-ing, before any distinction between the theoretical and the practical: prototechnique in the intentional dimension of being-close-to (*Sein-bei*) things in working with them habitually, protopolitics in being-with-one-another in understanding agreement, protoethics in coming to terms with oneself, in "being-ahead-of-itself" explicitly and in good conscience. *Bewandtnis* addresses itself to the ontologically primordial level of our naturally finding ourselves among things and becoming intimate with them by way of working with them and using them. And being-among-things by way of making *in the end* belongs equiprimordially in the actional contexts of being-with-others and of being-ahead-of-itself, each with its correlative protopractice of politics and ethics. All of these protopractices taken together in their variegated customs and "usage" (*Brauch*) and cultivation of a world would constitute the concept of a protoculture. *Ge-Stell*, by contrast, is an extreme manifestation of technique that has been "reworked" over centuries of "theory" by the onto-theo-logic of metaphysics. A practical hermeneutics thus inherits two radically different senses of technique.

The non-metaphysical nature of being-close-to things becomes evident in the phenomenological discovery that our most normal relation with things is to "dwell with" them in habitual familiarity, especially characteristic of our instrumental relations. The "in" of being-in-the-world is the "in" not only of intense inter-est but also of intimate involvement and implication to the point of latency or oblivion. We are absorbed in the world as in a whole of implicative relations of pertinent application toward a "cultural" end. The whole is defined by the human end ("for-the-sake-of") which makes its parts, the means ("in-order-to"), understandable in and through their varying functions serially working together toward that whole.

> A context of implicative appliance [*Bewandtniszusammenhang*] does not consist in one [appliance] being consecutively defined by another, but rather such that all is in each [appliance] referred to the whole. ...Each individual has incorporated the whole into itself. But the appliance-whole itself likewise only comes to the fore in this way [through its incorporation in each of its appliances].... That there is such an implicative appliance with chalk, eraser, and blackboard is defined in the whole such that the opportunity to write on the board is employed in the classroom, and the writing on the blackboard serves to communicate the lecture more pointedly in the context of the course. But the classroom as a whole is in advance defined by this task (GA27: 76).

I have translated the above passage in order to test the efficacy of translating *Bewandtnis* as "appliance." In SZ it is characterized as the very being of the handy [*Zuhandenes*], of the ready-to-hand immediately "at hand" for use. The being of the handy, its ontological structure, is said to lie between two other structures, that of reference and significance. *Bewandtnis*: involvement [Macquarrie & Robinson], relevance [Joan Stambaugh], functionality [Albert Hofstadter], appliance [Kisiel]), a highly idiomatic word from the Swabian dialect, is perhaps the most difficult German term in SZ for the translator of any language. The French translations stress the sheer conjuncture of relations either in their fittingness or in their "destination," i. e., the satisfying fulfillment of their purpose and coming to a closure. The modern Greek highlights their intertwining into a nexus, *sumplexis*.

Bewandtnis is a *category* that is located between reference and significance, but is closest to the references of the mediating "in order to," while significance

[*Bedeutsamkeit*], the full meaningfulness of the totality called the world, comes only with the final closure of "for the sake of Da-sein," making significance an existential and not a category (SZ 84, 88). References of "in order to" (listed *seriatim* on SZ 68, 83, 144) include manipulability (handiness, *Handlichkeit*), conduciveness (e. g., the beneficial aids of accessories), detrimentality (preventive measures that ward off harmful effects like corrosion and wear), serviceability (e. g. easily repaired), and usability. The last (*Verwendbarkeit* = applicability) is related to *Bewandtnis* and *Bewenden*, which in older Swabian mean "application" and "use" [*Anwenden*]. We therefore choose to translate *Bewandt-nis* as "appliance," whose suffix implies the present perfect state of having-been-applied by way of accustomed usage and practice, which continues to be applicable (effective) only if we repeatedly "let it be" and allow it to ply its course to term [*Bewendenlassen*]. The translation "ap-pliance" is also intended to suggest, in its other stem-senses, other features that tools include: pliancy (workability, adaptability, suppliance), compliance (fittingness, suitability), impliance or implication (more of a hermeneutical connective than Macquarrie & Robinson's "involvement"). Between generic reference and existential significance there is appliance, the being of the handy and the ontological structure of the surrounding world in which we get around with the handy and with which we are preoccupied.

The test of any translation of this term is its illuminating *fit* into the particular prepositional nexus that it is supposed to interconnect and weave into a world. Three slightly different prepositional idioms are intercalated here: the generic reference 1) *of* something *to* something (SZ 68), say, *of* a hammer *to* hammering, becomes, in Heidegger's oft repeated idiomatic expression, "*Mit* etwas hat es seine Bewandtnis *beim* etwas" (SZ 84), 2) "There is *with* this hammer its appliance *to* [or implication *in*] hammering." That is, an intimate habitual "with" *explicates* its implication expressly *to* hammer *in* the action of hammering. In the closely related third prepositional nexus of strict "in order to," in which we say that the handy hammer is 3) *for* hammering, it is clear that "the to-what [nexus 2 above] of appliance is [correlative to] the for-what [nexus 3] of serviceability, the wherefore of usability" (SZ 84). There is thus a whole referential chain of the noetic "with.. in, to" (nexus of habitual human apply*ing*), or the noematic "in-order-to... for" (nexus of appl*ied* tool handiness), where the same action within the series turns from being the *to* of an inter-mediate end "into" the following *with* of means:

> The for-what of serviceability can in turn have its appliance. For example, *with* this handy thing which we accordingly call a hammer, there is its implied appliance *in* hammering, *with* hammering there is its appliance *in* nailing fast, and *with* this fastening together its appliance *to* protection against bad weather; this protection "is" for-the-sake-of providing shelter to Da-sein. . . . The implicative totality of appliance itself [thus] ultimately leads back to a for-what which *no longer* has an appliance, which itself is not a being with the kind of being proper to something handy within a world. It is rather a being whose being is defined as being-*in*-the-world, to whose constitution worldliness itself belongs. The primary for-what is not just one more "*for* that" as a possible *to*-what of another appliance. The primary "for-what" is a for-the-sake-of-which. But the "for-the-sake-of-which" always refers to the being of *Da-sein* which in its be-ing goes *about* this be-ing itself." (SZ 84)

This crucial passage on "Appliance *and* Significance" illustrates the care needed in translating the complex of prepositions that defines the tone of each frame of reference, which is not sustained with any kind of consistency and clarity in the Stambaugh translation (SZ 84-87, 353f, *et passim*). But more importantly, this phenomenological account of human actions in their orienting frames of reference has just made its crucial

(Aristotelian) distinction between two types of praxis and frames of reference, 1) the instrumental action of appliance referring externally to things of use (and tools), and 2) the *self*-referential action for the sake of its own be-ing of properly human being that is the ultimate ground, reason, or "significance" of instrumental reference. This properly human frame of self-reference, the self-world (worldliness as such), grounds and anchors the environing world of getting by and around with things. With the emergence of this basic distinction in frames of reference, one begins to see the inadequacy of the translation of *Bewandtnis* with the generic "relevance" (Stambaugh), a word that is equally synonymous with "significance" as well as "applicability," and is not all that distinct from the equally generic "reference." The blurring of this crucial distinction in reference by such a generic translation is most evident in statements like the following: "The referential connection of significance is anchored in the being of Da-sein toward its ownmost being– a being with which there essentially cannot be a relation of relevance [appliance, functionality] – but which is rather the being *for the sake of which* Da-sein itself is as it is" (SZ 123). Its own being clearly is of acute relevance to an intrinsically self-referential being, which "in its be-ing goes about [*geht um* = is concerned with] this very be-ing" (Heidegger's repeated formal formula for the understanding-*of*-being that Da-sein itself is: SZ 12, 42, 52, 84, *et passim*). But this very same be-ing (*Sein*) cannot itself directly assume the character of appliance that properly refers to things; for such a reference would disengage the self-reference that Da-sein essentially is, an ontological self-reference which in fact is the very basis for encountering beings of the character of appliance at all. "Da-sein in each instance always already *refers itself* from and by way of a for-the-sake-of-which to the with-which of an appliance" (SZ 86). To put it another way: appli*ance* is the middle voice of instrumental intentionality, the present-perfect milieu of us*ance* where the noematic appli*ed* and noetic apply *ing* meet; but only the latter properly refers back to the self-reference implicated in significance.

This self-referential understanding brings us to the most central noun-prepositional phrase of SZ, *das Woraufhin*, the very *sense* or meaning of Da-sein, destined to find its place at the very root of originative temporality. Stambaugh by and large adopts, though not without inconsistency (SZ 85f = for which), the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of this key phrase, "the upon-which." But such a translation is only half-right, in view of the essentially "circular" teleological[10] character of the self-referential and double-genitive understanding-*of*-being, whose *pre*suppositional *fore*-structure is at once be*fore* and *for*ward, already and ahead. The full, temporally circular translation would therefore be (in a crucial sentence first introducing the hermeneutic circle) that "sense" (more directional than "meaning") "is the *toward-which* of the projection structured by prepossession, preview, and preconception, *according-to-which* something becomes understandable as something" (SZ 151). One does not need, of course, to cite the full circularity of *das Woraufhin*, "the toward-which-according-to-which," in every context. The "upon-which" or "according-to-which" would suffice in less futuristic contexts where the present perfect suffixes of world*liness* in its meaning*fulness* prevail, which includes the habitual referential contexts of appli*ance*. But one should at least on occasion be reminded of the full temporality of the archeological/teleological sense incorporated in *das Woraufhin*.

Through this climactic prepositional phrase defining the movement of the sense of Da-sein, one should sense the importance of getting the vectorial (spatio-temporal) sense of ordinary prepositional phrases as right as possible, which as the most idiomatic "parts of speech" in any language (some, like Hungarian, only have postpositions!) are most resistant to facile one-to-one translation. One should still strive to translate each distinctive prepositional constellation into one's own idiom in a way that would capture its specific tonality (the intimacy of *bei*) and maximize its prefiguration of the sense-structures of spatiotemporal reference. As Heidegger explicitly notes (SZ 112), the usance of appliance first defines the lived spatiality of the "around" [*das Um*] of the handy within the surrounding world [*Umwelt*] in which we get around [*umhergehen*] and make our rounds [*herumgehen*] in a daily circulation "in order to" [*um-zu*] carry out our habitual chores. Handiness is first of all the *quality* of the *ready to* hand proliferating around us, *accessible* to the hand by being in the right place at the right time. In the end, the "substantial being" of the things in place is being "volatized" (SZ 87, 117), they "evaporate" into a subtle spatiotemporal constellation of active habitual relations *and* the overall tonality of the actions within it. For *Bewandtnis* is a term that suggests two interrelated insubstantial ontological traits, one structural and the other elemental in nature: 1) a conjuncture of available relations, the operative "means" [*Verhältnisse*] that provision a working milieu, its working conditions, the "lay" [*Lage, Gelegenheit*] of a land, place, or situation; 2) the imponderable atmosphere that pervades such a state of affairs, the aura radiated by the milieu, the "air" about it, its felt quality, the mood of a relationship and its environment.[11] The conservative sense of comfort in the intimately familiar and pragmatic sense of convenience of already extant conventions are the overtones suggesting themselves in the German idiom of acceptance of the status quo used by Heidegger in this context, "lassen es bewenden: let the implications [of familiar appliance] apply," let the accustomed practice continue. "Letting something (things) be relevant, in relevance" (SZ 84-87, 110f, 353-356 in JS) is wrong also for appearing to reinstate the substantial "things," which can and should be left "volatized" in this reference to the network of references, to the background hermeneutic context of a "referential totality of implications."

Thus, *Bewandtnis* is at once an order concept and a style concept; it depicts the overall style or tenor of a set of actions in a practical setting (workshop, homestead) that necessarily shapes the practice. It is the very first of a line of concepts that the later Heidegger will gather under the pre-Socratic Greek rubric of *ethos*, which is first the spirit that haunts a dwelling, its *genius loci*, then the transmitted custom, practice, usage, tradition (*Brauch*) that structures our current dwelling; in short, the habit of a habitat, *how* it is inhabited. The tenor of usage in the "homey" Swabian workplace conveyed by its nexus of "appliance" ("relevance" is too generically neutral to suggest a style or mood, but "functionality" has American pragmatic possibilities) will have to be compared with the style and "working conditions" that Heidegger uncovers in the essence of modern technology. He characterizes it with the deliberately artificial word, *Ge-Stell*, the artifactual com-posite of planetary resources that repositions the world into a global warehouse (the Internet!) that holds its "natural" resources *including* "manpower" in standing reserve. The style of efficiency and efficacy pervading a workplace furnished by the Internet with a global reserve that supplements and supplants the more local ready-to-hand, e.g., that of a modern laboratory which facilitates its innovative experimentation with all forms of global networking, clearly

assumes a different tenor and ethos than a medieval workshop/farmstead ensconced in the domesticity of guild custom.

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NOTES

[1]   So Alan Richardson in his Introduction to *Origins of Logical Empiricism*, Ronald N. Giere and Alan W. Richardson (eds.), Vol. XVI of *The Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 13, note 4.

[2]   Michael Friedman, "Overcoming Metaphysics: Carnap and Heidegger" in Giere and Richardson, *Origins of Logical Empiricism*, 45-79, esp. 70.

[3]   Friedman, 58.

[4]   "Die vortheoretische Urwissenschaft des Ur-sprunges." This is a simplified composite drawn from Heidegger's first overtly phenomenological courses of 1919 into 1920. The matter of phenomenology, "the domain of origin or primal leap of experience," is at this time variously called the primal something ([*Ur-etwas*], life in and for itself, factic life experience, the historical I, the situational I, facticity, before it is given its fully ontological name, Da-sein, the indexically original experience of "being here." Original names like "primal leap" (*Ur-sprung*, Natorp's play on the German) suggest the degree to which Heidegger's "hermeneutics of facticity" is a genetic phenomenology, a genealogy of meaning. See Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's BEING AND TIME* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pb1995), esp. Chs. 1 & 3.

[5]   Martin Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, GA-Vol. 56-57, the early Freiburg lecture courses of Kriegnotsemester 1919 and SS 1919, edited by Bernd Heimbüchel (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987). 88, 91. Subsequently cited as ZBF. Further abbreviations of Heidegger's texts to be cited here are: GA21 = Heidegger Gesamtausgabe Volume 21: *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, Marburg lecture course of WS 1925/26, edited by Walter Biemel (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976); GA27 = Heidegger Gesamtausgabe Volume 27: *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Freiburg lecture course of WS 1928/29, edited by Otto Saame and Ina Saame-Speidel (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1996); SZ = *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927, [7]1953, [17]1993). English translations of *Being and Time* by Macquarrie & Robinson in 1962 (Harper & Row) and Joan Stambaugh in 1997 (SUNY Press) provide the German pagination of SZ in the margins; WM = *Was ist Metaphysik?* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1929; [8]1960, with Introduction & Postscript). Translation by David Krell (modified here) in *Basic Writings* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 95-112.

[6]   These citations of the Neurath/Carnap Program are taken from Alan Richardson, "Toward a History of Scientific Philosophy," *Perspectives on Science: Historical, Philosophical, Social* (University of Chicago Press, forthcoming). The contrast between the analytical and phenomenological sense of scientific philosophy inspires the present section. Richardson is alert enough to Heidegger's nuanced formulations to pick up on the pleonastic "redundancy" of the phrase "scientific philosophy" as early as the opening hour of the course of SS 1927.

[7]   Rudolf Carnap, "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache," *Erkenntnis* 2 (1932): 219-241. Here I am still following Friedman's account of the interchange.

[8]   Karl Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 179, 185.

[9]   Andrew Pickering, *The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), Ch. 4.

[10]   In the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition, *telos*, "final causation," is "first in intention, last in execution."

[11]   Word associations of the first group under *Bewandtnis* relate structure with spatiotemporal site: "*Gelegenheit–Konjunktur–Konstellation–Lage–Ort–Phase–Sachlage–Sachverhalt–Situation–Stadium–Stand–Stell ung– Stufe–Tatbestand–-Zeit–Zustand–Verhältnisse–Verumständung.*" The second grouping suggests a more elemental milieu: "*Atmosphäre–Aura–Bedingung–Begleitumstände–Bewandtnis–das Drum und Dran– Fluidum–Gefühlston–Imponderabilien–Milieu – die Luft um die Dinge – die Unwägbarkeiten – Gefühlswerte – Stimmung.*" Finally, some ordinary idioms that point to conditions thus qualified or *bewandt*: "*was los ist – woran man ist – es steht (liegt) so, das.*" Franz Dornseiff, *Der Deutsche Wortschatz nach Sachgruppen* (Berlin: de Gruyter, [5]1959), 196. Note also in this connection the particular aptness of translating *Umwelt* as "environment," which in the English idiom can be cozy or hostile, friendly or unfriendly, comfortable or threatening, etc.