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The 'New' Heidegger

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Chapter 10

The ‘New’ Heidegger

Babette Babich

10.1 Calculating Heidegger: From the Old to the New

The ‘new’ Heidegger corresponds less to what would or could be the Heidegger of the moment on some imagined ‘cutting edge’ than it corresponds to what some wish they had in Heidegger and above all in philosophical discussions of Heidegger’s thought. We have moved, we suppose, beyond grappling with the Heidegger of *Being and Time*. And we also tend to suppose a fairly regular recurrence of scandal—the current instantiation inflamed by the recent publication of Heidegger’s private, philosophical, *Tagebücher*, invokes what the editor of these recently published ‘black notebooks’ attempts to distinguish as Heidegger’s ‘historial antisemitism’ — ‘historial’ here serving to identify Heidegger’s references to World Jewry in one of the volumes.¹ We have hardly come to terms with the question of Heidegger and Nazism. To say this does not mean that some scholars do not read Heidegger as if one might bracket such historical associations or that others, conversely, think only of his all-too official Nazi affiliation as university rector in 1933–1934 and refuse, categorically, to read him at all. Indeed, the force of the most recent scandal threatens a new scholarly imperative towards just such non-engagement in the wake of what the popular press calls, following Trawny,

¹The ‘Black Notebooks,’ as these are called, correspond to the three (at the date of this writing) most recent editions of *Gesamtausgabe, IV Abteilung, Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen*, Vols. 94–96 (See GA 94, GA 95, GA 96), edited by Peter Trawny. A fourth volume, (GA 97), until now in the hands of Silvio Vietta, is scheduled to be published in March 2015. As editor, Trawny has also issued a commentary highlighting the third of the notebooks (GA 96). See Peter Trawny, *Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014).

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Heidegger's Nazi 'contamination,' a term that itself echoes Habermas's language with respect to Nietzsche.²

At the same time, Tom Sheehan, who has already earned his anti-Heidegger stripes in earlier scandals on this same theme, is today insisting that all Heidegger studies convert to what Sheehan names a 'new paradigm,' reducing being to meaning, a call that Sheehan already published as such more than a decade ago.³ Don Ihde—who years ago also stopped engaging Heidegger in his own work in technology studies—has similarly issued a call for a post-phenomenological move, which would bracket Heidegger even more than Husserl.⁴ So what is stopping Sheehan's 'new paradigm' or Ihde's post-phenomenology? Perhaps only the trivial or ontic detail that we continue to lack what might count as a genuinely 'new' Heidegger, assuming indeed that what we mean by the rubric of the 'new' is not merely a desire to shift a paradigm from the concerns of others to the concerns of a single scholar (no matter whether Sheehan or Ihde). Any talk of the 'new' should hold at least to the standard set in continental philosophical convention not with respect to Heidegger but Nietzsche, the thinker Heidegger claimed the most decisive for his thinking, in David B. Allison's collection, *The New Nietzsche*.⁵ What made Allison's Nietzsche 'new' was nothing other than the same Heidegger who influenced every other author in Allison's collection: Derrida, Deleuze, Klossowski, Blanchot, Lingis, etc. To date, there is no comparable programme of reflections on Heidegger.⁶

This particular point is one that can be made without adverting to the important differences between readings that one once upon a time might have counted as 'analytic'—here taking the term, *pars pro toto*—to stand for today's 'mainstream' readings, those of Dreyfus and Blattner and Guignon, Kelly and Haugeland and Okrent and Brandom, to name some American readings, along with Lafont and Philipse among many others, along with more traditional, or so-called 'continental,' readings such as those of Dastur and Janicaud and Schürmann but also like Kockelmans and Kisiel and certainly the present author.⁷

²See Joshua Rothman, 'Is Heidegger Contaminated by Nazism,' *The New Yorker*, April 28 2014. Rothman's essay describes the audience and the atmosphere at the April 8, 2014 interview with Peter Trawny, the editor of the notebooks, with Roger Berkowitz and later featuring a panel discussion adding Babette Babich, sponsored by the Goethe-Institut in New York.

³Thomas J. Sheehan, 'A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger's Research,' *Continental Philosophy Review* 34(2001): 183–202.

⁴Don Ihde, *Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

⁵David B. Allison, ed. *The New Nietzsche* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985).

⁶For further on this, see the several contributions in Keith Ansell-Pearson, ed. *The Fate of the New Nietzsche* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1993). See also the broad range of contributions in the journal explicitly founded in 1996 to foreground the new spirit of Allison's *New Nietzsche Studies*.

⁷The tradition of analytic scholarship also includes its own distinctions and differences and, detailing this further, one can add the contributions to Christopher Macann, ed. *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments (4 Volumes)* (London: Routledge, 1992), in addition to the tool-philosophers who reduce Heidegger to what is called object-oriented philosophy among other new bids to avoid engaging other readings of Heidegger.

In the interim, virtually everything written on Heidegger seems, more or less dissonantly, to advocate a restart. Thus, we are urged to start again, to return to the early Heidegger, the later Heidegger, to reflect after Heidegger and thus, post Heidegger, to think beyond him. Such recommencements include the habit of genealogizing Heidegger as well as efforts dedicated to re-thematizations of his work from the standpoint of political scandal.⁸

Perhaps, a better question would be to ask why we continue to refer to Heidegger at all? Given Heidegger's 'contaminated' thought or given that Heidegger might have been talking not about being but meaning, surely we are better off with a return to Frege or Wittgenstein, if not Searle or Austin or even Cavell? If Heidegger is outdated or has misled us as, for example, certain readings of his work on ontology are unified in suggesting, why not simply take up with another thinker, say, Lefebvre or Simondon or Laruelle or Latour or Sloterdijk or, just to go all rock star on the matter, Žižek himself? Indeed, why not do something else altogether? Of course, this tactic too is old hat: re-baptised under the rubric of Heidegger's contamination with historical anti-Semitism and resuscitated under the new non-engagement mentioned at the start. Omit Heidegger and move on. Has Heidegger not already been too well represented to require either analysis or discussion? 'Been there, done that,' says popular culture, and today's new scholar 'speculates' accordingly.

Indeed, our all-too modern desire for the new together with our tired postmodernity, that is, our sense of the already post-datedness of almost everything, may be the most persistent remnant of metaphysics, counted in millennia, as we date everything from a particular last god ('Nearly 2000 years and not a single new God,' as Nietzsche complained in all seriousness in his *The Antichrist*).⁹ In this spirit, we seek our redemption from Heidegger by way of a 'new Heidegger,' post-Heidegger.¹⁰

There is a fated impossibility to any 'new' undertaking of this kind—quite apart from the arbitrary assumption that is built into our chronological convictions that we ourselves count as newer, better, more advanced. Certainly, we have not tired of

⁸This politicizing goes, as one says in a certain American parlance, *way back* and has never been altogether neutral, thus we may note Tom Sheehan's review of the *Gesamtausgabe* itself in his well-titled, Thomas J. Sheehan, 'Caveat Lector: The New Heidegger,' *New York Review of Books* (December 4, 1980). See for example, Miguel de Beistegui, *The New Heidegger* (London: Continuum Press, 2005).; Theodore Kisiel and John Van Buren, eds., *Reading Heidegger From the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).; Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). The scandals themselves also go way back, indeed, to just after the war, arguably also during the war and, as noted in the text, seemingly resurface from time to time, such as the very plainly titled, Emmanuel Faye, *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy*, trans. Michael B. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

⁹Friedrich Nietzsche, *Der Antichrist*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 6* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), § 19, 185.

¹⁰The term dates from the very conflicted notion of the postmodern for Ihde and for other scholars who use the term in this sense. See, to begin with, Don Ihde, *Heidegger's Technologies: Postphenomenological Perspectives* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010).

the ‘siren twitterings’ of those Nietzsche named the ‘old metaphysical bird catchers, who have all too long been piping’ at us: “‘you are more! you are higher! you have a different genesis!’”¹¹

And we are quite sure that the ‘metaphysical bird catchers’ are right about us: all of us are secret Harry Potters, scions of lost wizards, with secret powers. In the same way, many of us are quite happy to designate ourselves posthuman (this would be Donna Haraway’s cyborg) or transhuman (whether alluding thereby to Nick Bostrom or Ray Kurzweil), while, and at the same time, others exercise themselves in bootless worries about the fate of being post-anything: from the now well and truly dated *postmodern condition* to post-analytic philosophy, and, of course, we eagerly add post-continental philosophy to boot. Beyond the merely posthuman, if we today opt to call ourselves transhuman, for which achievement we need do nothing at all, all performative work done by the trans-, and the achievement sheerly one of designation or ‘branding.’ Thus, ignoring the implications of the anthropo-obscenity of our self-absorption and our destructiveness, we declare ourselves *Humanity 2.0*¹² and the parallel with consumer product updates and capitalist speculation does not seem to be a coincidence.

Add update and stir, *et voila!*—and as if life were a television screenplay—we have *Humanity: The New Generation*. Thus, we debate the ethical implications of deploying technologies barely extant and become a *new old* vision of ourselves, packaged and marketed for a profit margin that does not, as it turns out, include most of us, no matter our efforts to buy every latest gadget, as illustrated by the (now failed) worldwide movement known as Occupy Wall Street. There is no one who doesn’t want to buy the latest thing, live the advertised good life. But the jobs are lacking, the houses too costly to buy, the rents obscenely high, and all this calls more than ever for a reflection on building, dwelling, thinking. The point of profit is also political. And we should ask about the politics of it all, but we do not: there is no god but capital—another meaning of speculation. And the Heideggerian programme of asking questions is itself complicated these days inasmuch as political control is increasingly a matter of media i.e., what is disseminated and what is not. What we do not see does not exist. Social protest movements are not given media time any more than their more or less brutal police suppression, unless there is a political reason to make it public. Nor is this limited to the social. We talk about climate change while ignoring weather modification technologies, fracking, mining, farming, fishing. And, above all, we ignore the spills and disasters consequent upon our activities. Nor do we think about what we do not see. All the oil seeping from the seabed, so we are confident, has vanished, been ‘cleaned up’ in the Gulf of

¹¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 5* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), § 230.

¹² In the interval between the time I first wrote this, Steve Fuller has obligingly published an invaluable overview of the traditional working notion of the human throughout the sciences, especially the human, social and political sciences. See Steve Fuller, *Humanity 2.0: What it Means to be Human Past, Present and Future* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

Mexico after the BP seabed rupture and undersea volcano. All gone. (Hardly, to be sure, but that would be the theme of another essay.)

Heidegger writes, almost in Theodor Adorno's Frankfurt School voice, almost in Günther Anders' voice, of the relation between thinking and media, reflecting that 'we do not yet hear, we whose hearing and seeing are perishing through radio and film under the rule of technology' (KE, p. 46).

The collusion between capital and supposed 'democratic' representation is unremarked upon, although everything that happens on the political world stage reflects this collusion. And today, a theoretical and even more importantly, a technical, data-rife, book appears on the stage, Thomas Piketty's *Capital* as if to tell us, bristling with statistics for the scientifically minded among us—and we are all, as Tzvetan Todorov underscores the point, *more* rather than less scientific—that this collusion and the disparity between classes, rich and poor, enfranchised and not, has not changed over time and cannot change.

If we take this point to another limit, that would be the Twitter or Facebook or, more patently still, the LinkedIn extreme of self-marketing, we thereby set aside the whole array of questions needed to consider such a self-assessment as the residuum of a by-now superseded, outmoded, 'humanist' worldview.¹³ But the ontic details remain, and, like the faded Arab spring, the Wall Street occupy movement is over—protesters systematically brought to order by prosecution and imprisonment, adjudged in the interim as legal felons, under which title they will now live their lives.

And who wants to talk about Heidegger and capitalism anyway? Certainly, and after Nietzsche, and given Adorno's failures, one would think one would know better.

Out with the old, in with the new. Let's just talk about 'objects' and pretend to be 'things.' As the Heidegger of *Being and Time* says, this modern passion for the new is the 'curiosity' that seeks newness 'but only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty' (SZ, p. 172). The insight persists throughout his work if it has gotten him little more than a reputation for being a rustic or black forest thug: critical of what he calls 'idle talk.' Everywhere and nowhere, 'curiosity is concern with the constant possibility of distraction,' but not in the sense of 'observing entities and marvelling at them,' as Heidegger remarks, and as distinguished from philosophical wonder, 'to be amazed to the point of not understanding is something in which it has no interest' (SZ, p. 172). As Heidegger goes on to add, both 'idle talk and curiosity take care in their ambiguity to ensure that what is genuinely and newly created is out of date as soon as it emerges before the public' (SZ, p. 174).

¹³ See, for example, of an overview of such concerns, Julian Savulescu and Nicklas Bostrom, eds., *Human Enhancement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), which takes the notion of the 'post-human' condition about as literally as one might wish. For one overview of transhumanism as a concept, see Nicholas Agar, 'Whereto Transhumanism? The Literature Reaches a Critical Mass,' *Hastings Center Report* 37, no. 3 (2007): 12–17. There are any number of essays and books on the theme of the post- and transhuman, as what Heidegger called the rush to overreach ourselves as the rage to think about and to write and to publish on nothing but the latest topics shows no sign of abating.

But as we thus attend only to what we anticipate as the latest thing, we are also well able to suppose that *that* fascist, eugenicist worldview was what was (Nazism), and that what we are promised in our new humanity 2.0 is somehow different. Indeed, more than the fantasy of the embedded gills that would permit one to swim underwater or the wings that might permit us to soar through the air, or any of the other things that might have been supposed, the new humanity 2.0 when it is not about prosthetic limbs turns out to be little more than having the virtual equivalent of prosthetic limbs, namely internet access, wireless access. Jean-François Lyotard would have been delighted, as he praised efficiency, above ‘the true, the just, or the beautiful ... a technical move is good when it does better and/or expends less energy than another.’¹⁴ Be it with Google or a Twitter or Facebook account, and above all with a certain dedication to life ‘online,’ our transhumanity is always mediated, a matter of attention; focus on a conversation, a game, a film, and automatically transcend our here and now.

Does the newly transhuman condition really reflect the ‘latest thing’? Perhaps but then everything old is new again. Well in advance of Steve Fuller or Jean-François Lyotard or Marshall McLuhan, Heidegger’s student, the phenomenological media theorist of radio and television, music and sound, Günther Anders had challenged us to reflect in Heidegger’s spirit on the mediating of media. For Anders, in a phenomenological reflection on radio *and* television *and* film, contending that ‘no medium is only a medium,’¹⁵ what matters is our devotion to having the ‘event’ come to us rather than the other way around.¹⁶ Rather than being oneself involved, messily, bodily, in real time, real world events, we voluntarily, using our own free or “leisure time,” as Anders emphasizes this in 1956, enslave ourselves to fabricating the very mass media selves—we used once to call them logins, avatars, screen names, and such; but the mindmeld is complete, and we no longer do that—and today we live and flourish in the image of networked media, from radio to television to the so-called cloud. Thus, our trans-humanity is negotiated digitally, we ‘act,’ like other ‘actants’ via network connections, no matter whether the network is meant literally, digitally or metaphorically, speculatively, in terms of capital investment. And the literal net (be it of networked things or selves) does not work on us without its own just as literally or all-too embodied connection to us. Today, we remain ‘connected’ via a changing proliferation of gadgets to which (this is key) we pay no attention (this is how mediation works in the case of media). Intentional beings as we are, intent on what we now simply, as if we ourselves were programmers, call ‘content,’ we relate to the computers on our desks while attending to neither our

¹⁴Jean-François Lyotard, *Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 44. I discuss this in Babette Babich, ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra, or Nietzsche and Hermeneutics in Gadamer, Lyotard, and Vattimo,’ in *Consequences of Hermeneutics: 50 Years After Gadamer’s Truth and Method*, ed. Jeff Malpas and Santiago Zabala (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 218–243.

¹⁵Günther Anders, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, Band 1: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution* (München: Beck, 1987), 99.

¹⁶He writes: ‘Die Ereignisse kommen zu uns, nicht wir zu ihnen.’ See *ibid.*, 110.

computers nor our desks, unless, and as Heidegger reminds us, *something goes wrong*; and when I say this, of course, I include tablets of whatever networked kind, like iPads, but I am also including as omnipresent cell phones, smart televisions, traffic and street cameras for surveillance, in the pocket networking, all ready to hand. These constitute and thus effect the current *commercium* to use Heidegger's 1927 terminology. Both Heidegger and Anders emphasize that mediation, that is to say, the means by means of which our communication is mediated, always makes a difference even as it withdraws from our awareness inasmuch as or because *our attention is*—and this is the way intentionality always works—*elsewhere*. To this extent, we *are* our multitouch gestures, we *are* our keyboards, real or virtual, we *are* our screens or displays—because what we touch and what we see mediates our interaction—tablets/iPads, smart phones, taking 'smart' television or cable or cell service for granted as we do, along with the entirety of what we call media in all its monotony, the lot of it mediated via an internet connection, mostly wireless, and to hell with the bees (and we are sure that cell phones can't possibly harm bees or any living thing) and to hell with our health.¹⁷

10.2 Technology and Transhumanism

Impatient to be done with Heidegger's warnings regarding what he named 'calculating representation' (KE, p. 45), both in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, especially now that it is clear that the same terminology also appears in connection with Heidegger's Black Notebooks, but also and to be sure in Heidegger's reflections on science and his questionings concerning technology, we remain quite certain, contra Heidegger, that we will indeed be able to calculate as we must and thereby 'save' our technological cake and eat it too.

¹⁷Ved Parkash Sharma and Neelima R. Kumar, 'Changes in Honeybee Behaviour and Biology under the Influence of Cellphone Radiations,' *Current Science* 98, no. 10 (25 May, 2010): 1376–1378. To this day, research on the damage done by cell phones to bees continues to be disputed; likewise, the effects of cell phone use on human health are also disputed. Nevertheless, it has long been known that cell phones present in measurable fact a danger to human health, but this fact, and this is so even when acknowledged and it should be said that the industry *continues* to 'dispute' it, has had little practical influence on regulation and even less on cell phone use. But see the World Health organization's 'Electromagnetic Fields and Public Health: Mobile Phones, Fact sheet N°193,' (Geneva: World Health Organization, June 2011). I discuss the limitations of scientific publishing in the circular context of mutual censoring characteristic of peer review, esp. pp. 360–361, in Babette Babich, 'Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs and Waterbears,' *International Journal of the Philosophy of Science* 24, no. 4 (2010): 343–391. For a discussion of the bees themselves, see one study that records the bees' screams (which the scientist 'objectively' describes and so diminishes as 'piping'), see Daniel Favre, 'Mobile Phone-Induced Honeybee Worker Piping,' *Apidologie* 42, no. 3 (2011): 270–279., as well as the study by the medical epidemiologist, Devra Davis, *Disconnect: The Truth About Cell Phone Radiation, What the Industry has Done to Hide It, and How to Protect Your Family* (New York: Dutton Adult, 2010).

Long past our post-war technological anxieties, we embrace the salvific promise of technology: the more, the better. And far less turns out to be needed for salvation than anyone ever seemed to have imagined in the 1930s dreams of technological Molochs. In fact, as Horlkheimer tells us, as Baudrillard tells us, all we need is the iconic, the imaginary: the image suffices. The idea of genetic engineering, the notion of software engineering, the concept of digital technology repackaging, like reality TV make-overs are seemingly all we need to ensure our confidence in a corporate vision or advertisement of what we take to be ‘the promise’ of the future. Thus, we expect the technological singularity as a rapture to be had for everyone. And if we listen to Ray Kurzweil and his marketing planners, pitched for new investment opportunities, all of it is already coming, any day now, at more and more affordable prices ...¹⁸

Apart from the all-too modern obsession with the ‘future,’ as Heidegger himself, writing as he wrote in the space and time of two post-war Germanys, taking over this engagement with time (and mortality) from the Stoics, our age is the very everyday concern with gossip.¹⁹ Thus, in his *What is Called Thinking?*, Heidegger writes:

Today every newspaper, every illustrated magazine, and every radio program offers all things in the identical way to uniform views ... The one-sided view ... has puffed itself up into an all-sidedness which in turn is masked so as to look harmless and natural. But this all-sided view which deals in all and everything with equal uniformity and mindlessness ... reduces everything to a univocity of concepts and specifications the precision of which not only corresponds to, but has the same essential origin as, the precision of technological process. (GA 8, p. 36)

And what makes these uniform views more captivating than ever is that our interest is purely disembodied. We are, closed in our world, not seen seeing, or so we imagine. This, too, Günther Anders emphasizes. For what is crucial for industry is precisely that consumption *not* be public but standardized, just as Adorno says, just as Marcuse says, universal or ubiquitous but above all atomized, autistic absorption, perfectly private. The programming, the ‘conditioning’ (Anders uses both terms and here he uses the English term in scare quotes in his German text) of the individual takes place individually, in one’s home, separately and, this is the key for Anders, quite individualistically, for everyone.²⁰ All of the aforementioned kinds of ‘mediation,’ in Anders’ sense of the term, were and remain ways of connecting, without having ourselves to be present: no connection, no actual contact, no fuss, no muss. It is also true that we thereby mean to catch what ‘comes to us’ privately—thus our

¹⁸ See Ray Kurzweil and Terry Grossman, *Transcend: Nine Steps to Living Well Forever* (Emmaus, PA: Rodale Press, 2009).; Ray Kurzweil, *The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology* (New York: Viking, 2005).

¹⁹ See my first chapter on ‘branding’ and Facebook in Babette Babich, *The Hallelujah Effect: Philosophical Reflections on Music, Performance Practice and Technology* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013).

²⁰ Anders, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, Band 1: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution*: 105. It is significant that Don Ihde himself would oppose the proposed English translation of Anders’ 1956 book when it was recommended in the decades to follow as ‘too negative.’

unquenchable appetite for the 'news,' be it for reports of war, riots, scandal, sports scores, all to anticipate what we suppose is coming, largely because of the conviction we have concerning the future, construed as we construe it as the only thing that matters.

Like those clamouring emigrants at port, in Nietzsche's quasi-psychoanalytic aphorism in *The Gay Science*, entitled 'The Thought of Death,' an uncannily Heideggerian or Lacanian sort of aphorism, we too comprise, as Nietzsche articulates it, nothing less than 'a brotherhood of death,' hell-bent on the future and inspired in this by our 'conviction' (this term, which can also be translated as 'prejudice', is an importantly Nietzschean hermeneutic terminus) 'that what has been were little or nothing while the near future is everything.'²¹ Indeed, as Nietzsche reminds us in black, satirical humour, 'everyone wants to be the first in this future.'²² Hermes, who carries messages between divinities and mortals, also accompanies the souls of the dead to their passage to the underworld, with Charon, the ferryman of Hades, emblematic as Charon is for the (Christian) Michelangelo and for the Stoics as he was always in evidence in archaic philosophical traditions, particularly Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius in addition to Nietzsche's nearly contradictory example of Epicurus.²³ Nietzsche's '*The Thought of Death*' is accordingly thematically aligned to Heidegger's own reflections in his *Being and Time* on that which comes, *Zu-kunft*: the future is an unknown sea.²⁴

It would be the Stoics who remind us that although meditation on future calamities may serve one well, time as such, regarded from the perspective that rules everything that comes to be, that is to say, *aeon* beyond Chronos, is also the fond image of time, as Eugen Fink also takes up this image in his analysis of the playing of Nietzsche's world child as this play conveys the cosmic legacy of Heraclitus and Empedocles, now broken into three parts.²⁵ Thus, too Nietzsche's gate, *Augenblick*, adds a third moment to the two collision courses of time, each into, each against itself.

Here we note what all philosophers know: time may be separated out into various moments only one of which approaches the momentary, that is the present (which does not stay), the past (which cannot be altered), and the future (which cannot be

²¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 3* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), § 278, 523.

²² Ibid. My emphasis, to be sure.

²³ On Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius as well as Epicurus, see the several studies by Pierre Hadot, particularly Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995). On Nietzsche and Epicurus, see Howard Caygill, 'The Consolation of Philosophy: Neither Dionysos nor the Crucified,' *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 7(1994): 131–151., as well as Fritz Bornmann, 'Nietzsches Epikur,' *Nietzsche-Studien* 13(1984): 177–188.

²⁴ Cf. the beginning of the fifth book, added 5 years later in 1887, where Nietzsche speaks of a 'new cheerfulness' and a sea open, like never before. See Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*: § 342.

²⁵ See Eugen Fink, *Nietzsches Philosophie* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960), 187. The ancients, as we recall Caesar's word on the division of Gaul, were fond of tripartite scissions, old gods too, as Nietzsche counts Christianity as a superannuated tradition.

known with certainty).²⁶ Clamour for the future, as we may, the strange point for Nietzsche (as the concluding section of his *Human, All-too-Human*, entitled *The Wanderer and his Shadow*, had already made clear enough) is the uncanny as such: ‘the shadow stands now behind everyone, as his dark fellow traveller’, thus ‘death and deathly silence alone are certain and common to all in this future.’²⁷

It is exactly this death, and we hardly need to say this when it comes to Heidegger, that we do not anticipate. This is the ‘one death’ singularized as the German convention singularizes the death that one has to die, as it is the culmination of the existence that *Dasein* has to live, as one’s own death: *einen Tod muss man sterben*, that is, as we say, sardonically, ironically, resignedly: *you’ve got to die somehow*. The jokes that go along with various odd ways that people die speak to us, as Freud tells about the relationship between what jokes tells us about our own truths, an all-too-intimate or personal death that every one of us must, that is to say, that every one of us has to die, and it is exactly this that we do not think in the mode of telling ourselves that of course, of course, it is so.

One dies. Thinking of the future, we remain disinclined to prepare for death, let alone to contemplate death. Like those emigrants at Nietzsche’s Italian portside and then as now, ‘nothing’ could be ‘further from their minds [our minds] than’ the ‘thought of death.’²⁸

More important perhaps than these neatly proto-existential parallels is a particular boredom. I began by noting our scholarly impatience for a ‘new Heidegger’ to say new things to us just to the extent that it can seem that we need new things to read, especially as it transpires, distracted as we are in a way that the Heidegger who wrote on idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity could never have imagined distraction, that *we read less and less*, even as we live our lives more mediatedly than ever through the text, texting, email, online posts. Without reading what has already been written on Heidegger, hard to do as many commentators point out, because so very much has already been written on his work, we are impatient for the ‘new.’

²⁶Marcus Aurelius famously writes at the conclusion of his *Meditations*: ‘The things are three of which thou art composed, a little body, a little breath (life), intelligence.’ And we may read his account of his spirit or intelligence in Heideggerian terms: ‘Of these the first two are thine, so far as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is properly thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from thyself, that is, from thy understanding, whatever others do or say, and whatever thou hast done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee because they may happen, and whatever in the body which envelops thee or in the breath (life), which is by nature associated with the body, is attached to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the external circumfluent vortex whirls round, so that the intellectual power exempt from the things of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is just and accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things which are attached to it by the impressions of sense, and the things of time to come and of time that is past, and wilt make thyself like Empedocles’ sphere, “All round, and in its joyous rest reposing;” and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, that is, the present—then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life which remains for thee up to the time of thy death, free from perturbations, nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon (to the god that is within thee).’ Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, *The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius*, trans. George Long (London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1914), 12.3.

²⁷Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*: § 278, 523.

²⁸Ibid.

And seemingly predicting the psycho-cognitive effects of Googling and emailing and downloading (this is the real Levinasian efficacy of Facebook), and above all the effects of the interactive effects of social networks on our memories and our capacity for innovative thought, Heidegger might well appear to have assessed the results of the same before any of it came to pass to the degree that we today simply take for granted:

The scholar disappears. He is succeeded by the 'research man' who is engaged in research projects. These, rather than the cultivating of erudition, lend his work its atmosphere of incisiveness. The research man no longer needs a library at home. Moreover, he is constantly on the move [ständig unterwegs]. (ZW, p. 85)

Heidegger thus writes 'The Age of Worldview [Die Zeit des Weltbildes]' for scholars across the nationalistic board, as relevant to research in Nazi Germany as indeed in the UK, as in America and Russia, not only in 1938 but today as well. Here, Heidegger highlights what is inherent in the nature of the mathematical projection of the world, that is qua knowable, whereby Heidegger writes that 'all events,' (and this has been hugely significant for Jean Baudrillard's analysis of the event), 'if they are to enter at all into representation as events of nature, must be defined beforehand as spatio-temporal magnitudes of motion, accomplished through measuring, with the help of number and calculation' (ZW, p. 79). And we know this, we fans of correctness, as Heidegger explains exactly unremarkably, the point of precision is effected through advance stipulation, as what is 'already known,' and with this 'already known' Heidegger only repeats the heart of Nietzsche's own epistemological, scientific insight: thus, we moderns, we scientifically-minded people explore the unknown in every case by reducing it in every case to what is already known. And we succeed in this, as Heidegger reminds us: 'The rigor of mathematical physical science is exactitude,' which works owing to stipulation. 'The plan or projection of that which must henceforth, for the knowing of nature that is sought after, be nature: the self-contained system of motion of units of mass related spatio-temporally' (ZW, p. 79). Here, the point for Heidegger is all about what stipulation, as this is the foundation of scientific exactitude, is secured to begin with. Natural science, he reminds us, 'is not exact because it calculates with precision; rather it must calculate in this way because its adherence to its object sphere has the character of exactitude' (ZW, p. 79). In other words, what matters is method: natural or mathematical science to be science 'becomes research through the projected plan and through the securing of that plan in the rigor of procedure' (ZW, p. 79). Heidegger would always emphasize that we have yet to begin to think, and he does this again and again, with particular injury (as if he needed to be particularly injurious) to the sciences along that way, reflecting that we are 'still' not thinking in *What is Called Thinking?* (1951/1952)—indeed, as he emphasized particularly with respect to Nietzsche, as he also maintained that we have yet to begin to understand even those 'easy' thinkers who serve us as our formative guides, this is Plato, as Whitehead famously tells us (and this is especially true if we speak English), but for German authors, this will also include Aristotle, Augustine, and this is also Kant and even if we are not French (but especially if we are), this is Descartes as well. To the list we can add Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger himself, etc.

The problem is our conviction not only that we need a *new* Heidegger but a *new* everybody and everything else in philosophy. We suppose ourselves to know all this past philosophy. Thus, analytic philosophy, following the model or exemplar of the *philosophy of science*, which early on separated itself and its prospects from what it called the *history of science*,²⁹ names the entirety of the concern with Heidegger as well as Nietzsche or Kant or Plato and so on, as so much *history of philosophy*. Here this mainstream or ‘analytic’ terminus is only deployed to differentiate such ‘historical’ studies from what is to be counted as philosophy proper. For such properly mainstream philosophy, all we need is what analytic scholars tell us is to be acquired via the sciences (philosophy says what science says or it is not philosophy) or else via survey on the model of the social sciences (i.e., what is called ‘experimental’ philosophy, on the model of Brian Leiter’s web polls). Both reference points raise the ticklish question of the academic redundancy of mainstream or ‘analytic’ philosophy on its own terms but these same terms dictate the importance of the contemporary or the ‘new.’

And yet reading Heidegger, Nietzsche, Kant, Plato, etc., should correct the conviction that we already know what they are saying. Once we begin to read an author we *think we know*, even when we do know this author, *perhaps especially when we do know the author*, we find ourselves in the realm of the unexplored: finding nuances, sometimes whole ranges of riches missed the first time, contexts we failed to see and points we realize may be vanishing from our grasp even as we notice them now for the very first time. We know a text, we know an author, only in our vain conviction that we know.

In this sense, we have yet to begin to read Heidegger. We do not ‘know’ Heidegger, any more than we ‘know’ Nietzsche, any more than Heidegger knew Nietzsche, a realization that was anything but an empty one in the human, all-too-human progression of Heidegger’s own life. All wisdom consists in this.

I mean to emphasize this in more than an esoteric sense, in terms of some secret Heidegger specific to the 1930s or even the 1950s. I am not talking about Heidegger’s unpublished works, be it the *Contributions* (GA 65) or his *Mindfulness* (GA 66) or even the still undigested (untranslated, incomplete) *Black Notebooks* (GA 94, GA 95, GA 96, etc.). My point is much rather that we literally do not understand Heidegger’s most well-known texts. Nor is this deficit a corrigible one. (I am not saying that I have the secret reading, or that one should prefer *my* new paradigm to any others on offer.) As Nietzsche points out, knowing the limitations of knowledge, knowing that we are in error, is not to abrogate those same limitations, that same error.³⁰ This is the hermeneutic phenomenological point Heidegger seeks to make in his teaching of Hölderlin and of Nietzsche, as of Aristotle and Plato, as Gadamer remarks upon this, a teaching that Gadamer took up for his own part, and that the later Heidegger argues as the need for thinking, for retrieve, reprise.

²⁹ See Babich, ‘Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs and Waterbears,’ 356f.

³⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Fragmente 1880–1882*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 9* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), 504.

Hence, if one posed the question of the 'new' whomever, two long centuries ago in 1810 or 1815, for example, say, in an academic reflection on Kant, it is likely that one would not exactly have pointed to or even identified the profile of neo-Kantianism as we have known it historically. And we know this just to think of Schopenhauer, as of Kierkegaard, as of Goethe, and so on. In the early years of the nineteenth century, one's sense of one's own very philosophical future would have been based, as are all of our futures, on one's own past, precisely as one's past only comes to one, 'temporalizes' as we say, out of the future *as we see it coming*. To be sure, the scholars in question can be defined as proto neo-Kantians, but that is precisely because our own classifications tend to work that way.³¹ But then, there would still be what *becomes* Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Bergson, James and Pierce, just to name a few philosophical names.³²

10.3 Thinking the End of Philosophy and the Death of the Scholar

Heidegger scholarship has long been fraught by interpretations bent on articulating and defending/attacking one, usually limited, version of Heidegger's work and scope but also by those who take seriously Heidegger's own reflections on interpretive rigor to apply these reflections to Heidegger's thought.

Heidegger himself, and despite his well-known lack of (explicit) engagement with contemporaneous scholarly literature, was nearly always engaged reflectively with his own claims, par for the course for a thinker schooled in the critical style of neo-Kantianism, together with theological hermeneutics, as in the kind of medieval logic and method that would serve him in reading both Kant and Descartes, but also

³¹ Thus, we can think of a text that appeared in 1810 and happened to have been inspired by a call from Berlin from Johann Christoph Hoffbauer (1766–1827), someone duly named a Kantian but who could also be aligned as a Fichtean and who also stood in the broader Wolfian, Lambertian, and Baumgartian traditions. See Johann Christoph Hoffbauer, *Ueber die Analyse in Philosophie, ein grossten Theils analytischer Versuch, veranlasst durch die erste, diesen Gegenstand betreffende, Preisfrage der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin philosophischen Wissenschaften* (Halle: Hemmerde und Scherweke, 1810). The essay was dedicated to the philologist Friedrich August Wolf whose 1795 *Prolegomena ad Homerum* pretty well inaugurated what remains known as the Homer question, if scholars today tend to assume this question a fully answered or closed issue and which was itself, precisely as a question, the theme for Nietzsche's own inaugural lecture at Basel, in addition to the physicist Georg Simon Klügel.

³² And, so too, if we skip ahead to 1910, a famous year all around, even there, it is still the case that predicting the future of 20th century philosophy would have been a tough call, and the disputes among various claimants to be the heirs to an unsettled throne continues today. For an account of the philosophy of science and related issues, including the invention of moving sidewalks (1893), not to be sure solely in 1910 but from 1890, and a bit prior to that and 1930 and a bit after that, see Babette Babich, 'Early Continental Philosophy of Science,' in *The New Century: Bergsonism, Phenomenology and Responses to Modern Science*, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson and Alan Schrift, *The History of Continental Philosophy* (Chesham: Acumen Press, 2010), 263–286.

with history as a discipline and including the study of art (perhaps most significantly as Heidegger himself opts to mention it as part of his formation).³³

When we look to our own future, claiming the twenty-first century as our legacy, we are either, as Nietzsche would say, pregnant with the future or simply full of ourselves: *nur Narr, nur Dichter*. What is certain, so history teaches us, is that mainstream scholars in any generation are sure that their pet projects constitute the future while marginalized scholars have no such confidence, and not least for this reason Nietzsche would have taught Heidegger to attend to the ‘few and the rare’ (although the terminus is also part of the second century AD Lucian’s *Philosophies for Sale* and so widely disseminated in translations by Erasmus and St. Thomas More and echoed by Jonathan Swift who variously teach us about mainstream wisdom and its attendant and oblique follies), just by contrast with the ‘few and the rare.’

By thinking of ourselves as so many variants on Nietzsche’s idea of the posthumous, qua philosophers of the future, one lays claim to the mainstream *by other means*. This way of thinking goes together with our all-too-Hegelian and non-hermeneutic supposition that we are the first properly or rightly to read a thinker other generations misunderstood or overlooked in their own time. This confidence, conviction, or prejudice is widespread in the history of philosophy. Certainly, Husserl, in the middle of his career working with the Hilbert school in Göttingen, was persuaded of this virtuosity in 1910, as was, on the analytic side, Bertrand Russell who had at the time just published the *Principia Mathematica* with Alfred North Whitehead, a year innocent of Wittgenstein (who had likewise in 1910 patented an aerodynamic propeller), an innocence even more marked for Kurt Gödel who was all of 4 years old in the same year. Mathematicians reach their peak in their twenties, and, two decades later, Gödel would prove formal incompleteness in answer to Hilbert’s call for mathematical foundations in 1900.

To our earlier citation of Heidegger’s reflection on time, ‘Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future’ (SZ, p. 331), what is noteworthy here is that the past thereby becomes what we *count* as ‘having been’ (SZ, p. 338). Here, all of Heidegger’s ecstatic reflections on time catch us up. Thus he writes, ‘The character of “having been” arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which “has been” releases from itself the present’ (SZ, p. 326). Now we all know that this crystallization of the past, in its character as ‘having been,’ thus in the whatness of what has been, together with its relatedness to the future and the present is the very temporal precondition of the possibility of authenticity as such: ‘Authentically *futural*, *Dasein* is authentically having been’ (SZ, p. 326).

This point has been captivating for Tom Sheehan and his focus on *Das Gewesen*, even if Sheehan also borrows (without, alas, mentioning it) a bit of Magda King’s thunder in his fascination. Sheehan outlines the distinction and the philosophical advantage for a reflection on time and being in simply having the linguistic where-withal that permits one to say: *Ich bin gewesen*, ‘I am been,’ as opposed to what

³³Note that if Heidegger did not learn critical thinking from Rickert or indeed from Jaspers, he certainly learnt it from Nietzsche. See discussion and references in Babich, ‘Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs and Waterbears.’

King calls the round-about and confusing English transliteration, using hyphens to make the temporal point: 'I am-(as)-having-been.'³⁴ But this means that *Dasein* qua futural, with all its anticipatory dimensionality, that is, ahead of itself as it is, also always finds itself attuned 'as the being that it still is and already was, that it constantly is as having been' (SZ, p. 328). It is indeed for this reason, as Heidegger from the start of *Being and Time* develops this point, that one *can* become what one is, as Pindar says to the benefit of Nietzsche's *amor fati*. 'We call authentic having-been "retrieve"' (SZ, p. 339).

In *What is Called Thinking?*, Heidegger observes that the project of thinking about what is most thought-worthy eludes academic interventions, writing papers, writing books, teaching, giving lectures at scholarly conferences. Instead, Heidegger calls for action more in the spirit of a Marx than a Dilthey or a James:

The state of the world is becoming constantly more thought-provoking. True, this course of events seems to demand rather that the human being should act without delay, instead of giving speeches at conferences and international conventions and never getting beyond proposing ideas on what ought to be, and how it ought to be done. (GA 8, p. 6)

Heidegger observes in 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,' a text that is often more reacted to than read (egad! how can one say that philosophy is at an end? Does one not see that the professors are still in possession of their chairs and the students yet in eager pursuit of degrees to ignore those professors and lay claim to chairs of their own?), the kind of thinking he intends as 'preparatory thinking' differs from the anticipation of projects for techno-scientific reflection. By contrast, for Heidegger,

The preparatory thinking in question does not wish and is not able to predict the future. It only attempts to say something to the present which was already said a long time ago precisely at the beginning of philosophy and from that beginning, but has not been explicitly thought. (GA 14, p. 75)

Here Heidegger invokes Parmenides, the 'father' of logic, the first thinker of being, observing that Parmenides' 'thoughtful poem ... as far as we know, was the first to reflect explicitly upon the being of beings, which still today, although unheard, speaks in the sciences into which philosophy dissolves' (GA 14, p. 83). This is the 'end' of philosophy, this is what comes 'after' metaphysics, here regarded 'in the pure sphere of the circle in which beginning and end are everywhere the same' (GA 14, p. 83). Heidegger argues that the 'contemplative human being is to experience the untrembling heart of unconcealment,'³⁵ which Heidegger goes on to call the 'place of stillness which gathers in itself what grants unconcealment to begin with ... the opening of what is open' (GA 14, p. 83). Thus, Heidegger suggests that we must 'think ἄλθθεια, unconcealment, as the opening which first grants

³⁴ Magda King, *A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 219.

³⁵ I discuss this translation of ἀτρεμῆς as 'untrembling' (rather than the more conventional 'unshaken') in an essay dedicated to Joan Stambaugh and her translations, in Babette Babich, 'Truth Untrembling Heart,' in *Being Shaken: Ontology and the Event*, ed. Michael Marder and Santiago Zabala (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 154–176.

being and thinking and their presencing to and for each other' (GA 14, p. 83). The argument thus continues that we also need to consider that 'self-concealing, concealment, Λήθη, belongs to Ἀ-λήθεια, not just as an addition, not as shadow to light, but rather as the heart of Ἀλήθεια' (GA 14, p. 88).

The thinker who could think the needed paradox that here calls for thinking is set upon already by the changing character of the intellectual world. There may be that which calls for thinking, but the problem is that we who should heed this call are increasingly unable to do so. It is not merely the case that we are 'still not thinking' as if we might somehow snap out of it: a scholar's apprentice waking up from the dream of reason. As we have seen, in an age of science as machination and business-integrated enterprise, what matters is 'impact', economic and intellectual productivity and in such a celebration of 'progress', 'the scholar disappears' (ZW, p. 85). Rather than 'erudition,' the research scholar strives in Heidegger's estimation at the time of his writing—a condition that as we noted above has not changed at all in the interim—to attain and maintain at the so-called cutting edge: 'The research worker necessarily presses forward of himself into the sphere characteristic of the technologist in the most essential sense' (ZW, p. 85).

Heidegger continues here in 'Die Zeit des Weltbildes' to write that 'knowing, as research, calls whatever is to account with regard to the way in which and the extent to which it lets itself be put at the disposal of representation' (ZW, p. 86). Far from empty theory or thought, science, now transformed into 'research' (ZW, p. 86), serves the common, productive, industrial or corporate good. Thus, as Heidegger goes on to observe in 'Wissenschaft und Besinnung,' however much it appears that physics has moved away from the determinism of the Newtonian world view, wherein 'every state of motion of bodies that occupy space is at any time simultaneously determinable—i.e., is precisely calculable in advance, predictable—both as to position and as to velocity' (GA 7, pp. 53–4), it nonetheless holds that in modern atomic physics—and here Heidegger is speaking of complementarity—'a state of motion may on principle be determined either as to position or as to velocity' (GA 7, pp. 53–4). The 'or' is logical or exclusive in this context. And yet, as Heidegger quotes Heisenberg, the point of quantum mechanics always remains calculation: 'being able to write one single fundamental equation from which the properties of all elementary particles, and therewith the behaviour of all matter whatever, follow.'³⁶ Here too, one has to do both with the objectification and calculation of nature as well as precisely because one has to do with nature as such, the same nature that as Heraclitus tells us, 'likes' to hide, and does so, as the late Pierre Hadot carefully reminded us, as from a wholly other temperament did Jacques Lacan, *in plain sight, without veils*.³⁷ Thus, Heidegger writes:

³⁶Cited in GA 7, p. 54. For Heisenberg's text, see Werner Heisenberg, 'Die gegenwärtigen Grundprobleme der Atomphysik,' in *Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaften* (Zurich: S. Hirzel, 1949), 89–101.

³⁷Pierre Hadot, 'Isis Has No Veils,' *Common Knowledge* 12, no. 3 (2006): 349–353. See further, Pierre Hadot, *The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature*, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

Scientific representation is never able to encompass the coming to presence of nature; for the objectness of nature is, antecedently, only one way in which nature exhibits itself. Nature thus remains for the science of physics that which cannot be gotten around. (GA 7, p. 56)

And that 'which cannot be gotten around' is where we find ourselves as we speculate on how it goes not with being but with Heidegger, on his impact prospects and his liabilities as a research thematic in the twenty-first century in which we find ourselves. That this is a suitable topic for research is already patent in our undertaking as a very explicit kind of intellectual *Machenschaft*, as Heidegger here explains that: 'Research has disposal over anything that is when it can either calculate it in its future course in advance or verify a calculation about its past' (ZW, pp. 86–7). In this way, speculators all, we continue to seek to get a bead on the state of Heidegger studies, the current stand of viable, respectable, worthwhile research (and the whole point will be about sorting the 'good' from the 'bad').

And yet, as with technology, precisely here in our effort to find which ways might be best encouraged and which might not, we find ourselves (Heidegger uses the nicely mathematical example of atomic physics and the gigantic) defined as 'a continual not-ever-having-been-here-yet.' Heidegger argues that this condition 'originates only in a blind mania for exaggerating and excelling' and notes that 'what can seemingly always be calculated completely, becomes precisely through this, incalculable' (ZW, p. 95).

It is with the incalculable that Heidegger calls for thinking, for reflection.³⁸ 'Reflection transports the futural human being into that "between" in which he belongs to being and yet remains a stranger amid that which is' (ZW, p. 96)—and, of course, as Heidegger adds:

Reflection is needed as a responding that forgets itself in the clarity of ceaseless questioning away at the inexhaustibility of That which is worthy of questioning—of that from out of which in the moment properly its own, responding loses the character of a questioning and becomes simply saying. (GA 7, p. 65)

In this fashion, we are set to thinking the 'new' Heidegger, in Heidegger's wake.³⁹ Nor will anyone be surprised to learn that we are well able to think any number of 'new' thoughts, like the countless swells of laughter (as Nietzsche quotes Aeschylus at the start of his *The Gay Science*), to wonder as he does about the future of philosophy (the teachers of the 'meaning of life'), as of the future of wisdom, or the future of laughter.

³⁸ So we read 'that the human being will know, i.e., carefully safeguard into is truth, that which is incalculable, only in creative questioning an shaping out of the power of genuine reflection' (ZW, p. 96).

³⁹ See David Wood, *Thinking after Heidegger* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Gail Stenstad, *Transformations: Thinking after Heidegger* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Hubert L. Dreyfus, ed. *Heidegger Reexamined: Art, Poetry, and Technology, Volume 3* (New York: Routledge, 2002). And see too John Sallis, *Echoes: After Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). Of course, Adorno had long ago sounded a call to go beyond Heidegger as had Carnap and the latter's heirs have been busy doing just that.

To say, as Heidegger says, that a thinker thinks one thought is also to say that that same thinker has yet to come into his or her own. Thinking is a project and one has to *become* what one is. As the Heidegger of *Being and Time* alludes to Nietzsche and through Nietzsche to Pindar:

Only because the being of the 'there' receives its Constitution through understanding and through the character of understanding as projection, only because it is what it becomes (or alternately does not become), can it say to itself 'Become what you are.' (SZ, p. 145)

The imperative form of this 'projective' 'potentiality-for-Being' as Heidegger speaks of it remains to be worked out in the form of ethics.⁴⁰ From Nietzsche, we may remember that the reason this imperative urgency remains 'needful' is because we have no idea who we are and not least because, essentially because, we never think about this, we never think about what we are. Thus, we are always and already late-comers in coming to realize that we have for Nietzsche 'never sought ourselves.'⁴¹

If we like our novelty dated, we can add Lacan for an edge or take a critical line from Adorno but most of all, because we mean to be *à la mode* or trendy or at least (and this is the inauthentic anxiety of our desire not to be disincluded among the 'they') not to be 'out of it,' we can add Agamben or Sloterdijk or Žižek just to cite a few names from the old new guard or else we can cite an array of younger/older 'new' theorists—i.e., *your name here*—be these 'new' theorists in France, in Germany or Scandinavia, borrowed perhaps via the analytic default of philosophy,⁴² or from the new fields of media theory of one sort or another, etc., provided they have not yet been too, too read, or too, too cited (by the wrong people), provided they are sufficiently 'fresh' to be counted as the right kind of 'new.'

Heidegger: this is why we convict him as did my own teacher, Jacques Taminiaux, of a critically important 'nostalgia,'⁴³ promises little in the way of either novelty or progress. How, again to ask his own question, can his thinking get us anywhere? And how then is a 'new' Heidegger even possible?

⁴⁰ See my discussion, via Heidegger, of Nietzsche's imperative in Babette Babich, 'Become the One You Are: On Commandments and Praise—Among Friends,' in *Nietzsche, Culture, and Education*, ed. Thomas E. Hart (London: Ashgate, 2009), 13–38.

⁴¹ See Preface of Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals : A Polemic. By way of Clarification and Supplement to my Last Book Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

⁴² See the author's earlier analyses of the analytic-continental divide, especially, Babette Babich, 'On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche's Lying Truth, Heidegger's Speaking Language, and Philosophy,' in *A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy*, ed. C. G. Prado (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003), 63–103. and for a recent discussion of this same default, see Babette Babich, *La fin de la pensée? Philosophie analytique contre philosophie continentale* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012). For my dialogue with interviewees Dennis Erwin and Matt Storey, see Babette Babich, 'An Improverishment of Philosophy,' *Purlieu: A Philosophical Journal* 1, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 37–72.

⁴³ See Jacques Taminiaux, *La Nostalgie de la Grèce à l'aube de l'idéalisme allemand: Kant et les Grecs dans l'itinéraire de Schiller, de Hölderlin et de Hegel* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1967).

And after the challenge of logical positivism posed almost from its inception if we read Heidegger's 1920 inaugural address 'What is Metaphysics?', the question of the bootlessness of his thought is one of the oldest questions raised against his thinking. Heidegger tells us that science is concerned with facts and for this reason wants to know 'nothing about nothing' (WM, p. 106). Science is concerned 'with what-is—and nothing else; only what-is—and nothing more; simply and solely what-is—and beyond that, nothing' (WM, p. 105). For Heidegger, alluding to Carnap's objection in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*: 'He who speaks of nothing does not know what he is doing' (GA 40, p. 25). Heidegger goes on detailing the argument from Parmenides through to the injunction articulated in the spirit of logical positivism and intellectual cleanliness, that is, vis-à-vis what logicians call a performative contradiction:

In speaking of nothing he makes it into a something. In speaking he speaks against what he intended. He contradicts himself. But discourse that contradicts itself offends against the fundamental rule of discourse (*logos*), against 'logic.' To speak of nothing is illogical. He who speaks and thinks illogically is unscientific Such a speaking about nothing more-over consists entirely of meaningless propositions. (GA 40, p. 25)

QED: Dr. Carnap. Demonstration points: Prof. Dr. Heidegger.

Later on, in a lecture in Bühlerhöhe in 1950, given in memory of Max Kommerell, Heidegger returns to the same problem, invoking meaningless utterances in terms of tautology as opposed to the incipient nihilism threatening empty pronouncements about nothing but nothing. Writing that 'Language itself is language,' Heidegger repeats: the 'understanding that is schooled in logic, thinking of everything in terms of calculation and hence usually overbearing, calls this proposition an empty tautology' (GA 12, p. 10). Here, Heidegger again does his critics the service of asking their questions for them, posed in and on their own terms, 'overbearing' or not, contra Heidegger's own point, as the point would seem to need to be made: 'Merely to say the identical thing twice—how is that supposed to get us anywhere?' (GA 12, p. 10).

Again and again, I reflect on Heidegger's contra: 'But we do not want to get anywhere. We would like only for once, to get to just where we are already' (GA 12, p. 10).

This would of course be the point of Da-Sein. What is key is openness, thinking.

The movement here is one that for Heidegger invites us 'to be ready and willing to listen' (GA 8, p. 15).

For this, in our doing that is constantly more than what we will, is still and always what calls for thinking.

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