Journal for the Philosophical Study of Education

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Recommended Citation
Journal for the Philosophical Study of Education Vol 4 (2023)
Journal for the Philosophical Study of Education
Vol. 4 (2023)

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The Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

Publisher: Digital Research@Fordham, Fordham University

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Zweetkamertje: The Sweat Room at Leiden University.
Image c/o Universiteit Leiden
The Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

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Das Ein Eks
Introduction

Welcome to the fourth volume of the *Journal for the Philosophical Study of Education (JPSE)*, a peer-reviewed journal put out by the Society for the Philosophical Study of Education (SPSE). We would like to thank Fordham University for giving us access to its digital research platform, and Professor Babette Babich of Fordham University, editor of *New Nietzsche Studies* and author of numerous articles and books on topics ranging from Nietzsche to Ivan Illich to Leonard Cohen and Harry Potter, for her generosity, support, and participation in this project.

We would also like to thank our special symposium editor, Professor Elias Schwieler, vice president of SPSE, for organizing the symposium on education and the event for the SPSE conference held online in Fall 2021. As a special guest we had François Raffoul of Louisiana State University. The symposium provided much food for thought to all presenters, auditors, and participants. Revisions of presentations from this symposium are included along with other papers in this volume of *JPSE* as a special symposium, “Education and the Event.”

Finally, we would like to thank Professor Sabrina Bacher, present president of SPSE, for bringing a remarkably diverse and international perspective to the online conference held in fall 2022. Participants from many countries introduced tremendously relevant and new topics to our annual meeting, and we hope that this presentation format marks a new beginning for the society, which for many years has relied mostly on native English speakers for its material.

SPSE is an old association, as one of our veterans, Alex Makedon, could testify, having himself been a member since 1975. Over the years this association has changed shape, but with the adoption of Zoom in a new diverse and global environment, it has moved beyond its origin as a regional society, the MPES or Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, to a point where it can live up to its global, international potential.

Our conference in fall 2022 brought to light many issues pertaining to the ways education is evolving, especially under such special and in many ways tragic circumstances such as the pandemic and the present war in Ukraine, forcing a whole generation of children to learn in a remote and sometimes disturbed environment. Indeed, in our 2022 conference we had participants whose presentations were delayed or cancelled as they sought shelter from bombardment. Also, for the first time the SPSE conference included speakers addressing education in the deaf community and the challenges this community faces in its relation to mainstream education. In short, not only did SPSE end the year with a multilingually diverse conference, but the diversity introduced in the gathering can only remind us how we are all one in our preoccupations, and how interconnected our world is.

This volume is organized around a selected set of contributions from our last two conferences as well as some additional contributions. The volume is comprised first of general submissions, then offers the symposium “Education and the Event,” edited by Dr. Schwieler, whose introduction to that section we yield to as far as commentary goes. You could say that the general section starts under the guise of the old question ‘Is teaching a science or an art?’—a dichotomy that is destroyed and dismissed for its gross simplicity and false dualism as soon as it is posed. The first three papers,
by James Magrini, Sabrina Bacher, and Sébastien Akira-Alex, raise this question, or challenge and perhaps even repudiate or destroy it, by presenting studies of three major figures in the history of education in the western world. Starting this attack is James Magrini, whose argument basically is that Socrates was NOT a teacher—at least not in the sense we often impute to this occupation or profession, insofar as its goal is to transmit knowledge or skill. Magrini’s argument is that Socrates’ endeavor was not to teach but to seek, and that in fact his primary emphasis was on making clear to his auditors that he did NOT know and was not imparting knowledge so much as demonstrating that he and his listeners did not possess the knowledge that they thought they did, particularly with regard to virtue. That in some ways he failed in imparting this lesson of humble acknowledgement of not knowing is shown by the subsequent actions of his tutees, ranging from their becoming tyrants to betraying the state and even engaging in taunting and ridiculing their elders for their hypocrisy in the face of their ignorance, a social faux pas that lay behind Socrates’ trial and ultimate death.

If we cannot say that Socrates engaged in teaching, either as an art or as a science, then we can say that Wilhelm von Humboldt engaged in a perhaps more artistic than scientific endeavor in exploring the possibilities of education. Sabrina Bacher makes this clear in her analysis of Humboldt’s Bildung as a key component in the development of Aristotelian eudaimonia in her study of Humboldt’s educational philosophy. By showing the connections between Bildung and eudaimonia and how these differ from more modern or at least Anglophone conceptions of education, she brings out the role that character development and formation of the self play in the classical and perhaps Romantic emphasis on self-development as a primary focus in education. This approach is not fully articulated in any one document produced by Humboldt, but can be pieced together through analysis of his biography and writings, leading to a full vision of the philosophical underpinnings of this important figure’s views.

Sébastien Akira-Alix brings us closer to the ‘scientific’ side of education in his study of John Dewey, though it could be argued that Dewey’s creative application of some of the scientific principles of his day hinges on a mode of analogical thinking that swerves nearer to literary trope than what our current understanding of science allows. Concerned like Humboldt with the development of the pupil, Dewey colors his understanding of human developmental processes with the biological myth “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” or the Meckel-Serres law, which sees the development of gamete into zygote, embryo, and fetus reflecting the stages of evolution of single-cellular organisms into the plethora of species we know as life. This interpretation was still bandied about as late as the 1960s in American high school biology classes, as one of the editors can attest. Dewey extends this model to the social and psychological development of the child, so that the stages of development the child undergoes are said to reflect stages in human evolution, extending from the most primitive phase through a ‘medieval’ stage before arriving at the ‘modern’ human. This application of scientific theory to human development through education certainly has its foibles, but suggests how interpretations and educational theories can be shaped by the discourse of their times.

We meet a different exploration of discourse in the paper jointly written by Elias Schwieler and Liz Adams Lyngbäck on ableism, education, and the deaf community. Our era of increasing focus on diversity too often overlooks ableist assumptions and the hegemonic modalities that assume that ableist learning strategies are available to all. Schwieler and Lyngbäck challenge this assumption through exploration of education in the deaf community, focusing on confrontations that provide opportunities for lessons through disruption, or dissensus. Disruption is viewed through the lens of
Jacques Rancière’s study of the ‘partage du sensible,’ an untranslatable interpretation of mind-body interaction since ‘partage’ indicates both inclusion and separation, much as the English word ‘yield’ means both to give way to and to bring forth. The incertitude of meaning disrupts the ‘normal’ Cartesian mind-body duality by altering the relationship between logic and voice, logos and phoné. The authors finish by describing an event in which an upset hearing-enabled instructor expresses anger over the requirement that instructors of the deaf learn sign language. This rupture, presented through a Rancièrian lens, ties in neatly to the central theme of the symposium “Education and the Event,” assembled by Dr Schwieler for this volume and introduced by him in this section of the journal.

Schwieler and Lyngbäck also introduce the word ‘envoy’ in its double role of signifying both the messenger and the concluding, explicatory moment of a poem. At the end of this volume we provide our own envoy, a poem by the enigmatic, pseudonymous Das Ein Eks that offers a take on the condition of modern education. We hope the works in this volume will find sympathetic ears or challenge predispositions regarding the art, science, or mix of these approaches that constitutes education.

*Guillemette and Allan Johnston*

**Philosophy of Education in Times of Transformation**

We are living in times of fundamental transformation. The COVID-19 pandemic, social movements that demand more diversity and inclusion, as well as the climate crisis mandate a radical rethink. While the pandemic caused major setbacks, it also provided us with the opportunity to step out of our comfort zone and make meaningful changes. Thus, SPSE decided to go virtual in 2021. Instead of moving the usual setting into a virtual space with the aim to return to the old status quo as soon as possible, we decided to take a different route. We asked ourselves how we can benefit from the advantages of the virtual world to react to the current challenges of our time. Not only is the virtual setting virus-free and climate-friendly, but it also offers the possibility to reach out to people from various parts of the world to establish a more diverse and inclusive environment. In the past two conferences (2021 and 2022) we have had presenters and audience from all continents of the world—Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, South America, and Zealandia—with the exception of Antarctica. Our website views represent this development. This new setting allows us to bring together a diverse group of international scholars, which provides us with an opportunity to view topics related to philosophy of education from different perspectives and to think outside the box. The present fourth volume of *JPSE* represents this diversity of ideas, including papers that consider topical issues in philosophy of education through the lens of classical as well as contemporary philosophers, and a theme-centered section that places special focus on “Education and the Event.” There is a separate introduction for that part.

*Sabrina Bacher, President*

*Society for the Philosophical Study of Education*
JSPE aims to publish papers that approach the field of education from a philosophical perspective, in the broadest sense of the term. Some of the papers considered for publication may be selected from works presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Philosophical Study of Education by members of that organization, after these papers undergo blind peer review and revision if necessary. However, this journal does not limit its content to works pertaining to the annual conference; it strongly invites outside submissions from any interested party, provided that such submissions fit the guidelines of the journal. JPSE will consider papers, book reviews, interviews, and other documents with emphases in history, psychology, literature, politics, religion, pedagogy, and other areas if they portend to the general ideal of philosophical speculation on the meaning, purpose, and/or nature of education, both in the literal and in the broadest sense of the word. To encourage diffusion, we are posting abstracts of the contributions.

With regard to paper selection, JPSE has established the following guidelines for paper review, consideration, and publication: each paper is blind reviewed by two outside readers as well as reviewed by the chief editors. If deemed necessary by the editors, the paper may be sent to a third reader. Reviews are “value free” insofar as JPSE is not consciously pushing an educational agenda. If the argument makes logical sense, seems valid, and does not violate facts, it is treated with a certain amount of flexibility. Our desire is to ensure that all papers go through a “screening” process of blind review, whether or not the paper has undergone previous commentary during conference presentation. Unless other arrangements are made, we claim one-time publication rights for any submission that is accepted.

A paper that receives two positive reviews from outside readers and support from the journal editors will be accepted, with suggested revisions if necessary. Whenever possible, readers and/or editors will suggest appropriate revisions, stylistic or otherwise, or raise questions regarding the content, context, and argument of the essay submitted. These should help the author make revisions if any are requested. Our goal is not to turn papers away, but rather to help authors develop their ideas. If the paper is returned and the suggested revisions have not been made to the satisfaction of the editors, the paper will not be accepted. The decision of the editor is final.

Often in academia, peer editing is highly select, and frequently it follows strict ideological guidelines, thus discouraging innovative approaches to areas of study. Our intention is to provide a platform for scholarship and speculation that can permit the exploration of ideas that may not represent mainstream concerns of the academic community. For this reason, a section of this journal may be dedicated to works in progress, including those on topics that are not currently fashionable in critical circles. The journal thus will consider finished works, reviews, and other forms of inquiry when these enrich the content of the review. Our approach aims to enable writers to receive constructive feedback, though without compromising the integrity of the writing as well as the contribution of accurate information and knowledge, which must remain the purpose of scholarship. Thus, the journal will encourage original endeavors and perspectives in order to broaden fields of research and speculation, concentrating on the eclectic purposes of pursuing inquiry and increasing thought about and reflection upon the educational landscape in the broad sense of the term. This format should allow for a safe exchange of feedback and foster the growth of scholarship, thus creating a supportive intellectual community.
CALL FOR PAPERS

JPSE is now actively seeking submissions of papers by members of SPSE and others. Priority will be given to papers delivered at the November meetings of SPSE in Chicago or in online format. However, other works, such as interviews, reviews, works in progress, articles, and various types of non-academic offerings will also be considered. See the introduction for an idea of the editorial strategy and scope of JPSE. Please submit materials as attachments to the editors, Allan Johnston and Guillemette Johnston, at the following email addresses:

ajohnst2@depaul.edu
ajohnston@colum.edu
gjohnsto@depaul.edu

Please indicate “JPSE submission” in the subject line of the email. Documents should be submitted in Microsoft Word doc or docx formats and use APA style. Please include an abstract of about 100 words and a list of key search terms with your submission, along with a short bio.

A NOTE FOR READERS

If you are interested in reviewing papers submitted to JPSE, please let us know. Interested parties should submit a CV and a writing sample for consideration. When reviewing a paper, readers are expected to exercise academic tolerance and provide constructive support with helpful suggestions, questions, and comments. Disparaging, egoistic, and dismissive feedback on behalf of the reader will not be accepted and will not be sent to the writer unless it is revised. This type of review, we feel, does not serve the purpose of helping to create a safe, respectful, and supportive academic community. We aim at opening minds, not closing them, and being helpful and productive.
Web-Coordinator’s Editorial: Climate Change and Teleconferencing: On Distinguishing the Acroamatic from the Dogmatic

Babette Babich

This editorial is on the current cyber-condition, or “future,” as Nietzsche (1980) wrote in a series of lectures presented in 1872, of “our educational institutions,”1 which Nietzsche, then Professor of Classical Philology at the University of Basel, assumed to be under siege. Two years later, in 1874, his concern continued, there indicting Hegel as the exacerbating danger in the 2nd of his Untimely Meditations, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” (1983):

I believe there has been no dangerous vacillation or crisis of German culture this century that has not been rendered more dangerous by the enormous and still continuing influence of this philosophy, the Hegelian. The belief that one is a latecomer of the ages is, in any case, paralyzing and depressing: but it must appear dreadful and devastating when such a belief, by a bold inversion, raises this latecomer to godhood as the true meaning and goal of all previous events, when his miserable condition is equated with a completion of world-history. (p. 102)

As Nietzsche (1983) dually continues, “for Hegel, the climax and terminus of the world-process coincided with his own existence in Berlin.” (p. 102)

Today, Nietzsche’s ‘untimely’ question has hardly lost its force. If anything, we are more persuaded than ever that we, thanks to ‘science,’ i.e., with certain pharmaceutical immunization assists via mRNA life-hacks, but also as we are determined to employ efforts to spray the world’s weather into submission—Canute as the Schwabs and the Gates of the WEF seem to be, not in this case meaning to control the waves but the global skies, with plans (already effected) to dim the sun, and other interventions also already long deployed, designed to “own” or change the atmosphere (House, Near, Shields, Celentano, Husband, et al, 1996),2 the climate, the course of the entire world. This, for Nietzsche (1983), who here continues to satirize Hegel and his spiritual heirs, cannot but correspond to the

[s]ummit and target of the world process! Meaning and solution of all the riddles of evolution come to light in modern man, the ripest fruit of the tree of knowledge! … modern man himself, who is capable of surveying this course. He stands high and proud upon the pyramid of the world-process; as he lays the keystone of his knowledge at the top of it, he seems to call out to nature all around him: “we have reached the goal, we are nature perfected.” (p. 102)

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2 See for a discussion—and there are too few such discussions, be it in philosophy or geography or political theory—Sloterdijk (2002) and, more recently, Babich (2019b).
To this day (one need only think of Slavoj Žižek or Robert Pippin or Terry Pinkard), theoretical enthusiasm for Hegel is not endangered. Here in this editorial, I raise the question of what Nietzsche’s “educational institutions” are for us today.

The past three years, including the punitively named (and executed) “lock-down,” the similarly minded mask and vaccine mandates for students at all levels, especially primary schools, especially at university, need review. The same holds for ‘Zoom’ or video-driven ‘instruction’ and its variations. The lack of debate is not surprising, as the directives were and continue to be ‘top-down’ driven, coming in most cases from government or, ceteris paribus—and the compliance at the university level is striking—from administration.

It might seem a little dissonant that scholars who have taught the ideal of questioning, especially that of questioning authority, and who have taught novels like 1984 and Fahrenheit 451, along with Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, and especially experts on Kafka and Levinas and Arendt, had what seems to have been nothing to say when these changes were instituted.

At the same time, academics tend to be among the most tractable of beings—else they would not be academics.

The growing trend to unthinking compliance ought to be worrisome. If the pandemic generation was singularly complicit, there is every indication that the new generation will also fall into line. To ask if this is a problem is to ask whether we need to teach students, following Kant’s ideal, as Weber and as Arendt pick up on the Kantian ideal of ‘Mündigkeit,’ to be able to think in their own voice, to think and to speak for themselves, without, famously, a ‘banister,’ without ‘direction’ [Kant’s term is Leitung] ‘from another.’ Hence Tracy B. Strong (1943-2022) begins his important 2012 Politics without Vision both with a reference to a Kantian/Arendtian banister and a signal first chapter on “Kant and the Death of God” to set up a reading of “Nietzsche: The Tragic Ethos and the Spirit of Music” (see pp. 16-56 and pp. 57-90).

In recent times we have clung to the ‘banister’ of mandates, the guide rail, as one might say, or the authoritative leading-strings of ‘the’ science. The reason there has such compliance is patent enough. School is the reward; the ability to study, to teach, to debate, to confer, to research is the reward. One is told that if one does not comply, one will be denied access to university study, as well as to museums and cultural entertainment, concert performances, etc. The threat of


Kant’s formula from his essay Beantwortung zur Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? [In answer to the question what is enlightenment] needs its own commentary—see references in Strong—expressed negatively as a lack of ‘emancipation,’ of not being able to speak in one’s own voice or for oneself: “Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen. […] Sapere aude! Habe Mut, dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen! ist also der Wahlspruch der Aufklärung.”
deprivation is sufficient to assure that many submit without question.

As for the future, we cannot say. But it matters that at the beginning of the ‘pandemic’ era, at the very start of what has continued to be an assault on education and learning, Giorgio Agamben wrote a “Requiem for the Students” (2020).

Note that to mention Agamben, once a respected and pervasive reference across a range of fields from political science to ethnography, from sociology to law, literature, as well as to art and theology and philosophy, has become increasingly rare, owing to a now-dominant tradition of cancellation, non-mention, the old German Todtschweigeret (dead-silencing, now updated as Rufmord, calumny) that collimates scholarship and has, in the Anglophone philosophy of history, been analyzed as inherently difficult to overcome—the narrowness imposing what are in effect intellectual blinders, as Herbert Butterfield (1965) argues in The Whig Interpretation of History.

For my own part, I took up some of the points Agamben raised in a brief address to the Jaspers Society held online (deferred and then compensating for cancelled meetings) in which I discussed Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Future of Our Educational Institutions together with Karl Jaspers and Alasdair MacIntyre on the university. A longer, editorially redacted version is online.

At stake is the topical distinction between the acroamatic understanding of education that is Nietzsche’s thematic focus in his lectures in contrast to the dialectical, dialogical approach, including ‘flipped classrooms,’ presupposing that students have heard pre-recorded lectures. The desire to foster student engagement means that students, and this is an old trend in education often named the ‘Socratic method,’ can be asked to workshop ideas amongst themselves in small groups, to present the material to one another and to the instructor, who is silent save for some corrective and, expectedly and hopefully, supportive interventions.

The flipped classroom includes the teacher’s lecture or a presentation of the material of the specific

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5 For English translation, see https://compart.uni-bremen.de/content/4-teaching/0-sommer-20/2-think-the-image-generative-art/3-material/paper-2020-agamben_requiem.pdf. Note that the original blog itself, the Italian version, has since fallen into the black hole of the ‘unfound’ or cancelled on the internet.

6 Although I recommend viewing all the scholarly presentations in the video prepared by Helmut Wautischer (2021) of the “Jaspers and Nietzsche” online session at the end of 2021 as of interest to students of the philosophy of education, I recommend the interventions by the late Tracy Burr Strong (6 August 1943-11 May 2022), 1:35 time stamp: https://youtu.be/RR01zd-JIH8. I reprised this (2020b) to foreground STEM featuring, as epigraph, Jaspers’ remark, indebted to Nietzsche from his 1935 Nietzsche book: “All great philosophers are our educators”: https://youtu.be/DHmUgac4y-4.

class in question, but this is silent in the actual meeting of the class, taken for granted or presupposed—quite in the way reading the assigned reading is taken for granted or presupposed—as something students will have viewed on their own time, quite in addition to reading texts and doing ancillary research to prepare for class.

The result, if applied, doubles both the work of the class and the preparatory time dedicated to the class, although students have the advantage, and this can lead to in-class impatience, being able to skip ahead in a video or to increase the speed (2x, 4x, 8x) of a presentation—a virtual or technical celerity that does not correspond to accelerated comprehension but may give one the impression that a lecture has been ‘heard.’ The doubling of work has the beneficial effect of increasing spoken interaction by transferring—thus the concept of the flip—the teaching burden of lecturing to the individual student or the representative of one of the several smaller student groups working monad-like, independently, and so, ideally, enhancing student confidence and mastery of the material assigned.

Here I am not arguing contra such pedagogy, as this is (or should be) a matter for individual instructors to decide. But the consequence can be that one can fail to understand the Humboldtian ideal that inspired the university in its current form in Germany and in the US, where this model has been influential, or that of the UK, with tutor specific, one-on-one changes, and Newman’s influential essay on the university, Jaspers’ reflections, crucial to understanding Heidegger’s notorious Rektoratsrede, and especially, and this is my main concern in this editorial, Nietzsche’s lectures on The Future of Our Educational Institutions, as this last unpublished and incomplete text, since Nietzsche never did deliver the final lecture, continues to be poorly received/understood, even among Nietzsche scholars.

Nietzsche foregrounds Wilhelm von Humboldt’s ideal of the solitude (Einsamkeit) and freedom (Freiheit) of the university, explaining that this extends from the teacher, “who very often reads while he speaks,” to the student in its fullest logical consequences:

“all education toward culture is, as said, ‘acroamatic.’”

Nietzsche, Über die Zukunft unsere Bildungsanstalten.
Very often, the student, while he listens, writes at the same time. These are the moments in which he is attached to the umbilical cord of the University. He can choose for himself what he wishes to hear, he need not believe what he hears, he can close his ears when he does not wish to hear. This is the “acroamatic” method of teaching. (Nietzsche, 1980, p. 739)

To be a student, Nietzsche argues in his lectures on the ‘future of our educational institutions,’ is to be a listener. To this same extent, Nietzsche (1980) emphasizes that attending university is about ‘hearing’ lectures: “all education toward culture is, as said, ‘acroamatic’” (p. 740).

At issue is Nietzsche’s emphasis on hearing, and above all on what it takes to be able to hear. Heidegger’s student, Günther Anders, focuses on what he calls “listening” and the active role required of the listener (listening is not passive), and in the case of Nietzsche’s lecture series, this is complicated, since for Nietzsche, a Classicist, a Graecist, as at the time of his speaking everyone who had enjoyed a university education would and could be expected to understand Greek, as a facility with Greek (and of course Latin) was to be assumed, it was then a prerequisite for matriculating and thus for hearing university classes as well as for taking a degree.

The acroamatic, as Nietzsche emphasizes, is derived from the Greek ἀκροαματικός—“for hearing only”—and ἀκροάομαι—concerning listening—referring to ‘things heard,’ teachings communicated not in writing (think of Plato’s famous caution in the Phaedrus) but orally, just and only to and for those who have met the prerequisites for understanding and who are thus capable of hearing what is communicated.

In the same way, Nietzsche’s provocative book subtitled ‘for all and none,” his Thus Spoke Zarathustra, emphasizes speaking, recounting the different “ways” Zarathustra “speaks” to his followers or disciples, to his animals, to the old saint he meets in the forest as recounted at the start of his Vorrede or Prologue, or to the crowd in the marketplace that hears him proclaim his conception of the “overhuman” and who, listening with their own convictions and expectations, take him not to be speaking of the human that is to be ‘overcome,’ whatever that might mean, but as the equivalent of an opening act for the tightrope entertainment they had all come to see. Esoteric as such, the ‘acroamatic’ method of instruction is traditionally contrasted with the erotematic, that is the dialogical method of teaching that is a matter of persuasion, i.e., belief and conviction, and dogma. The dialogical method has clear and convicted appeal; thus Nietzsche often invokes our ‘convictions’ as a word for our persuasions or prejudices, as these have faith on their side. The acroamatic is more challenging, relevant to the extent that one needs an account of a culture, of expert knowledge; thus Nietzsche’s reference to the epopts, and to the Platonic doctrine of the unwritten teaching, crucial to reflections on education, using the distinction between insiders and outsiders, esoteric and exoteric.

Asynchronous ‘content,’ educational time spent—if so you believe it is (and this faith or trust is key)—without the simultaneous ‘presence’ of student and instructor, is contrasted with synchronous ‘content,’ time spent again: in the best of good-faith assumptions, in the simultaneous virtual presence of both instructor and students. Yet where a student might be one face among a

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8 For a conventional, expressly Aristotelian reading, see the first chapter of Facca (2020), pp. 3-30. For a Straussian discussion, see Melzer (2014).
hundred or more in a large lecture hall and still have direct experience of and direct contact with an instructor; a Zoom screen of more than 4 or 9 is already too many to ensure the same ‘contact.’

In my longer essay on Jaspers and MacIntyre in addition to Nietzsche, I cite Jaspers’ account of the relationship between student and professor and the dynamic of the lecture hall. Noting the stock objection to lectures as dead weight better conveyed in a book (or indeed via a recorded version of the same), Jaspers underlines, without irony, that “The memory of outstanding scholars lecturing accompanies one throughout life.” Indeed, such teacherly exemplars, as Jaspers argues, following Nietzsche, are up to the student to find, just as Jaspers argues that “The young person must learn how to ask questions” (Jaspers, 1959, p. 45).

For Jaspers (1959), and I close with his phenomenology of university teaching,

> [t]hrough his tone, his gestures, the real presence of his thinking, the lecturer can unconsciously convey the “feel” of the subject. No doubt this can only be conveyed by the spoken word and only in a lecture—not in conversation or discussion. The lecture situation evokes something from the teacher which would remain hidden without it. There is nothing artificial about his thinking, his seriousness, his questioning, his perplexity. He allows us to take part in his innermost intellectual being. (p. 52)

Jaspers observes that this is lost the minute it becomes contrived, and, we may add, the minute it is recorded, which is the moment when the spoken teaching itself becomes ‘inscribed,’ repeatable, as dead as any written letter.
References


ABSTRACTS

Socrates is Not a Teacher. But Can We Learn from Him?
James M. Magrin

Educators employing the Socratic Method in classrooms accept the conclusion that Socrates is a teacher and that he embraces and practices a reproducible and transferable method for learning. This essay argues against this conclusion, which indeed was the view of Socrates’ accusers in the *Apology*, and instead defends the claim that Socrates is not a teacher, at least not in terms of a traditional educator. In doing so, the notion of Socratic ignorance is taken seriously, that is to say, Socrates’ claim to ignorance, linked with the limits of human knowledge regarding the understanding of the virtues, holds legitimate weight and is irreducible to instances of so-called Socratic irony. Despite not being a teacher, the essay considers what might be learned about education from Socrates, highlighting the potential benefit educators might draw from the portrait of Socrates sketched by attending to his portrayal in Plato’s *Dialogues* as a seeker of truth and co-learner in the process of becoming educated.

Key Words:
Socrates, Socratic method, Socratic irony, Socratic ignorance, education

*Bildung* as a Key to Eudaimonia: Aristotelian Foundations of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Educational Ideal
Sabrina Bacher

This article argues that Wilhelm von Humboldt’s educational concept of *Bildung* aims at the Aristotelian interpretation of *eudaimonia* (approximately “flourishing,” “well-being,” “happiness”) as its underlying intrinsic goal. Hence, *Bildung* in this understanding is portrayed as a key to *eudaimonia*. The author justifies this assertion by referring to both Humboldt’s biographical background and his philosophical *œuvre*. In this context, the author discusses how Humboldt's lifelong devotion to the general mindset and way of living of the ancient Greeks inspired the foundation for his concept of *Bildung*. In particular, this paper focusses on the similarities between Humboldt’s reasoning with respect to *Bildung* and Aristotle’s argumentation with regard to *eudaimonia*. It further shows how Humboldt extended his idea and drew pedagogical consequences by providing conditions that are both necessary to and sufficient for *Bildung*, and in consequence, *eudaimonia*. Finally, the author provides a systemized scheme of Humboldt’s concept of *Bildung* with *eudaimonia* as its ultimate goal.

Key Words:
Wilhelm von Humboldt, Aristotle, *Bildung*, *eudaimonia*. 
The Continuity of Experience Principle: A Deweyan Interpretation of Recapitulation Theory

Sébastien-Akira Alix

In this article, the author aims at clarifying the specific sense given to the *via media*, or middle way, John Dewey tried to achieve throughout his educational and pedagogical writings. To do so, the author analyzes the close relationship that exists between Dewey’s continuity of experience principle and recapitulation theory, showing that, with this principle, the philosopher proposed his own interpretation of recapitulation theory in education, viewed in the light of his philosophy of experience. The author goes on to demonstrate, first, that this refashioning implied a clear departure from genetic psychology while still subscribing to its main idea, namely that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” and second, that Dewey can best be considered an educational philosopher who used recapitulation theory to lend scientific support to his pedagogical thought at the turn of the 19th- and 20th-centuries.

Keywords:

John Dewey, Philosophy—Epistemology, learning theories, constructivism, cognitive development, classroom learning.

The Critical Body: Toward a Pedagogy of Disruption

Elias Schwieler and Liz Adams Lyngbäck

This essay develops the notion of disruptive pedagogy as a response to conservative and traditional education and its emphasis on Cartesian rationality, which consistently devalues and undermines the body as a modality of language. The hegemony of rationality, it is argued, also informs the discourse of critical thinking in higher education, which means that its dominance works to feed the already unequal power relations within education, which is exemplified by the ableism exposed in an authentic pedagogical situation. Through a critical reading of Jacques Rancière’s philosophy, the authors attempt to counteract and disrupt said hegemony by suggesting the necessity of the senses and the body to reimagine the critical and critical thinking from within the often uncomfortable disruptive pedagogical moments in which, for example, perceived ableism and disability clash.

Keywords:

Disruptive pedagogy; Jacques Rancière; critical thinking; ableism; body; translation.
Thinking the Event
François Raffoul

This essay takes its departure from my book Thinking the Event (2020) and proposes an argument regarding the event which broaches several themes. Among the themes addressed can be mentioned the event and reason, the event and the transcendental, the event and causality, the event as pure fact, the impersonality of the event, the event and the performative, the event and letting, and the event and ethics. I explore a notion of the event seen in its very eventfulness, which entails recognizing the event as being without reason and ground or foundation. For an event to be an event it must be absolutely unexpected and unanticipated, beyond all calculation and reckoning. The event, I argue, is sheer happening, exceeding every subjective anticipation of it. Rather, the event irrupts as something completely unanticipated and disrupts causality and rational thinking. Thinking the event, finally, implies an ethics of hospitality in which the one who comes is absolutely other, the arrivant, whose visitation I can never anticipate. The arrivant as the event is the one who comes uninvited, exceeding my power as host. Thus an ethics of true hospitality demands the welcoming of the unexpected and absolutely other.

Keywords:
Event, reason, transcendental, causality, fact, impersonality, performative, ethics

The Enigmatic Figure of Socrates in Heidegger: A Pure Vision of Education as Attuned Event of Learning
James M. Magrini

This paper explores Heidegger’s analysis of Plato’s Socrates and discuss how the metaphysics that can be drawn from Plato’s philosophy influences our conception and practice of education. Uniquely, it offers a reading of pure thinking, truth, and dialectic method in relation to “Heidegger’s Socrates,” which includes insights on how this view might be clarified and enhanced by turning to interpretations of Plato’s Socrates emerging from the recent phenomenological tradition in Continental tradition. The turn to Continental Platonic scholarship will elucidate key ideas emerging from Heidegger’s reading of Socrates in relation to similar writings embracing Socrates, as does Heidegger, as a radically non-systematic thinker. Ultimately, I synthesize these elements into a view of learning or education as an attuned ontological occurrence or event, which lives beyond the understanding of philosophy akin to a science and education understood as a standardized, controllable, and predictable technological achievement. Against the academic trend found in many variations of the popular Socratic Teaching Method, I avoid “systematizing” Socratic learning.
Keywords:
Socrates, Heidegger, metaphysics, education

A Free Flow Between Becomings and Becoming Imperceptible—Rare, but Possible
Klas Roth

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue that a free flow between becomings and becoming imperceptible is desirable between people in education, within societies, and among societies. Deleuze, however, came to believe that reactive forces triumph over active ones, and that the above-mentioned free flow is rare, though possible. It is therefore dangerous to think, from a Deleuzian perspective, that such a flow would be a more or less easy way out of reactive forces. It is thus problematic that a post-humanist such as Rosi Braidotti, who draws on Deleuze’s work, believes that she offers a way out of reactive forces. Such thoughts can lead, harmfully, to a one-sided view of affirmation, joy and happiness, on the one hand, and to dead-end utopias on the other, as expressed by educational post-humanists such as Nathan Snaza and John A. Weaver, who assert the promise that posthumanism—with its one-sided emphasis on joyful affirmation—will take us back to the Garden of Eden. Instead of misrecognising reactive forces, Deleuze argues that human beings should respond responsibly to both active and reactive forces through thinking. Deleuze also argues that there is no certainty concerning how a free flow between perceptible and imperceptible becoming can be aroused, nor concerning how it can be sustained—it is rather an open-ended and never-ending process in education, within society at large and between societies, on the one hand, and a possibility actualized by a few on the other.

Keywords:
Deleuze, Guattari, Kant, Braidotti, Arendt, Nietzsche, Cavell, Davidson, Mendelssohn, becomings, becoming imperceptible, active and reactive forces, posthumanism, affirmation and dead-end utopias

The Relationship Between Common Sense and Thinking: Keeping with the Event in Education
Ingrid Andersson

This article investigates the relationship between common sense, thinking and the event through engaging with the philosophies of Hannah Arendt and Gilles Deleuze: two prominent philosophers of our Western tradition that have problematized the notions of common sense and thinking from similar yet different angles. This article shows that Arendt espouses a two-fold understanding of common sense whilst Deleuze defines common sense as recognition. An exploration of joining the two understandings is undertaken and points towards a conception of thinking that stays close to the event.
Keywords:

common sense, thinking, Hannah Arendt, Gilles Deleuze, the event, education

Love and Education Beyond the Event Horizon: An Apology to Christopher Nolan
Andrew Gibbons

An apology to Christopher Nolan engages with one early childhood teacher educator’s shifting horizons of love in education. The paper uses the motion picture Interstellar and its theorization of love and event horizons in order to work philosophically with love in education. The event horizon gives a sense of love in place and the epistemological horizons of love. Science fiction offers speculative tools that stimulate a tinkering with the notion of the event horizon in relation to epistemological debates concerning scientific knowledge in Aotearoa New Zealand’s education system and sectors, and of tensions between love and measurement in early childhood care and education. The paper looks to the work of Heidegger and Camus to challenge traditions of scientific horizon building and question the absurdity of behavioral management techniques including, within the context of an analysis of Nolan’s Interstellar, the irony of the star chart.

Keywords:

Love, Interstellar, event horizons, Mātauranga Māori, early childhood care and education
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Das Ein Eks—(Das Ein [Dasein] as in Heidegger, and Eks [X] as in Malcolm)—is the pen name of an author who must otherwise remain unnamed. Suffice it to say that he has degrees and a Ph.D., a teaching pedigree comprising K-12 and university, and academic publications about education and philosophy. He turned to poetry because his muse sings through his spoken-word verse most distinctly. Her favorite theme: King Caliban spittin' a scholarly, hip-hopped idiom to curse Prospero.

Andrew Gibbons is an early childhood teacher, teacher educator and professor at the School of Education at Auckland University of Technology. He has worked in journalism, in the social services in England and in early childhood education in Auckland, Aotearoa New Zealand. Andrew works on the Bachelor of Education, Bachelor of Arts, Master of Education, and Doctor of Philosophy programs at the School of Education. He is an executive committee member of the Association of Visual Pedagogies and fellow of the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia.

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as Educational Philosophy and Theory, The Journal of Aesthetics and Education, Ethics and Global Politics, and Policy Futures in Education. Roth is currently working on topics related to work by Baruch Spinoza.

Elias Schwieler is Associate Professor in the Department of Education at Stockholm University, Sweden. He currently serves as Vice-President for the Society for the Philosophical Study of Education. Among his publications can be mentioned Aporias of Translation (2022) and “Tracing the Holy in Heidegger’s Hölderlin’s Hymns ‘Germania’ and ‘The Rhine’” (2022).
Socrates is Not a Teacher

*But Can We Learn from Him?*

James M. Magrini

Whether it be Socratic Circles, the Socratic Method, or Socratic Seminars, educators using “Socratic” teaching strategies and methods hold the view and accept the conclusion that Socrates employs a reproducible “method” that can be explicated, packaged, marketed and used in the classroom to produce sustainable and reliable results. Freydberg (2007), highly critical of such efforts to reduce Socrates’ philosophy to a method, contends that the Socratic Seminar or Method in education has become a “cliché that refers to hard-hitting question-and-answer exchange quite apart from the concerns with truth and justice that animated Socrates,” and that the method is often flagrantly misused in ways that “Socrates would have found appalling—in training lawyers for instance” (p. 111)—and, we add, within the classroom as an educational method that can be transposed and applied with consistent positive results. For example, Wilberding (2015), within his scripted Socratic curriculum, organizes learning objectives around what he classifies as the Ten Commandments of Socratic Questions—systematized Socratic principles for structuring lessons within the curriculum. Undeniably, we can derive beneficial insights from Wilberding’s analysis of Socrates as a teacher; however, our claim is that it is problematic to attach an indelible method of teaching students to Socrates, who would have denied possessing or employing such a method. This is because it is questionable whether or not Socrates had a method, and further, whether or not we can even legitimately classify Socrates as a “teacher.” Socrates’ unique pursuit of knowledge differs radically from our pursuits in the contemporary, standardized world of education, which, in the extreme, tends to emphasize skills and determine achievements in learning in ways that are, proximally and for the most part, reducible in a multiplicity of ways to rote assimilation of numerical statistics, results that are quantitative in nature. We are primarily concerned with the analysis of the so-called “Socratic Method” (dialectic) as related to knowledge construction and Socratic ignorance, in defense of the claim that *Socrates is not a teacher*, at least not in the sense of the traditional educator. We conclude by briefly considering the potential benefits that thinkers, educators, and students might draw from our reading, without attempting to establish definitive tenets or principles defining a so-called “Socratic education” in the classroom.

Socrates’ manner of practicing philosophy as we describe it is often referred to as a “method” of inquiry called “elenchus,” which is commonly linked with a mode of questioning that seeks to disprove or refute the other’s position. Let us briefly explore the use of “method” and “elenchus” when accurately attempting to understand Socrates’ philosophy. Freydberg (2007) points out, “Socrates uses the word μεθοδος on very few occasions and never, or perhaps only obliquely, in

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1 I thank the insightful reviewers from the journal for offering suggestions that improved this paper.
reference to his own practice,” and Freydberg continues, observing, “Ελέγχος is never called a μεθοδος” (p. 111).\(^ 1\) It is also the case that “elenchus” does not appear with any consistency in the dialogues in a way that would allow us to state with certainty that Socrates’ practice of philosophy should be labeled as such. Tarrant (2009) stresses that we should limit the use of elenchus when referring to Socrates’ practice of inquiry to only those instances when he is seeking to refute an interlocutor, while we should refer to what Socrates does most of the time as simply “exetasis.” For example, when Socrates is describing to the jury what he does on a daily basis in Athens, setting himself apart from the sophistic teachers of virtue, he says, “I question and examine [εξετασω] and cross-examine [ελέξω]” (Ap. 29e) the people encountered in the quest to understand virtue, and again at 38a, Socrates states, “I say that to talk every day about virtue” is the greatest thing, and this is why “you hear me talking and examining [εξεταζοντος] myself and others.” Indeed, this practice of “examination” is famously, for Socrates, the only antidote for the deadly poison of the “unexamined life”; however, he neither endorses nor adheres to a single, overarching technical or systematic “method.” Our reading is focused on Socrates’ examining himself and others by means of a rigorous practice of testing and scrutinizing opinions and knowledge about virtue through questioning and cross-examination, with the goal or aim stated simply as follows: Socratic philosophy works to arrive, through critical, rational argumentation and consensus, at a deeper understanding of what the virtues are and how they should be best organized within an ethical and excellent life.\(^ 2\)

Based on this understanding, we employ the term “dialectic” only throughout when describing Socrates’ philosophical practice. Dialectic, which is set apart from both the didactic method and the instances where Socrates employs elenchus refutation, generates both negative and positive results, indicating that through examining and questioning, Socrates is testing opinions and beliefs about virtue, with an eye to refuting and rejecting arguments put forth in defense of these views that are contradictory, inconsistent, or otherwise problematic, seeking, as the harbinger of enlightenment, to purge “others of their pretense of wisdom” (Brickhouse and Smith, 1984, p. 29).

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1 Two examples of the use of “elenchus” in the Dialogues appear. At Meno 75d, Socrates states: “Your business is to examine and refute it (σον εργον λαμβανειν λογον και ελεγχειν).” In the Apology, when Socrates considers the process of examining men’s lives, he employs the phrase, “ελεγχον του βιον” (Ap. 39c).

2 Referring to Plato, the source, as it were, dialectic is a form of inquiry characterized by the repeated process consisting of the movement between posing a question, receiving a response, and then questioning and testing the rational legitimacy of that response in the service of the continued progress of the investigation or examination. Plato informs us that when practicing dialectic, when speaking about what is just and unjust, we work through “names, definitions, and visual and other perceptions,” and when these are “rubbed against each other and tested,” through the process of asking and answering questions, “in good will and without enmity,” it is then, “when reason and knowledge are at the very extremity of human effort, [that] they illuminate the nature of any object” (Ep. 344b). In joint pursuit of the understanding (phronesis) of the virtues, revelation (α-letheia) occurs only after “long-continued intercourse”; then, “suddenly, like a light flashing forth when [the] fire [of truth] is kindled, it is born in the soul and straightaway nourishes itself” (Ep. 341d).
Socrates works not only to “test and refine definitions of virtues,” but also to “deliberate about right actions, and when the nature of right and wrong action is clear enough,” when a deeper understanding of the virtues is brought to light, Socrates exhorts “others to pursue what is right and shun what is wrong” (p. 29). Importantly for our purposes, Socrates’ dialectic is not restricted to testing others, for as our quotation from the Apology demonstrates, Socrates is also intensely concerned with self-examination in the process, and we have more to say about this below in terms of synerchomai—which for us means to go together in learning. Let us conclude this discussion by turning briefly to the Charmides, where Socrates punctuates this point, while intimating the negative and positive elements of dialectic. Here we encounter Socrates’ concern for both is own soul and the souls of the others engaged in dialectic:

[H]ow could you possibly think that even if I were to refute everything you say, I would be doing it for any other reasons than the one I would give for a thorough investigation of my own statements—the fear of unconsciously thinking I know something when I do not. And this is what I claim to be doing now, examining the argument for my own sake primarily, but perhaps also for the sake of my friends.  

(Charm. 166c-d)

Nehamas (1999) emphatically stresses that Socrates is “not a teacher of arête,” but as educators know well, it is undeniably the case that Socrates is often “perceived as a teacher,” and beyond, held up as a paragon of pedagogy to be emulated and imitated (p. 62). At his trial, Socrates is accused of “wrongdoing because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in” (Ap. 24c). Beyond these charges, he is accused, in the manner of Anaxagoras and other Greek physical scientists, of “investigating the things beneath the earth and in the heavens,” and also charged, in the manner of the sophists, with “making the weaker argument stronger.” Importantly, Socrates is, according to his accusers, “teaching [διδάσκων/didaskon] these things to others” (Ap. 19b-c). In his defense (apologia), Socrates distances himself from both the natural philosophers and the sophists, such as Gorgias of Leontini, Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Ellis, who all charge fees for their services and usually teach through speeches or didactic methods that communicate or transfer knowledge to their pupils. In light of these remarks, returning to Nehamas, although his accusers, and even his friends, consider Socrates a teacher, this offers no valid reason or sufficient evidence for us “to refuse to take his own disavowal of that role at face value” (p. 71). The Greek “διδάσκαλος” (didaskalos) defines a “teacher or master” of one or another subject, such as rhetoric, medicine, craft making, or even poetry (Lexicon 2015, p. 169). With the understanding of the didaskalos related to the type of instruction in virtue (arête) offered by the sophists, it is against the charges of Meletus that Socrates emphatically denies that he is a teacher, specifically of the virtues, claiming that he “was never anyone’s teacher” (Ap. 33a).

Scott (2000) provides us with four distinct characteristics that define the didaskalos: (1) the didaskalos is an authority; he possesses the knowledge he imparts through transmission to students who do not know; (2) the didaskalos demands payment for his teaching; (3) the didaskalos teaches only upon receipt of payment; indeed, without payment there is no instruction; and (4) the didaskalos (the knower) instructs through expository speeches employing didactic methods designed to communicate or transfer knowledge to the paying client, the non-knower or learner. We add to this list, (5) the didaskalos has a responsibility toward a student based on the service that is to be rendered, i.e., since the sophist takes payment for imparting knowledge to the pupil, a
sense of responsibility for the learning must obtain; in short, a sophist is liable for the end product of his labors. This is precisely what Plato’s Socrates denies; “I cannot justly be held responsible for the good or bad conduct of these people, as I never promised to teach [didasko] them anything and have not done so” (Ap. 33a-b), and in addition, he adds, “If you have heard from anyone that I undertake to teach people and charge a fee for it, that is not true either” (Ap. 19d-e). \(^1\) Recall the disastrous results that ensued when the young men imitated Socrates, contributing to the formulation of the charges against him. When the youth attempted to copy and employ Socrates’ supposed “method,” performing *elenchus* refutations of prominent Athenian citizens, they encountered many people who thought they had knowledge, but in truth were shown to sorely lack the knowledge they claimed to possess, and as a result, the Athenians who were examined and shamed by the youths became angry with Socrates (Ap. 32c-e). It is crucial to note, in relation to our theme, that as opposed to training or teaching (*didasko*) these youths were inspired to imitate him. Socrates did not, even in an indirect manner, “teach” the youths anything valuable about his practice of philosophy or the virtues.

From our description of the *didaskalos*, it is possible to infer a view of education associated with this type of teacher, and it is a form of learning, according to King (1976), which works off the “additive,” or what we refer to as the “edifice” model of knowledge acquisition through the primary mode of transfer. In the *additive model* new knowledge is piled on previous knowledge in a manner resembling the accumulation of a growing store of knowledge, and as King importantly stresses, in this mode of learning, the knower as receiver is passive. Educators are probably most familiar with this model in terms of the “factory model” of learning or, in the Marxist-existential inspired critical theory-pedagogy of Freire (2000), the “banking concept of education” (p. 72). If we relate it to Socrates’ understanding of education, it would be closely akin to what we term a *productionist* model of learning, and this is consistent with the *techne/episteme-poiesis-ergon* model of craft making, which is employed when a master, one who is an authority or expert, passes along his expertise to the apprentice, one who lacks the knowledge of the expert. Brickhouse and Smith (1984) observe that Plato often uses *techne* and *episteme* interchangeably when referring to the knowledge of both the craftsman and the sophists, and in the dialogues, “Socrates’ claim to lack ἐπιστήμη (knowledge),” in relation to understanding the virtues, “is contrasted directly with the craftsmen’s having it” (p. 33). The type of knowledge linked with the *productionist* model introduced is precise and explanatory, it affords the possessor a reasonable if

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\(^1\) We stated that Socrates refused responsibility for the behavior of those who participated in philosophical discussions. In line with our reading regarding the results or outcomes of these discussions, we consider the following: *If indeed Socrates was a teacher,* and his so-called instruction had a positive, educative influence on the ethical disposition of the participants, why did many of the interlocutors with whom he discoursed become rouges, ne’er-do-wells, and even violent tyrants? For example, in the case of Alcibiades, betrayer of both Athens and Sparta, Socrates could not muster the power to “teach” him anything that might have *turned his soul around* in an ethical manner, and indeed Alcibiades admits this in the *Symposium.* For a discussion of the so-called “Failure of Alcibiades’ Education,” see Magrini, J. M. (2021). *Politics of the Soul in the Alcibiades.* New York: Peter Lang.
not a confident sense of predictability, and as Kirkland (2010) contends, “one who possesses it knows not only what is the case but why this must be so, making it therefore teachable” (p. 80). This is why it is transferable from master to apprentice, as in the case of architects, engineers and, as is often mentioned by Socrates, physicians.

Socrates distrusts this “banking model” of education as a mode of transfer-learning, specifically as it relates to normative issues of value and human excellence, for according to Socrates, this is not the manner in which anyone learns to be virtuous; we will have more to say regarding Socratic philosophy and normativity as we proceed. The critique of transfer-learning is made explicit in the dialogues, e.g., in the Symposium; Agathon hopes to “absorb” knowledge from Socrates as it is passed through didactic transfer, to which Socrates slyly responds, “Wouldn’t it be marvelous, Agathon, if ideas were the kind of things which could be imparted simply by contact, and those of us who had few could absorb them from those who had a lot—in the same way that liquid can flow from a full container to an empty one if you put a piece of string between them?” (Smp. 175d). The exchange indicates that Agathon believes knowledge can be divined, possessed, and then passed along with certainty to others lacking in knowledge. For the type of education and learning Agathon stresses is, according to Socrates, sophistic and technical in nature, indicating that truth can be secured and possessed in a form that resists disambiguation when transferred from one person to another. Indeed, it is in the Protagoras that the Socratic question of whether virtue is teachable or transferable emerges in its most well-known and detailed form. The pressing concern, which ultimately separates the philosopher (the seeker and lover of virtue) from the sophist (the one who claims to have virtue) runs thusly: If virtue “turns out to be entirely knowledge [ἐπισημη],” it would therefore be teachable; however, “if virtue [ἀρετή] were anything else than knowledge [ἐπισημη] … obviously it would not be teachable” (Prot. 361a-b). Thus, we conclude, along with Kirkland (2010), if virtue could be reduced to episteme, it would provide Socrates “the propositional definitions he demands,” along with the subsequent ability to defend those definitions “from elenctic refutation” (p. 7-8). Such a view, as we contend throughout, runs counter to Socrates’ conception of the understanding, or phronesis, of the virtues that dialectic makes possible.¹

¹ In the Dialogues, teche and episteme are separated off from opinions and belief and also the knowledge or understanding Socrates seeks of the virtues, which is often rendered as sophia, but also, more consistently, as phronesis or a derivative thereof. In Definitions, a late work probably compiled by students of Plato’s Academy, we read, “Phronesis—practical wisdom … productive of human happiness” (Def. 411d). Importantly, to the issue of episteme, although the Lexicon (2015) links it to the Greek understanding of “scientific knowledge,” it also informs us that it can simply indicate “understanding, skill, and wisdom” (p. 261). Even in the Republic Plato does not suggest that episteme gives the philosopher rulers sure and certain knowledge of the so-called “Forms,” for the type of knowing that reveals “first principles” by means of intellectual intuition is “noesis,” a form of knowledge or insight that for Socrates, in his idealized vision of the perfected city of words, demonstrates categorical certainty. In a way that draws on the certainty of axiomatic truth in mathematics, Plato claims that through dialectic we make our way to a “first principle that is not a hypothesis,” but proceeding from a hypothesis, “using forms themselves and making the investigation through them” (Rep. 510b). As one reviewer of this paper astutely points out, which it is essential to mention within the context of our discussion about knowledge forms, scholars writing on Plato and Socrates must be attentive to the fact that when equating certainty with
Admittedly, in the *Meno* it is possible to state that Socrates does indeed share some similarities with the description of the *didaskalos* from above, despite adopting a dialectical mode of projective questioning, especially when Socrates educates Meno’s slave boy in geometry. In this instance Socrates appears to instantiate the *Socrates-as-teacher* model embraced and imitated by those practicing Socratic Seminar, the so-called educator as *guide-on-the-side*. We note that the *Meno* is one of several dialogues, along with the *Gorgias* and *Lysis*, from which the *Socrates-as-teacher* model is drawn, and indeed, the view of *Socrates-as-teacher* is most often justified through a standard interpretation of the *Meno*. In this dialogue Socrates leads Meno’s young slave to the knowledge of Euclidean geometry through a series of questions and statements designed specifically to enlighten and awaken the boy to the knowledge that is supposedly already present within his soul. However, when examining the dialogue we note that there are two forms of dialectic and types of educating transpiring, one a mode of *teaching* and the other the practice of what King (1976) calls *non-teaching*, or what we identify, along with Socrates, as a dialectical process of co-learning or *seeking together*. Thus we encounter (1) a “positive” or “constructive” *episteme* as a knowledge form, they run the danger of conflating “scientific” knowledge with propositional certitude. Science, as now practiced, as it is divorced from what might be labeled “Newtonian predictive certainty,” more resembles the type of inquiry embraced and practiced by Socrates, which, as we have argued, is continually in the process of revising its conclusions and renewing its inquiries. On this foregoing point, Gonzalez (1998) shares a similar view about the misconception of method in Plato, but Gonzalez’s claim relates to the reviewer’s comments on science and its method: Gonzalez argues that it is a misinterpretation of Plato to fall victim to the assumption that “philosophical *method* is subordinate to, and terminates in, some final result” (p. 9). For this wrongly gives the impression that apart from “the method of inquiry, a system exists which is thought to be the end (in both senses of the word) of the method,” and this leads to the inevitable destruction of the process of inquiry (p. 9). For in this view—which Gonzalez links to “doctrinal” or “orthodox” readings of Plato—the “process of questioning and investigating has a terminus that ultimately renders this process no longer necessary” (p. 9). This view of inquiry stands at odds with both our reading of Plato’s Socrates and the understanding of how the contemporary scientific method operates as indicated by the reviewer.

Prior to the geometry lesson, Socrates discusses the immortal soul and suggests that all learning is recollection (*αναμνησία/anamnesis*), intimating the remembrance of our past life when dwelling with the *Forms*, and this in Sahakian and Sahakian (1977) is identified, and I would argue incorrectly, as the *Doctrine of the Immortal Soul* and the *Doctrine of Anamnesis* in Platonic philosophy. However, we note that Socrates cuts this line of discussion short, abruptly insisting that this “captious argument” should be avoided (*Men. 81c*). Instead, what he describes resembles inference in learning, i.e., by recalling one thing, we can then work from there to recall or learn another in relation to the first (*Men. 81d*). It is unnecessary to attach mysterious, religious, or transcendent meanings to the term “anamnesis,” for the way Socrates carries out the Geometry lesson resembles what the *Lexicon* (2015) states is “calling [something] to mind” within a process where new insight dawns based on or inspired by what one already knows or has learned. To reiterate, *anamnesis* might be an instance of logical inference (p. 52). Although this Socratic lesson is undeniably impressive and inspirational, there is nothing other-worldly, religious, or mysterious about it.
The first dialectic, where Socrates takes the boy through a geometry lesson, might be said to represent educators employing the “Socratic Method,” or Socrates-as-teacher model. Although the boy has no prior knowledge of mathematics, through a series of leading questions, and the fact that Plato’s Socrates has knowledge of geometry, the boy is able to solve the problem, i.e., the slave boy is led to the knowledge that Socrates possesses. In the geometry lesson we encounter aporetic breakdowns in the process of learning, for when the boy is unable to follow Socrates’ line of questioning, he becomes confused, but importantly, this is not the case with Socrates (Men. 84e). Indeed, such occurrences are, for Socrates, valuable moments rife with potential for new insight, and in the geometry lesson, Socrates uses these moments as a valuable teaching tool. Within these moments, which Socrates controls and manipulates, the boy “feels the difficulty he is in, and besides not knowing does not think he knows” (Men. 84a), and so with prompting and encouragement (protreptic), the boy seeks to “push on in the search gladly, as lacking knowledge” (Men. 84b). Although Socrates states that as a result of this “perplexity” (tes aporias), the boy will go on to learn with Socrates (“joint-inquiry”), and further, that Socrates will not technically be “teaching” the boy (Men. 84d), it is clear that Socrates has the knowledge of mathematics required to complete the lesson and bring the boy to enlightenment. So, as opposed to Socrates’

1 I thank the reviewer who asked for clarification regarding the “normative” or normativity in Socratic philosophy for students reading this essay who might be unfamiliar with the term. There is no Greek word in the Dialogues that Plato incorporates that is the equivalent of the Latin “norma,” concerned with patterns, rules, and precepts. In the Greek, the idea of the normative is traceable to what Socrates understands as “nomos” and “nomoi,” expressive of laws, traditions, principles, and rules. Socrates, focused on values and ethics, formulates, communicates, and defends arguments presented in the form of “normative statements” rather than exclusively in the form of propositions. Certainly, Plato does not formulate the issue of the fact/value distinction in terms of Hume’s modern understanding, but it is present within the Dialogues; thus, although “unsaid,” it is certainly not “unthought” by Plato, despite its lack of systematic classification. Clearly, as this essay indicates, Socrates is concerned with “norms” of behavior that are regulative of ethical conduct, and concerned with judging and determining, through dialogue, through deliberating well (boule) on the good and true about what actions should and ought to be done and what actions should be avoided in service to the ethical life. Indeed, as we learn, this deliberation is actually “koine boule” (“common deliberation”) in Socratic philosophy, a deliberating well in the company of and with others.
personally experiencing the confusion of the aporetic breakdown in the pursuit of knowledge, coming to the conclusion that he himself does not know, as he does in the second dialectic concerned with virtue, Socrates in this case is using the moment of confusion (aporia), or learned ignorance, to the boy’s educational advantage. Socrates, to reiterate, is not the one inferring the knowledge of geometry or learning it; rather, he is imparting it, through a unique pedagogical strategy consisting of questioning, a mode of teaching that although not didactic in nature, still depends on and presupposes that Socrates has the knowledge required to enlighten the boy, the student. Here, we are not diminishing the educative significance of aporetic breakdown in the lesson, the difficult moment of acknowledging ignorance, which holds the potential to inspire continued inquiry. We are, however, pointing out that in this instance Socrates is not experiencing aporia in a manner that would indicate that he truly does not know the things he investigates, as in the case of the second dialectic in the Meno.

The second dialectic deals with the question of whether or not virtue is teachable, and also, perhaps more importantly, with the question of what virtue is, the Socratic question: “What-is-x?” (ti esti?). In the second form of dialectic, unlike the geometry lesson, the conclusions regarding whether or not virtue can be taught are not only unsatisfactory; they are confused, and as Nehamas (1999) stresses, this is because no agreeable definition is or can be provided in response to the perennial Socratic question, “what is virtue?” that would foreclose continued discussion and argumentation. As discussed, the teacher must possess knowledge and know that something is the case in order to give a reasoned account of what is true and how it is true in order to impart it or even lead others to it. In addition, the teacher has mastered the method to be employed in order to secure knowledge, and he must then be able to instruct the pupil in the proper practice of dialectic in order to bring the student to a state of enlightenment. This indicates, and here Nehamas asks us to keep in mind Socrates’ unique philosophical project, that it is necessary that Socrates possess, and hence be a master of (didaskalos), much like in the geometry lesson, both the “knowledge (episteme) of arête and the craft (techne) of teaching it” (p. 69). This demands that one have or possess knowledge and that one can articulate it through explanation and ultimately pass it along through transfer, or bring it about through the formulation and application of a series of pointed, leading questions, “with reasonable assurance of success” (p. 69). Weiss (2009) also contributes to this line of reasoning when asserting that in order for Socrates to be a master or expert instructor (didaskalos) in virtue, he would need to acquire objective knowledge of the virtues, or what Weiss calls theoretical definitions. For to have such knowledge, which for Socrates is impossible due to the built-in limitations of all normative concerns, would amount to establishing “a god’s eye perspective [sub specie aeternitas]” (p. 157), and to have access to such a perspective would require a person to be either a god or god-like. Not only does Socrates reject god-like knowledge, but he claims that “human wisdom” is essentially pervaded by a lack of complete knowledge—pervasive dialectic ignorance—for according to Socrates, when compared to the gods’ wisdom, “Human wisdom [ανθρωπινή σοφία] is of little or no value” (Ap. 23a). As Nehemas (1999) stresses, because the philosophical “domain in which Socrates is concerned is exclusively ethical,” i.e., normative, the type of knowledge required in order to teach the virtues to anyone is the precise form of knowledge that defies sure and certain possession and transmission, and for this reason continually eludes Socrates (p. 69).

Indeed, Socrates’ entire philosophical project, as care for the soul, is dedicated to pointing out and inspiring in others the necessary recognition of ignorance—of not-knowing—regarding the most
important things in life, namely, the philosophical pursuit of the virtues along with the concomitant understanding of their proper role and place in a life of eudaemonia. Here, when referring to ἐυδαμονία/eudaemonia, we are not suggesting, as does Bobonich (2011), that Socrates practices a system of either rational eudaimonism or psychological eudaimonism, but rather that Socrates seeks a life directed toward the idea and ideal of personal (private) and communal (public) perfection that is grounded in and inspired by notions of the good and of ethical excellence. Scott (2000) contends that Socrates assumes “the role as a paideutes” (31), and let us note that in the Greek, “παιδευτὴς/paideutes” is not a term that is interchangeable with the teaching or instruction of the didaskalos, for paideutes, as the Lexicon (2015) confirms, references “an educator” that assumes the critical role of a “corrector, chastiser,” and beyond, one that participates in the process of learning in such an intimate way that the educator’s character, disposition, and state of soul are at stake; education in this view consists of both the receiving and bestowing of an education. In line with this understanding, Socrates is more of a seeker (zeteos), or “lover of wisdom,” than one who is in the possession of truth or knowledge of the virtues (e.g., Meno 80c; Tht. 155d; Phds. 278d; Gor. 506a; Al. I 124a-c), who often assumes the role of co-participant or co-learner in the dialectical context of the investigation. The limited nature of Socrates’ understanding (phronesis) of the virtues, a way of knowing that can never be wholly trustworthy or complete, locates him “in-between” the ultimate wisdom of the gods and the bare, unacknowledged ignorance of those who do not practice philosophy (Sym. 202a-b). If there is a superiority to Socrates’ knowledge, if indeed Socrates can be called “wise” (Ap. 21d), and we must note that what he knows and the degree to which he knows it fails to qualify him as a teacher (didaskalos), it is to be found in his superior understanding of what the philosophical life encompasses and entails, which includes, as we have already stated, being attuned to the limited nature of all human wisdom.

In addition to misrepresenting the form of knowledge associated with the Socratic dialectic, the Socrates-as-teacher model also appears to discount the legitimacy of Socrates’ claims to ignorance regarding the wisdom of the virtues, interpreting him as ironically masquerading as a co-participant in dialectic, when in reality Socrates is in possession of the knowledge, holding the answers up his sleeve, as it were. This view incorrectly locates Socrates at a radical hierarchical (epistemological) distance from the interlocutor, as one who is far superior in his absolute possession of knowledge. It also, as stated above, wrongly presupposes that Socrates as educator already knows where he wants to lead the student and does so by framing a series of pointed questions, which if answered correctly, will lead the student down the path toward what appears to be authentic self-discovery. Such a position, argues Nehamas (1999), wrongly assumes that irony is “saying one thing and meaning the opposite,” for when interpreting Socrates as ironist, as someone in actual possession of the truth he is denying, the “holding back is part of the trope” (p. 71). This view is similar to Vlastos’ (1991) reading, wherein he argues that although Socrates is not a teacher who adopts a method of rote transfer, he is indeed a teacher in another and more

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1 Based on our reading, in conjunction with Davey’s (2006) understanding and analysis of philosophical hermeneutics, it is possible to establish an intimate connection between Socratic paideusis and Bildung as a form of education highlighted by personal involvement, the formation of the character, and the transformation of the intellect and soul, as this might be related to the moderate hermeneutics of Gadamer, who has given us many detailed hermeneutic studies of Plato’s dialogues.
important sense, one who engages potential “learners in elenctic argument to make them aware of their own ignorance and enable them to discover for themselves the truth the teacher had held back,” and so, as Vlastos concludes, “Socrates would want to say that he is a teacher, the only true teacher” (p. 32). This conclusion apparently ignores critical evidence from the dialogues regarding Socrates’ emphatic disavowal of knowledge, which indicates, as we have argued, that Socrates truly does not hold back any knowledge of virtue in dialectic, and rather, through his recognition of ignorance, seeks to further pursue it.

As opposed to reducing Socrates’ claims of ignorance to examples of Socratic irony or the Platonic incorporation of a literary trope, it is on this point, as Nehamas (1999) emphasizes, that “we should take Socrates very seriously, if rather literally, when he insists that he does not teach anyone anything” (p. 19). The failure to acknowledge and take seriously the literal nature of Socrates’ claims to ignorance “robs him of much of his strangeness”; conversely, taking seriously Socrates’ claims to not knowing actually “supplies him, paradoxically, with a much more profound ironical mask” (p. 71). Nehamas gives us a nuanced and complex treatment of Socratic irony in which it represents an instance where “not-knowing” actually grounds the instantiation of Socrates’ philosophical project, which is inseparable from attempting to live an ethical life. In other words, despite Socrates’ disavowing the possession of the form of ethical knowledge that would be required to be a teacher, Socrates is nevertheless and for that reason someone whose practice of philosophy embodies the paradigmatic “ethical life,” even though he is unable to pass the “truth” of the virtues along to those with whom he engages in dialogue. This is because he could not categorize it, systematize it, or formalize it in such a way as is required for educational transmission, but despite this, he realizes that the pursuit of this understanding (phronesis) of the virtues, even though the full-disclosure of their “truth” forever resides beyond the human’s full grasp, calls for and even demands the unwavering devotion to a philosophical life-style, and this for Socrates is the most ethical way in which to live.

Despite perceptions to the contrary, Socrates does not view himself as a teacher of virtue, and indeed, as Nehamas (1999) observes, Socrates’ “moral stature derives directly from his refusal to accept that role” (p. 62), based on his ignorance of the sure and certain meaning of the virtues. Jaspers (1962), in his existential-phenomenological reading of Plato’s dialogues and philosophy, refers to the fundamental sense of irony in Socrates as that “which strives to give an intimation of the hidden truth” (p. 27). In line with Nehamas’ reading, Jaspers also interprets Socratic irony in terms of an expression of Socrates’ authentic claims to not having knowledge, for irony, claims Jaspers, actually “provokes the knowledge of non-knowledge” (p. 27), e.g., in the crucial function of “confusion” or aporia in Socratic dialectic, which emerges as both the positive philosophical content and the function of dialectic. According to Jaspers, Socratic irony unmasks through sheltering and concealing “the candid awareness of what one does not know,” and by means of this “one will arrive not at nothingness but at the knowledge that is crucial for life” (p. 7). Even though dialectic as practiced by Socrates, through reasoned and rigorous exchange, reaches a point where there is consensus regarding the “temporary” truth of the issue under investigation, Socrates urges his interlocutors to continue working toward deeper modes of understanding by continually

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questioning their findings. Listening to Socrates’ words, we ask the reader to recall our earlier description of dialectic:

[A]ll of us ought to be contentiously eager to know what’s true and what’s false about the things we’re talking about…. I’ll go through the discussion, then, and say how I think it is, and if any of you thinks that what I agree to with myself isn’t so, you must object and refute me. For the things I say I certainly don’t say with any knowledge at all; no, I’m searching together with you so that if my opponent clearly has a point, I’ll be the first to concede it (Gorg. 506a).

Since the validity of the claims regarding the virtues that are brought to stand momentarily through the logos in dialogic-consensus refuse, in Socrates’ words, to be “held down and bound by arguments of iron and adamant” (Gor. 508a), it is impossible for Socrates to possess the knowledge required to assume the role of didaskalos, and so he cannot be a teacher in this sense, for he admits that he both lacks the knowledge in question and that he is a legitimate and dedicated “co-participant” (co-learner) in dialectic. In relation to what we have said about that manner in which normative statements function, manifesting the difference between episteme and phronesis, contrasting, as Mittelstrass (1988) points out, with “the systematic constraints of textbooks and treatises” (p. 140), the understanding (phronesis) of the virtues is fluid and elusive in nature and holds only the precarious potential to inspire and facilitate ethically informed “attitudes,” transforming the disposition (hexis) and soul (psyche) by informing and shaping the philosophical orientation of those participating in dialectic. In essence, it is the lack of possession of episteme, or some other “objective” form of knowledge, as Nehamas (1999) emphasizes, which prevents Plato’s Socrates “from being a teacher of the good life” (p. 67). This represents the crucial issue that Socrates continues to struggle with throughout the dialogues, namely, as we have shown, the difference between “dialectic and craft,” which is to say the difference between “pure persuasion by means of argument” and an “authority that can justify itself by its tried-and-true accomplishments” (p. 69). The latter of these two views relates to our earlier discussion of the factory model of learning in standardized education, and this represents, to reiterate, a productionist model of learning consistent with the techne/episteme-poiesis-ergon model of craft-making, of which Socrates is critical when relating it to understanding the virtues.

Bringing this analysis to a conclusion, let us now consider the exchange following Meno’s frustration during the dialogue’s aporetic breakdown where we encounter an authentic instance of Socratic ignorance in the dialogue, which might be understood as synonymous with “learning” in Socratic terms. Recall that when previously discussing aporia in the geometry lesson, it was only the boy who truly experienced the confusion and frustration of “not-knowing.” Yet here, as we have pointed out, in the ongoing discussion concerned with virtue, it is Socrates who is also befuddled and confused, because he too experiences and so participates in the aporetic breakdown in questioning. For when Meno becomes exhausted with Socrates’ questioning, he claims that Socrates, in a shrewd and beguiling manner, possesses the power of a “broad-torpedo fish” because Socrates stings and numbs interlocutors as part of his unique method of dialectical teaching. This analogy gives the surface impression that Socrates is in possession of knowledge and that his teaching strategy is designed to confuse or confound the pupil before finally revealing the knowledge that was in his possession all along, as in the aforementioned geometry lesson. Indeed, this is not the case, and Socrates assures Meno of this when stating that he does not possess sure
and certain knowledge of virtue, but is ignorant of its nature, and further, that the pursuit of such knowledge must be carried out in terms of a joint zetetic-educative venture, i.e., “to examine and seek together” (sképsasthai kai suzetetesai) within the context of co-participatory learning. Unlike with the “additive” model introduced earlier, King (1976) claims that this type of “joint-learning” resembles an “integrative” model of education as “non-teaching,” which is expressive of an active interpretive process through which understanding is revealed and reworked, reassessed, reconfigured, and rearranged. In addition, it is possible to state that in this educational model both the form and content of the learning are at issue as related directly to the enlightenment and transformation of the dispositions and souls of those participating in the process of dialectic.

Socrates, setting irony aside, assures Meno that he does not resemble the stinging fish, because the fish does not wound or numb itself when stinging and numbing its prey. For Socrates declares that when he “perplexes” others, he is just as perplexed as they are: “It is from being in more doubt than anyone else,” observes Socrates, “that I cause doubt in others” (Men. 80d). Socrates continues, asserting, “I do not know what virtue is,” but nevertheless, “I want to examine and seek together [σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι] with you what it may be” (Men. 80d).

Scott (2000) contributes to our reading when observing what might be termed, with caution, the “Socratic education process,” which is inseparable from the practice of Socratic dialectic, and is “guided by an erotic striving in which both teacher and student become co-seekers (sunerastes) after truths which are sure to be difficult to express and which turn out to be harder still to discover” (p. 47). Although we are skeptical of Scott’s use of “teacher and student,” which connote a traditional, asymmetrical pairing in education, we agree with his interpretation of the so-called “educational context” comprised of co-participants or co-learners united in the quest—“συνερχόμαι/synerchomai,” “to go along with or together”—to search out together trust-worthy responses to the “what is x?” question. As related to the Gorgias, Meno, and Charmides, in the Alcibiades I, we also encounter notions of co-learning, for although Socrates clearly has a greater understanding of what is entailed when caring for the soul than does Alcibiades, there is, nevertheless, a clear indication that Socrates is legitimately embracing and acknowledging the limits of his own knowledge, professing the acceptance of his ignorance. Socrates assures Alcibiades that they are both “in need of education” and that Socrates will participate as a “co-learner” in the process of interrogating “justice” (dikaiosune) in the service of “self-cultivation” while dedicated to deepening his own self-knowledge in dialogue with Alcibiades. Far from giving Alcibiades the impression that he’s a teacher of virtue, Socrates suggests that they should “take council together” (koine boule) in dialectic. When young Alcibiades asks Socrates to show him, or teach him, the art of self-cultivation, which is the process of becoming educated in the virtues, Socrates suggests the following: “Let us discuss together how we can become as good as possible. You know, what I’ve said about the need for education applies to me as well as you (Alc. I 124b-c; my emphasis). Let us note, as Denyer (2001) observes, that despite Socrates’ perpetual claims to ignorance of the virtues, we must acknowledge that he is morally superior to all of his

1 It is generally agreed upon among Platonic scholars that Plato is not the author of this dialogue, which is often classified amongst the Apocrypha. Taylor (2001) disputes its authorship but does have praise for it, stating that it is worth reading and analyzing: “This [the Alcibiades I] is in compass and worth the most important member of the group [Apocrypha], as it contains an excellent general summary of the Socratic-Platonic doctrines of the scale of good and the ‘tendance’ of the soul” (p. 522).
interlocutors based on what he has learned in his diligent and relentless philosophical pursuit of understanding the virtues. However, in line with our argument, Socrates undoubtedly benefits from the discussions within which he participates, for through the process he learns more about himself and those with whom he is engaged in discourse. Despite the sure and certain knowledge of the virtue in question evading Socrates’ firm grasp, he undoubtedly benefits through his participation with Alcibiades as co-learner in the examination.

We began with a brief discussion about Socratic Method in education, and highlighted the fact that it is questionable and even problematic to claim to “teach like Socrates.” Indeed, we went so far as to suggest that Socrates really doesn’t have a method, if by method we mean a transferable schema for learning, which can be formalized and applied with predictable results. Our reading exposed the chasm dividing educators embracing the Socratic Method in classroom instruction and Socrates as he appears in Plato’s dialogues, where he practices the non-systematic, open-ended form of dialectical examination. The question remains: If Socrates is not a teacher in the traditional sense, if he disavows claims to the type of knowledge required to be a teacher in the first instance, are there lessons we can learn or at least draw from his unique practice of philosophy as presented? We answer in the affirmative. For example, as an instructor of philosophy and ethics, it is often the case that I look to Socrates for inspiration, drawing out new ways to conceive myself in relation to my students, new ways to imagine education as something other than a means of transmitting knowledge, as a product of learning, to students who are being prepared for their marketable vocational futures. As we have shown, Socrates is far more concerned with turning our attention, as both educators and students, to the supreme value to be found in the pursuit of an ethical education, or in less formal terms, the quest to improve, to whatever degree possible, our attitudes toward, and the values we hold about, ourselves, others, and the world. Space does not allow us to compile a lengthy list of so-called “benefits” that might be derived from Socratic philosophy; indeed, many books have been written on this topic. However, although not attempting to systematize his process and offer for the reader indelible principles or even loose tenets of a Socratic education, there are three crucial aspects of Socratic philosophia that are worth mentioning in relation to our study—all of which, we might say, serve as preconditions for philosophizing and the enactment of authentic learning.

First, Socrates’ philosophy, which is inseparable from the practice of dialectic, demands the acknowledgement and acceptance of the limited nature of human knowledge. For as against dogmatism, the enemy of Socratic inquiry, admitting one’s lack of or privation of knowledge (ignorance) is essential for beginning and for inspiring and facilitating the continued and renewed pursuit of philosophical enlightenment, despite the limited nature of that enlightenment. This might be called the philosophical acknowledgement of human finitude. Second, rather than teaching, Socrates brings our attention to the supreme importance of co-learning, where the quest for knowledge and enlightenment, the pursuit of the reasoned understanding (phronesis) of the virtues, is carried out in communal dialogue through a form of examination that is precarious and unpredictable, difficult to manage, and monumentally demanding because of the stakes involved for all participants. For Socrates, what is ultimately at stake is the perfection of the soul or enlightened transformation of the ethical dispositions of all those involved. Communal discourse, however, always holds the potential danger to expose the vulnerability of our finite and fragile human natures, and so an intimate form of trust is required, because in the process of co-learning, our most cherished, long-held beliefs are rigorously challenged, put into question in such a way
that it calls for their reassessment, and in some instances, demands their rejection. The quest for self-improvement through dialectic is always already inextricably bound up with the potential improvement of others, and out of this type of co-learning a sense of communal or ecumenical possibilities also arises, indicating that in the process of revealing and appropriating my possibilities in relation to others, there is a collective transformation in learning also occurring. This we might say is the enlightening philosophical process of becoming other in the face of the other. Third, as opposed to answers or definitive solutions to the weighty ethical problems we face, Socrates shows us that we are more often than not confronted with the task of formulating appropriate questions about the things we deem the most valuable and meaningful. The pursuit of virtue calls for us to formulate original questions about the ethical life, queries about how to live in an excellent manner, questions that shape, guide, and direct the unfolding of our investigations. However, as we have shown, these inquiries and problems defy categorical answers and solutions, and this pushes us into the presence of all that is and must remain questionable, for such things demand further examination and require the formulation of new and different questions. Socrates inspires us to live in a way that instantiates learning as a life-long endeavor, task and vocation, because philosophically questioning the ethical life, although remaining an incomplete task, is for Socrates the most worthwhile and rewarding thing we can do, and this we call the Socratic devotion to live a question-worthy existence. Indeed, outside of the single fatality of death, Socrates demonstrates that it is possible and desirable to continue the search for wisdom. However, we must note that Socrates is unwilling to acknowledge or conclude with utter certainty that human learning truly ends with death (Ap. 41a-b).
References


Bildung as a Key to Eudaimonia: Aristotelian Foundations of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Educational Ideal

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Introduction

The recent revival of virtue ethics (e.g., Annas, 1993; Anscombe, 1959; Foot, 1978; MacIntyre 1981; Stocker, 1976; Zagzebski, 1997) has not only brought the idea of moral virtue, but also the Aristotelian interpretation of eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία; approximately “flourishing,” “well-being,” “happiness”) as the ideal of a good human life back into philosophical discussion. Eudaimonia has also reemerged in the field of philosophy of education, as several contemporary philosophers (e.g., Brighouse, 2008; de Ruyter, 2004; Foucault, Defert, and Ewald, 2007; White, 2011) have underscored the importance of human flourishing as one of the chief goals of education. The connection between education and happiness is not limited to philosophy of education, but also investigated in empirical studies (e.g., Chen, 2012; Ruiu and Ruiu, 2019; Sung, 2016), considered with respect to curriculum design (e.g., MacConville and Rae, 2012; Morris, 2013; Sherab, Maxwell and Cooksey, 2014), and in teacher education programs (e.g., O’Brien, 2010). Furthermore, UNESCO draws and promotes the same parallel (e.g., Bacha, 2007; Faure, 1972; Marujo and Casais, 2001), particularly with regard to the interrelation between education and the third Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 3), Good Health and Well-being (UN General Assembly, 2015; UNESCO, 2021).

In the late 18th and early 19th century, German philosophers (e.g., Fichte, 1800/1962; Humboldt, 1793/2000; Kant, 1803; Schleiermacher, 1820-21/2008) opened an impassioned debate on the concept of Bildung and redefined it as a life-long inner formation of human beings as individuals. Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) is considered the leading figure among them. As a philosopher, linguist, diplomat, functionary, and one of the chief initiators of the University of Berlin (today Humboldt University of Berlin), he made a substantial contribution to the theory and practice of Bildung, which is still highly relevant today (Biesta, 2002; Reble, 2004). His encompassing conception not only contains a fundamental theoretical discourse but also elaborates on the conditions that are necessary for the implementation of Bildung. In this context, Humboldt (1792/1854) also addresses the imperilment of Bildung through external factors. On a practical level, his reform of the Prussian school system, in which he attempted to establish an organizational and administrative framework for the realization of his ideas, has had a lasting effect on education systems within and also outside the German-speaking world (cf. Berghahn, 2022; Shaw and Lenartowicz, 2016).

This paper explores the link between eudaimonia and Humboldt’s concept of Bildung. I argue that Bildung in the Humboldtian way of interpretation strives for eudaimonia as its underlying goal and can be seen as a pathway towards eudaimonia. Throughout the paper, I justify this assertion...
by referring to both Humboldt’s biography and his philosophical work. First, I examine his background and the historical context of his time, which incited him to delve into Greek philosophy, as well as to embrace the general mindset and way of living of the ancient Greeks. Next, I elucidate how this dedication influenced the foundations of his concept of Bildung and his reasoning by collating manuscripts from both Humboldt and Aristotle regarding the inner formation of individuals. Through a comparison of their argumentation, I intend to clarify to what extent they match. Finally, I portray how Humboldt developed his thoughts further by indicating conditions that are necessary for Bildung, and in consequence, eudaimonia, to unfold. The article concludes with a systemized outline of Humboldt’s theory of Bildung with eudaimonia as its ultimate goal.

1. Background Information on Humboldt’s Concept of Bildung

While the philosophical discussion on Humboldt and his concept of Bildung has remained prevalent in the German-speaking world (e.g., Adorno, 1959; Benner, 2003; Berghahn, 2022; Gadamer, 1960/2010; Gruber, 1999; Horkheimer, 1953; Liemann, 2006; Menze, 1975; Meyer, 2011; Nida-Rümelin, 2013; Prüwer, 2009), the international arena has paid less attention to him and his ideas. This becomes apparent by comparing the frequency of the occurrence of “Wilhelm von Humboldt” respectively with his anglicized name “William von Humboldt” in a corpus of books in both German and English sources printed between his lifetime and today. The yearly count found in those texts shows a significant difference, as illustrated in the figure below (Google Books Ngram Viewer, 2022).

![Fig. 1. Frequency of occurrence of “Wilhelm von Humboldt” in a corpus of books in both German and English](image)

The results are similar for other languages. Not only has Humboldt himself received less consideration outside of the German-speaking world, but so has his concept of Bildung. Therefore, I provide additional background information on Humboldt and his idea of Bildung.

Bildung has been lost in translation in the English language. There is no specific word to accurately represent the concept of Bildung in English. Even though Bildung is frequently translated as ‘education,’ the conceptional range of Bildung is narrower and more specific than that of ‘education,’ which traces back to the Latin etymon ‘educatio’ (Hörner, Drinck and Jobst, 2010, pp. 11-12). Contrary to ‘education,’ notions such as ‘self-cultivation,’ ‘self-formation,’ or ‘fulfillment of one’s potential’ certainly present a higher degree of conceptional similarity with
Bildung than does ‘education.’ Nevertheless, although not always explicitly worded, the demand for a more Bildung-centered idea of education has been vital among renowned philosophers of education in the English speaking world as well (e.g., Dewey, 1902; Nussbaum, 2016; Rawls, 1971; Whitehead, 1929/1976).

Vice versa, German does not have a term precisely equivalent to ‘education,’ so ‘education’ cannot be accurately translated into German. Instead, the German language offers a semantic distinction between different forms of education: Erziehung (approximately “upbringing”), Ausbildung (approximately “vocational-training”), and, as aforementioned, Bildung. In contrast to Erziehung and Ausbildung, Bildung does not necessarily refer to an interrelation between two or more people where—in most cases—one passes on skills, knowledge, or values to the other(s). According to Humboldt (1809/2017), Bildung rather emphasizes the personal fulfillment of one’s unique potential as a life-long process (p. 112). Nevertheless, individuals can inspire others to strike the path towards Bildung or ensure the conditions that are necessary for it to unfold (Humboldt, 1792/1854, p. 11 ff.). Furthermore, the three forms of education aim at divergent objectives. Erziehung and Ausbildung in general aspire to the socialization of young people, whereas Bildung pursues a different goal, which is, as I argue in this article, eudaimonia of the individual and, in consequence, of humankind in its entirety.

While Bildung is one of the main topics in almost all of Humboldt’s writings, he never systematized his ideas into a theory and only wrote a few fragments exclusively on Bildung (Lauer, 2017, p. 252). This is because for Humboldt, writing was rather a way to clarify and deepen his thoughts than to address a broad audience (Reble, 2004, p. 193). Even the title of his short manuscript “Theory of Bildung” (Humboldt, 1793/2000) (original title: “Theorie der Bildung der Menschen,” 1793/1960) is misleading, as it only contains a fraction of his thoughts on Bildung. Instead, Humboldt’s ideas that constitute his concept of Bildung are integrated into a variety of his texts. For example, his philosophical treatise The Sphere and Limits of Government (The Limits of State Action) (Humboldt, 1792/1854) (original title: Ideen zu einem Versuch die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen, 1792/1851) contains essential passages that reveal parts of the foundation of his concept of Bildung. In addition, several of his thoughts and ideas were considered as too liberal and radical during his lifetime, and thus these writings were published only after his death (Lauer, 2017, p. 256). Therefore, his theory of Bildung can only be fully reconstructed from his complete writings in combination with his biography and the historical context of his time.

2. Influential Circumstances in Humboldt’s Idea of Bildung

Humboldt’s philosophical œuvre is mirrored by his life. Hence, to understand his train of thought, it is fundamental to gain an insight into some of the circumstances of his lifetime, as they vigorously influenced his ideas on Bildung. In the following, I argue that not only his writings but also his biography displays the intertwining between Bildung and eudaimonia. Humboldt was born in 1767 into a wealthy aristocratic family and spent most of his childhood at the Humboldt family estate, the castle of Tegel near Berlin, which was then in Prussia. Wilhelm and his famous brother, Alexander, enjoyed a privileged but still afflicted childhood. Their father died unexpectedly when Wilhelm was eleven years old, while their mother was unaffectionate and neglected her children’s emotional wellbeing. Under these circumstances, Wilhelm withdrew into a world of books and
lost himself in Greek antiquity, which later became a fundamental pillar of his concept of Bildung, while Alexander devoted himself to the exploration of nature. Their mother’s sole focus was to foster her sons’ intellectual and moral perfection, so she sought to provide them with the best education available (Wulf, 2016, pp. 13-15). Both boys were educated by renowned private tutors, such as Joachim Heinrich Campe, Johann Jakob Engel, and Christian Wilhelm Dohm, who imparted a broad general knowledge in the educational tradition of the Enlightenment. Their curriculum included subjects like ancient Greek, Latin, math, botany, physics, geography, philosophy, theology, economy, technology, natural law, and drawing (Lauer, 2017, p. 238). Truth, knowledge, and tolerance were some of the core values. Nevertheless, their educators followed a mainstream pedagogical approach with neither an understanding of child development nor room for the joy of learning (Holl, 2016, pp. 15-16). Despite their broad general education, eudaimonia was certainly not the main goal of their upbringing. Nevertheless, in their adolescence Wilhelm and Alexander were occasionally able to escape from their family constraints in Tegel to get a taste of the Berlin air. Accompanied by their educators, they spent a significant amount of time in Berlin, where they were introduced to the highest intellectual circles, participated in reading groups, and visited philosophical salons. These experiences unveiled the social aspect of learning to them and provided room for both to flourish (Klencke and Schlesier, 2009, pp. 15-16), or in other words, these intellectual adventures inspired them to strive for further growth and Bildung. However, in their early adulthood their mother impeded the Humboldt brothers’ academic freedom by determining the path of their university education. She expected her sons to follow a career as exalted civil servants, and, since they were financially dependent on her, they had no choice but to obey her wishes (Schaffstein 1952, p. 24). Therefore, Wilhelm had to begin his university studies in law in Frankfurt an der Oder, but changed to the University of Göttingen after one semester. Although he abandoned his studies in Göttingen after another three semesters without a degree, this chapter in his life was essential for his personal and intellectual progression.

Humboldt generated the main ideas for his concept of Bildung during his student days in Göttingen. Not only was the University of Göttingen an intellectual center of political science favored by aristocrats headed for government positions, but also a central location of Neuhumanismus (German New Humanism), a movement that deeply influenced and shaped Humboldt’s idea of Bildung (Bruford, 1971, p. 235). Neuhumanismus emerged during the second part of the 18th century and arose in connection with the literary and artistic movement of Sturm und Drang (Storm and Stress) (Hauer 2000, p. 486). Initiated by some of the German educated elites (e.g., Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Friedrich Schiller, Johann Gottfried Herder), the Sturm und Drang movement criticized the one-sided focus on reason and the devaluation of emotion which was predominant during the Age of Enlightenment. This fundamental change in thinking also impacted pedagogy. Instead of educating and moralizing people to become law-abiding citizens, Neuhumanismus promoted a holistic, inner development of human beings as individuals. Imagination, aesthetics, art, personal development, and individuation played an important role in this process. A second key element of Neuhumanismus was the establishment of harmony both within the individual and between the individual and the outside world. The world of the classic era was considered as a prototype for such an encompassing concept of self-formation. By studying and interpreting ancient Greek language and culture, humans were supposed to be driven towards self-formation, that is, the realization of their fullest potential (Reble, 2004, pp. 174-186). A return to the ideal of the ancient Greeks should support the individual’s quest for identity, virtue, and flourishing.
Inspired by *Neuhumanismus*, Humboldt devoted a significant amount of time to the detailed reading of ancient philosophy. He idealized the ancient Greeks as models of a perfection of humankind because he thought they had created a holistic connection between nature and culture (Andrzejewski, 2011, p. 26). Furthermore, Humboldt (1792/1864) admired how the “ancients devoted their attention more exclusively to the harmonious development of the individual […] [and] looked to virtue” (p. 7). In consequence, he formed a society for the development of virtue, a secret club dedicated to mutual moral improvement. There he met his future wife, Carolina von Dacheröden, who was highly sophisticated herself and further inspired his idea of *Bildung* (Sorkin, 1983, p. 57).

Beyond books and intellectual exchange, travelling and living abroad were additional ways for Humboldt to broaden his horizons and strive towards *Bildung*. In 1789, after his studies, he set forth on an educational journey to Paris, Southern Germany, and Switzerland, where he established intellectual connections with renowned scholars, explorers, and freethinkers. Over the years, he cultivated deep friendships with admired intellectuals, such as Goethe and Schiller. His varied experience led him to gradually reject the reason-based education of his youth in the tradition of the earlier years of Enlightenment and he began to question his anticipated career (Sorkin, 1983, p. 57). Nevertheless, after his journey, he joined the Prussian civil service as a law clerk to the Supreme Court of Berlin, but retired into private life after a few months because he found no satisfaction in his work and wanted to dedicate time to his writing. In 1802, he rejoined the Prussian civil service and became an envoy to the Vatican in Rome, which enabled him to delve even deeper into the history, culture, and mindset of classical Greece and Rome.

Apart from his own biography, the changing ideas during his lifetime, such as the social and political upheaval around the turn of the century, also influenced Humboldt’s conception of *Bildung*. After the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon, the state collapsed in 1806 and had to reorganize itself. The estate-based society turned into a civil society, and the feudal state into an administrative state. The Prussian Reform Movement brought constitutional, administrative, social, and economic reforms. These changes also affected the education system. In 1809, Humboldt was asked to return to Prussia to lead the directorate of education. In this position, he was one of the designers of the educational reforms and tried to revamp the Prussian educational system according to his concept of *Bildung* (Sorkin, 1983, pp. 55-56).

Humboldt’s *The Königsberg and the Lithuanian School Plan* (*Der Königsberger und der Litauische Schulplan*, 1809/2022) provides an overview of how he intended to implement his ideas. He was an advocate for cost-free schools that provide a broad general education for everyone, so each individual can find and develop his or her potential regardless of social status and prospective career. He also promoted a three-tier education system in which each level pursues a different goal. Based on the pedagogical ideas and teaching methods of Pestalozzi, elementary schools build the foundation for the subsequent levels of education. Thus, young school children should mainly acquire and practice skills, such as writing, reading, and calculating, that are prerequisites for learning. These skills should be integrated into their daily life with the help of subsidiary subjects. At the secondary level, Humboldt envisioned a comprehensive school for all adolescents, who should acquire knowledge and skills that are essential for scientific insight and artistry. They should immerse themselves into a variety of subjects, such as classical languages,
history, geography, natural sciences, math, and physics. This level aims at enhancing the maturity of young people, who should eventually become autonomous learners, emancipate themselves from their teachers, and continue their further education with intrinsic motivation. What follows is the tertiary level. At university, students should be guided and supported in their independent research and gain a holistic understanding of science, with a focus on philosophy as the mother of all sciences. Therefore, Humboldt also envisioned a general education instead of occupational training at the tertiary level. Moreover, he advocated for academic freedom and a unity of research and teaching.

Due to his opposition to state restrictions and a conflict with the state chancellor of Prussia, he resigned from state service after one year but remained chairman of the founding committee of the University of Berlin. Even though Humboldt’s educational policy concept did not gain general acceptance and he could only achieve a partial success in the first place, his ideas paved the way for fundamental educational reforms. In the following years, Humboldt served as a representative of the Prussian government to the Congress of Vienna and the Aachen Congress. In 1819, he was appointed Minister of Estates in the Prussian government, but resigned after a few months due to internal conflicts (UNESCO, 1993). Humboldt spent the rest of his life with personal, continuing self-formation and scientific correspondence with scholars from various parts of the world (Meyer, 1991, p. 201).

Humboldt’s background reveals that he was drawn towards Bildung, which resulted in a conflict between his character and parts of his formal education during his childhood (Sorkin, 1983, pp. 55-56). Regarding the relationship between Bildung and eudaimonia, I would like to particularly highlight his devotion to the ancient Greeks since his childhood, his dedication to Neuhumanismus since his youth, and his overall intrinsically motivated thirst for Bildung that ran like a golden thread throughout his entire life. In essence, Humboldt did not only preach Bildung, but also lived it, as it enabled him in his quest for personal fulfillment, and hence guided him towards eudaimonia.

This historical and biographical contextualization builds the foundation for understanding Humboldt’s thoughts on Bildung. It is important to note that his ideas do not solely arise from his written work but are fundamentally intertwined with his background. Since his texts are at times fragmented, background knowledge is essential to reconcile contradictions and fill the gaps. Consequently, this biographical foundation provides the basis for reconstructing his train of thought as related to Bildung. With this in mind, we can examine the interrelation between the Humboldtian concept of Bildung and the Aristotelian interpretation of eudaimonia.

3. Aristotelian Roots in Humboldt’s Notion of Bildung

In the previous section I contextualized Humboldt’s concept of Bildung through the lens of history, so that our topic can be understood in all its complexity and depth. With reference to Humboldt’s biography and the context of his lifetime, I showed that Greek antiquity served as a role model for him because he saw the original character of humanity best represented by the ancient Greeks. A closer look into the topic shows that Humboldt’s anthropological convictions also provide the ethical foundation for his concept of Bildung. The essence of this concept coincides substantially with Greek philosophy, more specifically with Aristotelean ethics. In the following, I explore the
extent to which Humboldt’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of the nature of human beings and the fulfilling of their potential coincide by focusing on the similarities and differences in their lines of argument, and by comparing and contrasting several of Humboldt’s and Aristotle’s ideas.

3.1. *Eudaimonia* as the Primary Goal of Existence

The central concept in Aristotle’s ethics is *eudaimonia* (εὐδαιμονία; approximately “flourishing,” “well-being,” “happiness”). Even though most modern languages do not offer a term that accurately represents its meaning, in English *eudaimonia* is frequently translated as happiness. This can be misleading, because *eudaimonia* does not represent a positive feeling but rather a distinctive form of happiness or well-being which refers to a state of flourishing (Besser-Jones, 2016, p. 187). In his *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle (ca. 350 B.C.E./1894) clarifies his specific understanding of *eudaimonia*. He criticizes the fact that some people interpret it as “pleasure” or “honor,” while others understand it with regard to their current state, such that, for instance, the sick generally relate it to “health” and the poor to “wealth.” However, if we live a life dedicated to pleasure (*bios apolaustikos*) or wealth (*bios chrêmatistês*), we turn into slaves of our needs or become fully dependent on others. Therefore, as Aristotle points out, such interpretations are superficial. Nevertheless, “apart from these many goods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well” (1.4). In other words, according to Aristotle, *eudaimonia* is the telos teleiotaton or ultimate goal of life. In his own words, “[v]erably there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is […] [eudaimonia], and identify living well and doing well with being happy” (1.4). In short, the essential purpose in life for any being is *eudaimonia*, which benefits both individuals and society alike.

The sentence fragment “happiness for which man is plainly destined” (Humboldt, 1792/1851, p. 27) is a rare example in which Humboldt explicitly refers to happiness as the primary goal of human life. Humboldt’s remarks on happiness are neither as clear and detailed as Aristotle’s, nor does he devote entire passages to the portrayal of a concept such as *eudaimonia*. In the original German version of *The Sphere and Limits of Government* (The Limits of State Action) (Humboldt, 1792/1854), *Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen* (Humboldt, 1792/1851), he uses both *Glück* and *Glückseligkeit* to refer to happiness without a terminological distinction. Yet if we read between the lines, we notice an implicit differentiation of the divergent interpretations in the contextual sphere. In some passages Humboldt refers to happiness in a superficial way with an interpretation in the form of pleasure or wealth (e.g., pp. 42, 55, 71), which he condemns, just like Aristotle. In other passages he relates to happiness in a deeper sense (e.g., pp. 59, 103, 121), which resembles *eudaimonia*. Hence, Aristotle’s idea of *eudaimonia* as the autotelic main purpose of life implicitly resonates to a great extent in Humboldt’s argumentation. This becomes apparent if we take a closer look at both philosophers’ train of thought and further concepts they use.

3.2. The Actualization of one’s Potential

After defining *eudaimonia* as the essential purpose of life, Aristotle (ca. 350 B.C.E./1894) raises the question of how we can reach *eudaimonia*. He argues that all living beings can attain *eudaimonia* through the fulfillment of their *ergon* (ἔργον; approximately “function”), which is
essential to their cause by nature. In his own words, “for all things that have a function […], the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function” (1.4). In short, performing one’s specific function well leads toward eudaimonia. The central idea of Aristotle’s argument is that the actualization of one’s potential is the key to eudaimonia. Throughout his works Physics (ca. 350 B.C.E./1970), Metaphysics (ca. 350 B.C.E./1999), Nicomachean Ethics (ca. 350 B.C.E./1894), Rhetoric (ca. 350 B.C.E./1924), and De Anima (ca. 350 B.C.E./2016), he analyzes the connected principles of potentiality and actuality with regard to causality, motion, physiology, and ethics. Aristotle assumes that all living beings carry the germ of their perfect form within, which unfolds naturally in the course of their development. He uses the term *dunamis* (*δύναμις*) to refer to “potentiality,” which is the actual nature of a thing or being and unfolds due to its innate tendency of change. In contrast to ‘potentiality,’ ‘actuality’ refers to the realization of that potential. In this context, Aristotle introduces the neologisms *energeia* (*ἐνέργεια*) and *entelecheia* (*ἐντελέχεια*) to refer to actuality. Most translators consider the two terms as synonyms (e.g., Bradshaw, 2004, p. 13), and, according to Aristotle (ca. 350 B.C.E./1999, 1047a30), their meanings were intended to converge. Yet there is an ambiguity in their usage. For example, in some places *energeia* may refer to an “actualization” of one’s physical, intellectual, or mental capacities, while elsewhere, *energeia* may allude to “activity” (Chen, 1956, 56-65), which may be interpreted as the performance of specific activities that pursue the goal of eudaimonia. Essentially, both concepts refer to a natural development, inherent in all living beings, towards their ideal form. Aristotle intends to explain this development according to the principle of cause and effect (Werner, 2021, 29).

In accordance with Aristotle, Humboldt (1792/1854) also claims that all beings, by nature, strive towards flourishing, and, therefore, have a desire to fulfill their potential. For example, “in the vegetable world, the simple and less graceful form of the fruit seems to prefigure the more perfect bloom and symmetry of the flower which it precedes, and which it is destined gradually to unfold” (p. 14-15). He was inspired by the idea of an instinct for self-formation, a so-called *nisus formativus* (approximately “formative drive”), presented by his teacher Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, who believed that everything in nature strives to evolve according to its unique given nature, so diversity can flourish (Lauer, 2017, 240, 252). According to Humboldt (1792/1854), the fulfillment of one’s potential can only be initiated extrinsically to a minor degree, as it mainly derives intrinsically. He claims that “whatever [each human] receives externally, is only as the grain of seed. It is […][their] own active energy alone that can convert the germ of the fairest growth, into a full and precious blessing for […] [themself]. It leads to beneficial issues only when it is full of vital power and essentially individual” (p. 15).

In this regard, Humboldt elaborates on a conception similar to Aristotle’s idea of potentiality and actuality. He uses the German terms *Kraft* (approximately “force,” “strength,” “power”), *Energie* (approximately “energy”), *Trieb* (approximately “urge,” “instinct”), and *Sehnsucht* (approximately “desire”) to refer to actuality, but uses them ambiguously and inconsistently (Surböck, 2012). In general, these terms can be interpreted as describing innate life forces or vital powers that are interconnected and that differ from person to person. *Kraft, Energie, Trieb,* and *Sehnsucht* enable humans to fulfill their specific potential, or, in Humboldt’s (1792/1854) words, they capacitate individuals to “cultivate […] the physical, intellectual, and moral faculties” (p. 8). He further argues that “those energies […] are the source of every active virtue, and the indispensable condition of any higher and more various culture” (p. 8). Thus, they are the driving
forces of Bildung. He even refers to Energie as the most important human virtue, or, in his own words, “[e]nergy appears to me to be the first and chiefest of human virtues. Whatever exalts our energy is of greater worth than aught that merely puts materials into our hands for its exercise” (p. 100). Humboldt’s concept of Bildung aims at the free development of humans as individuals, and he emphasizes that their vital powers and capacities differ from person to person. Aristotle's ethics, on the other hand, aims at the realization of a general human nature that is similar for all human beings (Werner, 2021, p. 31). Therefore, their ideas on the actualization of one’s potential differ insofar as Humboldt interprets self-realization in the spirit of individuality, which plays a minor role in Aristotle’s argument.

3.3. The Function of Logos or the Rational Principle

Prima facie, it seems as if Aristotle’s and Humboldt’s views with reference to the function of human beings share important aspects. According to Aristotle (ca. 350 B.C.E./1894), the distinctive feature of human beings as opposed to other living beings is logos (λόγος; approximately “rational principle”). Just like several other central Aristotelian terms, logos is not only difficult to interpret but also challenging to translate. There are thorough philosophical surveys on logos (e.g., Anton, 2016; Aygün, 2017) that illustrate the complexity of Aristotle’s diction. In Aristotle’s (ca. 350 B.C.E./1894) own words, “[t]here remains […] an active life of the element that has a rational principle” (1.7.). The rational principle differentiates humans from other species. Aristotle further argues that the ergon of humans is to fulfill the characteristic human energeia (here: “activity”) guided by logos, or in other words, the “function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle” (1.7). Hence, the function of human beings is to fulfill their potential by performing characteristic human activities guided by their rational principle.

In this context, Humboldt (1792/1854) explicitly refers to Aristotle’s connection between logos and eudaimonia by drawing a “conclusion with an illustrative passage from Aristotle’s Ethics:— For that which peculiarly belongs to each by nature, is best and most pleasant to every one; and consequently, to man, the life according to intellect (is most pleasant), if intellect especially constitutes Man. This life therefore is the most happy” (p. 9). Similar to Aristotle, Humboldt also regards the rational principle as an essential, characteristic feature of human beings and thinks that the development of intellectual abilities leads towards human perfection. In his own words, “[t]he true end of [each hu]man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal and immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires” (p. 11), is the actualization of their potential. However, in other passages, Humboldt emphasizes that reason is not the only component in the process of self-fulfillment. This also becomes apparent with regard to his biography. Inspired by Neuhumanismus, Humboldt claims that “in order to preserve society’s warmth and strength without which it will bear no inner fruit, it becomes just as necessary to keep the imagination and sentiment within a tight circle as it is to lead reason toward a broader sphere” (p. 9). Thus, he views self-realization holistically as a harmonious development of the human mind, spirit, and body, guided by reason (p. 11), imagination, and emotion.
3.4. The Role of Arete or Virtue

With respect to the relationship between virtue and human flourishing, Humboldt’s and Aristotle’s ideas also bear several common elements. Aristotle (ca. 350 B.C.E./1894) claims that *arete* (ἀρετή; approximately “virtue,” “excellence”) is autotelic as well as telic, because virtues are both self-sufficient and a means towards *eudaimonia*. In his words, “honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves […], but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy” (1.7). On the one hand, virtues are autotelic because they derive meaning and purpose from within. Aristotle claims that a virtuous life is a happy life, which can be lived in two ways: a life of moral and political virtues (*bios politikos*) or a life of scientific and philosophical virtues (*bios theorétikos*) (Höffe 2013, 58). On the other hand, virtues are telic because they pursue a specific goal, which is *eudaimonia*. Virtues are qualities that enable humans to fulfill their *ergon*. In other words, they capacitate humans to perform their characteristic human activities guided by reason. Thus, humans can pursue *eudaimonia* by performing characteristic human activities, which are enabled by *arete* and guided by *logos* (Aristoteles, ca. 350 B.C.E./1894, 1.7). Inspired by Plato’s four cardinal virtues (wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice), described in book IV of Plato’s *Republic* (ca. 380 B.C.E./1935), Aristotle lists specific virtues and extends Plato’s list by including other practical and intellectual virtues. For example, in *Rhetoric* (ca. 350 B.C.E./1924), Aristotle claims that “[t]he forms of [v]irtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, [and] wisdom” (1.9). All these traits are virtuous because they are necessary for humans to live a life of well-being. In other passages of his works, Aristotle extends this list even further.

In accordance with Aristotle, Humboldt (1792/1854) also regards virtue both as self-sufficient and as a means towards flourishing. In conjunction with his glorification of the ancient Greeks, he asserts that the “ancients sought for happiness in virtue” (p. 9). According to Humboldt, virtue is a pivotal aspect of human nature. In this context, he claims that “[v]irtue harmonizes […] sweetly and naturally with [each hu]man’s original inclinations” (p. 91) and that virtues do “not depend on any particular form of being, nor are necessarily connected with any particular aspect of character” (p. 70). Instead, humans develop virtues naturally through Bildung, as the full development of one’s potential, or the “harmony […] of all the different features of […] [each hu]man’s character” (p. 70) enables individuals to find to their primordial nature. For example, “love, […] social concord, […] justice, […] [and] self-sacrifice” (p. 90) are part of original human nature and enable humans to develop relationships, as “domestic and social life contribute so largely to human happiness, that it is far less necessary to look for new incentives to virtuous action, than simply to secure for those already implanted in the soul a more free and unhindered operation” (p. 90).

The quintessence of Aristotle’s and Humboldt’s common line of thought is that all beings, by nature, have a desire to flourish, or in other words, a desire for *eudaimonia*. They can approach *eudaimonia* by actualizing their specific potential. In this context, Humboldt emphasizes the benefits of individuality and diversity, which plays a minor role in Aristotle’s reasoning. According to Aristotle, the distinctive feature that differentiates humans from other beings is *logos*, which should, therefore, guide the development of one’s capacities. While Humboldt also views reason as a fundamental component in this process, his approach is more holistic, as besides reason he emphasizes imagination and emotion. Both philosophers agree on the role of virtue by claiming that virtue is both autotelic and telic. Thus, a virtuous life is a happy life, and, at the same time,
virtue enables humans to perform their function well, and, thus, aims at eudaimonia. Humboldt extends this idea further by exploring the practical implications of these ideas, which I will investigate in the next section.

4. The Essential Conditions of Humboldt’s Ideal of Bildung

After exploring the foundation of Humboldt’s educational ideal of Bildung and the connection between Bildung and eudaimonia, questions like the following may arise: If all beings have an urge for Bildung, why does the level of this desire vary? Why are some humans more successful in fulfilling their potential than others? Can we foster Bildung, and, if so, how? Humboldt (1792/1854) claims that Bildung is subject to two conditions: freedom and exposure to a variety of situations (p. 11-15).

These conditions are intertwined. In combination, they are both necessary and sufficient for the practical realization of Bildung.

According to Humboldt (1792/1854), freedom “is the grand and indispensable condition” (p. 11) for Bildung because it allows the human mind to strive for Bildung from within. To put it differently, if freedom is ensured, an intrinsically motivated thirst for Bildung unfolds naturally (Lauer, 2017, p. 256). Humboldt (1792/1854) argues that only individuals who are free from social, governmental, and economic constraints can realize their full potential, because freedom enables humans to emancipate themselves from authoritarian structures and empowers them to think and act critically, independently, and responsibly. Hence, they can develop into unconstrained individuals instead of obedient citizens (pp. 66 ff.). While freedom initially fosters the personal fulfillment of individuals, the self-realization of a sufficiently large number of people eventually evolves into the flourishing of humankind in its entirety. In his own words, among free humans “emulation naturally arises” (p. 69). The quote below illustrates how Humboldt develops this idea further:

Among […] [humans] who are really free, every form of industry becomes more rapidly improved,—all the arts flourish more gracefully,—all sciences become more largely enriched and expanded. In such a community, too, domestic bonds become closer and sweeter; the parents are more eagerly devoted to the care of their children, and, in a higher state of welfare, are better able to follow out their desires with regard to them […] and tutors better befit themselves. (p. 69)
In a nutshell, Humboldt claims that freedom implies many beneficial effects for humankind, which are visible in a variety of spheres, such as economy, art, science, domestic life, welfare, and education. Accordingly, ensuring freedom leads to a good human life and lays the foundation for future generations to flourish.

Besides freedom, Humboldt’s second fundamental condition for Bildung is exposure to a variety of situations, which can be divided into three subcategories: (1) educational content, (2) personal experience, and (3) social interaction. According to Humboldt, humans evolve and broaden their horizons by gaining a wide range of theoretical and practical knowledge in combination with a lively exchange of ideas. Hence, exposure to a variety of situations leads to growth and progress. Bildung is nourished by diverse intellectual stimulation and experience, such as a holistic general knowledge, travel, and human relationships (Levlie and Standish, 2002, p. 318). By being exposed to a variety of situations, as Humboldt explains (1792/1854), humans develop a holistic and multi-perspective view of the world. Therefore, “[e]ven the most free and self-reliant […] [individual] is thwarted and hindered in […] [their] development by uniformity of position” (p. 11). Humboldt claims that humans are by nature versatile and, therefore, should avoid one-sidedness. Instead of concentrating on one subject, they should broaden their minds and develop their capacities and skills holistically.

Consequently, Humboldt (1809/2017) expects educational content to be rich in variety and advocates for a broad general education for everybody, regardless of their social background and anticipated career. In The Königsberg and the Lithuanian School Plan (1809/2022) he claims that “[g]eneral secondary education is devoted to the complete human being […] in the principle functions of […] [their] natural being” (para. 4). Thus, curricula must be holistic, so that individuals can find and fulfill their potential, as he explains in the following quote:

This complete education therefore has but one and the same foundation. For the minds of the commonest day laborer and the most highly educated person must be tuned to the same key in the first place, if the former is not to become crude on a level beneath human dignity, and the latter is not to become sentimental, chimerical, and eccentric, falling short of human potential. (para. 6)

Humboldt illustrates this further in a letter to the king of Prussia: “There are undeniably certain kinds of knowledge that must be of a general nature and, more importantly, a certain cultivation of the mind and character that nobody can afford to be without” (Humboldt, 1809, as cited in Günther, 1988, p. 132). Furthermore, Humboldt (1792/1854) argues that humans should “unite the separate faculties of […] [their] nature” and endeavor to “increase and diversify […] [their] powers […] by harmoniously combining them, instead of looking for a mere variety of objects for their separate exercise” (p. 11). Thus, he envisions a world where humans can recognize and realize their individual full potential with the help of a broad general education before their job training. In the following quote, he describes how such an educational background not only fosters personal fulfillment, but also leads to positive effects on the professional sphere:

People obviously cannot be good craftworkers, merchants, soldiers or businessmen unless, regardless of their occupation, they are good, upstanding and—according to their condition—well-informed human beings and citizens. If this basis is laid
through schooling, vocational skills are easily acquired later on, and a person is always free to move from one occupation to another, as so often happens in life. (Humboldt, 1809, as cited in Günther, 1988, p. 132)

According to Humboldt, such a general education should be interdisciplinary, integrate intellectuality, sensuality, and imagination (Günther, 1988, p. 89), and animate individuals to fulfill their individual potential (Sorkin, 1983, p. 58).

Personal experience and social interaction between the individual and the environment are further essential ways to expose oneself to a variety of situations. A connection between the internal and external world stimulates the individual to reflect, strengthen, and further develop their character holistically (Løvlie and Standish, 2002). Humboldt is convinced that individuals can only understand themselves in relation to the world. Their experience and interaction with the world expands the boundaries of individual existence (Spranger, 1909, p. 424 ff.) and leads their self-awareness towards world citizenship and cosmopolitanism. Humboldt (1793/2000) describes the necessity of the interaction between the individual and the world in the following way:

At the convergence point of all particular kinds of activity is [the hu]man, who, in the absence of a purpose with a particular direction, wishes only to strengthen and heighten the powers of […] [their] nature and secure value and permanence for […] [their] being. However, because sheer power needs an object on which it may be exercised and pure form or idea needs a material in which, expressing itself, it can last, so too does [each hu]man need a world outside […] [themself]. (p. 58)

In this context, Humboldt, who also made essential contributions in the field of linguistics, emphasizes the important role of language as a means by which individuals can fulfill their individual potential (Seidel, 1962, p. 207). It is language that enables social interaction and integrates humans into a socio-cultural environment. Human thoughts, feelings, and lives are shaped by language (Humboldt, 1822/1905, p. 432). Language allows a connection between the individual and the outside world, which is necessary to understand the world holistically (Burger, 2013, p. 165). Speaking a variety of languages enables humans to grow and understand the richness and diversity of the world. Humboldt claims that social interaction benefits both individuals and society alike. It leads not only to personal development, but also toward political and social harmony (Humboldt, 1836, pp. 56-57).

While Humboldt (1792/1854) claims that freedom, personal experience, and social interaction are necessary conditions for Bildung, he criticizes the fact that, all too often, they are not ensured. This impedes people from striving towards Bildung and, consequently, towards eudaimonia. In particular, he lists specific factors that hinder individuals from fulfilling their potential, such as religious dogmatism (p. 89), authoritarian state leadership (p. 3), and a tendency towards a superficial mindset which equates happiness with possession and pleasure (p. 2). Some of these examples once more display Humboldt’s underlying idealization of the ancient Greeks. In this way, he closes the circle between his biographical background, the anthropological foundations, and the further development of his concept of Bildung, which pursues eudaimonia as its ultimate goal.
5. Conclusion

This article claims that Wilhelm von Humboldt’s educational concept of Bildung pursues eudaimonia in the Aristotelian sense as its underlying goal. Based on a biographical analysis, a comparative study of Humboldt’s and Aristotle’s ethical foundations, and a reconstruction of Humboldt’s theory of Bildung, I conclude the following: Essentially, the telos teleiotaton of Bildung is indeed eudaimonia. Reaching this conclusion is challenging insofar as Humboldt’s writing style is in some instances vague, ambiguous, and inconsistent. Furthermore, he only wrote a few fragments on Bildung exclusively, and neither outlined his argument explicitly nor systematized his ideas into a theory. Therefore, I interpret and reconstruct his line of thought based on a variety of his manuscripts and simultaneously take his biographical background into account.

The results indicate that Humboldt, who glorified the ancient Greeks, adopted the essence of Aristotle’s anthropological foundation by assuming that all beings naturally have a desire for eudaimonia, which they can approach by fulfilling their specific potential. With this in mind, we can see that Humboldt developed Aristotle’s idea further by focusing on the practical realization of the process towards eudaimonia, which is Bildung. The following figure illustrates the foundations of Humboldt’s conception of Bildung and its interconnectedness with eudaimonia.

![Fig. 3: Humboldt’s concept of Bildung as a key to eudaimonia](image)

What this all amounts to is that Humboldt assumed that human beings have innate vital powers (Kraft, Energie, Trieb, Sehnsucht) that stimulate them to fulfill their unique potential. These life forces unfold if the necessary and sufficient external conditions are met, which means that humans are free and exposed to a variety of situations through a diversity of educational content, personal experience, and social interaction. The cultivation of their faculties is guided by reason and supported by imagination and emotion. This process is called Bildung. In this context, humans develop both telic virtues that lead towards eudaimonia and autotelic virtues, as Humboldt was convinced that a virtuous life is a happy life.

To better understand the implications of these results, future studies could investigate how the foundations of Humboldt’s concept of Bildung shaped the further development of humankind through a more holistic approach to education like, for example, the United Nations’ educational concept as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948)
and the Sustainable Development Goals (UN General Assembly, 2015). Another direction could be how the eudemonistic rationale of Humboldt’s ideal of Bildung inspired other disciplines, such as the schools of thought of humanistic psychology and positive psychology. Moreover, it would be worthwhile investigating how Humboldt’s conditions for Bildung translate into the 21st century. Consequently, one could explore how these conditions can be fostered, so that the Bildung of a sufficiently large number of individuals eventually evolves into the flourishing of humankind in its entirety. Other highly relevant topics that could be focalized are Humboldt’s progressive notions of diversity, interdisciplinarity, and cosmopolitanism as integrated parts of his concept of Bildung, which could enrich today’s educational and political discussion. This article provides a foundation for conductive thoughts, but the discussion on Humboldt’s educational ideal of Bildung is nowhere near exhausted.
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The Continuity of Experience Principle: A Deweyan Interpretation of Recapitulation Theory

Sébastien-Akira Alix

Introduction

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, recapitulation theory greatly influenced most American social scientists. This interpretative scheme, according to which the development of the child (ontogenesis) recapitulated or reproduced that of humanity as a race (phylogenesis), had numerous pedagogical applications that took varying forms depending on the authors, their orientations, and their particular fields of study. The major impact of this theory upon turn-of-century scholars is now well known. Less known, however, is the determining influence of this theory upon John Dewey’s pedagogy.

Among the abundant literature available on Dewey, two prominent scholars have confronted this issue directly: Herbert M. Kliebard (1995) and Thomas D. Fallace (2009; 2010; 2011; 2012). In his *Struggle for the American Curriculum, 1893-1958*, Kliebard (1995) devotes a chapter to the description of Dewey’s pedagogical ideas, especially as related to the curriculum of the Laboratory School. Kliebard accurately shows how Dewey tried to achieve a synthesis between the ideas of two opposing interest groups, the “humanists” and the “developmentalists,” taking his own interpretation of recapitulation theory and trying “to reconstruct it in the curriculum of the Laboratory School” (p. 47; p. 61). Kliebard thus highlights the determining role played by recapitulation theory in shaping the curriculum of the Laboratory School. In a series of articles and books, Fallace (2009; 2010), building upon Kliebard’s work, further develops some of Kliebard’s conclusions, not only arguing that recapitulation theory “served as the foundation of the entire curriculum of the laboratory school, guiding both theory and practice” (Fallace, 2009, p. 383), but also that, during the Chicago period (1894-1904), Dewey was in fact a genetic psychologist, i.e. a thinker who believed that “human evolution involves intellectual growth, that this growth occurs through stages, and that each stage incorporates the prior one” (Fallace, 2010, p. 131). If both Kliebard and Fallace brilliantly describe the impact of recapitulation theory upon Dewey’s curriculum at the Laboratory School, though, they have not explored the entanglement between Dewey’s continuity of experience principle and recapitulation.

The reflections contained in this paper seek to corroborate some of the conclusions both Kliebard

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1 This essay is an expanded version of a paper presented at the 2013 Meeting of the Society for the Philosophical Study of Education, Chicago. It contains elements that are in part derived from and translated by Alix (2013; 2017). The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable and helpful suggestions.

2 See especially Egan (2004); Fallace, “Repeating the Race Experience” (2009); Gould (1977); and Stocking (1968).
and Fallace reached, but they also carry with them the aim of extending these conclusions one step further by showing the close relationship that exists between Dewey’s continuity of experience principle and recapitulation theory. Indeed, if Dewey evoked recapitulation theory in a number of works, particularly those written during the Chicago period, the continuity of experience principle pervades his entire opus of educational and pedagogical writings. With this principle, which is nowhere better illustrated than in his famous essay “The Child and the Curriculum,” Dewey (1902a) subscribed to the beliefs that the experiences of the child and that of humanity are simply two limits that define the educational process. Education is to be conceived as a continuous reconstruction of experience “moving from the child’s present experience out into that represented by the organized bodies of truth that we call studies” (p. 278), i.e., by human experience throughout history. Therefore, humanity has progressed through a series of stages that constitute as many steps as those a child takes in the course of his/her own development.

Thus, I argue that, throughout his educational writings, Dewey was in fact struggling with the evolutionary scheme in which his entire thinking is rooted. He was indeed constantly trying to stand aloof from a strictly biological interpretation of recapitulation theory, but without renouncing such an evolutionary perspective. With his continuity of experience principle, Dewey developed his own interpretation of recapitulation theory in education as viewed in light of his philosophy of experience. This theory constitutes the very foundation and the architectonic principle of his entire pedagogy. I therefore demonstrate, first, that Dewey was not so much a genetic psychologist as an educational philosopher who used recapitulation theory to lend scientific support to his pedagogical ideas at the turn of the 19th-and 20th-centuries; and second, that it is this close relationship between the continuity of experience principle and recapitulation theory that clarifies the specific sense given to the via media, or the “creative synthesis”—as Kliebard (1999, p. 111) puts it—that Dewey tried to achieve throughout his educational writings. To demonstrate this, the following essay analyzes, first, the continuity of experience principle, and second, Dewey’s stage theory of development in both the child and the human race.

I. The Continuity of Experience Principle

The continuity of experience principle is, together with the notion of growth, John Dewey’s educational philosophy’s most fundamental principle.1 This principle is best revealed in his 1902 essay “The Child and the Curriculum.” Dewey opens this essay by acknowledging the major discrepancies that exist between the child and the curriculum. He sums these up as follows: first, the contrast between the narrow but personal world of the child and the impersonal and infinitely extended world of space and time that one finds in the curriculum; second, the discordance between the unity of the child’s life and the specializations and divisions of the school subjects; and third, the opposition between the practical and emotional bonds of child life and the rather remote and abstract principle of classification and arrangement that prevails in school knowledge. In these elements of conflict between the child and the curriculum, Dewey (1902a) explains, “educational sects” take root (p. 278).

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1 In a major book on Dewey, philosopher Thomas M. Alexander has demonstrated that the principle of continuity “is the key to Dewey’s metaphysics” (John Dewey’s Theory of Art, Experience and Nature, p. xvii; see also chapter 3).
Dewey thus stages the antinomy, or contradiction, between a doctrine of discipline—the child has to surrender to the logical order of the constituted school subjects—and a doctrine centered on the child’s interest—all studies are subservient to the child’s growth. Though one might be tempted to believe that Dewey took his cues from the latter doctrine, he tried instead to find a _via media_, a middle way that would solve the conflict that lay at the very heart of this opposition. This _via media_ can be stated as follows: Even when the child, with his own living interests, powers, and capacities, stands in the foreground and is the central concern in education, reference to the constituted school disciplines should not be abandoned. This idea is well expressed in the following passage from Dewey’s (1902a) essay:

Abandon the notion of subject-matter as something fixed and ready-made in itself, outside the child’s experience; cease thinking of the child’s experience as also something hard and fast; see it as something fluent, embryonic, vital; and we realize that the child and the curriculum are simply two limits which define a single process. Just as two points define a straight line, so the present standpoint of the child and the facts and truths of studies define instruction. It is continuous reconstruction, moving from the child’s present experience out into that represented by the organized bodies of truth that we call studies. (p. 278; emphasis added)

For Dewey (1902a), the point is to get rid of the notion that there is a difference of nature between the child’s crude experience and the different studies that constitute the curriculum. Instead, he argues for the need to incorporate the idea of continuity between the child and the curriculum because, in the final instance, the sciences themselves, which the child has to learn, have grown out of ordinary experience, i.e., out of the “child’s present crude impulses in counting, measuring, and arranging things in rhythmic series” (p. 282).

The various studies, arithmetic, geography, language, botany, etc., _are themselves experience—they are that of the race_. They embody the cumulative outcome of the efforts, the strivings, and successes of the human race generation after generation. They present this, not as a mere accumulation, not as a miscellaneous heap of separate bits of experience, but in some organized and systematized way—that is, as reflectively formulated. (p. 278; emphasis added)

No longer conceived of “as something fixed and ready-made in itself, outside the child’s experience,” but as embodying “the cumulative outcome of the efforts, the strivings, and successes of the human race generation after generation,” the curriculum, in the Deweyan perspective, identifies itself with the process of human civilization, i.e., the growth process. The curriculum is then conceived as the repository of the experiences humanity has had throughout history, i.e., the “warranted assertibilities,” or knowledge, that adults have developed over the centuries in order to solve the practical problems they faced within their environment.

Consequently, the child and the curriculum are conceived as the initial and final terms of a single process: The educative or growth process itself. This continuity of experience principle allows Dewey to relate the child’s individual nature to the social culture as expressed in the curriculum. With this analysis, Dewey is implicitly claiming that the child’s only possible career and destiny are found in the idea that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” In saying that the child’s experience
is the initial term of a continuous process whose final term is human experience and knowledge in its present state, Dewey subscribed to the belief that throughout history humanity has progressed through a series of stages that constitute as many steps as those the child has to take in the course of his own development, and that the child finds himself at the beginning stage of that process, namely at the level of the primitive. Indeed, throughout his pedagogical and educational writings, Dewey constantly brings the child’s mind back to the level of the primitive or savage, thus extracting the notion of primitivity from its anthropological base in order to adapt it to child psychology:

Many anthropologists have told us there are certain identities in the child [sic] interests with those of primitive life. There is a sort of natural recurrence of the child mind to the typical activities of primitive peoples; witness the hut which the boy likes to build in the yard, playing hunt, with bows, arrows, spears, and so on. (Dewey, 1900a, p. 111)

For Dewey, even in our modern western societies, the child perceives reality and behaves essentially like a primitive. The child’s vision “is essentially that of the savage; being adapted to seeing large and somewhat remote objects in the mass, not near-by objects in detail” (Dewey, 1898, pp. 259-60). Dewey adds, “both primitive man and the child are decidedly motor in their activity. Both are interested in objects and materials, not from a contemplative or theoretical standpoint, but from the standpoint of what can be done with them, and what can be got out of them” (1901a, p. 233). If the child’s experience is similar to that of the primitive, and if the end of the educative process is the curriculum, i.e., present human experience and knowledge, then the child’s development mimics on a small scale the development of humanity throughout history. Thus, with this idea of the continuity between the child and the curriculum, Dewey contends that the child, as well as humanity throughout history, develops and progresses from primitivity to scientificity; education, then, consisted of supplying the conditions which will enable the child to reconstruct, in a few short months and years, the experience of the human race as embodied in the curriculum. This idea is nowhere better illustrated than in the following passage from Democracy and Education (1916):

Prior human efforts have made over natural conditions…. Every domesticated plant and animal, every tool, every utensil, every appliance, every manufactured article, every esthetic decoration, every work of art means a transformation of conditions once hostile or indifferent to characteristic human activities into friendly and favoring conditions. Because the activities of children today are controlled by these selected and charged stimuli, children are able to traverse in a short lifetime what the race has needed slow, tortured ages to attain. The dice have been loaded by all the successes which have preceded. (p. 44; emphasis added)

In the Deweyan perspective, it is only because the school and the teacher arrange the conditions which will enable children to reconstruct the human experience embodied in the curriculum that they are actually able to do so. It is only because “the activities of children today are controlled by these selected and charged stimuli” that “children are able” to reenact the experiences humanity has had throughout history. Here, Dewey is careful to stand aloof from a strictly biological recapitulation theory: he clearly rejects the approaches to biological recapitulation made by
Herbert Spencer and G. Stanley Hall. For Dewey, children, left on their own, are unable to achieve what humanity has accomplished throughout its history. Children must be guided: There is a need for a concerted action, an action designed to supply the conditions which will guide children’s growth so that they can reconstruct human experience. It is only through education, as a conscious plan, that children can recapitulate, in a short amount of time, the progress of humanity throughout the ages. In this way, education is not recapitulation in a strictly biological sense. It is the business of the teacher, through a deep knowledge of the curriculum, to direct children’s experience in such a way as to avoid the errors and wanderings of their ancestors so that they are able to recapitulate “in a short lifetime” the human experience embodied in the curriculum. It is in this sense that “The dice have been loaded by all the successes which have preceded.”

For Dewey (1902a), education is thus to be conceived as a continuous reconstruction of experience “moving from the child’s present experience out into that represented by the organized bodies of truth that we call studies.” In these conditions, the curriculum simply represents “the possibilities

1 On this matter, see Herbert Spencer’s Essays on Education (1949) and Hall’s Adolescence (1904), “The Contents of Children’s Minds” (1883), and Educational Problems, 2 vols. (New York: D. Appleton, 1911).

2 In Dewey’s view, all the progress humanity has made in knowledge, science, and correlated tools and technology throughout the centuries has led to a transformation of the environment we live in. Such a transformation has great implications for education. Teachers and educators have to use what Dewey calls “weighted stimuli” in order to promote child growth. As he puts it:

The advance of civilization means that a larger number of natural forces and objects have been transformed into instrumentalities of action, into means for securing ends. We start not so much with superior capacities as with superior stimuli for evocation and direction; we have weighted stimuli.…. Stimuli conducive to economical and effective response, such as our system of roads and means of transportation, our ready command of heat, light, and electricity, our readymade machines and apparatus for every purpose, do not, by themselves or in their aggregate, constitute a civilization. But the uses to which they are put are civilization, and without the things the uses would be impossible. Time otherwise devoted to wrestling a livelihood from a grudging environment and securing a precarious protection against its inclemencies is freed. A body of knowledge is transmitted, the legitimacy of which is guaranteed by the fact that the physical equipment in which it is incarnated leads to results that square with the other facts of nature. Thus these appliances of art supply a protection, perhaps our chief protection, against a recrudescence of these superstitious beliefs, those fanciful myths and infertile imaginings about nature in which so much of the best intellectual power of the past has been spent.…. Intentional education signifies … a specially selected environment, the selection being made on the basis of materials and method specifically promoting growth in the desired direction. (Democracy and Education, 1916, p. 44-45)
of development inherent in the child’s immediate crude experience” (1902a, p. 278-279). Thus, one has but to see the degree to which the child’s experience already contains, in germ, the interests, motives and attitudes that operated in the organization and elaboration of the curriculum as it stood at the time Dewey wrote. From a pedagogical standpoint, the curriculum then serves first and foremost as a revealing instrument: “The subject-matter of science and history and art serves to reveal the real child” to the teacher, i.e., to locate the child’s present position along the educational process. Thus the teacher can “see the step the child needs to take just here and now” (p. 278). As Dewey (1902a) puts it at the end of his essay,

the value of the formulated wealth of knowledge that makes up the course of study is that it may enable the educator to determine the environment of the child, and thus by indirection to direct. Its primary value, its primary indication, is for the teacher, not for the child. It says to the teacher: Such and such are the capacities, the fulfillments, in truth and beauty and behavior, open to these children. Now see to it that day by day the conditions are such that their own activities move inevitably in this direction, toward such culmination of themselves. Let the child's nature fulfill its own destiny, revealed to you in whatever of science and art and industry the world now holds as its own. (p. 291; Dewey’s emphasis)

The curriculum’s usefulness thus consists in its indicating to the teacher the different means to put at the child’s disposal in the different fields of knowledge. The educator’s task is then much more difficult than that of the teacher in a traditional or conventional school. Indeed, in the Deweyan perspective, the teacher does not, strictly speaking, hold class; his/her role is not to teach school subjects in their systematic progression; he/she is not a mediator of the culture to pupils. His/her task is much more sophisticated. It is similar to that of Rousseau’s governor: he/she has to arrange an environment. This environment must be arranged in such a way that the child will be able to reenact human experience without teacher intervention. Indeed, the Deweyan teacher or educator has to “psychologize” (p. 285) the curriculum, i.e., reinstate into the child’s present and crude experience the subject matter of the studies, or branches of learning, by means of a specific environment: the classroom.

With this continuity of experience principle, Dewey thus proposes an original version of recapitulation theory in education: his entire pedagogical work consists of a reinterpretation, based on his philosophy of experience, of that theory. At the time, this recapitulation theory lent scientific support to Dewey’s pedagogical and educational philosophy. In fact, it was the very foundation of and the architeconic principle of his entire educational and pedagogical approach. It is this close relationship between the continuity of experience principle and recapitulation theory that clarifies the specific sense given to the via media, or middle way, that Dewey tried to generate throughout his educational writings. The philosopher was thus highlighting the tension that existed in American academia at the time between two rival genetic psychologies of education: that of G. Stanley Hall and Herbert Spencer, which was rooted in the neo-Lamarckian principle of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and his own reinterpretation, closer to that of James Mark Baldwin, who denied such principles and considered that experience matters in education, and that culture is cumulative. Such a reinterpretation implied a clear departure from genetic psychology

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1 See Baldwin, Elements of Psychology (1893) and Mental Development in the Child and in the Race (1894).
while still subscribing to its main idea, namely, that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” Here, one must bear in mind that Dewey (1916) does not reduce the notion of education to that of life or growth: “Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing, is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, that means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming” (p. 59). Inasmuch as life itself is development, or growth, it is education, i.e., learning through interaction with the environment. There is then no end to the educational process. On the other hand, insofar as education is a conscious plan or an intentional business, a fostering of the child’s growth, it has a specific end: to represent the experience of the human race, i.e., the state of human knowledge imbedded in the curriculum. As Dewey (1902a) put it, “the facts and truths that enter into the child’s present experience, and those contained in the subject-matter of studies, are the initial and final terms of one reality. To oppose one to the other is to oppose the infancy and maturity of the same growing life; it is to set the moving tendency and the final result of the same process over against each other; it is to hold that the nature and the destiny of the child war with each other” (p. 278). From a pedagogical standpoint, Dewey (1902a) thus contended that the teacher is incapable of guiding the child’s growth if the adult knowledge is not “drawn upon as revealing the possible career open to the child” (p. 279). In other words, “the systematized and defined experience of the adult mind is of value to us in interpreting the child’s life as it immediately shows itself, and in passing on to guidance or direction” (p. 283).

Indeed, Dewey’s pedagogy is entirely rooted in recapitulation theory understood in this way. Without it, the experience of humanity throughout history is not the end of a single process—the educational or growth process—whose initial term is the child’s experience. Without it, the curriculum does not reveal “the real child to us”; the teacher is thus incapable of knowing “in what direction the present experience [of the child] is moving” (p. 279). Direction, guidance, and even education are then impossible, because the teacher simply cannot “see to it that day by day the conditions are such that their own activities [i.e., those of the children] move inevitably in this direction, toward such culmination of themselves”; he simply cannot “let the child’s nature fulfill its own destiny” (p. 291), because this destiny is not revealed to him in the curriculum, which is no longer conceived as the final terminus of the educational process. Dewey puts it thus in a fascinating passage from his 1938 work “Experience and Education”:

Every experience is a moving force. *Its value can be judged only on the ground of what it moves toward and into.* The greater maturity of experience which should belong to the adult as educator puts him in position to evaluate each experience of the young in a way which the one having the less mature experience cannot do. It is then the business of the educator to see in what direction an experience is heading. There is no point in his being more mature if, instead of using his greater insight to help organize the conditions of the experience of the immature, he throws away his insight. Failure to take the moving force of an experience into account so as to judge and direct it on the ground of what it is moving into means disloyalty to the principle of experience itself. (p. 21; emphasis added)

If one does not presuppose or accept, as Dewey did throughout his educational and pedagogical writings, the continuity of experience principle, which can be understood as Dewey’s own interpretation of recapitulation theory viewed in the light of his philosophy of experience (if one
is thus disloyal to this principle), one simply cannot evaluate or judge the child’s experience, simply because one has no idea of what it moves toward and into. Therefore, without this continuity of experience principle, Dewey’s pedagogy falls.

If Dewey considered education to be a process whose initial and final terms are the child’s experience and the curriculum, i.e., the experience humanity as a race has had throughout history, the philosopher also isolated a series of intermediate stages between these initial and final terms. These intermediate stages are all subsumed in Dewey’s continuity of experience principle. These stages of the child’s development, from the Deweyan perspective, constitute just as many moments of the civilization process, of the evolution of the human logical thought.

2. John Dewey’s Stage Theory of Development

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the social sciences were pervaded with the idea that the human mind, whether that of the individual or that of humanity as a race, progressed through a series of developmental stages.¹ This idea was commonplace at the time, and constituted a topos in American social science scholarship. In that regard, John Dewey was not an exception: like many of his peers, he subscribed to the belief that children develop through a series of stages that corresponds with the logical growth of the human race. In his pedagogical writings, Dewey thus proposed, as Thomas D. Fallace (2010; 2011) shows in “The Mind at Every Stage” and Dewey and the Dilemma of Race, a typology of the stages of the child’s growth that was linked with another one: the four stages of human logical thought. In the following pages, we will briefly review these two typologies that Fallace studies in depth elsewhere.

2.1. Stages of child development

Dewey insisted on the fact that his typology grew not so much out of anthropology, but from psychology and child-study (Dewey and McLellan, 1895, p. 18). According to Fallace (2010), this typology is composed of four different stages:

The educative period of life, covering the first twenty to twenty-five years, may be roughly subdivided into four stages: (1) Early infancy, lasting two or two and a half years; (2) Later infancy, extending to the sixth or seventh year; (3) Childhood to the thirteenth of fourteenth year; and (4) Youth. (Dewey, 1900b, p. 194)

2.1.1. Early infancy

Early infancy, which lasts until the child’s thirtieth month, is a sensitive-motor stage during which the child learns to master his body. For Dewey, sensitive observations and motor interactions with the environment are early infancy’s keynote features (Fallace, 2010, pp. 137-139; Tanner. 2016, p. 13).

As Dewey explains it, during the first six months of life, the child gains a certain degree of “bodily

¹ This idea served as the basis for the developmental approach in psychology and education, notably that of Jean Piaget. On this issue, see Boring (1950); Egan (2004); Fallace, “Recapitulation Theory” (2012); Gould (1977); and Stocking (1968; 1987).
control”; he or she learns “a few simple adjustments,” i.e., to master and coordinate his sensitive organs. This mastery is followed by the construction of “a simple world of objects.” The child then goes on to learn “to manage the body, not only at rest, but also in motion,” that is, “to creep and walk.” The child then extends acquaintance with the things that surround him or her, thus making “simple and crude connections of objects.” At the age of twelve or fifteen months, the instinct of imitation develops: the child “now endeavors to make the simple movements of hand, of vocal organs, etc., already in his possession the instruments of reproducing what his eye and his ear report to him of the world about him” (Dewey and McLellan. 1895, pp. 15-16). For Dewey, this second period lasts approximately until the child is thirty months old.

2.1.2. Later infancy

Later infancy, which lasts until the age of seven, is a stage in which the child develops a conscious control of and an awareness of his body and activities: It is the “period of ideal coordination,” of “imaginative activities,” and of the “play period” (Dewey, 1895, p. 299).

This second stage constitutes the first stage of elementary education. It is “characterized by directness of social and personal interests, and by directness and promptness of relationship between impressions, ideas, and action” (Dewey, 1900a, p. 73). Dewey (1896) considers this stage to be one “of Free Use of Formed Co-ordinations” (p. 310). From a pedagogical standpoint, social occupations should stand in the foreground, because “in connection with these occupations the historic development of man is recapitulated” (Dewey, 1900a, p. 14).

2.1.3. Childhood

Childhood is the “period of symbolism, of recognition of meaning, of significance,” and lasts until the age of thirteen (Dewey and McLellan, 1895, p. 17). This period is especially important for Dewey because, according to him, it is a “period of intense motor activity” during which the child’s “energy is … being consumed in the building up of connections and adjustments which refine and complicate the powers already attained.” At this point, “a distinctive intellectual interest” (Dewey, 1895, p. 299) emerges, fostering the emergence of other interests for tools and symbols. From a pedagogical standpoint, childhood is the second stage of elementary education. The three R’s are then introduced as “the keys which will unlock to the child the wealth of social capital which lies beyond the possible range of his limited individual experience” (Dewey, 1900a, p. 77). Just as in the earlier stage, teaching always occurs through social occupations because “they, more than any other study, more than reading or geography, story-telling or myth, evoke and direct what is most fundamental and vital in the child; that in which he is the heir of all the ages, and through which he recapitulates the progress of the race” (Dewey, 1901a, p. 235).

2.1.4. Youth

According to Dewey (1900b), youth lasts until the age of twenty or twenty-five and marks “the epoch of securing the final adjustment on the part of the individual of himself to the fundamental features of life.” It is the stage during which the young individual’s development and that of the race in its history meet. Dewey subdivided this stage into two periods: “That of pubescence from … thirteen to eighteen,” and “that of adolescence proper.” Pubescence is “a period of tremendous
enlargement of the sphere of interests, of the range of ideas and of stimuli of action” (p. 216). Then an “interest in reflective analysis,” an “introspective interest,” and a “conscious aesthetic interest” arise and ripen (Dewey, 1895, p. 299). As for adolescence, Dewey considered it to be the “reflective period.” From this moment on the individual seeks to contribute actively to the production of new knowledge and scholarship as well as to the betterment of society. “In history, in literature, in science, the tendency at this time is to see larger wholes, to try to gather together the facts otherwise scattered and to mass them as parts in the comprehensive whole.” At this stage, there is a shifting of the center of gravity in interest from the individual to the race; the adolescent “tends to go beyond the limitations of his own particular experiences, to escape from the bonds of his own individual limitations and to discover and lose himself in the world of humanity … the world which the race has formed for itself” (Dewey, 1900b, p. 217). At this point, the young individual finishes reconstructing the experience of the human race, strictly speaking, and sets about contributing actively to the construction of that experience.

These four stages of child development are, by virtue of the continuity of experience principle, closely correlated to the steps through which mankind has progressed in history.

2.2. Stages of race development

As Fallace (2010) demonstrates, Dewey confronted directly the issue of the development of the human race through history in a 1900 article published in The Philosophical Review titled “Some Stages of Logical Thought” (1900c). In it, he exposed “a variety of modes of thinking, easily recognizable in the progress of both the race and the individual” (1900c, p. 465; emphasis added). The term “progress” is to be understood in the strict sense of the word, since these modes of thinking constituted, for Dewey, “some of the main stages through which thinking … actually passes in its attempt to reach its most effective working; that is, the maximum of certainty” (p. 465). Dewey goes on to distinguish four stages of logical thought.

2.2.1. Primitive communities

In the first stage of logical thought, “ideas are treated as something fixed and static.” Drawing upon the social psychology scholarship of his time, Dewey (1900c) considered that “an apt illustration” of these fixed ideas was found “in the rules prevalent in primitive communities” (p. 468). These fixed ideas, these social customs, were “no less real than physical events”; indeed, they were “facts,” and carried “with them certain sanctions” which could go up to the physical suppression of the individual who departs from them. As Dewey (1900c) explains it, thought, in this stage, is pre-judgmental rather than judgmental: “The attitude is uncritical and dogmatic in the extreme—so much so that one might question whether it is to be properly designated as a stage of thinking” (p. 470). However, as the complexity of life advanced, “a certain degree of inquiring and critical attitude” emerges (p. 469), thus opening the way to the second stage of logical thought.

2.2.2. Ancient Greek societies

The emergence of this new way of thinking was due to a kind of inflation of customary rules: “As the scheduled stock of fixed ideas grows larger, their application to specific questions becomes more difficult, prolonged, and roundabout.” Consequently, a “hunting for the specific idea which
is appropriate” (Dewey, 1900c, p. 471) to each particular case begins. Individuals were forced to discuss and compare the different fixed ideas that existed in order to solve each particular problem the community faced. Judgment thus became “legislative.” According to Dewey (1900c), this second stage was typified in Hebrew history and, more specifically, in ancient Greek societies. In these societies, through meetings of assemblies, a new and constant emphasis was put upon discussion, thus creating “a marked departure from positive declaration of custom” (p. 472). Thus ancient Greek culture, where discussion was of paramount importance, contributed to a transformation of the individual himself: “He became a miniature social assemblage, in which pros and cons were brought into play struggling for the mastery—for final conclusion. In some such way we conceive reflection to be born.” However, as Dewey contended, under the Sophists’ influence, this culture of discussion led to a kind of subjectivism and skepticism; “Where all was fixity, now all is instability: where all was certitude, nothing now exists save personal opinion based on prejudice, interest, or arbitrary choice” (Dewey, 1900c, p. 473).

2.2.3. Medieval Scholasticism

The third stage of logical thought was that of “medieval scholasticism” (Dewey, 1900c, p. 482). This third period, better illustrated in “the reaction of the Socratic school against the Sophistic” (Dewey, 1900c, p. 475), is characterized by the acceptance of certain “fundamental truths unquestioned and unquestionable, self-evident and self-evidencing, neither established nor modified by thought, but standing firm in their own right” (1900c, p. 478)—namely Aristotelian logic. With this logic affording “the precise instrumentality through which the vague and chaotic details of life could be reduced to order by subjecting them to the terms of authoritative rules” (Dewey, 1900c, p. 479), a new mode of thinking emerged, which took the syllogism form. This new mode of thinking then led to “the transformation of discussion into reasoning, of subjective reflection into method of proof” (1900c, p. 476). However, according to Dewey (1900c), this thought remained narrow because it never questioned the fixed premises of the syllogism; reasoning in this stage then had only a formal value, thus contrasting with the expert or laboratory thought, which constitutes the last and final stage of logical thought.

2.2.4. Modern science and democracy

“Modern scientific procedure,” “inductive and empirical science,” defined “the ideal and limit of this process” (Dewey, 1900c, p. 486). In this stage, thought took the form of inference: “Inventio is more important than judicium, discovery than ‘proof’” (Dewey, 1900c, p. 483). This new form of thinking was that of the expert who strove to discover new ways of explaining the world. Theories and ideas were then no longer “fixed,” “static,” or “ultimate”; they were no longer outside of the world of experience; they were no longer part of a logically hierarchical order founded by an idea considered to be “the ultimate truth.” Rather, as Dewey (1900c) explained, “there is substituted for the hierarchical world, in which each degree in the scale has its righteousness imputed from above, a world homogeneous in structure and in the scheme of its parts” (p. 485). In this stage, sciences gradually specialize and modern disciplines emerge. According to Dewey (1900c), this specialization correlates to democracy: “When interest is occupied in finding out what anything and everything is … the observable world is a democracy” (p. 485).

Thus, Dewey distinguished four stages—albeit historically unconvincing—by which logical
thought has passed throughout history in order to reach its most effective working, namely scientific and democratic modern thinking. By this means, Dewey shows that thinking, as a knowing process, progressively acquires its knowledge in a genesis similar to that of ontogenesis. The history of logical thinking, as well as that of the child’s development, is the history of a progressive de-centering from auto-centered and purely subjective conceptions to a scientific mode of thinking focused on the object.

If Fallace (2010) accurately describes these stages of child’s growth and of human logical thought, saying that “humans develop through distinct, observable stages of consciousness that correspond with the intellectual development of the race” (p. 129), he overestimates the degree to which Dewey was a genetic psychologist. Indeed, as we saw earlier, if Dewey did believe that a child has to reconstruct the experience the human race has had throughout history, this did not imply that he believed that this child learned and thought differently from the civilized adult. On the contrary, as early as 1899 Dewey stressed the importance of recognizing the “psychological identity” between the child and the adult:

With the adult we unquestioningly assume that an attitude of personal inquiry, based upon the possession of a problem which interests and absorbs, is a necessary precondition of mental growth. With the child we assume that the precondition is rather the willing disposition which makes him ready to submit to any problem and material presented from without. Alertness is our ideal in one case; docility in the other. With one we assume that power of attention develops in dealing with problems which make a personal appeal, and through personal responsibility for determining what is relevant. With the other we provide next to no opportunities for the evolution of problems out of immediate experience, and allow next to no free mental play for selecting, assorting and adapting the experience and ideas that make for their solution. How profound a revolution in the position and service of text-book and teacher, and in methods of instruction depending therefrom, would be effected by a sincere recognition of the psychological identity of child and adult in these respects can with difficulty be realized. (Dewey, 1901b, p. 134-135; emphasis added)

As Robert B. Westbrook (1991) demonstrates, “it was precisely this revolution that Dewey aimed to effect” in his educational and pedagogical writings (p. 98). In the Deweyan perspective, one then must sincerely recognize this “psychological identity” of child and adult; both learn in the exact same way through interaction with their environment. As Dewey (1902b) explained in his 1902 essay on savage mind, “the biological point of view commits us to the conviction that mind, whatever else it may be, is at least an organ of service for the control of environment in relation to the ends of the life process” (p. 41). Thus, the child, the savage, and the civilized adult must all be considered first and foremost “intensely active” beings who think and learn from experience by trying to resolve the specific problem they face in their own environment. Consequently, the child, the primitive, the adolescent and the adult can all be considered “social constructivists” (Fallace, 2010, p. 146). This allows us to understand the specific sense Dewey (1900a) gave to education when he said, “The question of education is the question of taking hold of [the] activities [of the child], of giving them direction” (p. 25). The only difference that exists between the child, the savage, and the civilized adult is that they are located at various “stage[s] and phase[s] of the development of experience” (Dewey, 1902a, p. 285), that is, at different locations along a
hierarchical process that can be represented in terms of verticality, i.e., Dewey’s continuity of experience principle. Consequently, there is no discontinuity (Prawat, 2000) or “shift” (Fallace, 2010, p. 146) in Dewey’s pedagogy, but rather continuity (Garrison, 2001), because the continuity of experience principle pervades the philosopher’s entire educational writings, from his earlier to his later works, from “My Pedagogic Creed” (1897) to “Experience and Education” (1938). That this continuity of experience principle is a reinterpretation of recapitulation theory viewed in the light of Dewey’s philosophy of experience is fraught with implications regarding the limitations of Dewey’s own pedagogy. Indeed, one can see that Dewey was in fact struggling with the evolutionary scheme in which his entire thinking is rooted, but without renouncing such an evolutionary perspective. Here, Fallace (2009) is right when he argues for the need to understand Dewey in the intellectual currents of its time, showing that his pedagogical and educational writings carry with them hierarchical implications that cannot be dismissed easily (Fallace, “Repeating the Race Experience,” 2009, p. 402).

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I have demonstrated that the continuity of experience principle, which lies at the heart of Dewey’s educational and pedagogical work, consists fundamentally of a Deweyan reinterpretation of recapitulation theory in education, viewed in light of his philosophy of experience. This interpretation implies a clear departure from genetic psychology while still subscribing to its main idea, namely that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” It is this close relationship between the continuity of experience principle and recapitulation theory that clarifies the specific sense given to the *via media*, or middle way, that Dewey tried to achieve throughout his educational writings. Dewey was thus an educational philosopher who used recapitulation theory to lend scientific support to his entire pedagogical and educational philosophy. Consequently, and despite the deep elaboration that characterized his work, one cannot consider Dewey’s pedagogy and education without discussing, justifying, as well as bringing up to date the theoretical presuppositions that underlie them, particularly the specific meaning the philosopher gave to the continuity of experience principle. Indeed, far from being contingent or fortuitous, this principle lies at the very foundation of Dewey’s entire educational and pedagogical philosophy.
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The Critical Body: Toward a Pedagogy of Disruption

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Introduction

In the present essay we attempt to explore the question of the body and its relation to what is called critical thinking. By engaging with the philosophy of Jacques Rancière, we want to suggest a view of critical thinking that takes the body into account. We call this a move toward embodied critical thinking, which includes a disruption of the mind-body dichotomy. This disruption, in turn, is part of what we propose to call a pedagogy of disruption. We specifically focus on disability studies and the dominance of speech and hearing, not only in philosophy, but also in theories of education. We suggest renewed approaches to teaching by giving practical examples which include specific pedagogical situations where a disruptive pedagogy can alter the prevalent hierarchy of mind over body.

Perhaps Rancière’s most well-known concept is what he terms the ‘partage du sensible,’ often translated as a ‘distribution of the sensible.’ The keyword in Rancière’s concept is partage, because of its double meaning, since it signifies both partaking of and inclusion as well as partition, a closing off, and excluding. Interestingly, the ambiguity of partage that Rancière emphasizes in his use of the word has also been embraced by Jacques Derrida, and we would like to begin by referring to the last sentence in Jacques Derrida’s (2005) reading of Paul Celan’s poetry in the published version of his lecture “Shibboleth: For Paul Celan.” What is noteworthy, considering the philosophies of Derrida and Rancière, is that Derrida had used the double meaning of partage already in 1984 in his lecture on Celan.1 We see this in the last sentence of “Shibboloeth” which

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1 We are, to put it bluntly, hinting at the notion of ἀρχή, as used by Rancière, implying someone who leads, or who walks in front, as well as an origin or beginning. For reference, Aristotle identifies six different meanings of ἀρχή, which are catalogued and explained in his Metaphysics (1012b33-1013a23). Now, in his essay paying homage to Derrida, “Does Democracy Mean Something?” Rancière (2010a) starts out by stating: “I have never been a disciple of Derrida, nor a specialist of his thought. Since I had him as a teacher, very many years ago, there has been no opportunity to discuss philosophical questions with him. The tribute that I can pay him, then, cannot take the form of a commentary on his work” (p. 45). This statement provides, perhaps, an understatement of Rancière’s knowledge of Derrida’s work. And although it is next to impossible to show intentional influence with absolute certainty, the fact that Derrida uses the word partage in the same manner as Rancière later developed it and made it a salient part of his thinking is interesting, given the prominence of the word in Rancière’s philosophy. Moreover, the benefits one can get out of reading Rancière with or through Derrida are considerable. One such benefit, we suggest in the present essay, is a comparative analysis of speech (λόγος) and voice (φωνή)—prominent notions in both Rancière’s and Derrida’s work. Could we, then, say that Derrida’s
Permettez-moi de laisser tomber ceci, en forme d'envoi ou de shibboleth, c'est-à-dire dans l'économie d'une ellipse. Elle n'a cours que dans telle ou telle langue donnée en partage, ici la mienne, en forme de signature aujourd'hui : la circoncision—date. (Derrida, 1985, “Schibboleth: Pour Paul Celan,” p. 113)

Permit me to let fall, by way of envoy or shibboleth, that is to say, in the economy of an ellipsis that circulates only in the partaking and partition of a given language, here my own, by way of signature here, today, this: circumcision—dates. (Derrida, 2005, “Shibboleth: For Paul Celan,” p. 64)

There is much to be said about the translation as regards the French version and its English translation, not to speak of the intricate and difficult implications the passage has even in its original French. For example, the French word ‘envoi’ does not only mean ‘envoy,’ as the English translation would have it, but also signifies the concluding passage or explanatory remarks of a poem, and the sending of a message, and, to return to the keyword ‘partage,’ to the partaking and partition, that is to say to the inclusion and exclusion, of a certain language. These words and their potential translations, we contend, raise the question of possession and by extension of appropriation, which in turn raises the issue of the body and of the possessing and appropriating of one’s own or an other’s body. When we engage in critique we thus engage with the question of the body and the partage, or, what amount to the same thing, the aporia that installs itself in the very thinking of body and mind as separate phenomena. It is a question, to be more precise, of including while excluding, which it is imperative to address when considering ableism in education and critical thinking.

Hence, what we would like to develop further in the following is how the body, as the partage of the mind, can emerge within a pedagogy of disruption as embodied critical thinking. We will, consequently, broach the question of the body of language and the language of the body. When these languages translate each other, they do so by way of disruption—by breaking apart the presuppositions governing the mind-body dichotomy, and by staging the partage at play in any understanding of and any practice of body and language.

**Rancière and Aristotle: Dissensus and Ἀδιάκριτος**

thinking is the ἀποχή of at least some parts of Racière’s philosophy? Perhaps more than Rancière wants to admit.

1 Ableism refers to the oppressive conditions produced by the set of beliefs and actions in society which value abled bodies over disabled bodies. That which is typical for the human species, the corporeal standard, is projected as the perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human (Campbell 2008). In critical disability studies theory, the concept of ableism is employed to focus on perceptions of majority society which reproduce the notion that disability is a diminished state of being (Campbell, 2009). The objective of studies in ableism is to lay bare hierarchializing assumptions and to disrupt them, which provides openings for interrogating normality.
An important concept that Rancière’s philosophy circles around is the concept of dissensus. In Rancière’s (2011) own contribution to the anthology Reading Rancière, “The Thinking of Dissensus: Politics and Aesthetics,” he sets out to answer the question “What does it mean to think politics and aesthetics under the concept of dissensus?” In explaining what he means by dissensus, Rancière (2011) refers to his reading of Aristotle:

Aristotle tells us that slaves understand language but don’t possess it. This is what dissensus means. There is politics because speaking is not the same as speaking, because there is not even an agreement on what a sense means. Political dissensus is not a discussion between speaking people who would confront their interests and values. It is a conflict about who speaks and who does not speak, about what has to be heard as the voice of pain and what has to be heard as an argument on justice. (p. 2; emphasis in the original.)

This passage makes clear that for Rancière, dissensus in politics is a concept that designates conflict, and more precisely a conflict about language, which means language as connected to the body, since he states that “slaves understand language but don’t possess it.” This is so since slaves do not possess their body—they are possessions, and they, in consequence, are possessed by their possessor’s language. They are, to put it bluntly, possessions possessed by a foreign language. To be sure, this is true, also, of certain groups of people in society today. Nevertheless, Rancière’s statement that “Aristotle tells us that slaves understand language but don’t possess it” leads us to attend to the passage in Aristotle to which Rancière is referring. The passage reads as follows:

Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another’s, and he who participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend reason [logou]; they obey their passions. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labour, the other upright, and although useless for such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. (Aristotle, 1991, Politics, 1254a24-1255a3)

What Aristotle describes here is the result of a separation, with its origin in the sign. As Rancière (1999) states at the outset of Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, the sign is closely connected to politics—that is, the sign as representing speech on the one hand and the voice on the other. Speech, which is the translation of λόγος, is in Rancière’s reading of Aristotle connected to questions of ethics, to “good and evil,” while voice, which is the translation of φωνή, is reserved for those who can only feel “pleasure and suffering.” This is a difference, Rancière holds, “between two modes of access to sense experience” (p. 2). What is more, this difference and separation is what characterizes “politicity of a superior kind, which is achieved in the family and the city-state” (p. 2). It is, in other words, a question of the supremacy of the λόγος over the φωνή, viz, of the relation between what Rancière views as the difference between λόγος and φωνή, namely
the difference of the sign as expression (speech) and the sign as indication (voice). This is what Rancière means when he states that “speaking is not the same as speaking.” However, a pressing question to ask here is one of translation: How should we, to begin with, translate λόγος in the passage cited from Aristotle’s *Politics*? Rancière refers to it in the above passage as speech, while most translators of Aristotle translate it as reason. The word is, of course, infamously polysemous, which means that how we choose to translate the word, and so assign to it a specific meaning, brings with it precisely a *partage du sensible*. In other words, the translation installs a way of seeing and understanding, which inevitably not only distributes, but also shuts off possible ways of seeing and understanding. It is, indeed, as Rancière points out, a question of what λόγος comes to mean, as in the question “Do you understand?” This question installs λόγος as more than a simple answer to the question. For example, as Rancière explains, the question does not only ask for understanding, but also asks for obedience. And apprehending λόγος means being obedient and obviously makes the question rhetorical. The question “Do you understand?” thus transforms into an imperative, meaning, in effect, “Do as I say!” Hence, as Rancière insists, “he who participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have, is a slave by nature.”

Now, when it comes to politics and the translation of λόγος, we must first look to Rancière’s (1999) definition of politics in *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, where he states that the inception of politics involves “a major wrong”: “The wrong by which politics occurs is not some flaw calling for reparation. It is the introduction of an incommensurable at the heart of the distribution of speaking bodies” (p. 19). The incommensurable, we suggest, is also the double character of λόγος, and we find this incommensurability in Aristotle. Again, it is a question of translation, and, as we will see, even the impossibility of translation. Thus, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, speaking on the subject of happiness, Aristotle (1934) introduces the notion of excellency in relation to politics, from which he goes on to broach the question of the rational and irrational parts of the soul. He finds that the rational and irrational share the same doubleness of the λόγος:

Thus we see that the irrational (ἄλογον) part, as well as the soul as a whole, is double. One division of it, the vegetative, does not share in rational principle at all; the other, the seat of the appetites and of desire in general, does in a sense participate in principle, as being amenable and obedient to it (in the sense in fact in which we speak of “paying heed” [ἔχειν λόγον (echin logon)] to one’s father and friends, not in the sense of the term “rational” in mathematics). And that principle can in a manner appeal to the irrational part, is indicated by our practice of admonishing delinquents, and by our employment of rebuke and exhortation generally. (1102b25)

This passage (especially the parenthetical note), as the translator of Aristotle underscores, is next to untranslatable.¹ The doubleness and tautological character of λόγος (λόγος is λόγος) thus gives

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¹ H. Rackham states in a note to his translation of the passage, “This parenthetical note on the phrase ‘to have logos’ is untranslatable, and confusing even in the Greek. According to the psychology here expounded, the intellect ‘has a plan or principle,’ in the sense of understanding principle, and being able to reason and make a plan: in other words, it is fully rational. The appetitive part of man’s nature ‘has a plan or principle’ in so far as it is capable of following or obeying a principle. It happens that this relationship of following or obeying can itself be expressed by the words ‘to have logos’ in another sense of that phrase, viz. ‘to take account of, pay heed to.’ To be precise the writer should say that the appetitive part λόγον ἔχει τοῦ λόγου ‘has
Rancière a foundation for engaging in the necessary assignment of meanings to λόγος, which in turn differentiates between those who possess, that is, those who have the ability or disposition (ἕξις) to understand, and those who simply can perceive or feel (αισθησίς) and so do not possess understanding. Rancière’s analysis of the ambivalence of λόγος in this way points to a disruption of Aristotle’s argument, specifically in Politics, about the “natural” hierarchy pertaining to man, woman, slave, and animal, in which man is considered the ἀρχή, the one who walks in front, leading, and possessing understanding, while the other categories of being are obeying and following, since they are merely capable of perceiving and feeling. This then, to reiterate, is what Rancière (1999) holds as being “the introduction of an incommensurable at the heart of the distribution of speaking bodies” (p. 19). And “distribution,” here, should be read in the double sense of partage, as that which includes while excluding.

This brief outline of what pertains to our argument in Rancière’s thinking is necessarily incomplete, but nevertheless points to the disruptive character of translation and understanding—the incommensurability of the tautology λόγος is λόγος—which makes up the ground or foundation (ἀρχή) of what Rancière calls, precisely, the incommensurable. It also opens up for a continued questioning regarding who speaks and who is allowed to speak, to include the question of the way that speaking is heard or seen or sensed. We want, to put it differently, to question the dominance of both λόγος and φωνή, and expand the notion of speaking to include all senses and the body as modalities of language and, as such, important aspects of being critical. Being critical, traditionally defined as having the knowledge and understanding necessary for a thinking defined as critical, would instead come to mean that the “critical” is displaced from the purely rational discourse of λόγος, when defined as reason, to include sensibility, the senses of seeing and touching (αισθησίς), which means a disruption of the λόγος, of the way critical thinking, as one of the major goals of education is traditionally conceived.

Rancière and Heidegger: Ontology, Politics, and Aesthetics

In the aforementioned chapter, “The Thinking of Dissensus: Politics and Aesthetics” (2011), Rancière presents us with what could be called an explanatory summary of his philosophy. In his explanation he touches on the difference between his thinking and ontology:

The global logic of my work aims at showing that pure politics and pure aesthetics are doomed to be overturned together in the radicalization of the infinite wrong or infinite evil. I try to think disagreement as the wrong that cannot be settled but can be processed all the same. This means that I try to keep the conceptualization of exception, wrong

logos (takes account) of the logos.’ The phrase has yet a third sense in mathematics, where ‘to have logos’ (ratio) means ‘to be rational’ in the sense of commensurable” (Aristotle, 1934, Nicomachean Ethics, note 6).

1 See Politics, 1254b5-26. It should be emphasized that Rancière is dealing here with the complex notion of ἕξις in Politics. He is not, it seems, specifically addressing the different meanings of ἕξις in Aristotle’s work generally, but is focusing rather on ἕξις and αἰσθησίς as describing the double nature of λόγος and its formative implications for the concepts of politics, democracy, and emancipation, which make up a seminal part of his thinking. For a discussion of ἕξις in Aristotle’s philosophy more generally, see, e.g., Rodrigo (2011).
or excess apart from any kind of ontology. The current trend has it that you cannot think politics unless you trace back its principles to an ontological principle: Heideggerian difference, Spinozist infinity of Being in Negri’s conception, polarity of being and event in Badiou’s thought, re-articulation of the relationship between potency and act in Agamben’s theory, etc. My assumption is that such a requirement leads to the dissolution of politics on behalf of some historico-ontological destiny process. (pp. 11-12)

Given these statements, it can be clarifying to look more closely at Heidegger’s analysis of politics and aesthetics, that is, at what Rancière refers to as the “historico-ontological destiny process” in Heidegger’s thinking which, according to Rancière, dissolves politics. We have chosen to refer to Heidegger’s Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister” to compare his thinking with Rancière’s, since this work addresses the concepts under discussion, namely politics, aesthetics, and λόγος. In his analysis of the Greek conception of πόλις, Heidegger (1996) states the following:

Toward the beginning of his Politics, Aristotle designates the human being as ζῷον πολιτικόν. Translated in a superficial way, this oft-quoted word means: “the human being is a political being.” In ascertaining this, however, people are content to let their knowledge of Aristotle’s Politics rest. No one asks why the human being is and is able to be a “political being.” One pays no attention to the fact that Aristotle also provides the answer to this question at the beginning of his Politics. The human being is a ζῷον πολιτικόν because the human being, and only the human being, is a ζῷον λόγος ἔχων—a living being that has the word, which means: that being that can address beings as such with respect to their being. (p. 83)

For our purposes, it is noteworthy that λόγος in ζῷον λόγος ἔχων is rendered as “the word” by Heidegger, which is of course important, given his emphasis on speech and language.1 Hence, Heidegger holds that the human being is able to be a political being in so far as it is a living being (Lebewesen) that has the word, which means its ability to ask about the being of beings. In other words, the human being is, first and foremost, a living being of language, and of the word, which does not necessarily mean that it is a rational being. Instead of distributing living beings between those who are rational and those who are not, as Aristotle does, Heidegger separates the beings who have language from those who do not possess language. And language here, for Heidegger, as well as for Rancière, means sounding speech.

Now, what Rancière opposes in Heidegger is what he calls, in the passage above, “the dissolution of politics on behalf of some historico-ontological destiny process,” in other words, the way Heidegger conceives of how being manifests itself for Dasein, as it appears or is “given” in its epochal destining for appropriation (Ereignis). Heidegger’s analysis of the Greek πόλις in Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister” is a case in point of exactly that “historico-ontological destiny process” which Rancière wants to avoid in his thinking of the wrong(s) that constitute(s) politics, that is, the ἀρχή of politics. The πόλις, Heidegger asserts, “is neither merely state, nor merely city, rather in the first instance it is properly ‘the stead’ [‘die Statt’]: the site [die Stätte] of the abode of

1 Two texts in which Heidegger addresses the topic of λόγος in detail are Plato’s The Sophist (1997) and Introduction to Phenomenological Research (2005). For a discussion on Heidegger’s reading of λόγος in Aristotle, see e.g. S. Elden (2005).
human history that belongs to humans in the midst of beings. This, however, precisely does not mean that the political has priority” (p. 82). Instead, the πόλις is that site which makes politics possible in the first place. It is where human beings are determined as beings, or what Heidegger calls the fitting-destining destiny which determines history: “For whatever is fitting [das Schickliche] determines destiny [das Geschick], and such destiny determines history [die Geschichte]” (p. 82). On the basis of this, Heidegger can sum up the essence of the πόλις:

The pre-political essence of the πόλις, that essence that first makes possible everything political in the originary and in the derivative sense, lies in its being the open site of that fitting destining [Schickung] from out of which all human relations toward beings—and that always means in the first instance the relations of beings as such to humans—are determined. The essence of the πόλις therefore always comes to light in accordance with the way in which beings as such in general enter the realm of the unconcealed. (Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,” 1996, p. 82)

This, then, is an instance of the “historico-ontological destinary process” which Rancière claims dissolves politics. Instead of a collective destinary movement of the history of the being of beings, Rancière emphasizes the singularity of wrongs which constitute politics, that is, politics is reconstituted with each ‘new’ and unique wrong that is voiced out of the distribution of the sensible that suppresses those without λόγος as reason. The notion of a destinary process is what Rancière calls “messianism,” and besides Heidegger and the names mentioned in the passage quoted above (Badiou, Negri, and Agamben), Rancière also includes Derrida as belonging to this movement. What messianism implies is an advent, a waiting for something or someone to come; in Heidegger’s case it is the being of beings, in Derrida’s case it is, Rancière claims, the notion of the Other.

Now, what Rancière (2010b) views as the essence of politics is, as noted, dissensus, by which he means “the demonstration (manifestation) of a gap in the sensible itself,” as he states in the eighth of his “Ten Theses on Politics” (p. 38). Furthermore, this gap in the sensible has to do with language and the ability to reason and understand. Rancière refers to Book I of Aristotle’s Politics, in which Aristotle defines the human being as a political being. As Rancière interprets Aristotle, “the sign of the political nature of humans is constituted by their possession of the logos, which is alone able to demonstrate a community in the aesthesis of the just and the unjust, in contrast to the phônê, appropriate only for expressing feelings of pleasure and displeasure” (p. 37). This, in turn, leads Rancière to deduce the following from Aristotle’s Politics: “If there is someone you do not wish to recognize as a political being, you begin by not seeing him as the bearer of signs of politicity, by not understanding what he says, by not hearing what issues from his mouth as discourse” (p. 38). Thus, to break out of the gap of dissensus, or the distribution of the sensible, those who are suppressed must make themselves seen and heard. In other words, it is a question of αἰσθητις, of perception and of being perceived. But in order to do this one has to have λόγος, that is, λόγος ἔχων, and the dominant and preferred λόγος is sounding speech. This is where Heidegger and Rancière intersect, despite their differences when it comes to thinking the πόλις, politics, aesthetics, and λόγος; that is, and again, they both favor a reading of λόγος as speech.1

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1 As Heidegger (1997) states in Plato’s Sophist: “Thus ἀληθευεῖν shows itself most immediately in λέγειν. λέγειν ("to speak") is what most basically constitutes human Dasein. In speaking, Dasein expresses itself—by speaking about something, about the world. This λέγειν was for the Greeks
It is, in consequence, necessary to examine this ableism closer, in order to disrupt it and so make way for a disruptive pedagogy, and we find the beginning of such a critique in Derrida’s reading of Husserl in *Speech and Phenomena*, namely a deconstruction of the self-presence of the voice, that is, what we have up until now called sounding speech.

**Rancière and Derrida: The Deconstruction of Φωνή**

The deconstruction of Φωνή is necessary in order to conceive of and develop a critical thinking which encompasses the body and the sensible, that is to say, a critical thinking which, precisely, incorporates the sensuous and somatic with λόγος as rationality and self-present living speech. The conception of such critical thinking would, we suggest, entail the development of a disruptive pedagogy, with the power to subvert the ableism of philosophy, conservative pedagogy, and traditional notions of academic critical thinking.

Thus, from the deconstruction of λόγος as speech, and so also of the voice (φωνή), a deconstruction perhaps most carefully executed in the chapter “The Voice That Keeps Silent” of Derrida’s reading of Husserl in *Speech and Phenomena*, it becomes clear that what Derrida terms the “supplement of origin,” the *différance* before the difference of inside and outside, and of the self-presence of the voice, encompasses a translation that contains a disruption of the λόγος as speech-voice and/as self-presence. Furthermore, it means that any distribution of the sensible cannot rely on the speech-voice of those who do not possess λόγος as reason, speech as expression, authority, etc., but must take into account (λόγος) the disruption of logocentrism as the dominance and supremacy of the voice and of living self-present speech. In a crucial passage in chapter six of *Speech and Phenomena*, Derrida (1973) states the following:

> This self-presence of the animating act in the transparent spirituality of what it animates, this inwardness of life with itself, which has always made us say that speech *parole* is alive, supposes, then, that the speaking subject hears himself *[s’entende]* in the present. Such is the essence or norm of speech. It is implied in the very structure of speech that the speaker hears himself: both that he perceives the sensible form of the phonemes and that he understands his own expressive intention. If accidents occur which seem to contradict this teleological necessity, either they will be overcome by some supplementary operation or there will be no speech. Deaf and dumb go hand in hand. He who is deaf can engage in colloquy only by shaping his acts in the form of words, whose telos requires that they be heard by him who utters them. (p. 78; emphasis in the original)

so preponderant and such an everyday affair that they acquired their definition of man in relation to, and on the basis of, this phenomenon and thereby determined it as ζῷον λόγος ἔχων’ (p. 12).

1 ‘Contain’ here should be read as meaning both control, restrain, suppress, etc., and include, encompass, etc., since translation, as it is conceived of here, is always idiosyncratic, that is, what Rancière would perhaps call poetical.
As Derrida argues, the perceived ground of speech is presence and the self-presence of the speaker and his/her ability to hear. In comparison, when Rancière (2011) states that “[w]hat is important to me is that this ‘reduction’ of scientific discourse to the poetical moment means its reduction to the equality of speaking beings” (p. 14), which is what Heidegger, through Aristotle, calls ζῷον λόγος ἔχων, he accounts for only those in possession of voice, of the φωνὴ, and thus those who are able to hear, which, importantly, is what makes equality possible. Even if his displacement of scientific discourse in favor of the poetical moment makes possible a rethinking of critical thinking in terms of a disruption of the λόγος as rationality, his insistence on the sign as phoneme, speech-voice, as being part of those without part, leaves him unable to account for and dismantle the logocentrism of the φωνὴ, which amounts to a forgetting of the dominance of speech and sensory perception (αἴσθησις). Rancière thus relies, as Derrida expresses it, on a “teleological necessity,” namely the teleological necessity of the voice and speech, which is equal to the messianism with which Rancière labels the thinking of Heidegger and Derrida, among others. One could even claim that Rancière’s insistence on the subversive αἴσθησις of speech follows the same movement as Heidegger’s ontological destiny process.

If we are to question and, hopefully, develop the concept of critical thinking, we should nevertheless pay heed to Rancière’s critique of the ἀρχή and the dominance of λόγος as rationality. However, we must not remain content with simply following Rancière, but instead, as we want to suggest, problematize his insistence on speech-voice as metaphors for the disruption of rationality and thinking as the sole means by which critical thinking, and so the struggle for equality, can be conceived. In other words, we have to take his notion of incommensurability seriously. As we suggest, this would mean critical thinking as a pedagogy of disruption, as we envisage it: an embodied criticality which honors each dis-ability as a power of disruption and a possibility for thinking otherwise.

**Translation as Disruptive Praxis: Disrupting Ableist Language**

Having returned to the texts of Aristotle through Rancière via Derrida (or vice versa), and implicating/involving Heidegger, we are now able to discern a different path by way of the body. Our previous work together in Disability Studies and Deaf Studies conversations puts in reach a way to disrupt through the concepts of ableism and audism. Following the lead of disability scholars in challenging norms and ideas of normality (Davis, 1995), and drawing on the theoretical potential of the ubiquitous phenomenon of disability as a “new normal” (Ginsburg and Rapp, 2001), we are able to contribute to developing a pedagogy of disruption. This ‘disrupting through disability’ is possible because of how the landscape of understanding shifts in the wake of the creation of new categories through medical technology, i.e., increased longevity through health care, the prematurely born, the newly diagnosed, and the new ways to be deaf, with cochlear implants (Ginsburg and Rapp, 2001, Adams Lyngbäck, 2016). Both concepts, disruption and disability, are disorienting in the ways they puncture similitude, this being of thought in the one case and of corporeality in the other. Sara Ahmed calls this a politics of disorientation (Ahmed, 2006, p. 21), where we analyze with both temporality (past texts, re-readings, translation) and spatiality (the body). This placing in time and space disrupts assumptions about the body in

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1 Audism is a type of ableism which perpetuates negative attitudes towards those who do not hear, which result in the stigmatization of deafness and of the use of sign languages.
philosophy, as presented in our argument above. Through an example in the classroom, the body as a site for disruption expands what it means to think critically. In this way we join others who through method “place disability in conversation with other concepts and worlds” (Friedner and Weingarten, 2019, p. 485). The choices a teacher makes are described as pedagogical disruptions which direct learners towards particular ways of understanding and away from other ones.

We now turn to a discussion of the body and the senses through which the communication of thought can be shared. The example we use involves the way hearing-deaf relationships have been studied and how historically there is evidence that the difficulty of translation from one modality is an existential matter in intimate relationships: the hearing parent and the deaf child in each unique meeting between people reach across their signed or spoken ways of being in the world (Adams Lyngbäck, 2016). The challenge faced by parents who are not deaf is that they often experience regret at not being like their child, which due to phonocentrism and audism is largely missing in the stories of their grieving. This aspect becomes clearer in studies centering on the body and affect in experience as parents move beyond wishing the child were hearing to wishing they as caretakers could communicate more easily and share in their child’s way of existing. What evolves in deaf-hearing relationships is that the knowledge of the difference of the other’s way of existing is known to each, and it is this spatial and ontological territory of the meeting of the two that provides our entry point into a pedagogical relation. This will shed light on how the incommensurable is a site for disruption of dominant forms of thought.

Logocentrism, in Derrida’s sense, is comparable to the concepts of ableism, audism, and linguicism—systems of dominance privileging forms of expression of thought (Encyclopedia of Disability, 2006; Wolbring, 2012; Humphries, 1975; Bauman, 2004, 2008; Eckert and Rowley, 2013; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2012). As with translation, if one system is forced through another, it will be distorted, mangled out of shape, and the meaning intended to be conveyed will become difficult to reach, like dimming the lights and turning up the sound in order to look at a painting or see a facial expression. This is a likeness to how critical thinking, when involving knowledge of another’s knowledge and knowledge of another’s experience, will always require an interrogating of one’s own way of being in the world. Susan Wendell points to this acknowledgment of relationality and its role in vulnerability (2008, p. 832). To study the role of the body in critical thinking, notions of privileging are examined in the mediums, modalities, abilities, sensory systems or language systems, and analyzed as a disruption of normative thought systems (Applebaum, 2017; DiAngelo, 2011; Gilson, 2011).

Examples of the hearing discovering the world of the deaf are well documented (Sachs, 1990; Lane, 1989, 1992; Lane, Hoffmeister and Bahan, 1996; Ladd, 2010). It perhaps is a clearer path to take to show how the philosophers discussed in this essay do not utilize the potential of visual language systems in their own thinking. This is a similar re-analysis to how feminist philosophers are able to lay bare the shortcomings of privileging one type of sex/gender over others, and how the societal roles in the days of those philosophers hindered their thinking in ways that are known to those outside of particular historical points who have other types of bodies (Davis, 1995; Zeiler and Käll, 2014; Ahmed, 2013). In the case of dis-ability, by the same token, this means each body, each dis-ability, provides alternative and complementary ways of sensing and being in the world, which can further what can be known about how humans think and communicate (Davis, 1995; Barnes, 2016).
For our purposes, in pedagogical relations, the notion of disruption as a way to break out of one’s own way of thinking is not only a priority in educational practices, but also holds the potential to serve as a defining characteristic of learning for the betterment of humanity (Baldwin, 1971; hooks, 2003, 2010, 2014). A shift or change in perspective of thought through the body must occur, a primacy of embodiment in experience which we have learned from de Beauvoir (1952) and Merleau-Ponty (2002), as a defining element of criticality. The problem is paradoxical as well; to know more you have to acknowledge ignorance; to be more certain about the nature of the world you have to aim to rest in uncertainty and aporia about what you already know or can expect (hooks, 2014).

In Disability Studies and Deaf Studies, the lives of people who are disabled, are hard-of-hearing, deaf or culturally Deaf, are the points of departure for these disciplines. We are careful to point out that in this essay, there is a moral sensitivity to utilizing ways of being in differentness to support our point, that experiences can unsettle oppressive ‘isms’ in philosophy and in higher education through redefining critical thinking as disruption. At the same time, it is a crucial step towards not reproducing the limitations we have identified in how language, body, and thought have historically been contemplated. A necessary contribution then is to challenge even these philosophically foundational assumptions. One way to do this is to examine the intellectualized view, position, way of thought, or way of seeing an issue in higher education, in classrooms, and in conservative pedagogy. Excluding the Other in research, the primary reason why the aforementioned disciplines emerged, is one manifestation of oppression which is repeated when loyalty to systems of knowledge production (universities) comes before loyalty to admitting to not knowing. Two components, the unveiling of logocentric-abled-audist-linguicist privilege and the instigating of a disruptive force of pedagogical movement based on the lived body and differentness, provide learners with sensory experiences which can in no other way be reached than through the stories of others, be it through literature, personal encounters, or intimate relationships. (We have but one body in which to think but require the bodies of others to think critically.) In Rancièrean terms, an aesthetics of disability involves sharing in a sense experience (as politics) through a distribution of the senses, for others to see/hear/feel/know about what it means to be disabled, have impairment; or to utilize a visual language, as it is in that moment that subjectivities arise and the dialogue with a political subject begins. To make this way of intervening (staging disruption, translation, partage) into a pedagogical action which broadens knowledge through approaching uncertainty (aporia, shibboleth, incommensurability, dissensus), responsibility for allowing the process to occur is not a question of ‘freeing the ignorant from their ignorance’ but of acknowledging the political role held through educational privilege and letting the body speak, through its tangible pain and vulnerability.

Disability literacy and allyship (Adams Lyngbäck, 2016) through embodied critical thinking transform the philosophical underpinnings of phenomenology and metaphysical dualism into disruptive pedagogy as praxis. It embarks from ambiguity about embracing difference and continues through exposing ableism in language and thought. This movement provides insight into alternative understandings about what knowledge is, and reveals the unfinished, cyclical, unsettled nature of criticality. A way to shift what one knows lies in the approach to the problem, dilemma, or study of a phenomenon. As numerous scholars of difference have taught us, to first acknowledge vulnerability, relationality, and the complicity of injustices which lie therein is how
learning occurs (LaChance Adams, 2014; Ahmed, 2006; DiAngelo, 2011; hooks 2000; Gilson, 2011; Wendell, 2008). Here the approach necessarily includes the letting go of “givens” through examining assumptions, and in so doing gives rise to new subjectivities, which brings us back to Rancière’s distribution of the sensible.

**Disruption in Pedagogical Engagement in the Classroom**

The student, a hearing, non-signing teacher in a deaf school, often spoke about the importance of taking on the task of helping the deaf to learn (Lane, 1992). The shortage of qualified and certified teachers who could also sign was often acknowledged and discussed as a structural discrimination in the group. This student taught with the support of an interpreter. She expressed a desire to want to learn to sign, but thought that the main objective was to instruct. Having a pragmatic attitude, she countered the repeated message of the rights of the Deaf to be taught in sign language with arguments about how a sincere teacher was more important than knowing sign language. When the subject came up in her workplace, which was dominated by hearing teachers, she felt supported in this position. In the university classes in the special education needs program for the deaf and hearing impaired, where there is a large number of proficient signers, the collective view was that bicultural and sign-bilingual environment was more important for learners, and this serves as the origin of the conflict.

This situation led the student to defend her view, a solidifying of her previous knowledge, rather than toward what the objective of higher education entails: a shift in thinking through critical reflection. She stated that she was being shut out, discouraged, discriminated against as a hearing person in the deaf education arena, particularly in how deaf advocates and organizations insisted on proficient signing in the education of the deaf. “I’m so tired of hearing about how I’m not good enough!” is the way she expressed it with tears in her eyes—an expression of what Appelbaum (2017) names ethical and epistemological closure, and DiAngelo describes as fragility in respect to racism (2011). An incomplete likeness, but one sufficient for this example, is the term *hearing fragility*, which refers to how the position of being victimized is occupied and utilized to ward off having to acknowledge collective harm to deaf individuals and deaf culture.

This incident occurred in response to a lecture on a recent ten-year struggle to reinstate a program which allows deaf teachers to have their own seminar conducted in a national sign language embedded in the structure of the university’s compulsory schoolteacher education program. Previously the requirement for permanent positions in the schools for the deaf had been an advanced degree in special education needs for the deaf and hearing impaired. This first required deaf teachers to gain a teaching degree, acquire teaching experience for a minimum of three years, and then apply for the advanced program, which required an additional one and a half years of fulltime studies in order to be able to teach in the official language of instruction in the schools for the deaf. As it was presented, this policy had changed due to the lack of teachers and the exodus of those with advanced degrees from the deaf schools to higher paying positions, and not necessarily to the language rights of the deaf. The student’s tearful reaction in the following discussion was in response to the lecturer’s conclusion that deaf students should be taught by deaf teachers or other native or native-level proficient signers.

There is a paradox about the body in the classroom; on the one hand there is hearing fragility through becoming a victim, which is an oppressive form of ignorance, and on the other hand there
is epistemic vulnerability as a necessity for learning (Gilson, 2011). The show of emotion through the body is the moment where the teacher can pinpoint a starting towards the understanding of others’ experiences, but it can also derail the project of learning from others’ life conditions. In the above example, the moment was occupied by the hearing student’s not being able to remain in uncertainty about the dilemma of the language gap. There were not only tears, but also aggression in the form of accusations that the deaf were being closed-minded. It is here that the crucial step can occur in order to disrupt. The disruptive moment and pedagogical potential can only be attained if the teacher can also utilize the dissen sus without it resulting in a closing off of what can be learned about another’s vulnerability, in this case that of the deaf students. How deaf people exist involves a language of the body, which was the instigator of the disruptive pedagogical moment. What is pedagogically necessary is to redirect this crying state, an expression of hearing fragility, back to where there is no victim, or dichotomy of oppressed-oppressor, but to a point where the conversation returns to audism, collective complicity, and shared responsibility for change.

The affect, the crying, the tone of voice, the standing up and moving to reach for the microphone, the loudly moving furniture with her body created a nearly aggressive atmosphere. This arrangement imprinted the incident in memory for some who witnessed it, giving it a possible potential for disruption even in the future for others not present. The outburst was then framed by the instructor as an ‘understandable reaction,’ but in this frustration there is a chance to see elements of the dilemma: inequality in education, lack of proficient teachers who can sign, the necessity for but inadequacy of hearing-deaf teacher teams, the discriminatory education policies involved in teacher qualifications, the role of bi-directional language comprehension and psycho-social identity in learning and conceptual development, etc. In this way, the instructor was able to divert away from the ‘crying hearing girl’ as victim, which would have derailed the discussion (hooks, 2010). Knowledge of how to use a disruptive moment as pedagogy requires awareness of the way societal norms lead to going to great lengths to not have to translate social issues into violence in addressing emotion in the classroom. Critically thinking about what is allowed to be said and done in a classroom in regard to making people uncomfortable or even allowing the uncomfortable to disrupt leads to showing how the student is responsible, as we all are, for the injustices which were embodied by the deaf professor. Classmates pointed out that a teacher who does not sign is better than no teacher, but that does not mean deaf students’ rights are not being violated and that we (hearing and deaf alike) do not need to do more to work for a solution. The ones who have the most ‘translation work’ to do in this scenario, because of the production of and adherence to audist norms, are the hearing, a basic tenet of what privilege in a social and political sense imbues. There is a choice between holding fast to the idea of ‘this is how things are’ and engaging in the emotional labor of learning what is vital to the task of guaranteeing deaf people's rights to learn. Avoidance of uncomfortable moments in classrooms make much disruption impossible. The above, as an example of a pedagogy of disruption involving the body and its untranslatable nature, and exhibiting the theorizing about language and embodiment, makes explicit how university teaching underutilizes the pervasiveness of human vulnerability as a vehicle of learning. Erinn Gilson (2011) examines the ‘epistemology of ignorance’ which sheds light on our discussion of disruptive pedagogical moments:

[E]pistemic vulnerability is what makes learning, and thus a reduction of ignorance,
possible. Undoing ignorance involves cultivating the attitude of one who is epistemically vulnerable rather than that of the masterful, invulnerable knower who has nothing to learn from other. (Gilson, 2011, p. 324)

In “Crying Time,” a chapter in bell hooks’ *Teaching Critical Thinking*, hooks points out how displays of emotion in classroom settings anchored in real-life events are viewed by educators (2010). In hooks’ texts we detect a paradoxical relationship between potential disruptions of homogenous and hierarchical ways of doing critical thinking and potential distractions from the violence of dominator culture. hooks writes,

> Weeping, crying, wailing, all displays of emotional intensity are feared in the classroom because they upset the hierarchy that would have us assume that the mind should always have dominion over the body and spirit. We are called to learn beyond the boundary of language, of words, where we share common understanding. We are called to learn from our sense, from our feeling states, and find their ways of knowing. If we allow for the possibility of tears, then an insurrection of subjugated knowledge may occur. (hooks, 2010, p. 83)

Lived experience as a development of theory owes its credibility to embodiment as epistemology (Ahmed, 2018; Ahmed, 2017) and to how the language of the body, as untranslatable, will continually require that a choice be made by an educator on whether to allow or silence a moment. Being able to allow the possibility of embodied emotion precedes the choosing between disruption and distraction. However, more than simply being able to allow for possibility, it involves actively planning for the recognition of the body as language as a way to deepen and develop critical thinking. We best deal and interact with the crying student, then, in and through the act of recognizing the incommensurability, the aporetic, as the defining characteristic of the point in time and space in which disruption emanates or dissipates, is soothed or felt as discomfort. A pedagogy of disruption involves the body and the critical.

**Conclusion**

The urgent need for a disruptive pedagogy that the above example gives us to contemplate cannot be overestimated. What we have argued for in this essay is the necessity of breaking with the prevailing suppression of the body in conservative and traditional education, a suppression which extends to the importance granted to critical thinking in higher education. We have, moreover, suggested that a disruptive pedagogy can provide a way out of the hegemony of Cartesian rationality. Thus, by taking our cue from Jacques Rancière’s philosophy, while at the same time remaining critical of it, we have proposed a re-evaluation of the voice in philosophical and educational discourse, and a decentering of the dominance of normalcy in education. To think critically, we have argued, we have to have the courage and patience to remain in disrupting pedagogical moments, emotional, bodily straining, and aporetic moments, in order to subvert the simplistic reliance on positivist educational traditions. In sum, we have tried to situate the pedagogy of disruption “in the economy of an ellipsis that circulates only in the partaking and partition of a given language,” to borrow the words with which Jacques Derrida concludes his “Shibboleth.”
References


Education and the Event: A Symposium
Introduction: Education and the Event

Elias Schwieler

While I am writing this introduction, there is a thunderstorm outside; lightning illuminates the almost black sky in irregular intervals. I’m waiting for the next lightning flash to come; I don’t know when it will come, but I know it is coming. And even though I know there will be another flash of lightning, at times I give up waiting, my attention dissipates, but then there it is, in a sudden flash of light. I continue to write and can’t help but thinking that this same anticipation, and loss of anticipation, happens in education, in teaching as well as in learning. Something happens (at times) outside the horizon of anticipation and expectation, and I learn; in the blink of an eye, I am given an insight into something difficult which suddenly becomes clear. In a flash of lightning, I know, I understand what I didn’t understand before.

Are these two examples, the flash of lightning in a thunderstorm and the sudden realization or understanding of something I am set to learn, descriptions of what can be considered an event? Are they events? To genuinely address these questions, we must first of all ask what it means for something to be an event. This in order to come closer to an answer to what an educational event, an event in or of education, could be. A flash of lightning is always singular; just like the signature, it occurs as a singular event within a general system. As Jacques Derrida (2007) says in the conference talk published as “A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event,” “[R]epetition must already be at work in the singularity of the event, and with the repetition, the erasure of the first occurrence is already underway” (p. 453). There is certainly repetition in the recurrence of lightning in a thunderstorm; lightning signs with its singular signature each time it strikes, it is recognizable, we know what to look for, we know how it looks, we know its general features, but still each time it is different, its singularity erased, as when we sign a formal document with our names. But the event, Derrida holds, must also be absolutely unexpected for it to be an event. Must it then, we might ask, occur as a bolt from the blue, as the idiom goes? This idiom is often misunderstood as describing a lightning bolt striking out of a clear sky, but the idiom, in fact, has its origin in ancient warfare, referring to a projectile fired from a crossbow. However, the idiom expresses, one could even say translates, the same sense of the unexpected as the Swedish idiom en blixt från klar himmel, meaning a flash of lightning from a clear sky. But if we examine the two idioms carefully, it becomes clear that the translation is not precise enough, since in war the possibility of a bolt from the blue is indeed possible, just like a flash of lightning during a thunderstorm. A bolt from the blue, or a flash of lightning in a thunderstorm, is thus not an event, since “[p]recisely because it’s possible,” says Derrida, “[i]t merely develops and unfolds a possibility, a potentiality that is already present and therefore it is not an event” (p. 450). The event, similar but not identical to the Swedish idiom, must appear to be impossible; it must remain absolutely unanticipated and unexpected.

Let’s visit another example. Take the notion of play, the game, as in a game of chess, a soccer or hockey game, in which we have to adhere to certain prescribed, agreed-upon rules, that is, what I called above a system of generality. Thus, each play, each game is different, singular, but still an event, albeit an event for which we indeed often have expectations. We know that it is coming, but we don’t know, exactly, what form and shape it will take. The excitement in attending a game
is, precisely, that we know the rules, the statistics of each team and player, but we don’t know how the game will be played out. We might expect a team or a player to win, but we can’t be sure, because each game is singular, repeating itself within the prescribed rules of the game as something new and never before witnessed. But since there are prescribed rules that make the game possible, must we not, with Derrida, say that the game “merely develops and unfolds a possibility, a potentiality that is already present and therefore it is not an event”?

How about Schiller’s theory of play? The “play impulse,” as he calls it, “would aim at the extinction of time in time and the reconciliation of becoming with absolute being, of variation with identity” (14th Letter). But if, as Schiller would argue, time is the time of the game, and play is becoming, and the game itself is absolute being, an event in which we discern identity in variation and variation in identity, then play as an event (the reconciliation of becoming and absolute being) is the possibility of being (i.e., the limits of play are also its possibility and potential), which, as we have seen, disqualifies it as an event in Derrida’s sense. So, if the event cannot be founded on rules and the consequences of the rules that would make an event possible (such as Hegelian dialectics, or Schiller’s notion of play), then we must with Derrida imagine it as im-possible, meaning that the event cannot be inscribed within the binarism of the possible-impossible dichotomy. The event must come as a flash from a clear sky; the event is without foundation, causality, and reason. Can there be such an event in education, within an educational setting or the pedagogical situation, that is, an im-possible event? Is the im-possible at all possible in education? Can we learn the im-possible?

The event as im-possible, as François Raffoul explains in the first essay of the symposium section of this issue, must be thought as being without reason, exceeding reason, pure eventfulness. As he states, the event as im-possible is “that which happens outside the conditions of possibility offered in advance by a subject of representation, outside the transcendental conditions of possibility.” Raffoul goes on in his essay to indicate how we can begin to or prepare for thinking the event in its im-possibility, which leads him to consider ethics and responsibility in relation to the event. Such a responsibility of the event he finds in Derrida’s analysis of hospitality. Hospitality, Raffoul asserts, can only come about without invitation; the one who comes, the arrivant, does so without invitation, unanticipated and unexpected. The arrivant is the one who exceeds my power as host, the one I have not prepared to welcome or refuse. The arrivant crosses the limits of expectation by disrupting the regulated traditions of reception. The one who comes, in this sense, arrives without warning, beyond the power of rational or causal explanation.

Jean-Luc Marion (2015) refers to Charles Baudelaire’s poem “A un passante” (“To a Passer-By”) to exemplify the futility of explaining the event. Baudelaire’s poem, Marion holds, stages an encounter with the unanticipated, free of causal or rational preconditions. As Marion has it, in Baudelaire’s poem “an event happens by the simple fact that this woman passes and I cross her path without having the least cause to render a reason for her presence or for my own” (p. 183). A chance meeting, not even a meeting, since the woman doesn’t even acknowledge the encounter; there is no reciprocal recognition that the encounter ever took place at all, but still, for the poet, it is an event, since it touched him by being, precisely, without cause or reason.

Another literary example, perhaps more closely related to hospitality, is the appearance of Leggatt in Joseph Conrad’s (2007) short story “The Secret Sharer.” The scene is the following: A captain
of a ship, new to his command, has unconventionally volunteered to take the first anchor watch. While pondering his isolation and unfamiliarity with the ship and his crew, he paces the deck and notices a rope side-ladder that has not been hauled in. He goes to correct the matter and haul the ladder in, but when he attempts to get the ladder over the railing, it does not budge. The captain, surprised, looks over the railing: “I saw at once something elongated and pale floating close to the ladder. Before I could form a guess a faint flash of phosphorescent light, which seemed to issue from the naked body of a man, flickered in the sleeping water with the elusive, silent play of summer lightning in a night sky” (p. 178). The appearance of Leggatt, the naked man in the water, arrives as a lightning flash, completely unexpectedly and seemingly without cause or reason. The captain, taken by surprise, is at a loss at what to do and how to act; “my first words were prompted by just that troubled incertitude. ‘What’s the matter?’ I asked in my ordinary tone, speaking down to the face upturned exactly under mine. ‘Cramp,’ it answered, no louder” (p. 179). This slightly comical interaction in a sense puts the finger on the almost absurd situation when faced with an absolutely unanticipated event. Without knowing who the man in the water is at this point, the captain takes him in, not knowing the man’s history or if he bears good or ill intentions. Yet the captain receives him and helps him aboard. We could say, then, that Leggatt’s visitation, as an arrivant, exceeds the power of the captain as host; the captain has no rules or conventions to apply, other than welcoming the uninvited man in the water to join him on the ship. Leggatt’s arrival carries with it the signs of a pure event. However, the captain’s gesture of welcome also necessitates keeping Leggatt secret. But I will end my reflection on Conrad’s story here before it leads too far into what a secret entails. Nevertheless, this literary encounter exemplifies, I would like to suggest, what Raffoul, with Derrida, considers the impossibility of hospitality: that is, the very eventfulness of this absolutely unforeseen visitation. Hospitality and the ethics of hospitality can have significant implications for how we as educators approach our encounters with both students and other learners, and pedagogical content in itself. And Raffoul’s essay provides a solid foundation for beginning to think the event and hospitality in terms of how they affect our educational practice.

James M. Magrini’s contribution, “The Enigmatic Figure of Socrates in Heidegger: A Pure Vision of Education as Attuned Event of Learning,” provides a thorough reading of Heidegger’s Socrates and how the lighting of Being as event informs learning. Magrini centers his essay on the importance of how an original learning event creates wonder and amazement (Erstaunen), and how this is depicted and thought in Heidegger and Plato. Another focus of importance for learning as event in Magrini’s essay is the notion of lighting. As Magrini states, connecting Heidegger’s thinking with Plato’s, “The lighting and enabling power of Being that Plato intimates in the [allegory of the cave] is the event and occurrence of ‘lighting’ within which Dasein participates when revealing and founding and grounding a world and appropriating a historical destiny.” Thus Magrini underscores that, with Heidegger, the original event of learning as lighting, or clearing, is necessarily ontological, upsetting Plato’s insistence of learning as an epistemological concern. This is, however, addressed by Heidegger through a confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with Plato, by attending to the unsaid in Plato’s thought. It is this confrontation, in the end, which gives rise to the amazement and wonder of the original event (Ereignis) of learning. It is the very performative act of Heidegger’s reading of Plato, and by extension of Magrini’s reading of Heidegger and Plato, that stages an event of learning, even beyond onto-theological Platonism and Heidegger’s early thinking in Being and Time, and leads toward or on the way to another way of thinking, being, and learning.
Another confrontation takes place in Klas Roth’s essay titled “A Free Flow Between Becomings and Becoming Imperceptible—Rare, but Possible.” Roth’s analysis centers on Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy, and specifically on how Deleuze might, in fact, not be as positive about the future of humanity as is propounded by some posthumanist scholars. This, then, constitutes the confrontation in Roth’s essay. But Roth’s analysis of Deleuze should not only be seen as a critique of posthumanism, since it elucidates and contextualizes Deleuze’s later thinking beyond its being a simple tool for Roth to deconstruct posthumanistic applications of Deleuze’s philosophy. Roth’s reading of Deleuze especially emphasizes his notions of becoming versus becoming imperceptible and active versus reactive forces, which Roth complicates (in a positive sense) to make them not be so easy and straight-forward as, for example, Rose Braidotti would have it when she exclusively focuses on the positive, active side of becoming. Conversely, Roth points out the inevitability of both reactive and active forces in our lives, and that there is always the possibility of a “pure event” which uncovers our singularity as beings (human and non-human). The importance for education that Roth highlights in his essay is, precisely, how we should cultivate a way of thinking that makes possible the development of becoming imperceptible. Such cultivation opens us up for the pure event of “singularization” which lets us, teachers and students, creatively reinvent ourselves, respond in an ethical way to reactive suppressive and repressive forces which hinder genuine thinking, learning, and development. The event of singularization as an educational event also creates lines of flight that can help us escape fixed and determined identities and stagnated ways of thinking, an escape which, in turn, lets us become other than what we are. What is more, these lines of flight, or disruptive events, imply new ways of learning as well as new ways of teaching. The educational event, thought in this way, reveals the heretofore unknown, that which appears only in a “fundamental encounter” with that which is yet unthought. This, Roth argues finally, is the real possibility and freedom: to balance the reactive and active, the destructive and the creative forces, which together let the singularization of the pure event be what we can become, is perhaps what a Deleuzian education would strive for.

Deleuze’s thinking is also prominent in Ingrid Andersson’s essay “The Relationship Between Common Sense and Thinking: Keeping with the Event in Education.” In her essay, Andersson analyzes the two concepts “common sense” and “thinking” through the lens of the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Hannah Arendt. She positions herself by exploring how the two concepts’ significance for education can be developed by reconciling the thinking of Deleuze and Arendt. The event in Andersson’s essay is to be understood, in relation to the two concepts common sense and thinking, as a linguistic and an exterior phenomenon. As Andersson makes clear in her reading of Deleuze, the event can be expressed through language but not captured in language, making the event exterior to linguistic expression. In other words, there is a significance inherent in the eventfulness of the event which cannot be reduced to signs; that is, the event must be translated to be known, and so turned into knowledge, but what is lost in translation is, precisely, the eventfulness of the event. In her reading of Arendt, Andersson relates to Deleuze’s contention of the event as trace by pointing out how for Arendt to imagine the event, it must be known, meaning already past, and so possible to represent as a significant event. It is only in this way, Arendt suggests, that we can judge an event justly. The judge of an event must be a witness to what has happened. And as Andersson succinctly states, “Thinking is always an afterthought; it comes after the event.” This Nachträglichkeit, to borrow a word from Freud, gives us, paradoxically, the promise of another thought yet to come. And it is in creation, creation without past, that we become; or, as Andersson has it, “[F]or both Arendt and Deleuze the main question is not what we
can know *but what we can become.*” This, to paraphrase Andersson, is the futural possibility of education.

In the final essay in the symposium, Andrew Gibbons introduces a notion of the event which is perhaps at the very heart of the event and eventfulness, namely love. Can we ever be sure of another’s love? Most of us know that, in the past, someone has loved us and said, “Yes, I love you.” But can we be sure? What knowledge is there to rely on? When do I know that there is love? Mutual love? There is always that event horizon that swallows my knowing and erases my certainty. Gibbons approaches the notion of love from the perspective of the film *Interstellar*, directed by Christopher Nolan, and, importantly, juxtaposes it with programmatic statements on the development and improvement of education, the bureaucratic promises of monetary and material support, often political, of people in charge of education. In *Interstellar*, as Gibbons shows, we encounter the clash between science and love, and the intricate question of which of the two, in the end, can save humanity (if this is possible).

So what, then, can the movie *Interstellar* teach us about love? And about the event of love in education? As an early childhood educator, Gibbons asks the important question of whether we can measure, scientifically, a child’s progress and development. And even if we can, should we? What *Interstellar* suggests, according to Gibbons, is that it is only as an event that love can be learned, that is, as “pure finding,” as Heidegger has it. In other words, love as an event that cannot be known and that so is impossible to measure and assess. The paradox, then, is that we need both science and love, but as Gibbons makes abundantly clear, love has been afforded neither time nor space enough in education today.

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These five essays, all concerned with the event and with the event as an educational phenomenon, make clear that there is another side to education than the insistence on the instrumental and scientific drive for accountability, which is the bureaucratic word for ethics. That other side, that other dimension, is a line of flight or escape, that fleeting idea of love, which refuses to be pinned down and determined by methods of assessment, learning outcomes and criteria, rubrics, and other instruments to objectify knowledge, which politicians are so eager to implement in order to gain votes and approval. What the essays in the symposium show is the importance of that which is unsaid, the inexpressible, in any representation of knowledge. Taken together, the symposium essays show the paradoxical necessity of translating into words the very eventfulness of the event in education, an eventfulness which can only strike like lightning from a clear sky.
References


Thinking the Event

François Raffoul

Introduction

In the pages that follow, I will attempt to identify several features of the event which I explored in my recent book, *Thinking the Event* (2020). In this work, I have attempted a philosophical inquiry into what constitutes an event as an event, its very eventfulness: not what happens, not why it happens, but that it happens, and what “happening” mean: not the *eventum*, what has happened, but the *evenire*, the sheer happening of what happens. By the expression “thinking the event,” I do not mean the appropriation by thought of the event, under the authority of the principle of reason. Rather, “thinking the event” means to give thought to its very *eventfulness*, its sheer happening, which I suggest necessarily exceeds both reason and subjectivity. Indeed, one could say that the event, in its disruptive and unpredictable happening, exceeds both the concept and the anticipation of a subject. Such a project goes against the tradition that has always neutralized the event by anchoring it in a reason or a cause.

In all instances, it answers to the demands of the principle of sufficient reason, which states that no event happens without a cause or a reason. Indeed, the concept of event has traditionally been understood and neutralized within a metaphysics of causality, subjectivity, and reason, in a word, subjected to the demands of rational thought. An event is interpreted either as the accident of a substrate or substance, as the effect or deed of a subject or an agent, or else it is ordered and organized according to causality, when it is not included within fate or a rational order. In all instances, it answers to the demands of the principle of sufficient reason, which states that no event happens without a cause or a reason. In the words of Leibniz (Leibniz and Clarke, 2000), the “great” principle of natural philosophy and key metaphysical principle of truth is “the principle of sufficient reason, namely, that nothing happens without a reason why it should be so rather than otherwise” (p. 7). Such reason can also be a cause, as the principle of sufficient reason merges with a “principle of causality,” which states that every event is caused to be the event that it is. Again, in Leibniz’s (Leibniz and Clarke, 2000) words: “Nothing is without reason, or no effect is without a cause” (Leibniz, cited in Heidegger [1991], p. 21).

However, as Heidegger (1991) demonstrates in his 1955-1956 lecture course *The Principle of Reason*, the principle of reason self-deconstructs, because it cannot apply to itself its own requirements without undermining itself: if the principle of reason states that everything that happens must have a reason, then what is the reason for the principle of reason? Does the principle of reason have a reason? “*Nihil est sine ratione*. Nothing is without reason, says the principle of reason. Nothing—which means not even this principle of reason, certainly it least of all. It may then be that the principle of reason, that whereof it speaks, and this speaking itself do not belong within the jurisdiction of the principle of reason. To think this remains a grave burden. In short it means that the principle of reason is without reason. Said still more clearly: ‘Nothing without reason’— this, which is something, is without reason” (p. 17; emphasis mine). One divines here how the principle of reason is caught in a circle (What is the reason of the principle of reason? What is the foundation of a foundation?) that throws it into an abyss, into the abyss of its own impossible foundation.
Indeed, in order to be a ground, the ground must itself be without foundation and therefore groundless! This led Gilles Deleuze (cited in Zourabichvili [2012]) to speak of the paradoxical nature of the logic of grounding, of the “comical ungrounding” of the principle of reason: “But who still speaks of a foundation, when the logic of grounding or the principle of reason leads precisely to its own ‘ungrounding,’ comical and disappointing” (p. 57). The principle of reason collapses (“runs aground”) at the very place of its impossible foundation, “there where,” as Derrida (2005b) puts it in Rogues, “the Grund opens up onto the Abgrund, where giving reasons [rendre-raison] and giving an account [rendre-compte]—logon didonai or principium reddendae rationis—are threatened by or drawn into the abyss” (p. 122). The question “why,” the question seeking reasons, opens onto an abyss. As Heidegger (1991) argued, “Whenever we pursue the ground/reason of a being, we ask: why? Cognition stalks this interrogative word from one reason to another. The ‘why’ allows no rest, offers no stop, gives no support” (p. 126; my emphasis). The question ‘why,’ seeking a foundation, in fact undermines it. Reason is without reason, leading Derrida (2005) to ask: “The value of reason, the desire for reason, the dignity of reason—are these rational? Do these have to do wholly with reason?” (p. 120).

**The Transcendental, the Event**

Reason is thus exceeded from within, opening onto pure eventfulness, itself happening outside reason. In fact, each time unpredictable and incalculable, an event always exceeds or “suspends” (Marion, 2002a, p. 160) the principle of sufficient reason. As such, the event constitutes a challenge to reason and understanding. As Derrida (Derrida and Roudinesco [2004]), puts it, “The event is what comes and, in coming, comes to surprise me, to surprise and to suspend comprehension: the event is first of all that which I do not first of all comprehend. Better, the event is first of all that I do not comprehend. The fact that I do not comprehend: my incomprehension” (p. 50). This is why for Derrida it is not a matter of complying with the demands of the principle of reason, but instead of not “denying or ignoring this unforeseeable and incalculable coming of the other” (Derrida and Roudinesco [2004], p. 50). It is a matter of freeing eventfulness from the demands of the principle of reason. No longer placed under the authority of the principle of sufficient reason, the event must be rethought as the incalculable and unpredictable arrival of what will always remain other—and thus inappropria—for the one to whom it happens. In that sense, the event also comes as an excess in relation to the subject, and can only “naturally take by surprise not only the addressee but also the subject to whom and by whom it is supposed to happen” (Derrida [2004], p. 60). It would then be a matter, in order to give thought to the event in its eventfulness, of freeing the event from the demands of the principle of sufficient reason, as well as from the predominance of transcendental modes of thought, which claim to provide prior conditions of possibility for the occurrence of events. Indeed, it may well be the case that events are precisely eventful when not pre-organized or prepared by some transcendental conditions, or anticipated by a transcendental subject, when they break or “pierce” the horizon provided by transcendental conditions. An event cannot be made possible by a prior condition, or rather, as Jean-Luc Nancy (2007) pointed out, it “must not be the object of a programmatic and certain calculation…. It must be the possibility of the impossible (according to a logic used often by Derrida), it must know itself as such, that is to say, know that it happens also in the incalculable and the unassignable” (p. 49). An event cannot be reduced to what can happen: it does not happen because it can happen, but rather happens without being made possible in advance and to that extent can be called “impossible,” Jean-Luc Marion (2015) going so far as to state that the event
can only be impossible, the impossible itself: “Moreover, [the event] always appears to us at bottom as impossible, or even as the impossible, since it does not belong to the domain of the possible, of that of which we are able” (p. 182). The impossible, in this context, does not mean what cannot be or happen. Rather, the impossible, or the im-possible, as Derrida writes it, means that which happens outside the conditions of possibility offered in advance by a subject of representation, outside the transcendental conditions of possibility. Thinking the event will require to break with a certain transcendental mode of thinking, as the event deconstructs the transcendental as such.

The event deconstructs the transcendental, the transcendental conditions of possibility, the “power” of the possible. In *Paper Machine*, Derrida (2005a) resituates his relation to the motif of the transcendental and to the expression “quasi-transcendental,” as discussed by Rodolphe Gasché: “it is definitely not by chance that the modality of quasi (or the logical-rhetorical fiction of as if) has so often imposed itself on me to make a word into a phrase, and first of all, especially—it has often been noted and commented on—around the word transcendental” (p. 83). At stake is a questioning of the tradition of the transcendental, of the very motif of the conditions of possibility. “A question of problematic context and strategies, presumably: one must in this place relentlessly reaffirm questions of the transcendental type; and in that place, almost simultaneously, also ask questions about the history and the limits of what is called ‘transcendental’” (Derrida [2005a], p. 83). Derrida does not simply want to do away with transcendental strategies (he is quite clear on this point), he instead seeks to question the transcendental and reorient it toward the “quasi,” the “impossible,” and the event: “For nothing can discredit the right to the transcendental or ontological question. This is the only force that resists empiricism and relativism. Despite appearances to which philosophers in a hurry often rush, nothing is less empiricist or relativist than a certain attention to the multiplicity of contexts and the discursive strategies they govern; than a certain insistence on the fact that a context is always open and nonsaturable; or than taking into account the perhaps and the quasi in thinking about the event” (Derrida [2005a], p. 92). Mentioning the transcendental “condition of possibility” “in all its forms: medieval onto-theology, criticism, or phenomenology” (Derrida [2005a], p. 92), Derrida shows that at issue is the traditional demand for conditions of possibility, that is, for a ground. In question is “the philosophical inheritance, namely the demand for the condition of possibility (the a priori, the originary, or ground, all different forms of the same radical demand and of any philosophical ‘question’)” (Derrida [2005a], p. 84). The critique of the notion of conditions of possibility includes a critique, in fine, of the motif of ground and foundation, Derrida explaining, “What is thus said of the condition of possibility also goes, by analogy, for the ‘ground,’ the ‘origin,’ the ‘root’ of ‘radicality,’ and so on” (Derrida [2005a], p. 84).

The absence of ground, as noted prior, reveals the site of the event, which is now also tied to the impossible, which Derrida (2005b) writes as im-possible: im-possible, “that is, when it is not programmed by a structure of expectation and anticipation that annuls it by making it possible and thus foreseeable” (p. 128). Therein lies Derrida’s thought of the impossible, which designates that which happens outside of the anticipating conditions of possibility of the egological subject, outside of the horizons of expectation proposed by the subject, outside of transcendental horizons of calculability. The issue is to free “the pure eventfulness of the event” (Derrida, 2003, p. 134) by breaking the power of the ego and its attempts to neutralize it. To the power of the subject as neutralization of the event, Derrida will oppose “the im-possible” as paradoxical possibility of the
event. To the whole machination of the subject, to the establishment of the power of someone, some “I can,” “to all this,” Derrida (2003) writes, “I would oppose, in the first place, everything I placed earlier under the title of the im-possible, of what must remain (in a non-negative fashion) foreign to the order of my possibilities, to the order of the ‘I can’” (p. 134). Derrida engages a deconstruction of this tradition, reversing the conditions of possibility into conditions of impossibility! It is indeed a matter of converting the possible into the impossible and recognizing that what happens arises out of the impossible. It is when “the impossible makes itself possible” that “the event takes place” as the possibility of the impossible (p. 90). It is the impossible that is possible, that happens. For Derrida (2005a), for an event to be possible, it must arise from the impossible (it must happen as the im-possible), and not be made possible by prior conditions. In fact, it can only be an event by breaking the possible. “That, indisputably, is the paradoxical form of the event: if an event is only possible, in the classic sense of this word, if it fits in with conditions of possibility, if it only makes explicit, unveils, reveals, or accomplishes that which was already possible, then it is no longer an event. For an event to take place, for it to be possible, it has to be, as event, as invention, the coming of the impossible” (p. 90). Indeed, to make an event possible in advance is to render it impossible as an event, if it is the case that an event interrupts horizons of possibilities. It is paradoxically the condition of possibility that impossibilizes the experience of which it claims to be the condition; it is on the contrary the im-possible, as leap outside of the horizon of expectations, which possibilitizes the event, the eventfulness of the event, what Derrida (2005a) calls the happening/arrival of the arrivant (l’arrivée de l’arrivant). Everything takes place as if the impossible is what truly enabled or possibilitized the possible and as if the possible could only be possible as impossible. The possible “‘is’ the impossible” (Derrida, 2005a, p. 79), and in turn, the impossible is the true condition of possibility, Derrida going so far in Rogues (2005b) as writing of the impossible “as the only possibility and as the condition of possibility” (p. 47). The old expression of “condition of possibility” should be understood as “condition of impossibility,” undecidedly possible and impossible, possible as impossible. Derrida (2005b) often combining the two in one segment, as in “conditions of possibility or/and impossibility” (for instance, p. 49). He explains in Paper Machine (2005a): “As I try to show elsewhere more concretely, less formally but with more logical sequence, that requires us to think the possible . . . as the impossible.” Now, if “the possible ‘is’ the im-possible here,” then, Derrida (2005a) continues, “the ‘condition of possibility’ is a ‘condition of impossibility’” (p. 79). That thought of the event as happening from the impossible, he concludes, “has always guided me, between the possible and the impossible. This is what has so often prompted me to speak of a condition of impossibility” (Derrida, 2005a, p. 90).

**Event and Cause**

The deconstruction of the transcendental implies the renouncing of the reference to ground when thinking the event. Another conception of the event is called for, one no longer anchored in a cause-substrate, but happening without ground. With respect to causality, instead of the event following the cause, one might suggest that the event is the original phenomenon. Events do not simply follow pre-determined sequences. An event “worthy of the name” represents the surge of the new through which it precisely does not “follow” from a previous cause. A new understanding of temporality is here required: not a ruled sequence coming from the past to the present, but an eventful temporality, coming from the future, disrupting the causal networks, and transforming the entire complex of temporality, indeed transforming the past itself and our relationship to it.
Nietzsche describes an “inversion of temporality,” an Umkehrung der Zeit, in the process of an a posteriori imputation of a cause to an event. Nietzsche calls this phenomenon the error of “false causality,” which lies in the retroactive assigning of a cause to an event, an after-the-fact (re)construction that is then posited as having existed before the event. “I’ll begin with dreams: a particular sensation, for instance, a sensation due to a distant cannon shot, has a cause imputed to it (untergeschoben) afterwards (nachträglich).” (Nietzsche, 1997, pp, 32-33). Once the cause has been introduced, after the event, then, it is then said to exist prior to the event, an event that has now been transformed into necessity and meaning, a meaning that we have introduced: “In the meantime, the sensation persists in a kind of resonance: it waits, as it were, until the drive to find causes allows it to come into the foreground—not as an accident anymore, but as ‘meaning’” (p. 33). As Nietzsche explains, the sensation then becomes part of “a whole little novel in which precisely the dreamer is the protagonist.” Everyone knows the experience in a dream when the dreamer hears a sound which then becomes included in the narrative in a causal way. What was first a sheer event, perceived outside any causal network, is then integrated in the dream and reconstructed as causal origin in the narration. The event has been reconstructed and is now said to be happening according to causality. Of course, the cause was produced after the fact, and then re-injected as that from which the event occurred. “The cannon shot shows up in a causal way, and time seems to flow backward” (p. 33).

In fact, one must invert this inversion, and posit that the event happens before the cause. Only after something has happened can one begin to account for it causally. That something happens is the original fact. In that sense, there is nothing before the event. This is why Claude Romano (2009) states, in, Event and World, “Pure beginning from nothing, an event, in its an-arabic bursting forth, is absolved from all antecedent causality” (p. 41), or further: “An event has no cause, because it is its own origin” (p. 42).1 It is traditionally admitted that events are determined by prior causes, and Kant (1998) insisted that “everything that happens presupposes a previous state, upon which it follows without exception according to a rule” (p. 484). But are we to think that events simply follow pre-determined sequences? And if this was the case, would they still be events in the proper sense? By introducing the new in the world, indeed by bringing forth a new world, does an event not disqualify prior causal contexts and networks? To that extent, an event could not be “explained” by prior events because its occurrence has transformed the very context in which it happens. Jean-Luc Marion (2002) writes: “Inasmuch as it is a given phenomenon, the event does not have an adequate cause and cannot have one. Only in this way can it advance on the wings of a dove: unforeseen, unusual, unexpected, unheard of, and unseen” (p. 167). If “innerworldly facts” can indeed be causally explained, events in the proper sense exceed causal orders. “An event is marked off from all prior facts by its very arising—coming about from itself, free of any horizon of meaning and any prior condition. An event advenes only on its own horizon. It is a pure bursting forth from and in itself, unforeseeable in its radical novelty, and retrospectively establishing a rupture with the entire past…” (Romano, 2009, p. 42).2 The event happens first. The cause is added after the fact. “In summa: an event is neither effected nor does it effect. Causa

1 In Jean-Luc Marion’s (2002) words, the event cannot have a cause: “Now, it happens that the event—precisely because it arises in an unpredictable landing—overcomes measure and the understanding, and therefore is excepted from all adequate cause” (p. 167).

2 As Marion (2002) also explains in Being Given, “In taking the event as the product of a cause, one confuses it with a simple fact, added afterwards to others” (p. 165).
is a capacity to produce effects that has been super-added to the events” (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 296). There are no causes: the cause is added after the fact as an interpretation (Nietzsche [1968] speaks of an “interpretation by causality” as a “deception” [p. 296]) insofar as it is sought. The law of causality “has been projected by us into every event.”

The Event as Pure Fact

The event is a fact, an encounter, occurring outside reason. No reasons will ever measure up to the happening of the event. The event of an encounter, for instance, is not subject to the principle of sufficient reason: “An encounter is always inexplicable,” writes Gilles Deleuze (cited in Zourabichvili [2012], p. 57). To think the event is to think such absolute inexplicability and contingency. The well-known paradigm of such an encounter outside of reason is the case of friendship, such as that described by Michel de Montaigne (1958) between him and Étienne de La Boétie. “If you press me to tell why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed except by answering: because it was he; because it was I [Si on me presse de dire pourquoi je l’aimais, je sens que cela ne se peut exprimer qu’en répondant: parce que c’était lui; parce que c’était moi]” (p. 139). As Marion (2002) comments, the event of this friendship occurs “all at once, without warning or anticipation, according to an arrival without expectation and without rhythm” (p. 37). The event of friendship is a fact (it “imposes itself”), a fact and a chance irreducible to reason. Therefore, no reasons will ever measure up to the fact of the encounter, to the chance happening of friendship. As Derrida (1997) puts it in The Politics of Friendship, “The analysis of conditions of possibility, even existential ones, will never suffice in giving an account of the act or the event. An analysis of that kind will never measure up to what takes place, the effectivity—actuality—of what comes to pass—for example, a friendship which will never be reduced to the desire or the potentiality of friendship” (p. 17). Now the notion that philosophy is born out of an event that it does not control is “a shock to reason” in its quest for ultimate foundations. For “how is it supposed to find a foundation [assise] in that which defeats it, in the inexplicable or the aleatory?” In the end, what transpires is that “We cannot give the reason for an event” (Zourabichvili [2012], p. 57). As Heidegger (1991) stated, “The rose is without why…. [It] ‘blooms, because it blooms’” (p. 56-57). For Heidegger, that tautology, far from saying nothing, says everything, that is, the entire eventful facticity of the being: it happens because it happens. The because supersedes the why. The event becomes the highest reason. The reason given is harbored entirely within the fact of the being, that is, within the being itself, “the fact of its being a rose or its rose-being [ihr Rose-sein]” (Heidegger [1991], p. 57; Der Satz vom Grund, GA 10, p. 84, trans. slightly modified). Jean-Luc Nancy (2007) stressed that the world, not grounded on any principle, is a fact; it is only a fact (even if it is a singular fact, not being itself a fact within the world). It is not founded in reason or in God. It is the fact of a “mystery,” the mystery of an accidental, errant, or wandering existence. The world is neither necessary nor contingent, if contingency is defined in relation to necessity. Rather, it would be beyond or before necessity and of contingency, an absolute fact. It is possible to consider this facticity of the world “without referring it to a cause (neither efficient nor final)” (p. 45). The world is a fact without cause and without reason, it is “a fact without reason or end, and it is our fact” (p. 45). We are called, in this thought of the event of the world, to take on this facticity without reason of the world, as well as its non-sense, or rather the fact that its sense only lies in such a fact: “To think it, is to think this factuality, which implies not referring it to a meaning capable of appropriating it, but to placing in it, in its truth as a fact, all possible meaning” (p. 45). The world is a significance without a foundation in reason. The world as event is without reason
The Impersonality of the Event

One of the constitutive errors of the metaphysical tradition is its reliance on causality, its imposition of causes on every existence, on every event, as their substratum: causality is the alleged substrate of the event. “Being is thought into things everywhere as a cause, is imputed to things” (Nietzsche [1997], p. 20). We have created a world of causes, a world of wills, and a world of spirits. All happening is considered a doing, all doing is supposed to be the effect of a will; the world is understood as a multiplicity of doers; a doer or subject “was imputed to everything that happened” (Nietzsche [1997], p. 32). The belief in causality thus involves the belief in the subject. Yet Nietzsche (1967) insists that one cannot attach a doer to deeds, that “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming,” that the doer “is merely a fiction added to the deed” (p. 24). The notion of an underlying subjectivity is contrary to the facts, an unphenomenological construction. Instead of immediate certainties, we have the following questions: “From where do I get the concept of thinking? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an ego, and even of an ego as cause, and finally of an ego as the cause of thought?” (Nietzsche [1989] p. 24). All these are constructs for Nietzsche, which he understands in terms of the constitutive role of language in thinking (our thinking relies and depends on our grammar). The subject thus appears as a linguistic construct. Indeed, an underlying substantial ego is not a phenomenological fact, but a metaphysical idol, and ultimately for Nietzsche a linguistic prejudice. The substantialist egology of the Cartesian tradition harbors an implicit metaphysics of grammar. “One infers here according to the grammatical habit: ‘thinking is an activity; every activity requires an agent; consequently—’” (p. 24). Metaphysical idols are nothing but grammatical structures: “formerly, one believed in the soul as one believed in grammar and the grammatical subject” (p. 67). The difference between a doer and the deed, i.e., the position of an agent or subject beneath the event, is made possible by a “seduction of language” that distinguishes an agent from its deed. There is no doer, only the deed.

There is no doer. This reveals the radical impersonality of the event, of any event: it happens, of itself. This impersonality here revealed (“there is” thinking) leads us to consider subjectless sentences such as “it rains.” If the event has no subject underlying it, whether as a cause or substrate, then the danger is to substantiate the “it” in such expressions, as if it designated some substrate distinct from the happening. Just as the “popular mind,” Nietzsche (1967) tells us, distinguishes the lightning from its flash, just as it reifies the “it” in the “it rains,” just as it conceives of the event as an action requiring a subject (as if behind the manifestation of strength, there was an indifferent substratum that would have the freedom to be manifest strength or not), just as it “doubles the deed” (“it posits the same event first as cause and then a second time as its effect” (p. 45), the metaphysician distinguishes a subject from its effects. In fact, Nietzsche (1967) proclaims forcefully: “there is no such substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; the doer is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything” (p. 45). “The deed is everything”; this expression would require and call for another conception of the event, in which such event would no longer be anchored in a cause-substrate, but happening from itself (and yet, as we will see, happening to someone). “If I say: ‘Lightning flashes,’ I have posited the flashing once as activity and once as subject, and have thus added on to the event (Geschehen) a being that is not identical with the event but that remains, is, and does not ‘become’ (nicht wird).
To posit the event as effecting (Wirken), and effect (Wirkung) as being: that is the twofold error, or interpretation, of which we are guilty” (Nietzsche [2003], pp. 75-76).

The event rests on no substrate, has no author; this is why it is always impersonal: it happens. What of this “it”? Reflecting on the impersonality of the expression es gibt (“it gives, “there is”) in On Time and Being, Heidegger (1972) notes that the risk when discussing this “it” is to posit some “indeterminate power” that somehow would cause the event (p. 16). Here again, the problem resides in the very structure of language, in a certain grammar that divides subject and predicate, and determines the “it” as a separate entity with an efficiency of its own, leading to the belief in a metaphysical substrate. As such, this grammatical structure neutralizes the eventfulness of the event. It is a matter of no longer isolating the “it” from the happening of the event. The “it” does not refer to a subject existing under the event of being, but is co-extensive with such event. If I say “it rains,” the “it” designates the raining itself, i.e., the event of raining. The “it” does not designate an underlying substrate, but designates the impersonal eventfulness of the event itself. The “it” is a stand-in for no one.

The Performative, the Letting

The event is a radically impersonal phenomenon, enacted by no one, no subject, no self: the event thus occurs outside the subject. As Derrida (2004) states, an event is “something that happens in some sense without or before any subject, without or before anyone’s decision” (p. 10). The event exceeds the capacity of a subject, the power of a self. This is why Derrida (2004) ultimately rejected the notion of the performative to think the event, as it still relies too heavily on the action of a subject. One often associates the performative with the enacting of an event. “We traditionally say that the performative produces events—I do what I say, I open the session if I am presiding over it, I produce the event of which I speak. In general, we thus relate the possibility of the event that is produced to a performative initiative and thus to a performative responsibility” (p. 67). However, in such a performative, the event is neutralized by the position of a powerful subject. “A performative produces an event only by securing for itself, in the first-person singular or plural, in the present, and with the guarantee offered by conventions or legitimated fictions, the power that an ipseity gives itself to produce the event of which it speaks” (Derrida [2005b], p. 152). Just like so-called “constative” or theoretical language, the performative also misses the eventful in the event. “Now, just like the constative, it seems to me, the performative cannot avoid neutralizing, indeed annulling, the eventfulness of the event it is supposed to produce” (p. 152). Certainly, Derrida (2004) concedes, something does happen with the performative, but what is eventful exceeds it: “I am not saying that nothing then happens, but what happens is programmable, foreseeable, controlled, conditioned by conventions.” Therefore, “It can thus be said, I would dare say, that an event worthy of its name is an event that derails all performativity” (p. 67). This means that it is a matter of thinking the event outside of a problematics of power, “beyond all performative mastery, beyond all power” (Derrida [2005a], p. 94), as the event undoes both will and power. An event is not a power, but what Derrida calls a “weak” or “vulnerable” force. The experience of the event “defeats my will,” writes Derrida (2007). This is why when it comes to the event, it will not be a matter of doing (involving a will and a subject), but rather of a letting. As Derrida (2004) writes, when it comes to the event, it is a matter of abandoning the will and letting the event happen, as opposed to making it happen (a “making happen” that always mobilizes the power and will of a subject). “Must there not be an absence of the will to abandon, whence the question of letting-
happen rather than making-happen?” (p. 92).

Indeed, once the event is no longer referred to the demands of the principle of reason, no longer anchored in a subject-cause, it becomes possible to let it give itself in its eventfulness, in the way it happens each time. “Thinking the event” would here mean, not subjecting it to reason, but letting it be. “Thinking” here should be approached as a kind of letting, letting-be or Gelassenheit (Heidegger [2010], p. 71). Thinking the event would mean: letting the event happen of itself, an event which itself is a kind of letting. Letting the letting be, as it were. Indeed, “letting” is for Heidegger (as it is for Derrida, as we saw above) the “deepest meaning of being” (Heidegger [2003], p.59). For an event happens of itself, so that an event is never prepared, produced or made, but precisely let be. To the letting of the event of being corresponds the fundamental disposition of thinking as Gelassenheit, as letting-be. “Thinking the event” would mean here: letting … the letting, letting the letting be.

As the event happens of itself, it undoes the power of a subject, placing us, as it were, no longer in the position of actors, but, as Jean-Luc Marion (2002a) suggests, of witnesses. As he clarifies, the term witness signifies the undoing of the transcendental subject constituting the event as object: “With the name witness, we must understand a subjectivity stripped of the characteristics that gave it transcendental rank” (p. 217). To the constituting subject, “there follows the witness—the constituted witness” (p. 216). The event happens of itself, not constituted by a transcendental subject. The event, Marion writes, essentially is a passing; it passes and passes of itself: Il passe et se passe, it passes and happens of itself. Let us stress here the capital importance of the motif of passing in the thinking of the event. The event essentially passes. The event belongs to the fundamental category of passing; not “being” in the sense of a substantial presence, but passing. As Marion (2015) explains, “First, it is not self-evident that in order to be, a being must subsist in permanence: indeed, what is proper to the event, by definition, is not to be insofar as it subsists in permanence, but insofar as it passes” (p. 89; my emphasis). The event passes [passe] and passes of itself [se passe], while exceeding us from all sides. This passing passes us by. Marion writes: “The phenomenon of the passing reached me and, so to speak, constituted me as not constituting it—to the point that all I have to do is recognize myself as the mere witness (the one who certainly saw what he has seen, but does not understand what he has seen), and I renounce my claim to be its transcendental subject” (p. 186). Hence, in Waterloo, the battle “passes and passes away on its own, without anybody making it or deciding it. It passes, and each watches it pass, fade into the distance, and then disappear, disappear like it had come—that is to say, of itself” (Marion [2002a, p. 228). We, as subjects of the event, are also passing, passing and bypassed (expropriated) in the passing of the event.

The event happens of itself, is impersonal, and yet it always happens to someone, bringing forth an eventful self, that is to say, a self that is constituted (but also undone) by the event. Heidegger shows how being is an event (Ereignis) in which we have a part as human beings. The human being is not the ego cogito of the Cartesian tradition in a position of subject, but the one who is concerned by the event of being and happening from it. This new perspective requires that the self, far from designating some substantial ego or pre-given I, itself must be understood as arising from an event. In that sense, the self as such is an event, coming to be as a response to the eventfulness of being. It will be necessary, in our understanding of the event, to think together the impersonality of the event with the arising and responding of a self, as if the es gibt was the site of
Hospitality is the welcoming of such an event. The event is impersonal, happens of itself, but engages a self which consists precisely in the reception of such event, in which the I suffers the “shock” and trauma of the event. What is at stake here in the task of thinking the event is to reveal how the self itself is an event, happening, as it were, in and from the happening of being. The self cannot be presupposed as a pre-given or pre-constituted subject but rather originates in and as an event.

Conclusion: The Ethics of the Event

Ultimately, it is a matter of being hospitable to the event, of letting it come and letting it happen as it happens. The happening of the event is the coming of an arrivant, an arrival that is welcomed by an original hospitality. Indeed, the ethics of the event, as I approach it here, is to be taken as an ethics of hospitality, a welcome of the event in its irruptive coming. Let us focus, in closing, on this original ethics of the event. Derrida recognized in a 2004 interview with l’Humanité the growing importance that the thinking of the event has taken for him, significantly insisting on its ethical scope: “what you say about a privileged attention to the event is correct. It has become more and more insistent. The event, as that which happens (arrive) unpredictably, singularly. Not only what happens, but also who happens/arrives, the arrivant. The question ‘what is to be done with what/who arrives?’ commands a thinking of hospitality, of the gift, of forgiveness, of the secret, of witnessing” (Derrida and Nielsberg [2004]; my translation). We see here emerge the thematics of a hospitality to the event, an ethical welcome of the event. Such hospitality is on the side of the arrivant, who comes whenever it comes. Hence Derrida’s distinction between invitation and visitation. Derrida (2007) explains: “The absolute arrivant must not be merely an invited guest, someone I’m prepared to welcome, whom I have the ability to welcome. It must be someone whose unexpected, unforeseeable arrival, whose visitation—and here I’m opposing visitation to invitation—is such an irruption that I’m not prepared to receive the person. I must not even be prepared to receive the person, for there to be genuine hospitality” (p. 451). Invitation is the expecting of some guest, without surprise. But hospitality requires “absolute surprise”: “I must be unprepared, or prepared to be unprepared, for the unexpected arrival of any other,” and he adds: “The other, like the Messiah, must arrive whenever he or she wants” (Derrida [1999], p. 70). This, indeed, is the very definition of the event, which Derrida (2003) captures in its most limpid simplicity in this passage: “Whatever happens, happens, whoever comes, comes (ce qui arrive arrive), and that, in the end, is the only event worthy of this name” (p. 129).

Hospitality, then, is a receiving or welcoming that has no power over its own welcoming, it is an opening without horizon, without horizon of expectation. The event is an unforeseeable happening, affecting a vulnerable subjectivity. “If an event worthy of this name is to arrive or happen, it must, beyond all mastery, affect a passivity. It must touch an exposed vulnerability, one without absolute immunity, without indemnity; it must touch this vulnerability in its finitude and in a nonhorizontal fashion, there where it is not yet or is already no longer possible to face or face up to the unforeseeability of the other” (Derrida [2005b], p. 152). It is to this extent that Derrida understands hospitality in its full sense as unconditional. It is unconditional because it arises out of the event of the other and not from some conditions layed out by a subject-host. The subject is powerless before the coming of the event as arrivant. “The visitor is someone who could come at any moment, without any horizon of expectation, who could like the Messiah come by surprise. Anyone could come at any moment” (Derrida [2000], p. 17, n. 17). Hospitality is the unconditional welcoming of the arrivant. “The absolute guest [hôte] is this arrivant for whom there is not even a horizon of expectation, who bursts onto my horizon of expectations when I am not even prepared to receive the one who I’ll be receiving. That’s hospitality” (Derrida [2007], p. 451). The arrival of the arrivant will constitute an event, says Derrida (2007), “only if I’m not capable of receiving him or her” (p. 451). Unconditional hospitality is the welcoming of such event.
Throughout this work, it has been an issue of freeing, as Derrida (2007) puts it, the “pure eventfulness of the event” (p. 134) from the traditional attempts to neutralize it, whether through the demands of a principle of reason or through the position of a willful ego. As we also stressed, the event is an absolute *arrivance* (“what is true for the *arrivant* is equally true for the event” [Derrida (2007), p. 453]), which as such mobilizes a welcoming gesture. We noted the coming to the fore of the motif of “letting” in the happening of the event. This letting also affects the welcome of the event. To the letting of being (subjective genitive) corresponds the fundamental disposition of thinking as *Gelassenheit*, as letting-be. Ethics here designates such letting, a genuine *Gelassenheit* with respect to the event. This arrival is welcomed in an original hospitality, a welcome of the other in the subjective genitive. We noted throughout this work how the event happens outside knowledge, in excess of knowledge, thereby making room for another type of engagement with the event, i.e., an ethical engagement. Whereas knowledge, as Levinas claims, is a violence, ethics understood as unconditional hospitality lets the event be. Thinking the event thus leads us to an ethical engagement with its unpredictable arrival.

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1 Although, as Derrida (2007) notes, there is always an aporetic element to this question, as the event becomes each time neutralized by its reception. If on the one hand, the saying of the event “remains or should remain disarmed, utterly disarmed by … the always unique, exceptional, and unpredictable arrival of the other, of the event as other,” yet “this disarmament, this vulnerability, and this exposure are never pure or absolute. I was saying before that the saying of the event presupposed some sort of inevitable neutralization of the event by its iterability, that saying always harbors the possibility of resaying” (p. 452).
References


The Enigmatic Figure of Socrates in Heidegger: A Pure Vision of Education as Attuned Event of Learning\textsuperscript{1}

James M. Magrini

Introduction

This essay elucidates a view of “Heidegger’s Socrates” with the understanding that Socrates, unlike Plato, is a highly enigmatic figure in the Heideggerian corpus. In what follows, I attempt to sketch a portrait of Socrates—as a decidedly “non-doctrinal” philosopher or thinker—from an understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy in a way that might be related to a unique vision of education (\textit{paideia}) as a philosophical \textit{way-of-Being}, or perhaps, and more appropriately, given Heidegger’s explicit and unwavering task during the “Turn,” a mode of “pure thinking” unfolding in the relationship with the \textit{truth-of-Being}, which is at once an \textit{originary} educative event. Ultimately, turning to a view of Heidegger’s Socrates, I offer a counter view to such common educational issues as the employment of \textit{methods}, the means of \textit{knowledge acquisition}, and the understanding of the \textit{learning process} as they comprise the educational experience in the age of standardization and the rise and dominance of STEM curricula. The essay unfolds in three sections: (1) I explore Heidegger’s analysis of Plato and discuss how the metaphysics that can be drawn from Plato’s philosophy influences our conception and practice of education; (2) I offer a detailed analysis of \textit{pure thinking}, \textit{truth}, and \textit{dialectic method} in relation to “Heidegger’s Socrates,” which includes insights on how this view might be clarified and enhanced by turning to a non-doctrinal interpretation of Plato’s Socrates emerging from recent scholarship focused on re-readings of the Platonic corpus; and (3) I synthesize the foregoing analyses with a view of education (\textit{paideia}), attempting to elucidate a unique vision of a \textit{Socratic education} in the spirit of Heidegger’s reading, which lives beyond the understanding of philosophy akin to a science and education understood as a standardized, controllable, and predictable technological achievement. In relation to (2), a unique approach is adopted, which includes, because of the lack of detailed material written by Heidegger about Socrates, consulting works that are not explicitly Heideggerian in theme or content, e.g., turning to Continental Platonic scholarship which will assist in showing how key ideas emerging from Heidegger’s reading of Socrates might be understood when further illuminated by similar writings embracing Socrates, as does Heidegger, as a radically “non-doctrinal” and “non-systematic” thinker.

The Question of Heidegger’s Plato: Truth as Correctness in Relation to Education

Heidegger is often criticized in Platonic circles (Gonzalez 2009; Zuckert 1999), and by Continental “phenomenological” Platonic interpretation (Hyland 1995) and Heideggerian scholarship (Poggler 1987), for developing a “doctrinal” view of Plato’s philosophy. For example,

\textsuperscript{1} It is with much appreciation that I thank the editor of this symposium, Elias Schwieler, for suggesting that I contribute this paper. I am also grateful to Richard Capobianco for offering helpful commentary on several sections of the paper, which contributed greatly to its overall improvement. Lastly, I thank the \textit{JPSE} reviewers for their suggestions, specifically regarding the inclusion of a short discussion of \textit{Gelassenheit}.  

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Gonzalez states emphatically that the “figure who normally bears the name ‘Plato’ in Heidegger’s text is a dogmatic metaphysician,” and we add, the first systematic metaphysician and, as is related directly to our concern, “the complete antithesis to the figure Heidegger himself names ‘Socrates”’ (p. 431, emphasis added). Against Heidegger, Hyland offers a decidedly “non-doctrinal” reading of Plato, stating that Heidegger’s “reading … of the cave analogy in Plato’s Doctrine of Truth is cursory and orthodox [doctrinal] to the point of tediousness” (p. 140). As stated, to embrace Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s philosophy (i.e., metaphysics) as doctrinal in nature is not limited to Platonic scholars, for Poggler (1987), commentating on Heidegger’s path of thinking, also claims that Heidegger presents Plato as a doctrinal metaphysician, whose philosophy is grounded in a systematic view of both metaphysics and education—a philosophy that contributes to facilitating the birth and flourishing of the historical movement of secular humanism.1 Prior to attempting to understand Heidegger’s Socrates, it is crucial to address the question of Heidegger’s “doctrinal” Plato, because it is possible to encounter a different Plato that escapes the rigid classification as a doctrinal philosopher, i.e., in terms of a systematic metaphysician, present to Heidegger’s readings found in at least three texts other than the well-known essay we later examine, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” and those sources are The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, On the Essence of Truth, and “Will to Power as Art.” As Fried (2006) observes, although in Plato there undoubtedly occurs “the transition of truth as aletheia from unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) to the correctness of representation,” this “error” is irreducible to the expression of a tenet or principle within an explicit philosophical doctrine, for we must be clear that when Heidegger employs the term “doctrine” (Lehre), he refers to “that which, within what is said, remains unsaid,” rather than a self-conscious teaching of the thinker (p. 157). Although space does not allow for an overly detailed exploration of this issue, I examine, in connection to Heidegger’s writings, the scholarship of both Fried and Capobianco (2010) in the effort to arrive at a deeper and re-conceived understanding of Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato.

Fried (2006), in his reading of Plato as a non-doctrinal thinker, points out that many times Heidegger “insists even in specific readings of Plato’s texts, that he is confronting not Plato but Platonism” (p. 157). This issue becomes explicit when examining Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche as the last metaphysician in the “Will to Power as Art,” where it is clear that in reading Nietzsche, Heidegger (1979) is dealing with “Platonism” and not Plato as he might be understood when traced back to his original dialogues. There is a gaping historical chasm between Plato the philosopher and Plato the systematic, doctrinal metaphysician, i.e., between Plato and Platonism. It is Nietzsche, when presenting in Twilight of the Idols (“How the ‘True World’ Finally Became Fable”) the “portrayal of the history of Platonism and its overcoming” (p. 203) who, according to

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1 It is crucial to examine the term doctrinal or idealist in relation to Platonic scholarship in order to highlight characteristics consistent with systematic readings, as we have pointed out, that are relatable in some degree to Heideggerian interpretations of Plato. These characteristics of “doctrinal” or “idealist” readings are also linked to the analytic tradition, e.g., Sahakian and Sahakian (1976) read Plato as a systematic metaphysical idealist and embrace the notions that (1) Knowledge “produced” by the dialectic is propositional in nature; (2) The dialectic, as method sine qua non of the Philosopher-Rulers, culminates in noesis by transcending the hypothetical method in the production of certain truth; (3) Knowledge accruing via the dialectic is of the essential “Forms” and ultimately the “Idea” of the Good; and (4) The “positive” experience of the dialectic, which is equated with “Socratic” education, is substantive, definitive, and reproducible.
Heidegger, “establishes” and attaches a doctrinal, two-tiered metaphysics to Plato, as famously represented by the irreconcilable division between the sensuous realm of terrestrial dwelling and the supersensuous, eternal realm of the transcendental Forms (p. 202). Thus, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche’s understanding emerges through creative interpretation, for Plato’s original work “is not yet Platonism,” and further, the “true world” is not yet the object of a doctrine, [rather] it is what lights up in becoming present; it is pure radiance without cover” (p. 204). Fried (2006) argues that Plato moves away from “the conflictual heart of truth as unconcealment” in favor of the movement toward truth as “genuine transcendence,” and in doing so, Plato misses, or better, fails to formalize what remains “unsaid” and only intimated in his philosophy, namely, that we “cannot possess [truth as aletheia] because we do not own or master history or fate” (p. 170).

Moving forward, I show that Heidegger’s philosophy is more akin to Plato’s original thought, or view of philosophy, in more ways than many commentators might care to admit.1

Recall the meaning of Lehre in Heidegger from the discussion above, and relate this understanding to Capobianco’s (2010) illuminating analysis of “light” and “lighting” in Heidegger’s reading of Plato, which reveals that in Heidegger’s reading, what is and remains “unsaid,” that which resides beneath the surface of what Plato “said,” admittedly, through representational imagery—and not the logos proper—is that the Idea of the “Good,” which is beyond the Forms, is also beyond, and so more primordial than, either beings or Being(ess). This indicates that Plato’s thought is occurring in the midst of, but is unable to explicitly formalize, the lighting and enabling power (dem ursprünglichen Licht) of Being itself. As Capobianco contends, “Plato’s Idea of the Good is no ‘it’ at all,” in terms of an immutable, eternal essence, nor is it a normative ideal toward which to strive; rather, it is “to be understood as the (temporal) ‘enabling’ (ermöglichend) of all beings in their beingness” (p. 105), as the “condition of the possibility” for all knowledge and truth about beings in their beingness (p. 106). Following Heidegger, Capobianco brings attention to, in relation to the cave allegory, the sun (ηλιος) as the primordial light (φως), as the enabling power (δυναμις) that makes possible and links together (ζυγον), i.e., the ontological relationship between, what is seen in its presencing (ορομενα) and the “seeing” relating to the original experience or event of presencing (οραν) as a phenomenon in terms of aletheia. Plato did relate the Forms to light and lighting, as a “kind of letting-through—namely, a letting something be known as what it is in its full look (eidos), presence, whatness, beingness,” and although this “aspect of Plato’s thinking ultimately served as the foundation for the Western onto-theological tradition with its focus on timeless and immutable ‘essences’ of particular things,” as Capobianco importantly points out, “the allegory reveals to us that Plato’s thinking did not come to rest at this point” (p. 106), and with the Idea of the Good (as the lighting of Being itself), he appears to be thinking beyond the Forms and did not, as Aristotle claims, organize such thinking into a coherent and systematic account of metaphysical essences, paradigms, or concrete universals. Drawing a crucial connection between Heidegger’s Plato and Heidegger’s philosophy, Capobianco

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1 Although there is an ongoing scholarly debate about the doctrinal nature of Heidegger’s Plato, it is certainly the case that in the tradition of Platonism, Plato is read as either having a complete system expressed in an esoteric manner to initiate or a developing system evolving across Plato’s “early,” “middle,” and “late” periods of his life and philosophy, and indeed, as related to our themes, such interpretations of Plato as a systematic metaphysician are still taught in universities to philosophy students.
demonstrates that the notion of die Lichtung in Being and Time is traceable to Heidegger’s early readings of Plato and develops in Heidegger’s later thought. The lighting and enabling power of Being that Plato intimates in the allegory is the event and occurrence of “lighting” within which Dasein participates when revealing and founding and grounding a world and appropriating a historical destiny. Ontologically, Dasein is set within “the light that is the source of all that is seen in the light,” and not “in the first place, an ontic entity that possesses the ‘natural light’ of reason” (p. 106), and though Heidegger does not weave the interpretation of the allegory into Being and Time, it is, as Capobianco argues, “clearly in the background of his thinking,” for Heidegger appropriates “Plato’s metaphor of light in order to articulate his primary concern with that which enables the truth of all beings in their beingness” (p. 107).

To return to the understanding of Lehre in Heidegger, based on the foregoing analysis, I am not reading Plato as a thinker consciously aware of establishing or developing a system or doctrine of thought in the modern sense of the term. What is instead suggested is that due to Plato’s inability to properly formalize or “say” what was always already present to his philosophical experience—that which ultimately remained “unsaid”—the essence of truth as aletheia as primordial concealment and the concern for Being as such were issues subsequently covered over and obscured. In direct and succinct terms: since the enabling power of Being, which is rooted in its recession and move into finitude, was overlooked by Plato, so too was the essence of truth as aletheia as primordial unconcealment, which is linked ineluctably and intimately to the phenomenon of Being’s unfolding. As related directly to my concerns, Heidegger (1997) observes that Plato’s allegory is an experience of aletheia, but in Plato’s philosophy, “the fundamental experience from which that word α-ληθεία arose is already disappearing”—i.e., the originary pre-Socratic experience of truth—and thus it does not come to “light in its primordiality or essence” because Plato is unable, or falls into error due to a “failure” (Verfehlung) or “mistake” (Versehen), to formalize truth in its essence, in the antagonistic “characteristic of φως (being), to the κρυπτωσθαι φιλεί (“nature’s affinity for remaining hidden”), thus to hiddenness as such and not just to the false, not just to illusion” (p. 68). This error, through which aletheia is neither clarified nor grasped, spawns Western metaphysics, for in Plato the “word [aletheia] and its semantic power is already on the road to impoverishment and trivialization” (68). Thus, although Plato’s philosophy marks for Heidegger (1998) the beginning of Western onto-theological metaphysics, it is possible to interpret this “beginning” in terms that are other than Plato’s formulation and foundation of anything resembling a doctrinal metaphysics; this, it is possible to state, was left to Plato’s predecessors. Despite this insight, which should inspire rethinking Plato as a doctrinal thinker, I move to examine several topics that are unambiguous in Heidegger’s (1997) reading of Plato, namely, the influence of Platonic metaphysics—or Platonism—on our

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1 Turning to Sheehan (2001), the “enabling power” of which I am speaking makes possible and so is “responsible for the correlation between an entity’s givenness and the dative of that givenness” (p. 7). This enabling power is named by Heidegger as “ein drittes,” and insofar as it “makes Parousia possible, this enabling power is epekeina tes parousias, ‘beyond’ beings-as-givenness, in a way that is analogous to what Plato called to agathon [the Good]” (p. 8). Sheehan’s reading on this issue lines up, in many ways, with Capobianco’s interpretation as presented above.

conception of and experience of truth, and how this understanding shapes our practice and experience of education, and I approach these issues in terms of “a questioning which in a fundamental way changes Dasein, man, and the understanding of being” (p. 84).

“Plato’s Doctrine (Lehre) of Truth,” one of Heidegger’s (1998) most well-known readings of Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, elucidates a view of metaphysics that emerges from Plato’s philosophy of the essence of truth (aletheia) with the concomitant understanding of how the essence of truth ultimately determines an authentic view of education as paideia. Authentic education (paideia), for Heidegger, in his reading of Plato and the Allegory, is represented in a series of “movements” as the turning around (periagoge) of the entire soul back to itself enlightened, i.e., an authentic education “lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first leading us to the place of essential Being accustoming us to it” (p. 165). This, however, is the precise form of originary education that a Platonic view of metaphysics, with its privileging of presencing over concealment and its focus on the Being of beings as opposed to Being qua Being, ultimately fails to realize. As immersed in the Platonic tradition, we experience the essence of truth in terms of an epistemological and not an ontological issue, for it is taken as the “agreement” or relation between idea and thing as expressed through a locution or proposition, where the locus of truth is encountered, e.g., as in the history of Western philosophy and the understanding of aequatio intellectus et rei (“agreement between intellect (idea) and thing”), expressed through the Correspondence Model of Truth. According to Heidegger, due to this misinterpretation of aletheia, Plato’s vision of knowing and learning, or “education,” does not rise to the level of paideia and rather is represented by gignoschein, the process of “knowing by way of seeing,” and this is linked by Heidegger with the Greek idein in relation to idea in terms of homoiosis, as exclusively the overall “agreement of the act of knowing with the thing itself” as seen (p. 177).

Truth is inseparable from education, and following this line of thought, since the “first beginning” and Plato’s error education moves away from an original notion of paideia as it is instantiated within the soul’s relation to the truth of Being; learning is no longer an open questioning grounded in finitude, mystery, and primordial hiddenness, attuned in wonder or “astonishment” (das Erstaunen), and is instead systematically “harnessed in a relation to looking, apprehending, thinking, and asserting” (p. 182). This because, according to Heidegger (1997), education’s ontological origin in the experience of aletheia is occluded, and so we fail to realize the deeper truth that aletheia can never be arbitrarily possessed like propositional truths, “whose enjoyment we put aside at some point in order to instruct or lecture other people” (p. 66). This leads to a view of education that is directed toward the accumulation and possession of knowledge—established truths above falsehoods. Indeed, as Heidegger (1993) argues, if we were to receive a so-called “good education,” we would then “know everything possible to know in all realms of science, art, and the like,” and we would continue to “acquire each day what is newest and most valuable” (p. 258). This is a view of education, resulting from the fallout of Platonism, which can be equated with models of teaching-learning instantiated within contemporary education; it is a form of education that Scott (2001), in his reading of Plato’s Socrates’ non-doctrinal practice of education, claims is akin to an additive model of education, the very type of education—the filling up of empty vessels, the piling and building up of knowledge—that Plato’s Socrates continually decries
in the dialogues,⁴ which stands radically opposed to an integrative model of education, which might be associated with an original form of paideia. In relation to these thoughts, Heidegger (1993) observes that when thinking in education is conceived as a “technique for explaining highest causes,” it comes to an “end by slipping out of its element,” and it then achieves its “validity as techne, as an instrument of education and therefore as a classroom matter,” in terms of what we understand as the standardization of education—and as Heidegger stresses, this presupposes it is already a “cultural concern” (p. 221). Drawing on Heidegger’s interpretation, I note that today in education we encounter a technological-and-quantitative view of the three educational issues this essay discusses: (1) method is understood as a top-down, transposable schema for “problem-solving” (scientific method) or “teaching”; (2) truth is conceived (and experienced) as the destination to which method inevitably leads, i.e., knowledge as something that is acquired, possessed, and validated by one or another epistemological model (e.g., Correspondence Model of Truth); and (3) learning is a controllable, predictable, and terminal activity that occurs through the successful application of a given method, indicating that truth has been procured, which is then assessed to indicate the student’s or learner’s educational achievement.²

¹ For example, in the Symposium, Socrates assures Agathon that authentic education can neither be pursued nor carried out as a process through which those who have little in the way of knowledge are made more knowledgeable by those possessing greater knowledge, as “if ideas were the kind of things which could be imparted simply by contact, and those of us who had few could absorb them from those who have a lot,” much like the “way that liquid can flow from a full container to an empty one if you put a piece of string between them” (175d).

² Overlooking the plausible conclusion offered by many Platonic scholars regarding the lack of a codified method in Plato’s Socrates, Socratic Circles, Socratic Method, and Socratic Seminar (Wilberding 2014; Strong 1997) are all formalized Socratic Methods for application in the classroom. Educators implementing Socratic Seminars argue that Socrates employs a reproducible systematic method that can be explicated, packaged, marketed, taught, and applied in the classroom to produce definitive “academic” results that meet the criteria for the objectives in Common Core State Standards Curriculum and the concomitant high-stakes testing consistent with the contemporary standardized view of education. These educators claim that Socrates’ way of practicing his dialectic examination can be systematized and imitated. In relation to this claim, we bring the reader’s attention to a crucial issue that Plato highlights in the Apology, to which practitioners of the Socratic method in education have apparently paid no heed or have summarily dismissed, namely, the utterly and unmistakably disastrous results that ensued when the youths of Athens attempted to “imitate” the enigmatic and inimitable Socrates. Those who imitated Socrates contributed to the formulation of the charges against him, as they systematized, copied, and employed his supposed “method,” performing elenchus refutations of prominent Athenian citizens. Let us listen to Socrates, who proclaims, “The sons of the richest men accompany of their own accord, find pleasure in hearing people being examined, and often imitate me themselves, and then they undertake to examine others; and then, I fancy, they find a great plenty of people who think they know something, but know little or nothing. As a result, therefore, those who are examined by them are angry with me” (Plato 1997, Apol. 23c-e). It is interesting to note, in relation to “Socratic teaching,” that as opposed to training or teaching (didasko) these youths to be upstart “gadflies,” it is by chance (tuche), and neither by Socratic design nor the implementation of any
Heidegger’s Socrates: Pure Thinking in the Sway of the Unfolding of Essential Truth

Heidegger (1968) labels Socrates the “purest thinker of the West” (p. 17), and it is this classification as a “pure thinker” that I am committed to unpacking as it relates to Socrates’ understanding and practice of dialectic, his view of “truth,” and his understanding of philosophy (or thinking) as a process of original learning (paideia). Heidegger observes that Socrates is courageously “drawn to what withdraws” in the process of enacting the authentic process of thinking, which draws him into “the enigmatic and therefore mutable nearness of its appeal,” despite being “far away from what withdraws,” and even though “the withdrawal may remain as veiled as ever” (p. 17). This instantiates for Heidegger the “living context” of thinking, a context facilitating the “draft” of the dynamic counter-striving of lighting and primordial concealing, and Socrates, according to Heidegger, did “nothing else than place himself into this draft, this current, and maintain himself in it,” and this is why, according to Heidegger he was the purest thinker of the West (p. 17). To bring clarity to this notion of thinking in terms of an immersion in the “draft,” I turn to Heidegger’s (1999) interpretation of what he terms Da-sein’s Being-historical thinking (inceptive/mindful thinking), which is an original way of doing philosophy, or more correctly, thinking, “according to more originary basic stance,” within the context sheltering the unfolding of the question of the truth of being, which is no longer a thinking about something and representing something objective (p. 3), but rather a thinking of matters in the poietic manner of bringing forth what is thought in its incompleteness while at once retaining and sheltering traces and intimations of its supreme and primordial power, which inspires the respect for the ineffability of that which is thought, for there is a refusal of that-which-is-thought to be brought to full disclosure or rendered wholly intelligible in language.

For Heidegger, it is Being qua Being or the essential truth of Being that is thought as the grounding ontological topic. With respect to Socrates, as is known from the dialogues (especially the “early” dialogues, which are aporetic in nature), what Heidegger speaks of might be related to the Being or ineffable and mysterious essence of the virtues, which Socrates continually and relentlessly questions within the context of his ever-renewed thought and examination. Heidegger (1999) claims that inceptive-mindful thinking is attuned in an original mode of questioning, which draws in and holds the thinker in the primordial sway of the relationship between thinking and the formal or even informal “Socratic curriculum,” that these youths are drawn to Socrates, listen intently to him, and then take it upon themselves to imitate him (Magrini 2017; 2018).

1 It is necessary to include, in this definition of “pure thinking” in relation to Socrates, another reason why Heidegger (1968) considers him a “pure thinker”: Socrates was unique in that he understood and embraced that what he philosophized and thought was ineffable in terms of written communication, and this of course extended for Heidegger beyond even the type of allegory, metaphor, and mythology Plato employed. “For anyone who begins to write out of thoughtfulness,” declares Heidegger, “must inevitably be like those people who run to seek refuge from any draft too strong for them,” for Socrates knew that when thinking, he was pointing “at something which has not, not yet, been transposed into the language of our speech” (pp. 17-18). The so-called elusive, hidden, and original “truths” which Socrates pursued could not be formulated linguistically, via the logos.
essential truth of Being. This type of thinking does not come to an end, for it is never a means to the end of truth that might terminate the thinking, and so is always actively underway as an ever-renewed event of thinking and questioning, or we might say, learning. It abides amid Being’s essential unfolding, and as an experience of the coming-to-be and passing-away of Being, it breaks open and holds open what is most question-worthy. Heidegger claims that authentic thinkers are enraptured and attuned within the exigent and distressing need of “holding [themselves] within the essential sway of truth” (p. 258). This form of thinking shelters the mystery, or Being’s recession into hiddenness (Entrückung) that initially facilitates unhiddenness (Berückung), illuminating beings in such a way that the event and truth of Being unfolds in its most primordial manner. This is one way to interpret Heidegger’s comments regarding Socrates’ pure mode of thinking, and in phenomenological non-doctrinal readings of Plato’s Socrates, it is possible to understand the questioning-context of the dialectic as sheltering and instantiating the unfolding of Socrates’ mode or practice of questioning, his mode of dialectic examination, which is directed toward the most question-worthy issues (e.g., Hyland 1995; Kirkland 2010).

Heidegger (1958) claims that Socrates thinks and hence is driven by a single thought, for he repeatedly thinks “on no other topic than what things are” and continues to say “the same thing about the same thing” (p. 74), and, as stated, this for Socrates is to attempt to wrest from concealment the Being of the virtues. He thinks the same thing because the matter demands an unwavering dedication to continually return to it, responding to its enigmatic withdrawal and appeal, because its very essence resists being exhausted by the questioning; it defies acquisition and possession, and this is because, as stated, what Socrates inquires into always remains essentially open-ended and hence question-worthy. To think such thoughts we must first, states Heidegger (1968), “incline toward what addresses itself to thought” or “that which of itself gives food for thought,” and this he identifies as a gift, and the “gift of what must be properly be thought about, is what we call most thought-provoking” (p. 17)—i.e., that which is most question-worthy. This I relate directly to the “the question” Socrates asks, which finds its origin (archê) or beginning (Ursprung) in an attunement or pathos Heidegger calls “astonishment” (das Erstaunen) as related to “wonder” (thauma), and as Socrates explains in the Theaetetus, this attunement grounds philosophy.1 When talking of the “beginning,” Heidegger (1959) references archê, which “names that from which something proceeds”; however, that which emerges never truly leaves behind its origin or source, for the beginning is that which produces and also holds reigns over what is produced, for “the verb achein expresses, that which governs” (p. 81), i.e., astonishment and wonder give birth to and continue to nourish, invigorate, and direct Socrates’ ever-renewed philosophical inquiry. In short, turning to Capobianco (2010), “philosophia begins—and ends—\in ‘astonishment’” (p. 83). In and through “wonder” we are set within a relationship to what is inquired into, and here recall my initial comments regarding Socrates and the “draft” of thinking, wherein that which is questioned, that which is essential, “retreats” from our advances, as we are held in a state of “wonder” or “astonishment” and simultaneously drawn into the inquiry and

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1 In relation to our treatment of the attunement of originary thinking, Capobianco (2010) reminds us that pathos is related to paschein, the suffering and enduring through a mood or mode of attunement, and the Greeks’ and Heidegger’s understanding of pathos “is far removed from the modern psychological understanding of inward subjective feelings and emotions”; rather, pathos is more “originally understood as the way in which the human being is ‘attuned’ and ‘disposed’ by Being” (p. 83).
secured there by that which recedes from or retreats from our grasp. Out of this phenomenon spring forth what Heidegger (2000) terms “original questions,” and these original questions never terminate in definitive answers; they can never be closed-off or solved in terms of problems, and the most original question for Socrates, as Heidegger informs us, is the “Greek ti estin,” or “What is the essence of χάρις”? Since philosophy has as its beginning (archē) Erstaunen, original questions also have their origin in the pathos of astonishment, and this beginning, according to Heidegger, gives rise to a questioning that “pushes [Socrates] into the open,” and as an original questioning, it “transforms itself (as does every genuine questioning), and casts a new space over and through everything” (p. 32).

The type of truth consistent with doctrinal or idealist readings of Plato’s Socrates focuses on knowledge that can be grounded, as we saw in Heidegger’s reading of Plato, in “correctness,” but contrarily, Heidegger’s Socrates might be said, as Kirkland (2010) contends, to devote himself to the pursuit of “truth,” which presupposes an “attitude toward his subject matter in which he does not impose his will upon it,” because it can’t be a pure object of his thought; rather, he “aims to allow it to come to light in his discourse” (p. 51, my emphasis). This is strikingly similar to the manner in which Plato (1997) in Letter Seven describes philosophical understanding as an original occurrence of aletheia, which manifests in dialogue, but “cannot at all be expressed” or captured precisely “in words as other studies can, but instead, from living with the subject itself in frequent dialogue a light is [eventually] kindled and a leaping flame comes to [settle] in the soul where it presently nourishes itself” (341b-d, emphasis added). I want to explore this notion of Socratic truth as it might relate to Heidegger’s philosophy in a bit more detail by looking to the early Greek experience of aletheia, which is by now quite familiar to readers of Heidegger, as an encounter with unhiddenness (un-concealment) linked intimately with hiddenness (concealment) as the ground for its possibility, the possibility of entities presencing or showing up for our appropriation—in their givenness—in the first instance. As previously stated, Heidegger (2002) finds the original understanding of aletheia in Heraclitus’ Fragment 123: φύσις ... κρύπτεσθαι φιλει, which might be translated in a straightforward manner as “Nature has an affinity for hiding or remaining hidden.” To relate this idea to the language of the “sway” within which Socrates thinks, it is within the midst of the sway that the Being of beings “loves to conceal itself” (p. 9). This Heideggerian understanding of aletheia is stressed in Kirkland’s (2010) non-idealist reading of Plato’s Socrates in pursuit of the phenomenal Being of the virtues. In the course of questioning and interrogating the initial appearance of the virtue present to the doxa, as opposed to definitions or ideas filling the content of consciousness, “what emerges into truth through the questioning of the doxa with Socrates is ‘what virtue is’” (p. 115), but this truth cannot be brought to stand in propositional language, and rather must remain in an incomplete form. Indeed, Socrates’ living-with the appearance and instantiation of this truth, which like a flashing light attunes, nourishes, and enlivens the soul, represents the true success or positive aspect of the dialectic, for “it marks the [ontological] limit of virtue’s appearing to us, disturbing our doxa and pointing thereby beyond them to what is present in doxa only in exceeding it” (p. 115).

In his analysis of the pathein-of-truth (“suffering under” truth), Kirkland argues that the experience of aletheia is not only “excessive” it can also be “dangerous” in the sense of opening us up to an encounter with ta deinon, or the awe-inspiring presence of truth, which “resists being delimited and made intelligible, not merely frustrating our specific expectations, but radically calling into question what we presumed to be the limits of ‘what is,’ even of the possible” (p. 49). Here, we
can understand Heidegger’s claim regarding Socrates as a “pure thinker” demonstrating the courage to hold himself in the dialectic’s unfolding and resisting the temptation to flee-in-the-face of truth, to which many interlocutors ultimately fall victim. *Alethiea, as philosophical understanding,* manifests as the *flashing flame* within a momentary revelation, as an *intimation of truth,* where there is the concomitant movement or recession of what disappears into mystery, and certain aspects of the virtue Socrates interrogates—including its very *essence*—remain concealed (Magrini 2017; 2018). Thus, as opposed to the type of propositional or axiomatic certainty that many analytic or Anglo interpreters of Plato link with the (potential) philosopher-rulers’ practice of the dialectic in the *Republic,* it is possible to grasp Socrates’ notion of *philosophical understanding,* as would be consistent with Heidegger’s portrayal of Socrates, as intimated and poetized by Heidegger, in the following manner, which I have formalized: (1) it is a form of *insight* that although emerging from an interactive and discursive process of dialogue, it itself non-discursive; (2) it is non-propositional, but it is irreducible to rote or basic “know-how,” this because it is both an *ontological* and “normative” form of *insight*; (3) it is manifest and *comes-to-presence* only in the midst of dialogue or the practice of the philosophical method; (4) it is neither wholly subjective nor objective and rather *mediates* both realms; it is also reflexive in nature as a potential form of “self-knowledge” (Gonzalez 1998; Kirkland 2010; Hyland 1995). It is now to the issue of the practice of dialectic in Heidegger’s Socrates that I turn.

When separating the sophist off from Socrates—or Socratic philosophy—the real philosopher, the *ontos philosophos,* Heidegger (1997a) describes Socrates as embodying the vocation, task, or occupation that looks upon the *bios,* as this term and concept is set off from *zōe.* This indicates for Heidegger that the philosopher is not concerned with the life of things and entities set within the “nexus of animals and plants, of everything that crawls and flies,” but rather directed toward the “sense of existence, the leading of a life, which is characterized by a determinate *telos,* a *telos* functioning for the *bios* itself as an object of *praxis*” (p. 168), and for this reason, philosophy is a *way-of-Being* in the world. The philosopher is concerned with living out various kinds of life, and most importantly, makes a determination regarding the best type of life to live. For Socrates, as already stated, this is a life in pursuit of virtue, excellence, and the “good”; it is a life that is inseparable from the practice of the dialectic or *dialektikē*—the practice and *way-of-Being* that is at once a living with the *logoi.* Unlike typical doctrinal or idealist readings of Plato that view the dialectic as a tool or trusted method for arriving at certain truth, truth grasped in and through *noein*—beyond *dianoia* where the *hypothetical method* is jettisoned, as described in the *Republic*—Heidegger focuses on the dialectic’s flaws, revealing problems that Plato does not overcome. Gonzalez (1997), in his reading of the *Sophist,* informs us that according to Heidegger, the “*logos* pervading all forms of disclosing … has a tendency to conceal”; as such, what the dialectic aims at is what amounts to the transcendence of language or the *logos* by way of “proceeding *through* (dia) *logos,*” and “its ultimate aim, that towards which it is inherently directed, must be a pure seeing or *noein* beyond *logos*” (p. 18). However, the dialectic can never accomplish this end and so has an “inherent tendency toward a ‘pure seeing’ that it can never attain” (p. 19). At first blush, this appears to render the dialectic a failed project; however, this does not sound the death-knell for the dialectic in Socratic philosophy, for there are positive elements associated with the dialectic as practiced by Socrates, despite its failing to rise to the level of epistemological trustworthiness granted in doctrinal or idealist readings of Plato. It is successful within limits, and there are positive aspects of the Socratic dialectic that relate to truth, education, and the potential development of our character and disposition (*hexis*).
If, as Heidegger argues, the dialectic is limited, what then can it accomplish as related directly to a “Socratic” philosophy? In a response requiring some explanation, I show that the dialectic is both essential and beneficial to a philosophical life, as described above, in that it instantiates a living-practice and way-of-Being that is educational or heuristically educative in its essence, in terms of Heidegger’s understanding of paideia as initially described. The dialectic is a process that is disclosive; however, according to Gonzalez (1997), what it discloses does so “indirectly, negatively, and ‘reflexively’ (i.e., through the process of philosophy itself)” (p. 38). When speaking of disclosing things “negatively,” this for Heidegger (1997) means a “denial by way of legein,” which indicates that “saying ‘no,’ is a letting be seen,” but always in a limited and incomplete manner. Negation in the dialectic for Heidegger, and here I include Socrates, possesses a “disclosive character,” in that within the denial of a line of argumentation or position, an encounter with the aporetic breakdown of examination, “within the concrete [but limited] uncovering of beings,” denial serves a “purifying [cathartic] function, so that negation itself acquires a productive character” (p. 388). Negation is understood by Heidegger as an integral component of the Socratic dialectic, which is thought of as a process of “καθαρσίς of the αγώνα by ελεγχός,” which works by “setting the δόχαι against each other through the συναγεῖν εἰς ἑν” (p. 260) — i.e., the purification of ignorance through the questioning and synthesizing through the gathering of beliefs and opinions held by those who are engaged in the dialogue, which importantly includes the process of winnowing out those beliefs and opinions determined untenable. In this process, what is positive for Socrates is the partial and limited revelation of the matter under discussion, i.e., the partial appearance of and glimpse into elusive phenomenal Being of the virtues. Here recall Plato’s claim in Letter Seven regarding the leaping flame of truth that settles in the soul, which transforms it through periagoge, or the soul’s turning back or around to itself enlightened, which is an “educative” (paideutic) occurrence or event. What Heidegger indicates about what is positive in the dialectic is linked intimately with a “Socratic attitude,” which achieves the “positive only in actually carrying it out,” by living within the draft and sway of the inquiry and not in terms of the dialectic producing positive results in terms of truth that somehow stands at the end, and hence beyond, the inquiry itself (p. 368), i.e., we are transformed only within the dialectic, only within the process itself, and not by some result it might produce.1 How this enlightenment occurs, however, is not clearly explicated by Heidegger; however, in relation to his reading, I explore this issue by turning to non-doctrinal readings of Plato’s Socrates’s practice of dialectic in the attempt to show that although never culminating in noetic insight of the so-called “truth” of the essence of virtue, the logoi, in rigorous, well-meaning discourse, does

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1 Heidegger (1988) defines phenomenology in precisely the same manner, as a “method” within which truth manifests that cannot be jettisoned once we have arrived at it, e.g., when talking of interpreting facticity, Heidegger is clear that this interpretation can be nothing other than “living” it, for only in interpretive activity is Dasein’s possibility for “becoming and being for itself” made known and pursued; ἐρμηνεύειν (the interpreting of facticity), is a method for living and acquiring “an understanding of itself” (p. 11). This observation is made by Gonzalez (2009) when stating in his reading of Socrates, “the truth of philosophy is its method,” for “Socrates himself, at least as depicted in Plato, places much more emphasis on method than on results, not only because his discussions are often aporetic, but also, and more importantly, because he appears to value more the process of dialectic and dialogue than any outcome of this process” (p. 427).
demonstrate a revelatory capacity in the process of questioning, refuting (negating), and winnowing out opinions and beliefs that are shown to be problematic and questionable.

Heidegger describes the practice of the dialectic as a vigorous questioning (διερωταν) with the purpose of shaking one out of familiar and complacent modes of knowing whereby many doxai are brought together and set in tension in relation to that which is questioned. Within the unfolding interrogation, the doxai “slap each other in the face” (p. 261), and there occurs the “casting out [απαλλαγη] of ungenuine δοξαι,” and a “clearing away,” or a “removal of what stands in the way of the μαθηματα, the proper positive learning” (p. 262), which demonstrates the function of “εκβαλλειν” (p. 258), the act of casting out ignorance and transcending αμαθηα in a way that “clarifies” or “purifies” (καθαρυςις) the soul. Indeed, when Heidegger describes the context of the Socratic dialectic, and here recall Heidegger’s description of the philosopher’s life as introduced above, it should not be conceived as “a dwelling with the material content of knowledge,” i.e., not a process privileging content-over-method, or propositional knowledge over a more vague and limited form of understanding; rather, it is a matter of “the Being of Dasein itself: to what extent does it dwell in αληθηειν[understanding/truth of the virtues and the “good” life] or in αγνοι [ignorance of the virtues and the “good” life]” (pp. 262). But how, returning to Heidegger’s critique of the dialectic, as a practice driven by and given structure within language, a process that cannot transcend language in the pursuit to arrive at a pure form of seeing (noesis) that is beyond the logos, is it possible to imagine truth emerging from a practice driven by and at once limited by language? Gonzalez (1997) observes that what philosophy requires is a form of speech, or manner of approaching discourse, that “breaks through speech in a process of ‘speaking for and against,’” in a way that might direct our “attention beyond what is said, thereby leading us more and more to the matter under discussion and letting it be seen” (p. 18). If we take into consideration what Heidegger has said regarding the Being of Dasein as representing the true philosopher’s concern in relation to what he claims about dialogue, perhaps it is possible to suggest a response to this query and concern related to Socratic dialectic. Heidegger (1968) informs us that if dialogue focuses exclusively on “what is directly said” and what might be directly known through this saying, dialogue “becomes halting and fruitless” (p. 178). However, if inquirers in the dialogue “involve each other in that realm and abode about which they are speaking,” i.e., situate themselves in close proximity to the Being of that which is interrogated; and for Heidegger, as we have discussed, this is the realm of original questioning that gives rise to speaking in and from out of the “site of thought in its relation to the essential truth of Being,” and so opens the potential of dwelling “in the “soul of the dialogue” where the speakers are “led into the unspoken,” i.e., in this case, what emerges from the logos is irreducible to it (p. 178).

To approach an understanding of how this movement into the unspoken through the logos might occur in the unfolding of the Socratic dialectic, we consider Gonzalez’s (1998) and Gadamer’s (1988) insightful analyses of Plato’s Letter Seven, focusing on the manner in which the four ways of knowing contend in order to open a space for the presencing of the “fifth way,” or brief insight into a truth barely seen in the midst of the dialectic. I now consider how this phenomenon might occur through the winnowing process of clearing away the negative and making space for the positive in dialectic as Heidegger describes above. In Letter Seven, Plato (1997) discusses four ways of knowing: (1) names/words, (2) images/figures, (3) propositions, and (4) resulting insight (knowing). Plato also discusses a “fifth way” that occurs from these, a form of philosophical insight (philosophical understanding) that he stresses is ineffable; it cannot be spoken of like other
things philosophers discuss, and I note that it certainly does not possess the degree of certainty required to ground any systematic doctrine of philosophy (EP VII 341c). Whereas Heidegger elicits the imagery of the doxai “slapping against each other” within dialogic exchange, in both Gonzalez (1998) and Gadamer (1988), we encounter a similar metaphor, namely, that of the dialectic unfolding as process wherein the doxai or the “ways of knowing” are rubbed against each other, and this relates to the notion of language’s potential transparency in relation to the Greek term that Plato employs, tribein, “to rub down.” Ideally, in the dialectic, we might imagine words fading into the background so that partial meaning shines forth. However, as Gadamer (1988) contends, in the “rubbing” together of the four ways in dialectic, language fails to achieve the level of full transparency required to let the “thing itself” (the Being of virtue) move to the fore unimpeded so as to be seen in the fullness of its self-showing (p. 105). Now, consider what Gonzalez (1998) contends about the Greek term tribein, as a “process of a vigorous rubbing that wears things down” (p. 265), or wears them away, and it is possible to understand the process of truth-happening in Plato’s Letter Seven, as this relates to the “negation” stressed in Heidegger’s reading of the dialectic: As we move through the four ways, rubbing each against the other, there occurs a “wearing down” of the language, so to speak. The more intensely we seek to clarify the names, images, and propositions we employ to ground our knowledge, the more the words/images begin to wear down and away; they recede, as it were, and a partial and momentary transparency of language occurs, and the fleeting light of truth shines forth, like a leaping flame. In more direct terms, according to Gonzalez (1998), through the “process of question and answer in which we expose the weakness of the words, propositions, and images we use”—through “negation”—we are afforded a momentary and partial vista onto truth, and “just barely glimpse through the cracks [opened in the process] the true being which they all attempt but fail to express” (p. 268). It is possible to link the “fifth way” of “barely” knowing the “thing itself” with the moment when language reaches its limited, but disclosive and “positive” potential as a transparent medium for aletheia.

This is not, however, to indicate that this form of insight transcends language usage entirely, or that it is a moment when truth is fully disclosed with no dissembling, because this moment of truth-happening occurs only in and through the vigorous use of language, which is always grounded in human limitation and radical finitude. As Gonzalez stresses, in a way related to this reading of Heidegger’s Socrates, this unique, fleeing, and fragile instance of philosophical insight as described is not and can never be “the kind of knowledge that will put an end to all inquiry or that can be ‘grasped’ once and for all” (p. 267), for it requires ever-renewed attempts to bring it to light, which requires the participants in the dialectic, as Heidegger has stressed in relation to Socrates, to strive to situate and hold themselves in the draft of the inquiry, for as Plato (1997) teaches,

1 Original passages from Plato’s (1997) Letter Seven will assist the reader in understanding the analysis we have provided: “Only when all of these things—names, definitions, and visual and other perceptions—have been rubbed against one another and tested, pupil and teacher asking, and answering questions in good will and without enmity—only then, when reason and knowledge are at the very extremity of human effort, can they illuminate the nature of any object (344b) … [but] this knowledge is not something that can be [put] into words like other sciences; but only after long-continued discourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the subject, suddenly, like a light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born of the soul and straightaway nourishes itself” (341c).
whatever “we learn” must be “learned together” [synerchomai], through long and earnest labor” (EP VII 344b). To further contribute to this line of thought as related to a theme already discussed, Kirkland (2010) stresses that the process of “truth-happening” highlights the ontological distance that the human being is situated from full disclosure of truth, which is always given in an obscure, oblique, and partially veiled manner. However, the dedicated participants in the pursuit of truth agree to inhabit the space, the “site of distance from but nonetheless toward the being of virtue” (xxii), and this indicates that we “abide with doxa while pointing beyond it and to its limits” (p. 114). In relation to what Kirkland identifies as the deinos associated with philosophical insight, what has been described is a distressing distance from Being, but one that is, in a sense and in an important way, wonderous and alluring—evoking the mood of “astonishment”—which establishes our relationship to issues that remain “as concealed, hidden, and thus questionworthy” (p. 55). We are drawn, as Heidegger indicates about Socrates, to the pursuit of that which withdraws from our grasp, and in its withdrawal it beckons us to continue our pursuit, because it is truly worthy of our continued questioning and represents the very essence of an education directed toward those things that are most beneficial for the development of the soul. The site of the dialectic, the ever-developing, ever-expanding context of originary learning, which is the locus of “distance and the excess of truth, belongs essentially to the site opened by melete,” which is related directly to Plato’s Socrates’ avowed practice of philosophy as care for the soul (as a paideutic practice), “by our being originally concerned with the being of virtue, compelled to be toward it in its withdrawal” (p. 114). We have more to say regarding this phenomenon, occurrence, or event in the concluding section below.

*Paideia* as Philosophical Task and Way-of-Being: A Socratic Notion of Truth-and-Method in Learning

What I have described in these foregoing sections might be said to represent an originary understanding of method and truth in Socratic philosophy, as a practical way-of-Being or living out of one’s existence attuned to the understanding that this also instantiates a life-of-learning. In terms of what Heidegger describes, in relation to the undeniable Socratic influence on Plato’s thought, philosophy is a way of life, a way-of-Being, that is “on the way” (unterwegs) toward learning, which can never be equated with, to return to my earlier description of contemporary standardized education, the application of methods in the pursuit of acquiring sure and certain knowledge in education. Learning in a manner associated with Heidegger’s Socrates is never reducible to the rote accumulation of the day’s lessons, to be rehearsed on exams that calculate and assess the proficiency level of the student in memorizing and regurgitating the lesson; this is not Socratic learning, which I argue can never be authenticly reproduced in the classroom, e.g., as is claimed by many embracing the so-called *Socratic Seminar*. Heidegger (1999) assures us of this when observing that *paideia* is not education in terms of transmission and accumulation of facts, linked with the additive model of learning; rather, it is “πραγματεία, a task, and hence not a self-evident possession,” and further, it is not merely a “task any person can take up according to whim but is one which precisely encounters in each person its own proper resistances” (p. 258). Heidegger (1968) recognizes that learning, just as is the case with thinking, is something we must first begin to “learn,” for learning in an essential way “means to make everything we do answer to whatever essentials address themselves to us at a given time” (p. 14). Education calls for, as opposed to the speaking of monologues or the delivering of lectures, an attuned mode of “listening” in advance for the call of education itself, and here I return to the *archē* of authentic philosophy—
from out of which we are attuned and continually guided and directed by the original issues we pursue and questions we ask—and the “unspoken” essence in dialogue, which reveals “truth” that partially and momentarily nourishes the soul, does so in such a way that we are at once challenged by it and attuned to continue on in the pursuit to better understand it, to bring to light further aspects of it that continue to recede from full disclosure.

Education, or authentic learning, as understood and practiced by Heidegger’s Socrates, is an ongoing and ever-renewed “task”—recall Heidegger’s understanding of education as “πραγματεία,” as exercise or labor—that is instantiated within the educational practice of dialectic, which according to Heidegger (1999), “provides the positive only in actually carrying it out and not by making it the direct theme of reflection” (p. 368), and then producing objective instances of knowledge that terminate the method or process. Based on this speculative reading of Heidegger’s Socrates, what we term the originary context of education, which shelters the draft of authentic thinking and learning, unfolds in the following manner, grounded in the understanding that in learning there occurs a two-fold movement, captured by Heidegger’s use of the Greek term “απαλλαγή”: (1) our soul moves away from ignorance or amathia, and (2) because of the excessive and elusive nature of that which we seek to reveal, its essence moves away from us, living at an ontological remove from the scope and parameters of our inquiries, and we are set at a distance from the full disclosure of the essence of what we are inquiring into. Admittedly, if this two-fold movement fully captured the process we identify as paidiea, the situation of learning would indeed appear frustratingly pessimistic in the extreme. However, there is a third component that is inseparable from the movement that Heidegger importantly stresses, namely, that as we are attuned within this process, we are at once transformed; we are drawn toward and to the very thing that withdraws from our inquiry. In relation to this concern, I argue that authentic learning occurs within the dynamic “draft” created by the counter-striving movement between thought and what is thought set within the ontological context that instantiates our relationship to the essential truth.

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1 In his reading of Socratic philosophy and the dialectic, Gonzalez (2004) stresses that philosophy is an endeavor where truth and method are inseparable, and “the truth of the matter shows itself, not in some definition or teaching that would conclude philosophical questioning, but rather in the very carrying out of this questioning” (p. 427). If we relate the issue of “pure thinking” to an education that would be consistent with it because it is instantiated by Heidegger’s Socrates, the ever-renewed practice of the dialectic requires, as Gonzalez elucidates, a form of pure thinking that is “always underway and yet so in touch with the being of the matter in question as to be continually changed by it,” i.e., a thinking in relation to truth that can never be brought to full unhiddenness and yet still holds the supreme power to transform the soul (epagoge), and this thinking “pays more attention to the way,” or practice and movement, of the dialectic, “than to the content without becoming contentless,” or devolving into a transposable, applicable, formable, and hence, empty method, and this type of pure thinking “transforms without instructing” (p. 431).

2 We undoubtedly get the sense of απαλλαγή (apallage) referring to the “casting out” of ignorance through dialectic. But this term can also indicate, as we have suggested, in addition to “deliverance, release, riddance of a thing,” the “going away” or taking a “departure” from a thing, hence our reference to truth’s movement away from our understanding as well as the movement away that we experience from our previous state of ignorance in the midst of the dialectic (Lexicon, p. 76).
of Being, and this movement is highlighted, as in the case of Socrates, by the back-and-forth of the question-rejoinder-refutation of the dialectic in praxis—all the while, as Heidegger (1968) claims, there is an attendance to what remains “unspoken” in the dialogue (p. 17), i.e., this highlights our relationship to and encounter with aletheia. When learning, as stated, we are inspired, attuned and held fast in wonder (thauma) to continually inquire into that which withdraws from full disclosure, “drawn to what withdraws” (p. 17), and in this process, we are located at an ontological distance from the essential nature of what remains question-worthy, and hence worthy of our educational pursuits, and here we experience a way-of-Being within a context of thinking highlighted by the “mutual nearness of its appeal” (p. 17). So, within this questioning in the midst of this distance from truth, a proximity we can never close off, although distressing, we find the inspiration to continue on, for this thinking at a distance is attuned to continue on in the pursuit of what withdraws from our inquiry. In learning, the partial and oblique revelation of truth, or the intimation of truth, nourishes the soul and inspires us to hold ourselves in the ever-evolving draft of thinking, for like Socrates, if we are attuned to the “call” of education itself, we do “nothing else than place [ourselves] into this draft, this current, and maintain [ourselves] in it” (p. 17), for it is only in this draft that enlightenment and authentic education can occur.¹

What we have described in this essay, in relation to Socrates and inquiry, might be expressed in Heideggerian terms as the event of education that uniquely includes the phenomena of attunement (Erstaunen) and Gelassenheit occurring with the context of learning. Heidegger (1956) is emphatic that the pathos of Erstaunen penetrates and pervades the entire philosophical project or process of seeking knowledge—as its arché—and so it determines, as we have mentioned, the practitioner’s “dis-position” (p. 83). Das Erstaunen facilitates the resolute approach to questioning as described above, a questioning, we recall, that both propels Socrates forward and holds him in the sway and draft of the inquiry. In this occurrence or event, the inquirer is inspired to display, and beyond, instantiate, the attuned attitude of “self-restraint,” which is a dis-position in which the inquirer refrains from imposing her prejudices in advance onto to the thing or issue under investigation. Here, Heidegger (1966) has in mind a troubling characteristic of contemporary thinking, let us call it “calculative thought,” associated with a way of knowing grounded and enacted in the willed effort to know and hence “possess” and “appropriate” things in a way that exhausts their Being in knowledge (p. 58). Rather than imposing our will onto that into which we inquire, Heidegger urges us to release ourselves over to it in advance—Gelassenheit zu den Dingen (“releasement toward things”)—granting it the space to manifest and reveal itself in its own Being, on its own terms, in its own unique manner of self-showing. In this occurrence, as Heidegger points out, the inquirer stays and remains released in inquiry in such a way that she is given over to the thing, and in effect, in an original manner, belongs to it, “insofar as [she] is appropriated initially” by it, rather than the reverse (p. 73, emphasis in original). In this attuned disposition, to return to Heidegger’s (1956) analysis of Erstaunen, there is a “retreat” of that which is questioned from full and complete disclosure, and although, and indeed because, the inquirer, under the spell of and in the grip of Erstaunen, remains “self-restrained,” she is “forcibly drawn to and, as it were, held fast by that which … retreats” (p. 85), or, as we have stated, the inquirer is drawn into and secured within the inquiry into that which perpetually withdraws or recedes from full revelation.

¹ For a detailed analysis focused on Gelassenheit and education in Heidegger’s later philosophy, which does not reference Socrates, see: Schwieeler, E., and Magrini J. (2015). “Meditative Thought and Gelassenheit in Heidegger’s Thought of the Turn: Releasing Ourselves to the Original Event of Learning,” Analysis and Metaphysics, 14, 7-37.
It is understandable then, why such an event occurs and must occur as the continued “repetition” of the process, which is why, as stated throughout, the event of originary learning finds no end, no teleological point of complete closure, no final moment of full enlightenment. For enlightenment, when and if it comes, arrives slowly and only after long and engaged inquiry, granted in the sway and draft of the unfolding educative process (Plato 1997, EP VII; Heidegger 1968).

Returning to and concluding with Socrates, Heidegger (1968) states that as Socrates is drawn into what withdraws, “he points into what withdraws,” and in this way we might think of him as serving as a “sign, a pointer,” but what he is pointing at is “something which has not, not yet, been transposed into the language of our speech” (p. 18); indeed, still to this day, what Socrates philosophized—which he could not properly or systematically bring to language—has not yet been understood by a majority of educators, who are “like those people who run to seek refuge from any draft too strong for them” (p. 17). In the presence of Heidegger’s Socrates, we find ourselves faced with the practice of education that is not only foreign but radically at odds, proximally and for the most part, with the way we as contemporary educators have viewed and practiced education. For education as described relating to and emerging from Heidegger’s Socrates cannot be reduced to the type of method that can be successfully reproduced or imitated in the classroom with the aim of producing the result of learning, which can be gauged through quantification. To even attempt to thematize or systematize it would serve only to bastardize its unique and original essence; indeed, to write it down in the service of a systematized or scripted curriculum, with the requisite set “lesson-plans,” already betrays Heidegger’s point about one of the things that makes Socrates the purest thinker of the West, namely, “he wrote nothing,” and if he would have attempted to do so, he would have turned away from authentic thought, or “pure thought,” to become a “fugitive” of thought (pp. 17-18). Thus, a Socratic education drawn from Heidegger’s reading is a form of learning and education which, to continue a theme drawn from contemporary Platonic scholarship, by its very essence must remain non-systematic; it cannot become a doctrine in the sense that we in education understand it today. However, it is my hope that this essay might work in service of offering Socratic intimations of and gestures toward—despite how veiled these elucidations must remain—inspiring new and potentially fecund thinking on the ways we currently go about educating our students, offering philosophical insights into the potential re-conceptualization of what we currently understand about the standards for methods, truth, and learning. For the education I have attempted to describe and elucidate, as related to Heidegger’s Socrates, depends on a genuine form of questioning that lies at the heart of the educational experience, where deep transformation and attunement to the soul (psychē) or disposition (hexis) occurs. Here, it is possible to understand the pathos-of-education in Heideggerian (1959) terms as the event of “tuning” or the “turning” of the “dis-position and determination” (p. 83), i.e., the soul in periaogoge turned back to itself enlightened, and it is enlightened in and through a unique and non-systematic understanding of the experience of truth as aletheia, in the occurrence of aletheuein as it is inseparable from the originary context of education, which shelters and facilitates the draft of authentic thinking and learning: authentic paideia.
References


A Free Flow Between Becomings and Becoming Imperceptible—Rare, but Possible

Klas Roth

“[W]e bathe in delirium,” Gilles Deleuze (2001, p. 43) says in Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, asserting that “history presents us with a most peculiar phenomenon: the reactive forces triumph … [and] Everywhere we see the victory of No over Yes, of reaction over action” (pp. 74-75). And because of this he thinks that “[l]ife becomes adaptive and regulative” (p. 75) and that we no longer understand what it means to become imperceptible, that is, creative—the restless inhabitant of imperceptible becoming. Such insights concerning the darker sides of life, or what he called the overwhelming reactive forces, the sadness of life, which he had developed earlier in his Nietzsche and Philosophy (1983a), suggest that he had given up on the hope that the whole human species would make a free flow between perceptible becomings and becoming imperceptible possible. Does this suggest that he gave up the hope that specific individuals can make such a free flow possible in education and society at large? I do not think so. I argue that his writings suggest that a free flow between perceptible becomings and becoming imperceptible is possible, and that this flow requires a recognition of active and reactive forces as well as a regulation of reactive forces through thinking (Deleuze, 1994), something a post-humanist such as Rosi Braidotti does not acknowledge to any great extent. On the contrary, she focuses one-sidedly on the affirmation of active forces, asserting that there is a way out of the reactive; she even claims that it is possible to remove reactive forces. I argue that such a one-sided view is naïve and does not support a free flow between becomings and imperceptible becoming; it misrecognises reactive forces, and leads to a one-sided view of affirmation, joy, and happiness, and to dead-end utopias such as the one suggested by Nathan Snaza and John A. Weaver (2015).

Deleuze, who warns about such tendencies mentioned above, affirmed not merely the value, but also the possibility of and hope for a free flow between becoming perceptible and becoming imperceptible. He also expresses, inter alia, in his latest book, the woeful examples of people becoming slaves through education and in societies by repeating the flow of cases forged by “fictive causal chains, illegitimate rules [and the] simulacra of belief … [through] simple verbal repetition that only simulates its effect” (Deleuze, 2001, p. 42). Such forces will, according to Deleuze, not merely make any individual or group fall into present concerns and maintain them as if these should be upheld, but will also make people believe that they have to try to solve issues or problems under already more or less given conditions, without necessarily changing these conditions or the way issues and problems are understood. In order to oppose such moves, Deleuze argues for the importance of acting upon our freedom to respond responsibly to chains of constraining conditions through thinking.¹ Such a response is, for him, not about moving beyond

¹ Even though Deleuze portrays, via Friedrich Nietzsche, the historical conditions for freedom in not very positive terms, he is optimistic about the possibility that at least some people can move away from constraining chains, and find their ways anew—themes that we also see cropping up in Hannah Arendt and Immanuel Kant, although in different ways; see also Allen W. Wood (2014), who argues, through Immanuel Kant, Johan Gottlieb Fichte, Karl Marx and Georg Wilhelm
reactive forces or about a transition from becoming perceptible to becoming imperceptible; it is rather about a free flow or play or moving between perceptible becomings and becoming imperceptible. Such moves are, for Deleuze, not easily actualised, at least not in relation to powerful reactive forces such as ressentiment and bad conscience, which he thinks diminish the possibility of becoming imperceptible or even triumph over it. Both of these can weigh one down, and make it hard to find one’s way again, according to him. For example, ressentiment separates the active force from what it can do, that is, from bursting creativity, and, when this is the case, the separation leads, for Deleuze, to an inability to respect and love, to the imputation of wrongs to the other, even to the need to view the other as evil. It can then make those concerned oppose “themselves to active forces and represent themselves as superior” (Deleuze, 1983a, p. 123), and even hide their “hatred under a tempting love: I who accuse you, it is for your own good; I love you in order that you will join me, until you are joined with me, until you yourself become a painful, sick, reactive being, a good being” (1983a, p. 128). A sign of this is when the other has its conscience being poisoned and becomes the slave of its slavishness. Ressentiment then becomes a powerful reactive force, together with bad conscience; that is, when, through projection, it has made the other responsible for whatever it is that caused the situation, and the other cries, “It is my fault, it is my fault” (1983a, p. 132). When this happens, ressentiment makes one hostile towards the other; it creates a sense of jealousy and of inferiority towards the other, and makes one believe that one’s presumed inferiority justifies one’s actions towards the other, and that one can do what one wants with the other, instead of engaging in becoming imperceptible and making it possible for the other to do the same. It even fuels shame and guilt on the part of the other; the other can, then, feel so overwhelmed by negative emotions that he/she feels at a loss, even becomes invisible, that is, diminished to the point that he or she loses himself- or herself, at times even completely. Reactive forces have then triumphed overactive forces.

In my view, shame and guilt can be related not merely to negativity, but also to what could be done in a positive sense, something that Deleuze does not seem to consider.¹ He says, for example, that

Friedrich Hegel, for the free development of each in the various relations they encounter. Hence, as constrained beings, people are not just slaves to present conditions, even though, at times, it is so or may feel so; they are free, or at least capable of acting upon the idea of freedom, in relation to conditions that limit their freedom. So, we see that Deleuze is in good company when it comes to acknowledging constraining conditions, while at the same time recognizing the value of freedom, even though he does so in a somewhat different way than, inter alia, Arendt and Kant.

¹ Stanley Cavell, for example, views shame and guilt not merely in relation to disgust or disdain, but also as “a call for a transformation of things, and before all a transformation of the self” (1990, p. 46); the latter is, as I argue, through the voice of Cavell, “a return to philosophy” (Roth, 2010, p. 396), and to the possibility of finding one’s way again. See also Kant (1996) when he says that conscience is the “internal court in man (‘before which his thoughts accuse or excuse one another’)” (p. 203/AA 6: p. 438) (here and elsewhere in this article, references to Kant cite page numbers from the English translation followed by volume and page number from the German Akademie-Ausgabe edition of Kant’s works. “Translations of Kant’s works commonly include volume and page numbers of the Academy Edition. References to the Academy Edition often use ‘AA’ for Akademie-Ausgabe” [“Further Reading,” in Kant 2017, p. xxxii]). Here Kant treats conscience as a crucial aspect of our duty to engage in self-examination and self-knowledge. It should remind us of our duty to engage in the pursuit of coming to “know (scrutinize, fathom)
humanity’s “only hope lies in a revolutionary becoming: the only way of casting off … shame or responding to what is intolerable” (1995, p. 171). Here we see that, even though Deleuze seems to say that shame is potentially productive, it is more a question of a casting of shame than of being reminded of what can be done through shame in a constructive sense. That is, if one lets shame weigh oneself down, then it is not constructive, but if, for example, shame is related to what one could do, that is, to becoming imperceptible, then it does not weigh one down. It becomes, instead, an active force. Nonetheless, even though Deleuze does not seem to recognise that conscience can work both ways, he is clear about the dangers of not encountering the above-mentioned forces responsibly through thinking, and of believing that there is a way out of reactive forces. Such thoughts open up, for Deleuze, not merely to a disintegration of the various possible becomings, but also to fictional ideas such as dead-end utopias. He also thinks that these ideas open the door to reactive forces that diminish our freedom to find our way again. It is therefore risky, even dangerous, that a post-humanist such as Braidotti, who draws on the work of Deleuze, focuses so one-sidedly on the affirmation of various becomings, joy and the vital force of life—Zoe—without paying enough attention to the value of also encountering and regulating reactive forces, which Deleuze, through Friedrich Nietzsche, emphasises. Even though she says that she wants to

1 Aislinn O´Donnell (2017), for example, defends a view of shame in the writings of Deleuze that focuses more on casting shame off, instead of viewing it as a force that also can be understood as a reminder of what can be done in a more positive sense. Even Sjoerd van Tuinen (2014), who talks about Deleuze’s writings on shame and guilt, does not draw attention to how shame and guilt can be a call for transformation and/or a reminder of our duty to do what the moral law requires, even demands, of us.

2 See Deleuze (2001), and his book on Nietzsche and his philosophy (1983a, in particular Chapters 2 and 4), in which he continuously comes back to the idea that reactive forces triumph over the active; in this book, Deleuze (1983a) also argues that “an active force becomes reactive (in a new sense) when reactive forces (in the first sense) separate it from what it can do” (p. 57). When this happens, an active force is “dragged into the abyss and turned against itself” (Deleuze, 1983a, p. 67), thereby hindering it to “produce a burst of creativity” (Deleuze, 1983a, p. 111). However, it is not just a case of an active force being separated from what it can do; it is also dangerous to offer more or less easy ways out of reactive forces, since doing so misrecognises the strength of reactive forces, thereby contaminating the active.

3 See for example, Braidotti (2006; 2011; 2018; 2019), in which she somewhat surprisingly focuses merely on affirming the vital force of Zoe, but not on finding a balance between active and reactive forces in a developed sense. It is also surprising that Ian Buchanan, in edited books such as A Deleuzian Century? (1999) and Deleuze and the Contemporary World (2006), edited together with Adrian Parr, does not draw attention to Deleuze’s call for encountering both active and reactive forces. Sjoerd van Tuinen (2014), however, draws some attention to active and reactive forces, and to the reactive triumphing over the active. Unfortunately, Van Tuinen (2014) merely mentions
replace what she calls the negativity of reactive forces with “Spinoza’s ethics of joyful affirmation” (2013, p. 343), without dismissing “the reality of conflict and pain” (2019, p. 154), she does not encounter reactive forces thoroughly, nor how these can be regulated. On the contrary, she says, naively, that “the pursuit of an ethics of joyful affirmation” (2019, p. 72) not only takes the “negative elements … seriously” (2019, p. 154), but also removes “the barriers of negativity” (2018, p. 221) and “offers a way out of the state of exhaustion, anxiety and fear” (2019, p. 154), not merely at a particular time, but eternally.

Hence, even though it seems that she would not want to dismiss reactive forces, she also asserts that there is a way out of them, and that they can be removed, and stopped from having a negative impact on ourselves. Such a one-sided and blind emphasis on “an ethics of joyful affirmation,” with its stress on “a way out” and on “removing” reactive forces, misrecognises the strength of such forces. As such it opens the gates to dark waters such as fictional utopian ideals of a coming perfect world in which human beings are supposed to experience the fruits of becomings, such as the ones expressed by Braidotti, in terms of affirmation, joy and happiness. The naïve stress on the above-mentioned ethics has even led educational post-humanists such as Snaza and Weaver (2015) to express not merely their wish or hope, but also the promise that posthumanism—with its one-sided emphasis on joyful affirmation—will provide us with “a general direction for an evolutionary development of culture” (p. xi), one that will take us back to the Garden of Eden.1

Although such images may be appealing, experience shows us that the whole human species has not come back to the Garden of Eden. Moreover, as Moses Mendelssohn (1983) says, “you will find no steady progress in … [the] development [of the human species] that brings it ever closer to perfection,” nor back to the promised land; despite the lack of such experiences, it happens, according to him, that “a dot blazes up in the midst of the great mass, [and] becomes a glittering star” (pp. 96-97). Such insights by Mendelssohn are, unfortunately, not reflected in the work by Snaza and Weaver, nor in the work by Braidotti. Moreover, even though some human beings can
None of them, therefore, undertakes the task of regulating reactive forces through thinking. It is therefore problematic that the above-mentioned authors focus so narrowly on just one of two forces which are, for Deleuze, inseparable. Deleuze also argues that the denial of the vital balance between the above forces drags us down into the abyss of evaluating others and ourselves in relation to the extent to which we pursue various specific ends such as the dead-end utopias mentioned above, with their one-sided stress on affirmation and joy. It is, for him, not a simple case of experiencing joy when moving between various becomings. Such moves can also fuel frustration, anxiety, fear, despair and loss. It is not even the case that moves between perceptible and imperceptible becomings necessary lead to an experience of happiness; such moves can be overwhelming and terrifying, and lead to disorder and chaos, apart from transformations over time; this can be seen in science, philosophy and art as well as in other ways of life, in particular when people come up with something new and original which may constitute an example of a work of genius. People can respond in negative ways to that which stands as an example of originality, and it can take years before such a work is recognised as original; this is due to the fact that people do not necessarily and in each and every case want to disturb and destabilise that which they believe, which when it happens can frustrate and even lead to loss and despair; it may even be the case that they avoid opening the gates to territories unknown to them, for fear of doing so. Their responses can, therefore, be an expression of reactive forces in relation to that which at some point can be recognised as original and as an example of genius. Additionally, it is not clear whether Braidotti thinks that her suggested path to the affirmation of joy necessarily concerns the whole human species or all species as such, or whether it concerns what Deleuze called the indefinite individuality of life. Nor is it clear whether Braidotti thinks that there is a sure way of arousing and maintaining an ethics of joyful affirmation over time, a becoming which Deleuze (1995) does not think is possible to arouse or maintain consistently over time; such issues ought to be clarified.

Apart from what has been said above, Deleuze also thinks that a misrecognition of the power of reactive forces has led to more or less modern philosophical and fictional ideas concerning, inter alia, the possibility for human beings to render themselves autonomous in each and every situation become “glittering stars,” there is no guarantee that they will continue to be such creatures. On the contrary, human beings can oscillate between active and reactive forces and backslide—even wilfully—from the pursuit of an ethics of joyful affirmation (see also note 3, p. 112 above).

1 Donna Haraway (2016), for example, also points out the dangers of not staying with specific troubles. She argues that when one does not do so, one can be led to either utopian (or dystopian) thoughts (as in the case of Snaza and Weaver), or to naïve views of finding a way out of reactive forces (as in the case of Braidotti).

2 See Deleuze and Guattari (1994), in particular their final chapter “Conclusion: From Chaos to the Brain,” in which they argue that neither art, science, nor philosophy can avoid chaos completely; these faculties can, however, “return from the land of the dead” (p. 202) by creating something new and original. Hence, even though Braidotti seems to think that she can avoid chaos entirely by offering a way to joy and happiness, it is, for Deleuze and Guattari, not possible to avoid chaos, other than temporarily, and through hard and creative work.
through the use of their understanding and reason, something that Deleuze disputes.\(^1\) He thinks that we cannot control reactive forces effectively. A reason for this is, for Deleuze, that the unconscious and constitutive synthesis of habits is so strong that we cannot control reactive forces completely.\(^2\) Another reason is that Deleuze together with Guattari believes that the above-mentioned formation of habits is shaped and disciplined under the conditions of the capitalist market.\(^3\) They think this market shapes and controls our images and directs our desire towards them instead of encouraging a free flow between perceptible and imperceptible becoming. Deleuze (1994) thinks, therefore, that it is just a fiction that we can control our actions effectively in each and every situation. Such a disconcerting view does not, however, suggest, for him, that we are slaves under the above-mentioned conditions. On the contrary, he believes that we can react and respond responsibly to flows of habitual reactive behaviour through thinking, and this we can do, according to him, by increasing our powers of thinking by affirming such a good mode

\[^1\] Deleuze criticizes Kant’s ideas of autonomy. He thinks that Kant does not pay enough attention to challenges people encounter when they try to render themselves autonomous. Kant, however, was aware of the challenges that human beings face when they try to render themselves autonomous; see, for example, his *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1998b), in which he discusses human beings’ innate propensity to radical evil; this is a book Deleuze did not pay much attention to. In it, Kant (1998b) argues that it is hard work to regulate what he called our innate propensity to radical evil, and that it would require “a revolution in the disposition of the human being … so a ‘new man’ can come about only through a kind of rebirth, as it were a new creation” (p. 68/AA 6: p. 47). Although Kant (1986b) thinks it would require such a revolution, he raises the question whether such a new man ever could come about. He says: “[I]f a human being is corrupt in the very ground of his maxims, how can he possibly bring about this revolution by his own forces and become a good human being on his own?” (p. 68/AA 6: p. 47). He seeks to resolve these seemingly incompatible views about human beings in his *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, namely the views that they can and should render themselves autonomous, on the one hand, and that they have an innate propensity to radical evil, which corrupts their duty to render themselves autonomous, on the other. Kant’s way of resolving the issue with above-mentioned views is to turn to religion, in particular Christianity. He argues that human beings have to turn to Christianity in order to fulfill their duty to comply with the moral law, since they cannot expect to fulfill their duty on their own, due to their innate propensity to radical evil. Moses Mendelssohn, however, questioned whether Christianity is the only organized religion that can serve as a vehicle for good; see also Paul Guyer (2020) for a discussion on this and similar issues. Whether Kant succeeds in solving the above-mentioned and seemingly incompatible views is also philosophically questionable; see Stephen R. Palmquist (2016, in particular Parts III and IV), Lawrence R. Pasternack (2014, in particular Chapters 5 and 6) and Allen W. Wood (1999, in particular Chapter 9, and 1970, in particular Chapters 5 and 6), for discussions on Kant’s views on human beings’ duty to render themselves autonomous, and on evil, religion and the Church; also, on whether Kant succeeds in solving the seemingly incompatible views about human beings.

\[^2\] Our consciousness is for Deleuze a slave of the unconsciousness; in this he is echoing the words of David Hume (1978, p. 415), who argued that reason is the slave of our passions.

\[^3\] See Deleuze and Guattari (1987; 2013).
of existence.\(^1\) When we do so, there is, for him, an opening for “an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life” (Deleuze, 2001, p. 28). Such an opening instantiates an affirmation of a vital form of life, namely the “singularization: a life of pure immanence” (2001, p. 29), which, for him, also opens the door to joy and not to sadness, and to the possibility of becoming new anew. It signifies, moreover, a responsible response towards reactive behaviour (at least for the moment), and “a liberation of thought from those images which imprison it” (Deleuze, 1994, p. xv), that is, from dogmatic thought. It also exemplifies the value of the freedom of moving between different perceptible becomings such as becoming woman, mother, friend, doctor etc., as well as between perceptible becoming and becoming imperceptible in an affirmative and joyful dance, in which the active forces are affirmed and the power of the reactive ones are regulated through thinking.\(^2\) Such a world in which thinking is recaptured marks, for Deleuze, a good mode of existence, in which the process of thinking is open-ended and never-ending; it is a regulative ideal toward which we can move while not fully attaining it.\(^3\)

The above-mentioned doubleness of becoming suggests, however, that it is not merely moves between already perceptible identities, but also consists of flights that go beyond those more or less fixed identities to that which is not yet, to an affirmation of an infinite flow of newness.\(^4\) Such moves instantiate flights beyond perceptible becomings to that which is yet to come, to something new. Such a becoming is not, for Deleuze and Guattari (1987), a “correspondence between relations… [nor] is it a resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification” (p. 237). It is neither a “progress or regress along a series …. [it does not] occur in the imagination … [and it is]

\(^1\) See, for example, Deleuze (1983b, pp. 22-25). Kant (1988b) also thinks that it is a continuous challenge for people to regulate their inclinations and raise themselves above constraining conditions; see also Guyer (2009) for a discussion on this and similar issues.

\(^2\) See Arendt (2003) and Kant (2000, pp. 174-175/AA 5: p. 294; 2006, pp. 122-124/AA § 59 [7: pp. 226-229]; 2007, pp. 445-446/AA 9: p. 451) for similar arguments concerning the value of thinking; see also for Arendt (2006; 1968, in particular Chaptera 12 and 13), and Kant (1998b) for discussions on what can happen when people do not think for themselves, etc. This tendency not to think for oneself cannot merely lead to dogmatic thought, as Deleuze claims, or to totalitarianism in power, as Arendt claims; it can also fuel the three grades of evil, as Kant would claim, namely, the frailty of our will, our liability to deceive others and ourselves, and our capacity to exterminate the other, none of which promotes thinking for oneself or from the standpoint of the other; and it happens constantly. See also Klas Roth (2018; 2019) for discussions that education, as it stands, does not necessarily promote thinking in the above mentioned Kantian sense.

\(^3\) See also Guyer (2014), which argues that Cavell and Kant argue for a similar position, namely that thinking in moral education is never-ending and never ended; see also Roth (2014) for a related standpoint about the process of education.

\(^4\) See also Kant (2006) which claims that “what can be made of the human being [and] what he is prepared to make of himself” (p. 185/[AA 7: p. 285]) is dependent upon whether he acts upon the idea of freedom or not, which indicates something similar to what Deleuze expresses, namely, that what human beings can become is dependent upon what they are prepared to become through freedom in education and society at large.
not an evolution, at least not an evolution by descent and filiation” (p. 238). It means, for Deleuze (2007a), “never to imitate, nor to ‘do like’, nor to conform to a model, whether it’s of justice or of truth,” and he continues, “There is no terminus from which you set out, none which you arrive at or which you ought to arrive at” (p. 2). Becomings are, for him, therefore “not phenomena of imitation or assimilation, but of a double capture…” (p. 2). This doubleness suggests, moreover, that it is not just a case of moving between various perceptible becomings without becoming imperceptible, since such a one-sided view of becoming diminishes the freedom to engage in thinking and leads to wandering in deserts of illusions such as those expressed by Snaza and Weaver. If, however, people do try to find a balance between the above-mentioned becomings, then it is also possible to move beyond perceptible becomings and engage in lines of flight that have “no beginning or end” (Deleuze, 2007a, p. 30). Such flights are for him, therefore, not a part of history; [since] history amounts only the set of preconditions, however recent, that one leaves behind in order to “become,” that is, to create something new. (Deleuze, 1995, p. 171)

Such flights are, for him, creative, and societies that make it possible for those concerned to encounter them are characterised not so much by their reactive forces, nor by their contradictions, but by their flights to horizons, something Deleuze believes happens in philosophy, literature, and science when the free flow between the doubleness of becoming is made possible. However, the free flow or dance implies, for Deleuze and Guattari (1994), not merely a movement between perceptible becomings and imperceptible becoming, but it also implies the inevitability of chaos, a chaos that “undoes every consistency in the infinite” (p. 42), which can be a difficult experience. This is because it is a move away from ourselves, our specific identities, and when this happens, we find ourselves wandering in deserts “populated by tribes, flora and fauna” (Deleuze, 2007b, p. 11), and sometimes in despair before we can find our way again and become filled with hope for the possibility of flights beyond that which is already known to that which has no beginning nor end. However, as we have seen, even though Deleuze in some of his earlier writings may have had the hope that such societies could come about, he became more doubtful, perhaps even more despondent, in his hope for the possibility that the whole human species could become imperceptible. Some of Deleuze’s darker views can, however, also be seen earlier on, as when he talks about control societies, and says

People are of course constantly talking about prisons, schools, hospitals: the institutions are breaking down. But they’re breaking down because they’re fighting a losing battle. New kinds of punishment, education, health care are being stealthily introduced. (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 174-175)

Or when he says

Educational reforms, industrial reforms, hospital, army, prison reforms … everyone knows these institutions are in more or less terminal decline. It’s simply a matter of nursing them through their death throes and keeping people busy until the new forces

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1 See Deleuze (1995, p. 171), and also Deleuze (2007b), in which he argues that “philosophy is a discipline that is just as inventive, just as creative as any other discipline, and it consists in creating or inventing concepts” (p. 318).
knocking at the door take over. (Deleuze, 1995, p. 178)

The passages above seem to suggest that even though there are examples of what he calls becoming imperceptible or lines of flight in societies, Deleuze came to believe that it is a lost battle for the whole human species, something Braidotti does not seem to believe in with her emphasis on a way out of reactive forces. This is so not merely because people get caught in reactive behaviour and more or less troublesome separations between active and reactive forces, but also because of all that which, according to Deleuze and Guattari (1994), threatens thinking, such as “stupidity, forgetfulness, aphasia, delirium, madness” (p. 52). Deleuze and Guattari also think that “thought [can be] threatened less by error than by [the] inevitable illusions that come from within reason” (p. 52), something Deleuze thinks Immanuel Kant eloquently has shown in his three critiques.1 Another reason for this doubt is the lack of examples of becoming imperceptible when it comes to the whole human species. However, and as seen from the above, Deleuze believes that even though there are rare flights of becoming imperceptible, these are not overwhelming or strong enough to combat reactive forces as such. Hence, Deleuze seems to have given up on the belief that the human species as a whole can become imperceptible. He also believes that we do not even have a “sure way of maintaining becomings, or still more of arousing them, even within ourselves” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 173);2 this is because we cannot know with certainty how to go on in each and every situation, according to Deleuze (Deleuze, 1983a, p. 58); it is more a question of engaging in the difficult art of thinking. Nonetheless, such dark views about the whole human species’ potential for becoming imperceptible do not suggest that he had given up on the possibility of examples of creativity, of becoming imperceptible, for specific individuals.3 On the contrary. It

1 See Deleuze (2008), in which he discusses the three critiques of Kant, namely Critique of the Power of Judgment (2000); Critique of Pure Reason (1998a); Critique of Practical Reason (1997); see also Craig Lundy and Daniela Voss (2015, in particular Chapters 1-4) for critical discussions on Deleuze interpretation of Kant’s philosophy as it is expressed in his three critiques.

2 See also Kant (1998b), who argued that “the depths of his own heart (the subjective first ground of his maxims) are to him inscrutable” (p. 71/AA 6: p. 51). People cannot, therefore, be certain of how to comply with the moral law, nor how they can maintain it. See also Kant’s comments on ends that are also duties in his Metaphysics of Morals (2017, pp. 160-170/AA, 6: pp. 386-6: 398), namely on our duties to perfect ourselves and the happiness of others, which for Kant, are wide, and therefore do not specify how or when to perfect ourselves and make others happy. Kant says, for example, that no “rational principle prescribes specifically how far one should go in cultivating one’s capacities (in enlarging or correcting one’s capacity for understanding, i.e., in acquiring knowledge or skill)” (Kant, 2017, p.165/AA 6: p. 392), nor does such a principle prescribe specifically how one can go about helping others to become happy. Additionally, the fulfillment of such principles is, for Kant, meritorious, “but failure to fulfill them is not in itself culpability” (Kant, 2017, p. 164/AA, 6: p. 390).

3 The question, however, about whether the whole of humankind or individuals are progressing is not new. It was also discussed between Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant, where Mendelssohn (1983) says, “Now, as far as human race as a whole is concerned, you will find no steady progress in its development that brings it ever closer to perfection. Rather do we see the human race in its totality slightly oscillate; it never took a few steps forward without soon afterwards, and with redoubled speed, sliding back to its previous position…. Individual man
would not merely be a contradiction to claim that there are no such examples and have never been; it would also suggest a lack of recognition and understanding of the obvious examples of creativity in, for example, philosophy, science and art. But this is not what Deleuze expresses. It is rather the other way around. He continuously comes back to the possibility of becoming imperceptible by using examples from philosophy, science and art in education and society at large, and by encouraging thinking. He says, for example,

The task of philosophy when it creates concepts, entities, is always to extract an event from things and beings, to set up the new event from things and beings, always to give them a new event: space, time, matter, thought, the possible as events. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 33)

The creation of concepts can then disturb that which is already known and challenge our ways of understanding.¹ Such events can create cracks in that which is known, and throw us into unknown advances, but mankind continually fluctuates within fixed limits, while maintaining, on the whole, about the same degree of morality in all periods—the same amount of religion and irreligion, of virtue and vice, of felicity and misery; the same result, if one compares like with like; of all these goods and evils as much as is required for the passage of the individual man in order that he might be educated here below, and approach as closely as possible the perfection which is apportioned to him and for which he is destined” (pp. 96-97). Here we see that Mendelssohn was not optimistic about the progression of humankind. Kant (1991), on the other, and against Mendelssohn, asserts that he (Kant) is “permitted to assume that, since the human race is constantly progressing in cultural matters (in keeping with its natural purpose), it is also engaged in progressive improvement in relation to the moral end of its existence. This progress may at times be interrupted but never broken off.” And he continuous, somewhat surprisingly, “I do not need to prove this assumption; it is up to the adversary to prove his case” (p. 88). The discussion between Mendelssohn and Kant had, however, to do with whether Christianity is a more progressive religion than Judaism and whether Christianity would bring “its adherents closer to moral perfection and should be universally adopted for that reason” (Guyer, 2020, p. 324). Kant, who believed that Christianity is the religion that would bring its adherents closer to perfection, did not believe that Judaism would do so. Mendelssohn, by contrast, thought that perfection is possible for individuals, but not for the whole human species, and believed “that the moral truths of the religion of reason always are and always have been available to all people, thus that Christianity should not be regarded as a more progressive religion than Judaism” (Guyer, 2020, p. 324).

¹ See for example Kant (2000), § 9, pp. 102-105/AA 5: pp. 216-219; § 29, pp. 148-160/AA 5: pp. 264-279; § 50, pp. 196-197/AA 5: 319-321, who argues for the value of searching for new ways of thinking, and claims that this can be done by engaging in the free play between imagination and understanding; see also Guyer (2006) for a discussion on various interpretations of such free play, and for his arguments for how it reasonably should be understood. Guyer also argues that we cannot know how to awaken nor sustain such a free play, nor how we can make ourselves creative in a decisive way; he says, “the very concept of the harmony of the faculties as the explanation of our pleasure in beauty requires that our experience of beauty not be constrained by any determinate rules, such characterizations can never offer anything more than some examples of the ways in which our experience of beauty can go beyond the determinate requirements of cognition” (2006, p. 193).
territories, which can disintegrate us, and hence frustrate and create anxiety, even despair. However infrequent, these are tokens of potentials, which, according to Deleuze, should not be ignored, but taken seriously. He thinks that the potential of such tokens demands of us to make perceptible becomings imperceptible, that is, lines of flight toward the indefinite and infinite. Such engagement is, for Deleuze and Guattari (1994), not disconnected and disengaged. It is instead connected with that which is already known, which is maintained, reproduced, imitated, and copied in an endless process of repetitive acts. It is an encounter with that which is known, with the urgency of impossible situations, in which questions of immediacy require acts of thinking other than the ones expected; such events are, for Deleuze (2015) “actualized in us, they wait for us and invite us in” (p.153). He believes that such acts can break with that which is already known—from dogmatic images of thought, dead-end utopias, and naïve affirmations of joy and happiness. He also thinks that the singularisation of such acts deterritorialise us and others, and open the door to the possibility of finding one’s way again, a process seemingly open to each and every one at any time. It enlarges thought beyond that which is known to the horizon of the possible, to new possibilities that are not, and cannot be, known in advance, nor aroused in accordance with specific guidelines or rules. To think new thoughts is, therefore, for Deleuze and Guattari (1994), to engage in experimenting with that which is actual, the shapes, lines, colours, moves that are already in place. It is to destabilise them. It is to move in unforeseen ways, not necessarily limited by present and historical states. It is to actualise that which is not and cannot be known beforehand; it is, for Deleuze, to become “someone who creates [his or her] own impossibilities, and thereby creates possibilities” without which we would not “have the line of flight, the exit that is creation” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 133). To think is therefore “to create—there is no other creation—but to create is first of all to engender ‘thinking’ in thought” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 185). Without thinking we are lost, reduced to objects of destructive forces, which limit, even triumph over us and our possibilities. Without thinking we give in to circumstances that make us slaves or move us in misleading directions. We give up the originality of thought, and diminish our ability to be creative and to engage “in new, perhaps previously unimagined, modes of thinking” (Jeanes, 2006, p. 128). In order to combat such destructive forces, we should, engage in thinking, which is territorial, that is, placed in various moves or ways of life; thinking leads us to encounter both active and reactive forces, which for Deleuze, is a “fundamental encounter” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 176), one which can deterritorialise us in relation to the various embedded ways of thought and fuel the “passion to think” (p. 176), and as such can open the possibility to recapture that which is lost, and help us to find our way anew.

Thinking is, therefore, always dangerous. It means, for Deleuze and Guattari (1994), “to follow the witch’s flight” (p. 41) and move from that which is known to the unthought. It leads us to experiment without predetermined or fixed ends, and is as such “an art of living” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 111). To move between perceptible becomings and becoming imperceptible through thinking is therefore to “head for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and … [to] return with bloodshot eyes, yet they are the eyes of the mind” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 41). It leads us to “cross the line, and make it endurable, workable, thinkable” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 111). Such thinking is a real possibility, although sometimes it is overwhelmed, even triumphed over, by reactive forces.

See Fredrika Spindler (2011) for a discussion on Deleuze and the event, and on how events can create cracks in that which is known so that lines of flight can be created to that which is not yet known.
It can lead us away from a narrow focus on active forces, the one-sided views on affirmation, joy and happiness and dead-end utopias, to an encounter with both active and reactive forces, the impact of capitalism on the formation of our images, as well as to a real affirmation of the indefinite individuality of life, which when it happens is hard work.
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The Relationship Between Common Sense and Thinking: Keeping with the Event in Education

Ingrid Andersson

Introduction

In this article, I investigate the relationship between common sense and thinking. Two prominent philosophers of our Western tradition that have problematized the notions of common sense and thinking from different yet similar perspectives are Gilles Deleuze and Hannah Arendt. Common sense and thinking are both to be understood in juxtaposition to the notion of the event. The event is something that happens to us from the outside, while at the same time it is captured in our linguistic expressions, yet not contained within them.

The article is organized as follows. The first section accounts for the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and his views on thinking, sense and the event. Although his concepts are manifold and connect with one another in multiple ways, I have restricted myself to keeping with the concepts noted above. Additional concepts such as virtual intensities will be embedded in my discussion as an element of the aforementioned concepts and not as free-standing ones (although none of his concepts are free-standing). Following that, I account for Hannah Arendt’s philosophy based on my reading of The Human Condition and The Life of the Mind, by addressing her notions of thinking, judging and common sense. In the third section, I show how Deleuze and Arendt can be read through one another by directing my attention to their respective takes on common sense. I conclude my paper with a discussion of how common sense and thinking, read through Deleuze and Arendt, have implications for education.

Images of Thinking

In Difference and Repetition (2014), we come across Deleuze’s “image of thought.” Images of thought are the philosophical presuppositions that have permeated Western philosophical thinking dating back to Plato. The images of thought ground thinking and steer it in a certain direction in that presuppositions are not called into question. For instance, the Cartesian image of thought captured by the cogito presupposes “that everybody knows what it means to think” (Deleuze, 2014). It presupposes a subject detached from the world, the object, which the subject can strive to get to know (Colebrook, 2001).

This Cartesian image, Deleuze explains, contains three levels: a naturally upright thought, an in-principle natural common sense, and a transcendental model of recognition (2014, p. 177). These assumptions, Deleuze claims, are pre-philosophical since they constitute the inner condition for thinking without being subjected to scrutiny themselves. We are not actually thinking with this image in place; we are merely recognizing. The “I think” is presupposed to be the unifier of all
our faculties, and the *cogito* becomes the philosophical concept of common sense. For Deleuze, true thought is “primarily trespass and violence, the enemy, and nothing presupposes philosophy: everything begins with misosophy” (2014, p. 183). What forces us to think is an object of an encounter, not recognition, and its primary characteristic is that it can only be *sensed*. From the perspective of recognition, it is imperceptible.

What Deleuze seeks to liberate is “pure difference.” Pure difference is difference *in itself* and cannot as such be reduced to the separative nature of habitual thought and recognition in which difference gains its tenor through comparison. For instance, when we say, “Lars is different from Laila,” we merely erect a fence between them, routinely grafted on current cultural understandings, for example gender, in which the difference of Lars is completely dependent on the identity of Laila. Within common-sense understanding, with rigid and solidified analytical categories (for instance man/woman), we lose the two-fold sense of pure difference: firstly, difference as *transfiguration*; and secondly, difference as *immanent within the actual* (Bogue, 2004).

**The Immanent Event**

Deleuze draws a line between morality and ethics. Morality, Deleuze claims, is rooted in a representational image of thought (Spangenberg, 2009, p. 90). This representational image presupposes who we are and what we ought to do, rather than what we have the potential to become. What hinders us from exceeding who we are, and becoming something different, is identity and habitual thinking. Deleuze holds the view that when we identify, we represent, and when we represent, we remove ourselves from the potentiality of becoming imperceptible. Identity in representation prevents us from experiencing the virtual intensities of pure difference. To enable thinking, and to counteract recognition, Deleuze introduces his notion of Ideas with a capital ‘I’ to distinguish his understanding of Ideas from our common usage of ideas as contained in our minds (Spangenberg, 2009, p. 94). Ideas and problems constitute the transcendental conditions for thought for Deleuze. In the *Logic of Sense* (2015), sense is understood as identical with the event (Deleuze, 1990). Since Ideas reside in the virtual realm, they can only be sensed and not contained within a representational scheme. For Deleuze, sensations and virtual intensities “are the virtual but necessary conditions for the occurrence of significant events” (Spangenberg, 2009, p. 94). Events, Deleuze continues, are incorporeal entities that are expressed through language yet subsist beyond their manifestation. Concepts, in that they are created as a response (not a solution) to particular problems, are an example of events.

Thus, what is expressed in a proposition, the sense/event, is distinguished from the bodies it denotes. In this way, the virtual and the actual are interconnected yet belong to different orders. Common sense for Deleuze is always representational and hence dogmatic and moral. We need to be ethically attuned to the event to actualize pure thought. In Spangenberg’s words, “Deleuze conceives of ethics as an event and as inextricably linked with the sole aim of philosophy: to become imperceptible or, as Deleuze would also say, to become worthy of the event” (2009, p. 90). And how do we do that?

To be worthy of the event, we need to extract the virtual event from a state of affairs. This move Deleuze calls a “counter-actualization.” For example, say one has an unusual experience while reading a novel. The particular novel elicits new and uncommon sensations in the reader. Perhaps
the narrator in the story presents a perceptual field that seems completely alien to the reader. This experience is first and foremost *sensed* rather than comprehended, Deleuze would claim, in that the encounter with this new way of perceiving is not eligible for representation and identification: the sensation, encounter, forces us to think *involutarily*. This encounter with something new and different ignites an idea constitutive of a problem that actualizes thinking in that we are forced to explicate something of which there exists no pre-given representation. In other words, we experience difference as transfiguration and immanent within the actual. Now, a counter-actualization would be to immerse oneself in that creative flow unleashed by the new encounter, to be transformed, and bring that process of transformation into new situations.

**The Creation of Concepts**

In *What is Philosophy?* (2014), Deleuze, and Guattari present their view on immanence, or more precisely “the plane of immanence.” Philosophy, they contend, is constructivism with the purpose of creating concepts and laying out a plane of immanence. The plane is presupposed in that concepts refer to a non-conceptual understanding. If philosophy involves the creation of concepts, then the plane is the ground for the creation itself. However, this does not mean that the pre-philosophical is outside of philosophy or that it precedes it, although it is pre-supposed by philosophy:

> Philosophy is at once concept creation and instituting of the plane. The concept is the beginning of philosophy, but the plane is its instituting. The plane is clearly not a program, design, end, or means: it is a plane of immanence that constitutes the absolute ground of philosophy, its earth or deterritorialization, the foundation on which it creates its concepts. Both the creation of concepts and the instituting of the plane are required, like two wings or fins. (p. 41)

The plane of immanence *is* the image of thought: “The plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one’s bearings in thought” (p. 41). Important to note is that the plane of immanence is not a concept in itself since a concept is always a response to a problem and hence cannot constitute a foundation. The image of thought is thus no longer dogmatic, since it is now a movable plane, not a re-presentation. With the plane of immanence, Deleuze and Guattari understand an infinite yet absolute horizon from which thinking is given consistency:

> Concepts are concrete assemblages, like the configurations of a machine, but the plane is the abstract machine of which these assemblages are the working parts. Concepts are events, but the plane is the horizon of events, the reservoir or reserve of purely conceptual events: not the relative horizon that functions as a limit, which changes with an observer and encloses observable states of affairs, but the absolute horizon, independent of any observer, which makes the event as concept independent of a visible state of affairs in which it is brought about. (Guattari and Deleuze, 2014, p. 36)
The image of thought, Deleuze and Guattari explain, “implies a strict division between fact and right.” Thus, historical facts or facts pertaining to the function of the brain are contingent and must therefore be separated from thought as such: “The image of thought retains only what thought can claim by right. Thought demands ‘only’ movement that can be carried to infinity. What thought claims by right, what it selects, is infinite movement or the movement of the infinite. It is this that constitutes the image of thought” (2014, p. 37). Immanence, in the words of Claire Colebrook, is “not the ground or foundation of life; the plane of immanence is the thought of that which produces any ground” (2001, p. 77).

With this understanding of philosophy in place, we are able to move beyond the grip of representation and measure philosophy in terms of effectivity. The creation of concepts underwrites the actualization of virtual relations and as a corollary establishes an interconnection between the virtual and the actual, not due to concepts’ ability to refer, but to concepts’ ability to express sense. As we have seen, sense belongs to the virtual realm, but is also always part of the actual world. Reality is never fully grasped unless both virtual intensities and actual states of affairs are accounted for (Spangenberg, 2009).

The Active Life

We now turn to Hannah Arendt. In The Human Condition, Arendt discusses three activities that underpin human life: labor, work and action. Each activity corresponds to a basic human condition. The basic condition for labor is life itself. We need to labor to provide ourselves with the necessities of food and shelter. The corresponding condition for work is worldliness. Through work humans create a shared world in the form of communities, objects and culture. Action corresponds to the basic condition of plurality. Action can only take place in the presence of other people. All three activities and their corresponding conditions are underpinned by the conditions for life: natality and mortality. Natality signifies a new beginning—we are born into this world as newcomers, which always implies that new actions are initiated and that the consequences reach beyond our grasp and control. In action and speech, we disclose not just the action in itself but who we are. Unlike labor and work, action can never be tamed nor performed in a way in which the individual loses its who.

Judgment

Arendt’s notion of judgment is based on Kant’s notion of aesthetic judgment and sensus communis, respectively. An aesthetic judgment can be deductive or reflective; the former moves from the general to the particular and the latter moves from the particular to the general. For Kant, judgment is the ability to think the particular as subsumed under a universal. Through the particular we can ascend to the generality of a certain concept; for instance, stumbling upon a beautiful sculpture might give one an understanding of what beauty is. It is only through the particular that the universal can arise. In the particular, we can see the universal at the same time as the particular retains its particularity. For Arendt, it is the spectators that are in a position to judge events impartially. To do this, they make use of two faculties: imagination and common sense. Imagination means that we represent for our mind events that have already taken place; this representation thus establishes a distance from which we can make a disinterested judgment. When this distance has been established, we can view the representations from multiple perspectives;
that is, we are able to enact representative thinking. The other faculty that spectators have to make use of is common sense or *sensus communis*, since without it, spectators would not be able to transcend their subjective position of judging. Hence, judgments need to be communicable intersubjectively with other members of the same community. Arendt again draws on Kant and uses the notion of an “enlarged mentality” in order to show how the spectator’s verdict, although impartial, still relies on the views of others (1981, p. 94). A spectator is thus withdrawn from the scene of action to be able to understand the spectacle.

**Two Types of Common Sense**

Israeli philosopher Itay Snir points out that “The most radical aspect of Arendt’s conception of common sense” (2020, p. 73) is that it does not exist automatically in a society: it has to be created and maintained continuously. We judge within a common sense, but we also intervene and reconstruct common sense through our judging actions. Common-sense understanding and reasoning is not a static feature of the world; rather, it is brought forward by people inhabiting a specific place in which common sense is always up for grabs. The corresponding worldly property of our sixth sense, common sense, is realness:

> In a world of appearances, filled with error and semblance, reality is guaranteed by this three-fold commonness: the five senses, utterly different from each other, have the same object in common, members of the same species have the context in common that endows every single object with its particular meaning; and all other sense-endowed beings, though perceiving this object from utterly different perspectives, agree on its identity. Out of this threefold commonness arises the *sensation* of reality. (Arendt, 1981, p. 50)

Although our sixth sense is not strictly speaking a sense on par with our five senses, since its worldly property cannot be perceived, it brings about a sensation of realness, a thereness, which always takes place in a specific context of appearances (1981, p. 51). We can identify two types of common sense herein: i) common sense as imagination, representation and judgment (an enlarged mentality); ii) common sense as a sixth sense which brings about the sensation of realness, anchored in the functions and worldly properties of our five general senses. Both of these understandings of common sense are targets for Deleuze’s criticism, as we saw above.

**Thinking as Afterthought and the Creation of Meaning**

Thinking for Arendt is the silent dialogue between me and myself. Thinking demands a withdrawal from everyday practice, from the world of appearances, in that the thinking process, although prompted by everyday experience, needs to de-sense that which has appeared in order for the thinking process to create “thought-things.” Thus, common sense, our sensation of realness, is suspended in the act of thinking (1981, p. 52).

Thinking is always an afterthought; it comes *after the event*. The afterthought can suddenly hit us, creep up on us, as it were, or be voluntarily recalled and mulled over. In the search for meaning, which the afterthought gives rise to, we do not simply replay events that have taken place, but rather pick them apart and move beyond them as part of the search for meaning. That is, in thinking
we recall events and create meaning for further thought; thought always goes further (Arendt, 1981). Thus, within the thinking process that Arendt discusses, we can see similarities with Deleuze’s actual-virtual dimensions of thinking and reality, in that thinking and the creation of meaning are never conditioned by a foreseeable terminus.

When we think, we are in solitude, and we present for our minds episodes that have already taken place. In this re-presentation we rely on both memory and imagination. Note that although the contingency of everyday appearances is of a different order than the thinking process itself, the former gives rise to the latter. The activity of thinking has no goal that lies outside of itself; rather, the process of thinking in itself is the aim. Moreover, when the thinking process comes to an end, we find ourselves back in the everyday world of appearances in which doing, and not thinking, takes place. When we are in the midst of everyday practice, for instance when we are engaged in a lively discussion with friends, we are not thinking, although we obviously make use of our cognitive abilities, since we are not in solitude, which is the prerequisite of having an inner dialogue between me and myself.

**Thinking, Knowledge and Judging**

Arendt differentiates thinking from knowing. Knowing is concerned with truth, whereas thinking is concerned with meaning. Thinking concerns itself with unanswerable questions, and there is no finality to the process of thinking in the form of a tangible object, which is the success of knowledge. Through thinking, we seek to understand the meaning of events in which the taxonomy of true and false has no abode. However, this does not mean that meaning and truth are fully separate. Thinking arises from knowledge, and knowledge would be impossible to obtain without thinking. Yet while related, they are of different orders, as we have seen.

For Arendt, the faculty of judging is interrelated with the faculty of thinking in that thinking has a liberating effect on the judging spectator who realizes thinking in the public realm, in which thinking itself can never take place. Judging thus makes thinking manifest, a “thinking” that is not knowledge but the ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly. The difference between thinking and judging is that judging takes place in the world of appearances, whereas thinking demands a withdrawal from that very same world. However, judging is the ability both to tell right from wrong and to draw on our imagination in order to enact representative thinking. Thus, we are thinking, but in the form of a spectator in whom the inner dialogue between me and myself is not actualized. The withdrawal demanded by the spectator is one from action rather than one from the world of appearances. The withdrawal is necessary in order to see the whole. But it does not demand solitude. On the contrary, the spectator’s verdict depends on the views of others, an “enlarged mentality,” as Arendt explained in her lectures on Kant. Judging, like thinking, takes place in isolation, in the moment when imagination is used to represent the perspective of other people. The withdrawal of judgment, unlike thinking, is still located within the world of appearances. However, the precondition for representative thinking is interaction with other people in a shared world in which common sense is created.

Thinking, as we have seen, does not yield tangible rules of conduct or a stable foundation for acting morally. What it does yield is a critical examination of present norms, conventions and political systems that are contingent and thus always open for discussion and change. Conscience is a
byproduct of thinking that stems from the inner dialogue between me and myself. The ground for telling right from wrong is “subjective in two senses. First, what I can bear to have done without losing my internal harmony might change from one individual to another, or depend on historical and political circumstances. Second, moral judgments turn on the question of with whom I wish to be, namely on something resembling concrete human interaction, not on abstract standards and rules that allow for Platonic objectivity” (Snir, 2020, p. 64). Although thinking deals with invisibles while judgment deals with particulars, they are interconnected, as we have seen, in that thinking is actualized in judgment, when we tell right from wrong, but without instating universal rules of conduct.

Thus, thinking dissolves firm categories and prepares the activity of judging particulars without using universals as guideposts. In other words, judgment is our public manifestation of thinking critically. Thinking thus gives options for actions. So judgment is our outer manifestation of thought; but how do we communicate our thinking to other people? Arendt, again following Kant, proposes metaphors as mediators for thinking. Through metaphorical language, we can make manifest the experience of thinking and not the thinking process itself, since it demands solitude. The experience of thinking is transferred in speech through metaphorical language. In Arendt’s words,

Analogies, metaphors, and emblems are the threads by which the mind holds on to the world even when, absentmindedly, it has lost direct contact with it, and they guarantee the unity of human experience. Moreover, in the thinking process itself they serve as models to give us our bearings lest we stagger blindly among experiences that our bodily senses with their relative certainty of knowledge cannot guide us through. The simple fact that our mind is able to find such analogies, that the world of appearances reminds us of things non-apparent, may be seen as a kind of “proof” that mind and body, thinking and sense experience, the invisible and the visible, belong together, are “made” for each other, as it were. (1981, p. 109)

Metaphors bring together the invisible and the visible. The abyss between the two modes is thus bridged. The ongoing process of thinking, Arendt says, is like “Penelope’s web; it undoes every morning what it has finished the night before” (1981, p. 88). But the “only possible” metaphor for thinking itself, Arendt states, “is the sensation of being alive” (1981, p. 123). A potential danger with all thinking, Arendt claims, is to confuse thinking with a withdrawal from the world of human affairs. We have seen that thinking indeed demands solitude; however, solitude is not to be confused with loneliness. Thinking is, furthermore, always tied to action, and action always takes place amid fellow individuals. This is why Arendt draws on Socrates in fleshing out the life of the mind, in that he operated in the polis and tried to draw out truth from opinions (doxa). That is, he did not try to impose philosophical truths upon opinions, but rather engaged in dialogue, trying to make doxa more truthful.

So, thinking is both something that takes place in solitude, in the inner dialogue between me and myself, and an outer manifestation in judgment and action. In action, we are in the world of appearances, and when acting, we are judged by spectators who make use of imagination and common sense to evaluate the actions on display. Both action and judgment are underpinned by plurality.
Arendt and Deleuze Making (Common) Sense

Imagination is used by both Arendt and Deleuze to transcend our own narrow subject and our human point of view as a way of unleashing thinking from firm banisters. The philosophy of common sense that Deleuze criticizes is one in which sense is defined as the condition of truth, whereas Arendt defines common sense as a political faculty in which opinions are formed. Within the philosophy of Arendt, thinking, judgment and action are ontologically rooted in natality and plurality. The initiation of something new, conditioned by the fact that we are born into a world populated by other acting subjects, shapes our course of action from the viewpoint of the actor, and our ability to judge from the standpoint of the spectator. We are free to act and judge in the sense that we are unique and able to set something in motion. However, this freedom is hinged on the unexpectedness of action and does not stem from an isolated will. The subject never acts alone; its uniqueness and ability to act and judge is dependent on other people, that is, on plurality. Through the faculty of imagination, we are able to represent other people’s viewpoints from the standpoint of our subjective selves. This imagination is preconditioned by the actual involvement and interaction with other people. Thus, Arendt is not assuming an established image of thought before representative thinking is enacted.

The notion of common sense that Deleuze is attacking is one in which all our faculties are understood to work together to recognize, identify and subsume. This is how common sense is reproduced; we merely recognize, and in recognizing, we are not thinking, since we are under the chairmanship of the dogmatic image of thought. Thinking, for Deleuze, is preceded by a shocking encounter with an object that forces us to think and on which our senses no longer work jointly to recognize; from the view of perception, what we encounter is imperceptible.

Arendt, like Deleuze, draws on Kant’s understanding of common sense, which, as we have seen, moves beyond the mere harmonizing exercise of our five senses. Whilst Deleuze settles with the understanding of common sense as recognition and doxa, Arendt pushes the envelope further in positing a common sense that is always in flux, and not a natural part of a society; it is always being created, maintained, eradicated. Moreover, common sense for Arendt is pre-conditioned by the interaction with others, but not in a fashion that leads to expressions, such as “everybody knows what it means to think.” On the contrary, Arendt’s sensus communis thrives on plurality and difference, on the cultivation of different perspectives and standpoints. Thinking, strictly speaking, is not taking place in common sense for Arendt, just as for Deleuze. However, thinking, for Arendt, must always return to doxa to make sense, and to being part and parcel of our world of appearances. Through this move, Arendt inserts an element of thinking also within doxa—not the pure activity which demands solitude, but one instantiated in the spectator and the actor. From within common sense, thinking and action can thus emerge for Arendt, which for Deleuze suggests something close to an abomination in that the very “thinking” would be circumscribed by the dogmatic image of thought which thinking contends to transcend. However, that Deleuzian understanding becomes circumscribed itself, I claim, when plurality and difference are purged from the notion at the outset. His particular understanding of commonsensical reasoning as solely transmitted through recognition is a definition of common sense that Arendt seeks to transcend, but without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. When Arendt and Socrates roam the streets of the polis, they discover that not everybody knows what it means to think, and that it is not a natural capacity. A possible reply to my claim that Deleuze’s conception of common sense
becomes circumscribed itself would be that common sense, in that it is representational and moral, is by necessity disconnected from virtual intensities and becomings. In line with this objection is the objection that Arendt’s understanding of common sense, and of thinking and judging, is hinged on a presupposed subject that initiates independent action in this world. I believe that this tension is more apparent than real in that Deleuze’s point of departure is the immanent difference of virtual events that are interconnected with actual states of affairs, whereas Arendt’s point of departure is the acting and thinking subject contained within actual states of affairs. These two presuppositions are seemingly at odds with one another, but only if we close ourselves off to the virtual relationship between them. For instance, Deleuze claims that to stay close to the event, we have to enact counter-actualizations in the actual world. Arendt’s judging spectator who says “no” to business as usual is, I claim, an example of a counter-actualization. Furthermore, Deleuze’s notion of virtual intensities expands Arendt’s notion of common sense and shows how we could transcend doxa with our faculty of thinking that, as a consequence, moves beyond a traditional or stale understanding of representational thinking. Thus, the Arendtian standpoint of another person need not solely be perceived as different from mine; it is different in itself.

With Arendt’s notions of common sense and judgment, Deleuze’s understanding of the interconnection between virtual intensities and actual states of affairs can be expanded upon through understanding Arendt’s subject as anchored in a common world yet endowed with a faculty of thinking (and judgment) that never comes to a halt or relies upon logical principles.

Implications for Education

Education, for both Arendt and Deleuze, needs to move beyond the mere transmission of knowledge. In Proust and Signs (2000), Deleuze spells out an apprenticeship that the protagonist of Proust’s In Search of Lost Time is undergoing. The search, for Deleuze, is not oriented towards the past but towards the future. Along the way, the protagonist learns that objects emitting signs do not contain the secret of the sign, and neither does the subjective interpreter. However, it is through the engagement with other people that the protagonist of the search comes to understand the process of explicating signs and rids himself of the illusions of pure objectivity and pure subjective interpretive associations. He comes to learn that essences, or what Deleuze deems differences, are internal in both objects and subjects alike, and that the signs being emitted need to be explicated rather than represented; we need to unfold that which the sign enfolds. We can read this approach through Arendt’s understanding of the representation of other people’s viewpoints from the viewpoint of oneself: I think from where I stand, imagining that it could be different—the world as much as my outlook.

Arendt’s plurality and unicity bring about unexpected encounters, events, that give rise to thought that goes further than the identification of the emitted sign, that is the person/situation we come across, and looks for meaning and difference that demand explication rather than simple representation. However, a precondition for learning, or apprenticeship, for Arendt is to get to know the old world. Children must be taught our collective accumulated body of knowledge, customs and common sense to properly immerse themselves therein and to subsequently change it. In this regard, education must be conservative. Important to note is that the task of familiarizing youngsters with the old world for Arendt is not equivalent to inculcation, but, rather, to assuming responsibility for a future to come. Thus, the responsibility to acquaint the youngsters with the
old world stipulates more than the mere transmission of knowledge.

Deleuze would claim that however necessary, this is not education for thinking, but only for recognition. However, without the first step of recognition, we would be completely unmoored from the world and unable to cultivate thinking and open ourselves up to rare encounters and events. Of course, what Deleuze cautions against is the danger and inertia of remaining within the confines of common sense (and confusing structure of thought for thinking), not our colloquial usage of it. What we can learn from Arendt is that representation and explication must not be oppositional. When we represent, imagining a different viewpoint, we are in a position to judge things differently, counter to common sense, which in itself bears the power of changing common sense. Our judging faculty bears the promise of creation, and creation is always an event. For Arendt, common sense contains not only uncontested mundane knowledge from which we derive temporary “truths” and permissible conduct, but a sensation of realness that functions as an arena for action. When we act, we act as a response to the actions of others, and these others can readily be expanded to encompass signs, mental and physical objects, technology, natural phenomena and so forth, and remain consistent with Arendt’s philosophy at large.

Within a Deleuzian creative process, there is an Idea that is constitutive of problems. Common sense is for Arendt created rather than discovered. In representative thinking, we tackle head-on the problem of natality, the new beginning inherent in all actions unfolding from a specific point of view. Always different, always fleeting. Thinking in terms of creating concepts, in terms of withdrawal from the world of appearances and in terms of representative thinking, are all on par with being “worthy of the event,” in that sense resides in the problem itself. It is not about finding proper solutions to well-defined problems, but to continue thinking and expressing that sense/event through action and speech.

In education, then, Arendt’s and Deleuze’s common sense can join forces and point towards the cultivation of thinking: firstly, through getting to know the old world, and secondly, by creating a new one. Snir (2020) proposes that the inner dialogue between me and myself, a withdrawal from the world of appearances, is complemented with the faculty of judgment that thinking in solitude liberates. In an educational context, this can be formed as giving space for students to contemplate and engage with their peers through dialogue that opens up the possibility for actualizing representative thinking. A common sense is then both established and challenged in concert, with no pre-given goal as to where to arrive.

So, what can we learn from Arendt and Deleuze? From Arendt, we learn about a continuous inner dialogue from which public judgment can be cultivated. From Deleuze, we learn about the explicating process of interpreting signs from which sense and pure difference can be derived, paired with the creation of concepts.

A cultivation of judgment from thinking, and an open-ended examining of pre-suppositions (very much similar to getting to know the old world), can be merged, I claim, in that both steer us to move beyond business as usual, not for the sake of moving beyond—it is not the end-goal—but for the sake of creating a better world in which movement of thought can be actualized. Thus, for both Arendt and Deleuze, the main question is not what we can know but what we can become.
Conclusion

In this paper, I inquired into the concepts of common sense, thinking and the event through engaging with the philosophies of Hannah Arendt and Gilles Deleuze. I showed that common sense can be understood as both an intersubjective faculty in which opinions are formed and a representative thought-scheme that imprisons thought through actualizing recognition and identification rather than creative thinking. However, these two aspects are both important to keep in mind while examining the origin of common sense and thinking. When we realize that common sense imposes a thought-regime in which recognition is taken as an in-principle transcendental faculty of human perception, then we can more easily catch a sight of creative thought, thinking, as a process that momentarily captures pure difference.
References


**Love and Education Beyond the Event Horizon: An Apology to Christopher Nolan**

Andrew Gibbons

**Introduction**

This paper engages with the concept of love in education through an analysis of the motion picture *Interstellar* by Christopher Nolan. Love is taken as a necessarily tricky, elusive, concept—taking for granted that anything that appears simple and predictable might be some kind of love-like thing, but not the kind of love that is of interest here. The love of interest here is a kind of gravity-shattering force that releases the sciences from their epistemological event horizons. It’s love, but not as ‘we’ know it (the ‘we’ here referring to any culture that has typically disregarded or marginalised love in some way).

*Interstellar* adds some complexity to working philosophically with love in education through its association of love with event horizons—the film takes up something of a logic and a science of love to suggest that love is both an essential condition and a provocation for thinking through the seemingly impossible equations that confound the physical sciences. Those associations are explored through the flows of the narrative, and observations of a selection of key characters.

The application of Nolan’s work on love is speculative, presenting a sense of the ways in which science fiction might offer the philosophy of education different tools to tinker with the things that matter. “Science fiction, in our reading of it, does not need to stand up to science in order to be effective … it gives us license to engage in a series of aesthetic thought experiments, of what currently is and where it might go” (Gibbons and Kupferman, 2019, pp. 168-169). In this paper, that tinkering is explored as resonant with the work of Heidegger and Camus. Both writers are read here as offering a way into science fiction as poetic work in the philosophy of education. Their respective questions with regard science lend a hand to the task of questioning science and education through science fiction.

In the study of education, science fiction is educational in its engagement with speculation on the what ifs and the why nots: speculations that are not simply future focused, but rather are approaches to imagining the already present. For example, first contact with a galaxy travelling civilisation is not limited to thinking ahead, it is also productive for thinking back (the abiding narratives that generate thoughts about colonisation) and the present (the ways in which a society or community might not notice that which is already at hand). Science fiction demands something of the imagination, in a way that sparks a wonder. Here wonder is more than simply a curiosity about the future; wonder generates both present and future in its existentially generative sense.... [W]ithin this concept of wonder, kept at arm's length from the cold calculations and measurements of an analytic mind, is a more radical imagination of new questions, and an intensification of these questions
Using science fiction to explore love and education adds to existing scholarly engagement on, for just a few examples, love and pedagogy (Goldstein, 1997; Page, 2018), love and the purpose of education (Lin, 2006), love and child rearing (de Grice, Braun, and Wetherell, 2017), love and community (Cram, 2021) and love and critical education (Lanas and Zembylas, 2015).

When using cinema, science fiction or otherwise, to engage with the philosophy of education, it’s perhaps important to first make disclaimers and alerts. A disclaimer: this is not a cinematic review of the film within the field of cinematic studies. While the work here may add to cinematic studies, that is not its purpose. An alert: If the reader has not seen Interstellar then this article is full of spoilers. I recommend putting the paper down and watching the film. However, I also recognise that reading about a film and watching that same film can happen in any order with generative implications, particularly if being conditioned and warned as to (an interpretation of) the film’s devices is not a problem.

In this paper, the thinking that is nurtured through an exploration of Interstellar is then applied to education policy and curriculum through two contexts: 1) epistemological debates concerning scientific and “Indigenous knowledge” (Stewart, 2021a, p. 2) systems in one bicultural nation; and 2) early childhood care and education as a distinct and problematic education ‘sector’ in many nations. Early childhood education and care is of interest here because of its nearness to the problem of love in education and because of the direct reference to love through the concept of aroha in Mātauranga Māori—a reference that symbolises a persistent tension for curriculum and policy writers, and for the children and adults who come together to form early childhood care and education communities.

Interstellar

The central characters in Interstellar are Coop and Murph—father and daughter. Other characters of interest include the black hole Gargantua, the robot TARS and the astronaut scientists Mann and Brand.

When we meet the Coopers, Murph is talking about a ghost in her room. She’s not scared of the ghost; rather, she thinks it's trying to communicate with her. Coop argues that suggesting there’s a ghost trying to communicate with her is not very scientific. Murph replies to Coop, “you said science is about admitting what we don't know.” Coop then encourages Murph to start observing the phenomenon, gathering all the facts. Coop is especially proud of Murph and her love of science, so inviting her to gather all the facts is not undermining or dismissing a daughter, but rather a celebration of knowing a daughter—he loves Murph, and knows what makes Murph tick.

This love for Murph plays out in a scene at school. Coop is brought in to talk to the principal and to Murph’s teacher about Murph’s behaviour. Murph has been fighting, which is concerning. But more concerning for the teacher is that Murph is fighting about a disagreement over a book of Coop’s that she brought to school. The book speaks of a history in which an organisation called NASA chose to go to the moon. As such, this book is banned at school for spreading misinformation about the space race of the mid-twentieth century. The moon landing never
happened. Murph’s teacher explains with certainty that the moon landing was a conspiracy.

In *Interstellar*, a teacher can genuinely, and with an unquestioning faith, state the moon landing was a cunning fiction designed to undermine the Soviet Union during the Cold War—convincing the Soviet Union to invest in a mythical space race gives the United States some breathing space. Those that talked of conspiracies to manufacture the moon landing were right—it was a conspiracy. Anyone who now suggests that NASA did actually land on the moon is the new conspiracy theorist undermining humanity’s mission to save a dying planet. Conveniently then, it is organisations like NASA that can be shown to be responsible for the predicament of the planet (Peters et al., 2021). In *Interstellar*, a good teacher and a good curriculum is concerned with a rationality that allows for the greatest number to survive without further environmental degradation. But the clock is ticking, and no one seems to seriously think there’s any possibility of saving the planet.

Coop is unwilling to believe that there is no future. He is ex-NASA and believes that living the best life involves looking up to the stars and believing in an extra-terrestrial future for humanity. So, Coop is also unwilling to discipline Murph for her behaviour at school. The teacher and principal are mocked by Coop, who advises them he is going to punish Murph by treating her to a baseball game.

Murph, meanwhile, is happily gathering data on a phenomenon with a thorough and rational belief that something is trying to communicate with her, and that her father and brother are playfully dismissing it as a ghost. Coop’s failure to believe in an entity trying to communicate with Murph is ironic, because it’s actually him attempting to communicate with himself through Murph. And paradoxically, if he is successful in the future at stopping himself in the past, he never ends up in that future, at least as far as we can make sense of time at the moment. Present Coop is failing to listen to future Coop in warning present Coop to stay on Earth and not fly through a mysterious wormhole leading to a new and potentially habitable galaxy of planets.

When Coop realises that there is indeed something communicating with Murph, and that it is communicating in binary, he discovers the coordinates to a secret NASA base where NASA is working on an equation that will enable an exodus from the dying Earth. Solving the problem of gravity appears unlikely, so, at the same time, NASA is sending human embryos through a wormhole that has been deposited near Saturn and appears to be a benign intervention aimed at opening access to habitable planets in another galaxy.

Having not heeded his own future warning to himself, Coop travels through the wormhole and ends up in a system of three potentially habitable planets orbiting a black hole that NASA has decided to call Gargantua. Gargantua is explained as a collapsed star. Nothing escapes Gargantua’s event horizon, not even light, although this debated astrophysical theory (see Curiel, 2019) regarding the inescapability of events beyond the event horizon turns out to be incorrect. All the same, NASA plans to send in a probe to gather data, believing that somewhere beyond this inescapable event horizon is an answer, and that maybe for a brief moment some data can be relayed out of the black hole by the probe.

Gargantua has a huge gravitational pull, and the closer that the expedition flies to it, the more their
experience of time slows down compared to Earth. The team has to decide just how much time they can lose and return to an Earth still habited by their loved ones. In arguing over which habitable planet to head to in this new galaxy, Brand, who happens to be in love with one of the three astronauts alone on one of the three potentially habitable planets, argues that following one’s heart could be a legitimate approach to solving the problem of which direction to take. Brand argues that “we’ve spent too long trying to figure [time and gravity] out with theory.” She goes on: “Love isn’t something we invented, it’s observable, powerful. It has to have meaning.” Love, Brand argues, “is the one thing that we’re capable of perceiving that transcends time and space.” Love might bust through the apparently impervious event horizon, and so events become newly available from beyond the horizon.

Gargantua is a key character in Interstellar, offering an event horizon past, or perhaps through, which humanity hopes it might find paradigm-changing formulae—answers to questions that have yet to be asked. For the science of Interstellar, Gargantua offers challenges to experiences of time and gravity, and their association with yet to be discovered dimensions (Davis, 2021). Nolan worked with astrophysicists in creating Gargantua, in order to “attempt depicting a black hole as it would actually be seen by somebody nearby” (James et al., 2015, p. 1). The aim was to “make the film as scientifically accurate as possible—within constraints of not confusing his mass audience unduly and using images that are exciting and fresh” (James et al., 2015, p. 22). Gargantua, then, in a sense, invites us to wonder whether there’s something beyond the horizons of science within the black hole—and who is to say that whatever that something unimaginable is, that it might not be love? Coop, driven by a concern to return to earth with a minimal loss of years, disregards Brand’s appeal to a new theory of love, and they head off to Dr. Mann’s planet.

The leader of a previous expedition through the wormhole, Dr. Mann is considered a hero because he committed to a mission which had little chance of success and most likely would result in him dying alone on an uninhabitable planet. It was a one-way trip unless the planet was habitable. Dr. Mann has a change of heart. He decides he does not want to sacrifice his life for humanity when he realises the planet is uninhabitable, and he tricks Coop and the rest of the team in order to escape the planet and save himself. Mann apologises to Coop as he smashes Coop’s space suit and leaves Coop to die on the planet. Mann’s apology takes the form of an ironic lecture on how the imagination of loved ones will be the last thing Coop thinks of. Mann explains that this connection to loved ones is humanity’s greatest source of inspiration—the human survival instinct is powered by intimacy. That intimacy, Dr. Mann argues, “rarely extends beyond our line of sight.” Mann theorises love as an evolutionary function. He ascribes a scientific rationale for love in this sense; however, it’s limited to survival in the face of adversity. Love conjures up loved ones to generate a little more desire to stay alive.

Coop manages to survive Dr. Mann’s attack on his spacesuit, chases after Dr. Mann, and Dr. Mann then dies attempting to steal Coop’s ship in a bid to return to a dying Earth.

Then, and this is important, Coop sacrifices himself for the mission, propelling Brand to the final possible habitable planet, exhausting his own fuel and getting sucked into Gargantua. This is where we find out that
There is indeed dimension-changing data to see once inside the black hole, beyond the event horizon.

You can escape a black hole.

In Gargantua, Coop finds himself in a visual and physical representation of Murph’s room back on Earth, a representation which he can alter. It’s now that Coop realises it was him sending messages to Murph, including the coordinates for NASA and the warning to stay on Earth. He also realises that Brand was right—that there is a quantifiable love between father and daughter that enables a power of connection that transcends time and space. Coop realises that this representation of Murph’s room, and the wormhole itself, are not gifts from a benign intergalactic Santa Claus, but rather an access key and blueprint from his own human future. With the help of the robot TARS, Coop uses this connection to transmit the secrets of Gargantua as data to Murph, data which enables Murph to complete the necessary equations for escaping the gravity of Earth.

Coop achieves the seemingly impossible. He crosses a conceptual threshold and discovers a new truth to the appearance of the event horizon. Gargantua sucks him beyond the horizon. The love that matters here is the love that confounds Dr. Mann. Coop submits himself to the gravity of Gargantua and gets pulled into the black hole, accepting that he will not escape, he will not see Murph again. There are some complex love equations to explore here. Love reveals a connection that transcends time and space, and love reveals a capacity to throw oneself into an apparent void.

The apology: Love, science and philosophy

This paper is developed as an apology because I was initially critical and dismissive of the positioning of love as a *deus ex machina* described above. Perhaps not as much as TV science and technology personality Adam Savage (2014), who shared in a review of the film, “I was not moved by the plot, even a little bit … the plot of *Interstellar* left me cold cold cold and I was very sad about that.” One might argue that being left feeling cold is a kind of movement that is worth exploring. I too felt a little cold, hostile to the use of love to solve the necessary equations and resolve the problem of escaping a poorly (if at all) loved Earth. This device seemed to be cheap.

Over time, this analysis appeared more than just unnecessarily hostile; it failed to see nuance in Brand’s hypothesis and in Coop’s experiment. Here I want to challenge that it is important to explore what Brand might offer when she argues that “we’ve spent too long trying to figure [time and gravity] out with theory,” to recognise persistent challenges to what counts as science, and to speculate on some alternative ways of thinking through the themes of love and science in the philosophy of education.

Brand needn’t think of love as some kind of theory vacuum. Recognising that love “isn’t something we invented, it’s observable, powerful” is entirely theoretical. What Brand might be taken to mean to say is that there’s been a tendency to look behind only some select bushes (Nietzsche, 1979) for the right scientific theories. Brand challenges that it is time to look behind bushes that have been disregarded for their relevance to seemingly proper questions concerning science.

Brand is asking that her colleagues reconceptualise what is and what is not scientific. This is a
debate of significance in Aotearoa New Zealand, with particular concern for the ways in which claims to what counts as scientific legitimacy has led to a recognition of the ways in which epistemological chauvinisms (Young, 2002) continue to operate in a supposedly bicultural nation that is bonded in partnership by a treaty which acknowledges the knowledge rights of the treaty partners.

As the nation explores more deeply and broadly what such a partnership might mean for bicultural epistemologies, a hostility has amplified with regard to cultural knowledge, with claims from within the academic science community that cultural knowledge is of cultural importance for cultures, but cannot make claims to being scientific knowledge (see Stewart, 2021a). In this debate, the public of Aotearoa New Zealand has been served a “warning that science is being attacked by Mātauranga Māori” (Stewart, 2021a, p. 1). In exploring the political and philosophical dimensions of this debate, Stewart explains, “traditional Māori cosmogenic and nature narratives taken together make up the paradigm and philosophy of mātauranga, within which Māori empirical knowledge is organised and makes sense” (Stewart, 2022, p. 22).

Stewart counters concerns with regard to any apparent undermining of science with the challenge that “the boundary between science and Indigenous knowledge has historically helped science to define itself” (Stewart, 2021a, p. 2), hence challenging the grounds upon which any warning to the public might be made. At the same time, Stewart (2022) offers a challenge to any attempts to see science and Mātauranga Māori as commensurate with particular attention to the observation that there’s little agreement on what counts as science (Stewart, 2022). Stewart (2022, p. 19) argues:

All cultural knowledges or ethnosciences involve knowledge of nature, collect evidence using the human senses, and use logical thinking to process experience and guide decision-making. In this sense, mātauranga counts as a science. But such general descriptors do not justify the claim that all cultural knowledge bases are therefore “the same” as contemporary science knowledge. (Stewart, 2022, p. 20)

Brand’s problem is then one which might open her up to the colonising tendencies of a science that she has long been dedicated to, but for which she had lacked the philosophical imagination to see beyond.

A key challenge for Brand is to avoid any theory of the transcendence of love being assimilated into a narrowed understanding of what counts as science. This is an essential concern with a significant history and contemporary relevance for knowledge. Stewart (2022, p. 21) suggests that

To examine the relationship between mātauranga and science shines a light on the “invisible” philosophy of science. In this sense, mātauranga acts as a mirror for science: a way for Western knowledge to see beyond its blinkers, to gain more understanding of itself and its own limitations.

Seeing beyond these blinkers might draw on the horizon-imagining experimentations of philosophical work. Here I would like to consider briefly the work of just two philosophers: Heidegger and Camus. These two are of particular relevance to an analysis of Interstellar because their questions concerning science come from an attention to an aesthetic that invites closer
attention to the poetic and, possibly, to love.

Camus, in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, speaks directly to science and a love for the world. He recognises that through science he might learn to settle upon certain truths of the quantum nature of things, but that the

science that was ready to teach me everything ends up in a hypothesis, that lucidity founders in metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved in a work of art. What need had I of so many efforts? The soft lines of these hills and the hand of evening on this troubled heart reach me much more. I have returned to my beginning. I realise that if through science I can seize phenomena and enumerate them, I cannot, for all that, apprehend the world. Were I to trace its entire relief with my finger, I should not know any more. (Camus, 1991, p. 20)

Camus offers this approach to an epistemological release through an attention to the beauty that is on the horizon. His troubled heart is massaged by his love for the world. His love for the world offers a sense of the horizons of a science that lacks a philosophical reflexivity (Stewart, 2022). Camus offers this sense through the release of poetry. Heidegger’s concern for dwelling and measuring offers a similar release.

Through the poetry of Hölderlin, Heidegger (1971) wonders on poetry establishing a grounding, an earthing, that brings about dwelling. In *Building Dwelling Thinking*, Heidegger (1993a) continues on a path of questioning technology and human being. He questions what it means to, in particular, build and dwell, offering that “dwelling itself is always a staying with things” (Heidegger, 1993a, p. 353) and that learning to dwell is being in the world. Dwelling invokes a relationship of caring for, and of giving presence to (Heidegger, 1993a).

Heidegger’s observation of the problem with thinking about measurement makes sense when considering Brand’s problem. Heidegger (1971, p. 224) says:

> When we hear of measure, we immediately think of number and imagine the two, measure and number, as quantitative. But the *nature* of measure is no more a quantum than is the *nature* of a number. True, we can reckon with numbers—but not with the nature of number. When Hölderlin envisages poetry as a measuring, and above all himself achieves poetry as taking measure … we must pay heed to the kind of taking here, which does not consist in a clutching or any other kind of grasping, but rather in a letting come of what has been dealt out.

Through a questioning of measuring, Heidegger offers a recognition of the limits of science and of theorising that concerns Brand and that leads her to wonder about what might be offered in thinking about love. Love and poetry need not be seen as interchangeable here. Rather, love like poetry invites a different way of thinking through being and measuring that offers a way into thinking about dimensionality:

> The upward glance passes aloft toward the sky, and yet it remains below on the earth. The upward glance spans the between of sky and earth. This between is measured out
for the dwelling of man. We now call the span thus meted out the dimension. This

dimension does not arise from the fact that sky and earth are turned toward one another.

Rather, their facing each other itself depends on the dimension. Nor is the dimension

a stretch of space as ordinarily understood; for everything spatial, as something for

which space is made, is already in need of the dimension, that is, that into which is it

admitted. (Heidegger, 1971, p. 220)

A turn to love is here understood as a philosophical and educational turn, an opening up to love as educational in the sense of a deep connection to the world. As poetry might be seen to cause dwelling (Heidegger, 1971), perhaps then love can be seen to cause learning.

To play with this idea further, should children be studying love instead of studying calculus and physics at school? And might they discover the events beyond event horizons staying right here on Earth? Would a curriculum focused on love unlock the mysteries of time and gravity? Maybe, maybe not. What I’d like to propose is that this new curriculum would offer many other mysteries to explore, mysteries concerning care of the planet and everything on it, and caring for the horizons that disclose being.

Of course, one should be careful with sharing such innovations with policy makers in a Modern educational system. Suggesting that love should be a part of the curriculum could translate into an instrumental social conditioning, producing a series of normalised and enframing beliefs, ideas and practice, a measuring of the truths of love, and assessment of whether children meet the love grade. In other words, when Brand observes that maybe science needs to take more notice of love, whatever might be worth noticing could slip through anxiously clutching hands.

Camus’ exploration of atoms and the horizon in The Myth of Sisyphus and Heidegger’s work with dimensionality in “...Poetically Man Dwells...” might provide alternative readings on love and science for this curriculum. Heidegger’s thinking might stretch dimensionality beyond the ordinary notions of measurement and bring new dimension to dimensions through a poetry of dwelling and measuring, an attention to the “breadth of being” (1971, p. 222). Curriculum-wise, this turn might look like a slowing down of the measuring events that happen in education systems to, in Heidegger’s words, “pay heed” (p. 224) to measuring, a “concentrated perception, a gathered taking-in, that remains a listening” (p. 223).

However, in Aotearoa New Zealand, attention to Mātauranga Māori has already been recognised as a way to remove the ‘blinders’ of science (Stewart, 2022) or perhaps even move beyond the horizon—that event horizon that Mann chauvinistically regards as rarely crossed. In working with the poetic measuring of dimensions, the nation already has many opportunities. For three very brief examples:

1. Rau and Ritchie (2011) engage the meaning of whakapapa as presencing intimate relationships with the Earth and with family, and revealing a different understanding of the temporality of these relationships.

2. Rameka speaks to “Māori perspectives of time … the past, the present and the future are viewed as intertwined” (Rameka, 2016, p. 387). Life is “a continuous cosmic process”
(Rameka, 2016, p. 387); time is untethered, free from any sense of linearity or even perhaps inevitability. To think of the future as being behind requires thinking about one’s position in relation to what is knowable and what can be seen. The experience of time is understood as having spiritual dimensions. Experiences of time are threads that intertwine with experiences of spirituality, family and community, genealogy and so on (Rameka, 2016).

3. Stewart’s (2021b, p. 109) recognition of the concept of love in relation to the concept in te reo Māori (the Māori language) of aroha works with the recognition of love as “infinite.” While stressing that the concepts of love and aroha are close, they don’t “completely match” (Stewart, 2021b, p. 82), and the ways in which their horizons are distinct offers generative educational questions concerning the association of aroha with open-mindedness, generosity, and attentiveness, an infinite, “boundless sense of responsibility for the Other” (Stewart, 2021b, p. 83). Aroha then puts forth a challenge to Mann with regard just where that line of sight might really end.

While it would be dangerous to suggest Camus, or Heidegger, or Interstellar’s cosmic flows between daughter and father are in any way analogous with a cosmic perspective of love and life, and the implications of this perspective for a science of event horizons, there is at the same time a resonance that invites wonder. Wondering about time in this way does have its traditional epistemological chauvinisms (Young, 2002) to detether. Allowing for the possibility that love transcends time is however not a new small step for ‘man’ nor a new giant leap for ‘mankind’ as humanity looks to reach the stars. Those steps and leaps are ancient to communities that have understood the essence of a relationship to the stars and horizons and events and time and dimensionality and love. The challenge of letting go of predominant understandings of the way in which time works is a challenge of letting go of many apparent Modern comforts and securities. To give up on time would be like giving up on the Internet—it’s possibly inconceivable (or at least, the inability to believe in the possibility of an altogether different understanding of time is a very serious condition that defines a process of industrial normalisation and a colonising project that has tick-tocked around the world). If a certain technologically oriented forgetfulness is indeed a condition of Modernity (Heidegger, 1993b), forgetting alternative relationships to time might be one of the key devices for locking thinking into a predictable and inevitable flow that at the same time is the blinkering that denies an open perspective of the cosmos.

Conclusion: Working beyond the event horizon through love and early childhood care and education

This paper concludes with a turn to the context of early childhood care and education and horizons of love. Love and early childhood education sit in a particular relationship that might still make sense and that might offer the philosophy of education a space less hostile to an embracing of love and science. However, this conclusion also shows those philosophical dimensions and possibilities to be under new forms of educational policing through a renewal of very Modern educational traditions in behaviour management—traditions that might be evidence of an absence of love (Lanas and Zembylas, 2015), and that warrant questioning through a theory of love.

In early childhood care and education, an interest in the behavioural sciences fuels a tendency to
work with behaviour management as if it is pedagogy (Arndt, Gibbons, and Fitzsimons, 2015). How does this appear to us? Think of an educational space where all the available spaces on the walls are covered with star charts, loudly proclaiming which children are measuring up to the approved measures of good learning and good behaviour.

The education and care of the child before they reach school age, in many nations around the world, has become a central concern for government. This concern reflects a largely economy-driven realisation in the potential economic benefits of investment in, and regulation of, the child’s early care and education experiences. Perhaps most notably, an elevated interest in the care and education of the child is evident in the OECD’s comprehensive review of early childhood care and education research and policy—the ‘Starting Strong’ series (see for instance Barata, 2018). Before starting strong, however, there was an intensification of economic interest and economic thinking in the analysis of longitudinal data of the effects of early childhood care and education for some communities (see for instance Belfield, Nores, Barnett, and Schweinhart, 2006).

This highly technical and pseudo-scientific dimension of educational space might pay heed to measuring through an exploration of love. This exploration is not limited to an affective political operation (Lanas and Zembylas, 2015), but rather opens up to new modes of thinking power and an understanding of thinking as in some kind of interdimensional relationship with emotion, choice, politics and praxis (Lanas and Zembylas, 2015)—a gravity-shattering force and an approach to making sense of the cosmos beyond event horizons. Mann’s lecture is an important moment with regard to what is in and out of sight, and the ways in which love might not resolve in the evolutionary ways that Mann understands. Mann cannot think beyond certain functionalities. Having theorised love as a basic behaviouristic survival instinct, Mann reveals he has insufficiently attended to love as a theoretically rich line of inquiry in its own right. Love is beyond Mann’s questions and his horizon; he misunderstands what he has discovered about knowledge and being, and “allows the possibility of no other reality-revealing horizon” (Young, 2002, p. 29).

If Mann allows for the possibility that love transcends time and space, he discovers new questions. What might happen then if children and teachers question the whats and hows and whys of the reality-revealing horizon of behaviourism? Perhaps their questions would make these star charts seem somehow strange … to wonder how those beautiful stars in the sky, that offer up ideas of unknowable life and death, that hint at dimensions of time and gravity beyond sight, became the crude instrument of a community’s love for enframing the behaviour of children. I wonder whether then this love might also be revealed for its very Modern tendencies, and then put aside to grow dust, replaced with a different kind of less anxious, more questioning, more dimensional, more essential, love.

As an early childhood teacher and teacher educator in Aotearoa New Zealand, for me it’s not just love that is of interest here, but the way in which love is thought differently through the partnership established in the signing of the aforementioned treaty, which consists of two treaties: the Treaty of Waitangi and te Titiri o Waitangi, two versions of an agreement in two languages with the purpose of coming together in partnership.

One place to look for that partnership is in the early childhood curriculum. It is perhaps getting
closer to the source of love. In Aotearoa New Zealand’s early childhood curriculum Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 2017), love is a secondary concept to aroha. Aroha is explained as love, compassion, empathy and affection (p. 66). Aroha is a key curriculum concept with regard to the child’s learning dispositions, relationship to Papatūānuku (typically explained as the Earth mother), and relationships with peers. The curriculum can be seen then as guiding mahi aroha, practices through which mana is recognised, protected, and enhanced (Cram, 2021), and invites thinking about the kind of measuring that compels Heidegger and Camus, and at the same time invites a concern for any sciences that anxiously attempt to fix education and childhood through blinkered approaches to measurement. Take for example this star chart phenomenon.

The managerial star chart is emblematic of events that have occurred in early childhood education over the two decades either side of the turn of the millennium and that obscure anxieties with regard to the enumeration of the child in ways that trouble this heart. When I started out teaching in early childhood education many years ago, the early childhood education sector had only just appeared on the educational radar of the Cold War. It was largely free to do whatever it wished with regard to providing for the care and education of children, and many children were not likely to spend much more than 20 hours a week in an early childhood centre.

Travelling through time, to early childhood education, here in Aotearoa New Zealand now, we have this seemingly paradoxical situation in which the Government maintains that early childhood education is not a compulsory educational stage, but at the same time compels parents to send their children to early childhood education centres at increasingly younger ages, for increasing hours in the week.

I am concerned with what is overlooked, discarded, marginalised, and exploited in this brave new world of early childhood education. I am particularly concerned with the incessant and absurd production of star charts and other tools to measure the young child’s educational progress. For instance, we are currently, in Aotearoa New Zealand, being asked to implement a host of new “progress tools” to amplify the attention to evidence of each child’s learning and development. We must measure the children more.

I read in Heidegger, Camus, and Interstellar a challenge to education systems obsessed with the metric production of educational quantities. The enumeration of each child, and of all children, educationally, appears to be an absurd obsession, fixated with producing numbers and rarely, in Heidegger’s terms, paying heed to those productions, nor to the nature of number (Heidegger, 1971, p. 224). I am wondering whether a fixation of enumerating the child might be challenged not just through a turn to Heidegger but also a turn to the kind of hard science fiction that questions the truths of the educational sciences, and that opens up questions concerning events, horizons, education and love.

A love-oriented curriculum can be understood in different ways.

Of course, there’s the possibility that love becomes some kind of truth, or a prescribed lesson, and something to assess. Perhaps the main caution here is to think of love as a phenomenon worth more study. To study love is not to determine its finality. The point is not to harass love until it’s a thing that can be put to work for some agenda, but to dwell poetically in love (Heidegger, 1971).
Perhaps in dwelling poetically in the study of love there is some recognition of the very tendency to turn love into a potion for “gain and success” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 213). In other words, an education reform movement that seeks to install love into curriculum as a subject area, or into pedagogy as a teaching tool, could end up looking and feeling just as absurd as every other instrumental and technical curriculum subject and pedagogy, a reform that might rarely extend beyond our line of sight.
References


MythBusters' Adam Savage Explains Why Interstellar's TARS is the Perfect Robot (December 17, 2014). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0UoOhdvQYmo


Envoy: Miseducation of the Public

Das Ein Eks

Intro: The U.S. public education system is a child of the Industrial Revolution. Among other things, this means that the factory was the template for creating, managing, and determining the quality of public schools. This legacy lives on in the present. This poem expresses one of the basic problems of this legacy.
Miseducation of the Public

Mr. Robert James Public
Be smokin’ crack
To wanna blame
Teachers for not
Raising his cherubim’s
Standardized test scores
In the hallowed name of accountability.

RJ Public wanna frame
Teachers for his lame ignorance of
Metaphors’ limits.
RJ felt delighted
At Joe Politician’s enlightened
Stump speech conjoinin’
Education and industrial design,
He swooned as if drunk on wine
At the prospect of disciplinin’
Liberal education
By modeling schools on factories,
And teachers on assembly line workers
Manufacturing products winding
Through work stations—
A.K.A. kindergarten through
High school graduation:

Thirteen stops along
The straight and narrow path
Leading to standardized parts,
Interchangeable with other parts
To fill corporate labor shopping carts,
No Child Left Behind slogans
Ensuring voters stay blind
To how thoroughly corporate values
Have refashioned schools
To run like factories do.

RJ Public bolted for the polls
When Joe Politician spit this
Factory metaphor to describe
Progressive educational reform
In terms RJ understood well:
The talk of the shop he daily roamed,
The place he called his second home.

If I were to see RJ Public on the street,
I’d slap this politicians’ bought bitch
With knowledge ‘bout where
This metaphor break down:
Where education and
Factories cease
To have something in common.

Every factor in any
Factory-made product
Is known and tightly controlled,
Behaviors predictable
With methods statistical
Rendering products to
Each other identical.

It is not so with children,
Especially not when
Profit-making orientations
Fill classroom work stations with
High teacher-to-student ratios.

In such cases,
Many factors remain unknown,
And rarely,
When known,
Baffling statistical methods
For controlling individuals.

Yet, RJ Public votes
To hold teachers accountable
For his angel’s standardized test scores.

RJ can’t see these fault lines,
He was Magna Cum Laude
At Assembly Line High,
Where critical thought
And aimless study hall
Were tightly aligned.

Hey, RJ!
You wanna hold me
Completely accountable
For the quality of the output?!?
Then give me total rule
Over the inputs!
I’d want sole custody and
Full control o’er every where and when
Of all that enters and exits his body—
Strategy John Watson embodied;
Only then would I consent
To having RJ determine
The extent of my professional success.

Until RJ Public grants me such access,
I’ll burn rogue factory metaphors
Into heaps of ashes.

--Das Ein Eks

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