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Solicitude: Towards a Heideggerian Care Ethics-of-Assistance

Babette Babich

What is the orientation of care if not to reinstate the human in his/her essence?

– Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*

Friends and enemies

Heidegger has been criticized for lacking an ethics, a point of view Heidegger himself highlights as perhaps the key to his well-known but elusive *Letter on Humanism*, a response offered in reply to a letter written to him after the war by Jean Beaufret, a scholar of ancient philosophy. Certainly, in this post-war era (where Sartre's 1945 Paris lecture 'Existentialism Is a Humanism' sought to defend the ethical credentials of existentialism in the face of the charge of nihilism) and more so today in the wake of the *Black Notebooks* scandal, Heidegger's philosophy falters on ethical grounds as on political complications. Thus, a deservedly unrelenting indictment of Heidegger's 'world-historical' anti-Semitism may be added to his undisputedly enduring Nazi loyalties. Where questions concerning the status of Heidegger's ethical and political thought inevitably involve debates on Heidegger's Nazism, similar debates contra Heidegger were already at work under National Socialism where he was criticized by party superiors for having his own 'private' Nazism.

None of this is news, despite the claims of a new scandal associated with Heidegger's 'world-historical' anti-Semitism.¹ Nor was this damning judgement limited to his enemies. Heidegger's erstwhile friend and colleague, Karl Jaspers, wrote the key official 'reference' on Heidegger's behalf, assessing both his guilt along with his potential for rehabilitation in the de-Nazification hearings. These proceedings affected all German academics after the end of the Second World War, and Heidegger too was subject to the official rehabilitation process.²

Heidegger failed the rehabilitation hearings, and his right to teach was suspended from 1945 to 1949 directly as a result of Jaspers's *Gutachten* but no surely less as a result of the deficiencies of Heidegger's response. Subsequently, Heidegger was not to resume university teaching until after becoming emeritus (1951).³ Heidegger highlights

this ban on teaching as William J. Richardson, S. J. details Heidegger's amendments to the 'Appendix' Richardson included in his *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*.⁴

For context, note that most academics managed to be 'rehabilitated' *after* the war and this included former university rectors. Thus one must underscore the respective post-war fates, as it were, of Freiburg's 'other' Nazi rectors, beginning with Eduard Kern, who immediately succeeded Heidegger as rector in Freiburg (1934–6). In 1945, Kern was reinstated as Professor Ordinarius in the faculty of law at the University of Tübingen. Friedrich Metz, a geographer who next served as rector (1936–8), was seemingly dealt with more harshly as he was officially dismissed from the university only to regain a university chair in Heidelberg in 1954. But this is misleading as Metz remained officially engaged as a geographer throughout the years from 1945 to 1954, serving not only as head of the Freiburg *Alemannischen Institut* but continuing to serve as director of the *Freiburger Geographischen Gesellschaft* – an office he had also occupied under Nazi rule. The next rector in Freiburg was the zoologist, Otto Mangold (1938–40), who exemplified publicly explicit anti-Semitism and was thus, and like Heidegger, banned from teaching at Freiburg. But unlike Heidegger, Mangold could almost immediately go on to establish the Heiligenberg-Institut for Experimental Biology in Baden in 1946, serving as its director, becoming emeritus professor in 1953. Finally, the last Nazi rector at Freiburg was Wilhelm Süss, a mathematician. Süss, a member of the Nazi Party, was more conventionally aligned with the values of National Socialism than Heidegger. Yet although Süss was promptly placed under the infamous *Lehrverbot* in 1945, Süss returned to a professorial teaching appointment in Freiburg in December of that very same year: 1945.

Heidegger would be the only Nazi rector of Freiburg to serve less than two years.⁵ Indeed, Hannah Arendt could make the claim that, by comparison with others, Heidegger rectified 'his own "error" more quickly and more radically than many of those who later sat in judgment over him – he took considerably greater risks than were usual in German literary and university life during that period'.⁶ Today Heidegger is denounced at the level of any desired crime, beginning not just with Guido Schneeberger or Victor Farias, Hugo Ott or Emmanuel Faye, but also with Tom Sheehan, Richard Wolin, and Tom Rockmore, along with Peter Trawny and other soon-to-be known future names of the newest debacle.⁷ Recent collections have appeared, all condemning Heidegger, whether in French or German or, most recently, in English.⁸ All of these have antecedents.⁹ If I continue to include, on the most thoughtful level, Reiner Schürmann,¹⁰ Graeme Nicholson's reading remains the most balanced to date,¹¹ and to this I would add Tracy B. Strong's account from the side of political theory along with his fellow travellers in that discipline.¹²

The ethical question of Heidegger's philosophy is a matter of scandal and associative 'tainting' or 'contamination' (these are terms used in the literature), not only with Heidegger's private Nazism (whatever that was) but also with his personally private anti-Semitism, whatever it is that we are meant to understand as 'world-historical anti-Semitism'.¹³ Worthy of a secret, details are whispered, challenges are issued, rumours surge, all in a perfect illustration of the court of opinion and prejudice about which Socrates spoke. Plato alludes to such a circumstance of conviction via prejudice not

only in the famous locus of the *Apology* but also at the outset of *The Republic* where just as Socrates is delayed against his will to return to Athens by being claimed (or hijacked) as a houseguest for the sake of conversation and diversion for Polemarchus' friends and family, Socrates asks the young man if he might not be willing to hear a counterclaim, to which question Polemarchus asserts his resolution 'not to listen' to any of Socrates' arguments (and the esoteric spirits of Platonists have been running riot all the way to Leo Strauss ever since).

The convoluted circumstance based on what seems to be the case – worthy of Heidegger's illustration of hermeneutic phenomenology in his own discussion of the appearance of appearances in *Being and Time*¹⁴ – Jonathan Derbyshire informs us that

Eric Aeschmann, writing in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, reports that Heidegger's *Schwarzen Hefte* (*Black Notebooks*) will trouble even the most faithful of his acolytes in France. It appears that the German editor of the notebooks, Peter Trawny, has written an essay entitled 'Heidegger: The Black Notebooks and Historical Antisemitism' ('historial' being one of those neologisms of which Heidegger, and Heideggerians, were and are fond) in which he argues that these manuscripts, written between 1931 and 1946, contain ideas that are 'clearly antisemitic, even if it is not a question of anti-Semitism of the kind promoted by Nazi ideology.'¹⁵

What is at stake is more than a matter of prejudice; this is also the heart of ethics inasmuch as the ethical tradition of the West, so Nietzsche reminds us following Schopenhauer, is a desire to judge the character of others and to prescribe to them what they ought and ought not do, whereby ethical prescription turns out to be less about cultivating 'virtue' than setting rules for others.¹⁶

Ethics and the man

Beaufret's question concerning humanism¹⁷ was posed to Heidegger in the wake of the Second World War, second in a span of mere decades between these once-upon-a-time official enemies who were now corresponding as friends. On Heidegger's account, he had already offered a reply in a foundational sense to the question put to him just after the publication of *Being and Time*, 'When are you going to write an ethics?'¹⁸ Here I argue that Heidegger writing on 'Dasein's Being as Care' in *Being and Time* may be read as an ethics. But how can one talk about Heidegger's philosophical ethics when the very question is 'tainted', to use the title of one antagonistic book collection, with the question of Heidegger's personal conduct?

From the perspective of political theory on the related connection between Nietzsche's thought and Nazism, Tracy Strong points out that one can either argue that, on the one hand, there is no relevance of the man to the political or – and this is where it becomes interestingly complex – on the other hand, one can argue that there *is* such a connection. The first case separates the man and the politics, arguing for sheer contingency or else in other instances (with other names, say in the case of Gottlob Frege) bracketing matters, a strategy which lets us go on reading whomever we happen to

be reading. For Strong, a more urgent sequence of questions emerges in this latter case, where we do not practice such an isolating strategy:¹⁹

If it is an aberration (say due to a historically specific combination of the sense of betrayal after World War I, of a revengeful peace, of the particularities of German anti-Semitism, and of the development of technologies of propaganda), then it need not be part of future history and there is no need to do anything except to make sure that it does not happen again. Any relation Nietzsche might be said to have to it will be destined for the historical ash heap. This stance has been highly significant for political philosophy as much of the political philosophy written since World War II has been done with the more or less explicit aim of making sure that 'it' never happens again – to shut down, that is, any possibility of anything that looks like Nazism.²⁰

The decisive point Strong makes above is borrowed, although Strong himself does offer a powerful reflection on *formation*. For Adorno, and *singulare tantum*, the problem is barbarism, and what is at stake concerns the future of what Nietzsche called our educational institutions. For Adorno, what makes Auschwitz a problem is not that it is something that we are henceforth to prevent but the very fact that it was, Auschwitz is and remains given. It *was*, and this having done as we did is the condition of trauma; this having been is the stone fact. Thus, Adorno reflects that

every debate about the ideals of education is trivial and inconsequential compared to this single ideal: never again Auschwitz. It was the barbarism all education strives against. One speaks of the threat of a relapse into barbarism. But it is not a threat – Auschwitz was this relapse, and barbarism continues as long as the fundamental conditions that favored that relapse continue largely unchanged.²¹

With respect to Heidegger, we might say, whether in terms of his ethics or his politics, Heidegger is to be judged on just such terms of supposedly pre-emptive efficacy, as Strong speaks of this, and in terms of which Heidegger presents little in the way of a case.

Where there is (ontically) less of a problem with Nietzsche, despite his language of will to power, despite Nietzsche's historical association with the question of nihilism, Nietzsche would seem to be beyond direct suspicion, having been dead for more than three decades before the Nazi rise to power. We read whatever we are reading (Nazism, Ayn Randism, Jordan Petersonism, whatever-ism) *into* Nietzsche. Heidegger catches some of this projective element in his Nietzsche lectures, which he claimed as the stage for the 'resistance' he offered to Nazism from within university teaching.²² Despite his claims to have resisted (Nazism by teaching Nietzsche), Heidegger was a member of the Nazi Party, and if what one wants from an ethics is that it pre-empt Nazism, Heidegger presents a singularly lost cause. For not only is it claimed that he does not have an ethics, but it is claimed that his thought is 'tainted' and should be junked.

In addition, there is also the patent division of philosophical disciplinary concern, just to use Kant's questions to mark those divisions. If Heidegger's question is, as we know, the Being question, that is, the question of the ontological difference as opposed

to the more traditionally ontic question of beings as such, as first presented in *Being and Time* and again outlined at the outset of his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger's concerns are epistemological: Do we know what we mean by what we take to be Being? Yet the question of knowledge – *What can I know?* – seems to lack the same urgency in the hierarchy of Kantian questions: *What must I do?* *What can I hope for?* If Heidegger seems to address the last question in his own later writings, explicitly in the *Der Spiegel* 'Interview', with the appeal to an as yet unspecified deity, his word, *Nur ein Gott*, only a God, has an unnerving singularity about it in our very monotheistic era. 'Two thousand years', Nietzsche rues drily, 'and not a single new god.'²³

'When are you going to write an ethics?'

Alasdair MacIntyre remarked that certain moral elements seem well compatible with Nazism. For MacIntyre, these moral elements are presupposed as part of the project of moral re-education, and this would be what is involved with de-Nazification and any moral rehabilitation just to the degree to which it presupposes 'something on which to build'.²⁴ Yet to ask whether Heidegger, *qua* Nazi, might have been capable of rehabilitation – and, as noted above, in historical matter of fact, Heidegger was judged as having required a suspension of his right to teach at the university level for such a length of time "(this juridical detail would not have been lost on Jaspers) that could only take Heidegger past the time of expecting any ultimate teaching rehabilitation to matter past the official time for his retirement – is not so much the issue here. Beaufret's leading question – how to restore meaning to the word 'humanism', the sense that makes the language of humanism a vapour in the gas fields of the First World War, extinguishes its sense along with the incomprehensible inhumanity of the gas chambers of the Second World War, lost in fire-bombings and, above all perhaps, in the impact of two hydrogen bombs, all of which we are still far from understanding, transpiring in a span of less than half a century. Replying, Heidegger also undertook to answer Beaufret's implicit question regarding the putative lack of ethics in his philosophy as in his person by putting Beaufret's question into a student's mouth: 'Soon after *Being and Time* appeared a young friend asked me, "When are you going to write an ethics?"'²⁵ Heidegger's reply suggests that an ethics was always already at hand in his work, reflecting that 'the tragedies of Sophocles – provided such a comparison is at all permissible – preserve the *ethos* in their sagas more primordially than Aristotle's lectures on "Ethics"'.²⁶ In this way, Heidegger immediately goes on to refer to his concern with building, dwelling, and thinking: themes that increasingly occupied him, by no means accidentally in tandem with the housing crisis in a devastated post-war Germany – we recall, as Americans sometimes are fond of saying, with no little pride, that cities were *flattened* – citing Heraclitus, 'ἦθος ἀνθρώπου δαίμων'. For Heidegger, retranslating the routine rendering, it can be observed that for the Greek, the word *ethos* 'signifies dwelling, place of habitation' (115), and consequently these three words are more attentively rendered: 'Man dwells insofar as he is human, in the nearness of god' (233/351). In Heidegger's essay on the *Anaximander Fragment* (which should, I submit, be read together with Nietzsche's reflections on Anaximander),²⁷

Heidegger's reference is to 'the reck corresponding to *δίκη*, order'.²⁸ By conservatively rendering το κρεών as 'der Brauch', such a usage corresponds to the ethical, meaning: 'To hand something over to its own essence and to keep it in hand, preserving it as something present'.²⁹

The reflection on humanism after the war foregrounded and perhaps had to foreground the inhuman. The post-war challenge was not analogous to today's discussions of transhumanism, posthumanism as these are literally imaginary stipulations of humanity as having arrived at some numeric condition denoted as 2.0 in which anxieties and phantoms remain nevertheless 'real' or efficacious enough, considering the eagerness of our self-projections into our own devices, via social media, via texting on cell phones and the whole of social relatedness engendered thereby (important for students: Are you on the right app? Can you be found on Tinder? Instagram? All these are vapours – and that is the good point of Snapchat: but we have taken up residence in such vapours).³⁰ The post-war debate on humanism included existentialism in France but also Jaspers' *Existenzphilosophie* as well as the Frankfurt School and even, in the person of Bertrand Russell, analytic philosophy, and so cut across the usual schools of philosophy as immediate and urgent, given the patent failure of humanism and the heightened challenge to any possible theodicy that might come forth (the current resurgence of theological issues in philosophy is related to this) along with the spectres, in Heidegger's terms, of *nihilism* and, as the Frankfurt School emphasized it, alas via the enduring literary criticism of Lukács as Habermas inhaled the language and the imperative, of *irrationalism*.

For Heidegger, what would be problematic – this is already evident in his Nietzsche lectures delivered during the war – is neither our nihilism nor our irrationalism but, and much rather, *our humanism* just as this stands and falls with us, as Heidegger famously quotes his friend, the physicist Werner Heisenberg, that 'it seems to us as if the human being encounters only himself everywhere'.³¹ For Heidegger, per contra, the danger was the growing absence of the human from what Heidegger elsewhere details as the quadrate: earth and sky, mortal and divine. We are far from hearing the point Heidegger endeavours to make regarding the 'danger' and thereby regarding the insurgence of the human in *The Question Concerning Technology*. To this day our ethical theories remains ineluctably absorbed with the question of human 'dignity' as of human 'value', thus ineluctably humanistic, anthropocentric. Like nationalism and subjectivism, humanism would seem to be the problem. We get in our own philosophical way, blocking our insight into the question of what we should and, mostly to be sure, what we should not do. In articulating the question of what is to be done in this way, I follow Nietzsche with regard to the concern for any ethical way of dwelling on this earth that might come forth, that might be possible. I use Kantian language to underscore that the question of the human may be heard in Kantian terms, not via anthropology but today's very basic discussions of human values. Kant's term is dignity, *Würde*, which Kant defined as value beyond or apart from price. Taking his cue from Nietzsche-Kant once again, Heidegger's reflection in response underlines that every distinction of value is itself a kind of valuing.³²

Heidegger draws his insight from a meditation on value, continuing Nietzsche's mocking invocation of our dedication to 'shopkeeper's gold'³³ as Nietzsche had argued that

this is the heart of the idealization of the 'higher gold of the spirit'.³⁴ For Nietzsche, the good Christian, even the saint, seeks his reward, in effect: to be 'well-paid'.³⁵ In Heidegger's encapsulation,

precisely through the characterization of something as 'a value' what is so valued is robbed of its worth. That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value what is valued is admitted only as an object for human estimation. But what a thing is in its Being is not exhausted by its being an object, particularly when objectivity takes the form of value. Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings: be. Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid – solely as the objects of its doing.³⁶

Ethics and solicitude

Key to Heidegger's reflections on humanism, apart from his recommendation that one take a step back before Aristotle, invoking both the tragic poets, like Sophocles, and the tragic philosophers, like Heraclitus and Anaximander, was the intimation that an ethics could already be found in *Being and Time*, a text he repeatedly asserted had not been understood. There is no shortage of scholars who have dismissed Heidegger's claim that *Being and Time* had not been understood. In fact, the great majority of Heidegger scholars dispute only which interpretation one might best follow, beyond, say, Dreyfus (and this is a name *pars pro toto* for the analytic readings which currently dominate). There are now turf disputes, most loudly claimed by Tom Sheehan. Yet given all the handbooks written on *Being and Time*, surely this book is known and understood all the way down to elaborations of the unwritten bits: hence a number of articles and books over the years purport to finish it. Despite the conventionality of repeating that Heidegger lacks an ethics, there are also a number of contributions including Heideggerian 'care ethics,' which arguably tend to combine an analytic philosophical enterprise with Heideggerian concerns.

One of the first efforts to consider a Heideggerian ethics of care appears in Michael Theunissen's magisterial study of *The Other*,³⁷ a book surprisingly little received by scholars. Care, in a Heideggerian modality, also appears more generically in nursing and in connection with the separate tradition of care ethics in Jean Watson in 1985, and fifteen years later John Paley's article on the same topic was featured in the inaugural issue of *Nursing Philosophy*.³⁸ Paley's own philosophical formation is Anglophone analytic, and an analytic formation handicaps any scholarly reading of Heidegger, a detail which has yet to hinder such readings. Engaging exclusively analytically oriented Heideggerian scholars like Mulhall, Olafson, and Guignon, Paley can write, contra Heidegger himself as we have just cited him above, that 'there is no ethical theory in *Being and Time*', just because, as Paley writes, 'Heidegger was not particularly interested in ethics'.³⁹ In this sense, any effort to deduce any kind of ethics, particularly an ethics of care, fails to elaborate a practical or applied ethics, particularly 'any form of ethics nurses would find congenial'.⁴⁰ The last point seems self-confirming whereby addressing the applied aspect of any applied ethics, from business ethics to medical ethics, must

exclude attention to Heidegger's own meaning in favour of what are thus designated as 'congenial' readings of Heidegger.⁴¹ The consequence of such a tactical approach, excluding what Heidegger might, in spite of any inconvenience or 'uncongeniality', otherwise have to offer nursing and other concerns that might profit from conjoining Heidegger and ethics, sacrifices an important resource (his text) and arguably throws the baby out with the bathwater.

By contrast, I consider Heidegger's suggestion in his *Letter on Humanism* that he had 'already' offered an ethics by taking another look at *Being and Time*. The discussion of Dasein as care concerns what one might name the Heideggerian human condition.⁴² This description fits Heidegger's discussion of fallenness, publicness, anxiety ('real' and not), ambiguity, and, even more than idle talk and being-in, the very worldliness of the world, *qua* surround, *qua* our around: with-which, and the sheer regionality of our environs including day to night and the seasons of the year and of life, as the context of the with-which of equipmentality, *qua* ready-to-hand as juxtaposed to present-at-hand, as this later forms the basis for Heidegger's post-war articulation of his question concerning technology, an articulation addressed not to professors of philosophy but to businessmen, and perforce a practical, applied, and, irrecusably, ethical discussion.⁴³ Heidegger argues that the project of *Being and Time*, that is, inquiring after 'the question of the meaning of being', had required, owing to the ontological significance of Dasein, 'that one be able to answer the guiding question of the Being of the totality of Dasein's structural whole,'⁴⁴ and thereby required an attention to the phenomenon of anxiety, in the context of 'existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen' (§41, 191).

Heidegger thus reprises his point of departure, restating Dasein's singular ontological excellence: 'Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue' (§41, 192). Recalling his discussion of 'understanding as self-projective Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being' (ibid.), Heidegger rearticulates the Augustinian insight that drives every phenomenological analysis: 'Ontologically, Being towards one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being means that in each case, Dasein is already ahead of itself in its Being' (ibid.). In this 'ahead of itself', as Heidegger notes at once, 'Dasein is always "beyond itself"', an intentional directionality which Heidegger immediately distinguishes from a relation to 'other entities which it is *not*, but as Being towards the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself' (ibid.). For Heidegger, there is no way to think Dasein solipsistically, autistically we might say, as if this were or could be a solitary self solely concerned with itself. Thus, 'Even Dasein's Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing only in and for a Being-with' (BT 1.4. §26, 120). In this most intimate sense and from the start and throughout, one is 'with' others, *qua* Being-with which Heidegger qualifies as having an 'existential-ontological meaning' (1.4. §26, 120) and which he had already clarified by saying – and this is key – 'from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself' (§26, 118). In this sense (and thus I began with a reference to the political), Heidegger's ethics is always also a politics, as is also patent in Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics*. For Heidegger, 'The world of Dasein is a with-world [*Mitwelt*]. Being-in is Being-with-Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [*Mittdasein*]' (ibid.).

It is on the basis of this analysis of how we find ourselves among the others that we encounter in the world that Heidegger refers to his earlier tool analysis which already

echoes the distinction Kant had made between beings that are for us (or mere means) and those that are, like ourselves as Kant always emphasized, ends in themselves. As beings that 'are themselves Dasein', Heidegger argues that these 'entities are not objects of concern, but rather of solicitude' (§26, 121). The word Heidegger uses here is *Fürsorge*, and what makes this relevant as an ethics of assistance/solicitude is how Heidegger unpacks this in the world of care [*Sorge*], that is, again, the world of our preoccupations or concerns with a wide variety of involvements and projects, all so very many garden variety ontic matters. But *Fürsorge*, assistance/solicitude, concerns and is always directed towards others. As these others, *Mitdasein* are together-with-us in our common with-world. As Heidegger defines it, in its 'positive modes, solicitude has two extreme possibilities. It can, as it were, take "care" away from the Other and put itself in his position in concern: it can leap in for him' (§26, 122). This quote should at once catch our attention, for it makes it quite clear that 'the Other' is, like ourselves, Dasein in every sense, including authenticity/inauthenticity, expressed in our empathic engagement with the Other (wherein solicitude takes over for the other). For Heidegger, the ideal here is not 'to substitute for the other and relieve him of his "cares" but to restore them to him authentically' (ibid.).

If there is a great deal to say about authenticity in this context (and if a great deal has already been said about this in the literature both explicative and critical), what is important to note is not only that for Heidegger 'authenticity' – the holy grail of Heideggerians – is not a given but we are, most of the time and in the most intimate, heartfelt of ways, inauthentic: 'Dasein is not itself.' (§25, 116) Ontico-ontologically, authenticity is, as Heidegger takes care to remind us, a mode of inauthenticity.

Heidegger begins his general discussion of solicitude by noting that it includes basic 'preoccupations' such as 'with food and clothing and the nursing of the sick body' (§26, 121), and by emphasizing that most of these concerns are dispensed with in the most intimate ways and, most of the time, negatively, deficiently – Nietzsche would say, sheerly or merely reactively (ignoring something is also a reaction). The predominance of such negative modes of solicitude foregrounds in turn the social requirement of alleviating (and also routinely dis-attending to) human needs. Thus, for Heidegger, 'welfare work' or 'social assistance', which also happens to be named *Fürsorge* as he mentions (and there is a parallel with the technical force of Heidegger's use of the term *Fürsorge* and the everyday, mechanical or automatic sense in which we speak of such 'caring' or 'solicitude'), has to be set up precisely as an institution. This is so because, in parallel with Heidegger's emphasis on the predominant modality of inauthenticity, 'Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part in the deficient modes of solicitude' (ibid.). Just as Heidegger does not mean to claim inauthenticity as reprehensible but only as the basic way of, so to say, being oneself, so too he more or less straightforwardly defines 'Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not "mattering" to one another – these are possible ways of solicitude' (ibid.). For Heidegger, such 'modes as cited in the last instance, of deficient and indifferent modes ... characterize everyday, average Being-with-one-another' (ibid.).

This deficient modality does not permit us to draw the conclusion that we have here to do either with 'the mere Being-present-at-hand of several subjects' or indeed simply to 'assume that others are merely present at hand' (ibid.). Already in advance,

and already and without introduction, we find ourselves without excuse. This insight Sartre and de Beauvoir appropriate from Heidegger, and as we know it, it becomes for Beauvoir the basis of what she calls an ethics of ambiguity, as both our freedom and our responsibility to others are co-founded. We already know the others we encounter as *Mitdasein*, as part of our own with-world, *Mitwelt*, and hence we are, as Cain was, already-responsible. But we can discharge that responsibility either expeditiously, taking it over, or we can free the other to his own projects, his own authentic potentiality for being. The first mode, determinative in large part, as Heidegger says, of our Being with one another (cf. §26, 121) allows us to treat others as for the most part we treat things, as mere means, and certainly not as ends in themselves, but the way we might treat supposed 'friends' on Facebook, and the new designation of friends (echoing the parlance of Twitter) as one's 'followers', as ready-to-hand.

As an instantiation of this, consider the affective difference, to use a social media illustration, between being 'unfriended' on social media and being 'unfollowed'. It matters, so I would submit, that there is a website *who unfollowed me* but no app to track how many friends lost on Facebook for the good ontic reason that most of one's supposed friends are not in fact friends – and Facebook can allow one (shades of real life) to affect the appearance of friendship while shutting off notifications, such that only older folk using Facebook need ever unfriend anyone in order not to see their posts. By contrast, one's 'followers' – here Twitter is far more intimate – give consent to have one's tweets show up in their Twitter feed, that is, on their phones, in their pockets. Very ready-to-hand. Lady Gaga has some million followers, or so it is bruited about, which is the point of Twitter. Following is non-reciprocal by definition. I may follow you, you need not follow me, and vice versa.

Aristotle had already analysed human interaction in his *Nicomachean Ethics* in similar terms: friends, for the most part, are useful, more rarely and then only in one's innocent youth, decreasing as one gets older, are they friendships of pleasure, sheer delights to us. Thus taking pleasure in one's friend is a matter of youth and it is changeable depending on our own disposition. Apart from utility, friendship in general is rare enough, that as Nietzsche emphasized, following Montaigne, following the logic (that is to say not the letter but the spirit) of Aristotle's distinction between kinds and heights of friendship, one might say, *O friends, there are no friends*.⁴⁵ The ethical point here is not the lamentation of the lack of 'true' or 'good' friends. For Aristotle, as we know, to have a good friend requires that one be good, an excellent or even perfect human being – that is, that one be without excesses, without deficiencies, simply perfect. That is such a tall order that philosophers, beginning with Aristotle himself, make just this ideal, in its sheer unrealizable ideality, the ideal point from the ideal start. It is in this sense that ethics is a modal noun. We have to do in practical philosophy with what we *should* do, with how we should act, and that is to say with ideals that tend to remain unattained. Reflecting in 1870 on freedom of the will and the seeming of appearances, Nietzsche writes: 'We shall always behave as we are and never as we ought to be.'

In what follows, I argue that we may, however, speak of an ethics of authenticity, not in the popular sense of authenticity (this would be one aspect of Nietzsche's point above) as being true to oneself, one's real self, or following one's bliss, and not as the Ayn Randian ideal of self-affirmation or -aggrandizement which is often the only thing one takes out of Nietzsche's critique (or genealogy) of morals and his animadversion

contra pity. The problem of solicitude is not wholly with caring for another person in terms of their cares and concerns, but the positive *and* the negative or deficient expressions of such caring. Thus, the problem in the first extreme modality is an appropriated and thereby *negatived* positive solicitude insofar as it takes 'care' over and thus away from the Other, is that one, thereby as Heidegger emphasizes, 'takes over for the Other that with which he is to concern himself'. This is fatal, for Heidegger, and we should not miss the Kantian element here, because it illustrates that for the most part and often *at best*, our involvement with Others is ordered as, that is, merely subordinated to, our concern with the ready-to-hand. There is a project that needs doing, the one charged with doing it is inefficient or limited or what have you, and thus one takes over on the other's behalf, for his or her sake. Someone needs something and one supplies that something for that other. Homeless families are homeless and hungry, social services in New York City (for a proximate example) devises a system of feeding and housing them that requires them to become adjuncts to the public social help system, filling out forms, again and again, meeting with public social workers, again and again, and sleeping, every night, so that they do not acquire permanent residence, in a different residence, because the day must be spent applying for assistance and travelling to sites seemingly as far flung as possible from one another. It is as if one sought to devise techniques to keep them as occupied as possible, and in the most impoverishing way possible. One lived definition of poverty is the sheer amount of time spent on a daily and nightly basis on public transportation, with the logical extreme, hardly limited to New York, of those who make the subway cars themselves their home – but even there they are not spared the task of constantly changing trains and fleeing police. Here what is at stake appears to be little more than a matter of expedience. Feed the hungry, but make them pay for it, either by the sheer task of applying for food stamps or by enduring the religious pieties and time demands of the same at the YMCA or the Salvation Army (there is a sense that the poor are also insufficiently occupied, so efforts to help them often entail consuming or occupying their time).⁴⁶

Bracketing New York City's deficient modes of dealing with the poor and the homeless, for now, what is at issue in *Being and Time* is authenticity. *Qua* ethics of authenticity, the authenticity in question, the ownedness in question, is not only one's own ownedness but that of the Other. Thus, Heidegger considers the contrasting 'possibility of a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for the Other as *leap ahead* of him [*ihm vorausspringt*]' in his existentiell potentiality for Being, not in order to take away his "care" but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time' (ibid.). At this juncture it is common to imagine that what Heidegger refers to – certainly every college professor teaching Heidegger's *Being and Time* seems to have had recourse to such examples – is the care the mother of a young child might take to allow the child to work things out for themselves as opposed to taking over for them, be it finishing a school assignment or what not. The tying of shoelaces tends to loom large in such illustrations.⁴⁷

If Heidegger had been as convivial a mind as Jean Piaget,⁴⁸ one might emphasize the autobiographical detail, as others have, that beyond such a mother's concern for very young, that is, shoe-tying children, Heidegger's sons would have been, at the respective

ages of eight (Jörg) and seven (Hermann), recipients of their father's solicitude. In addition, as professor extraordinarius in Marburg, as Heidegger was at the time of the writing of *Being and Time*, Heidegger as teacher would also have had to have been solicitously engaged with each student, no matter whether we know their names or not, in ways differentially specific for each one.⁴⁹ Thus, Heidegger's words to Arendt, '*Denken is ein einsames Geschäft*' as Arendt recorded this (she would also write 'There is a teacher, it is perhaps possible that one can learn to think'), as Margarethe von Trotta's film *Hannah Arendt* emphasizes it for us in the film's fleeting vignette of the young Heidegger and the young Arendt, would not necessarily speak to Gadamer or other students and it may not speak to us, his readers. Nor does the engagement between teacher and student need to involve a word. It can be a matter of example, what Nietzsche called an exemplar; it can be a positive action – arranging a job is the fantasy ideal of a positive effort here⁵⁰ – and perhaps it is most often negative or lacking.

Wim Wenders' film, *Himmel über Berlin* (Wings of Desire), gives another illustration of Heideggerian solicitude. The film begins with Peter Handke's meditation on the child as child, written out on screen, and spoken in the charming conceit of the childish (*qua* adult's meditation on being a child, *Vom Kindsein*) in sing-song fashion by Bruno Ganz: '*Als das Kind Kind war*'.⁵¹ As filmic poesy, the film plays upon and with filmic poetic device after filmic poetic device: two angels, Cassiel and Daniel (the lead or hero angel, played by Ganz), the veritable Berlin angel itself, and the notion that the innocent eyes of children can see angels, as well as Rilke's *Duino* angels, allusions to which also run throughout the film. Significantly, for me, the film offers several Heideggerian moments of solicitude, one of which refers to a child, shades of the classroom example, tying his shoes with great concentration, to which Ganz's Daniel observes, '*Ein doppelter Knoten ist das einzige, was hält*' (a double knot is the only thing that holds). The recognition here is not only of the achievement of tying one's shoes on one's own but of circumspection, the insight into the demands of the environment, shoe leather and laces, weather, the stress of one's feet, flexing over different situations, and, the key thing for Heidegger when it comes to care and especially to solicitude, time. Thus Peter Falk, who plays the once fallen angel, has a visible-invisible exchange with Daniel – 'I can't see you, but I know that you are there' – and speaks to the angelic presence of embodiment, not just technical things like knots but tangible intangibles like rubbing one's hands together to warm them in the cold, like drinking a cup of coffee from a kiosk on the street. When Daniel gives up the wings of his eternity for mortal desire and time, he looks for Falk who is, of course, on the set making a movie. Daniel, newly incarnate, encounters limits for the first time and cannot get through the gate, but he shouts and waves to Falk, who sees him and comes over to shake his hand through the fence. Falk then offers money. Daniel responds that he has some. 'The armor?' Falk asks, 'How much did you get for it?' Hesitantly, Daniel replies: '200 Marks?' Falk laughs. 'You got robbed. It happens.' Passing his cigarette to Daniel who takes it with pleasure, Falk turns away, waving goodbye. But Daniel calls after him; he wants to know everything, but Falk laughs again: 'You have to find it out all by yourself. That's the beauty of it!'

For Wenders, these angelic discoveries are of the human condition and the wings that mortal love, more accurately erotic desire, gives to our soul (Wenders knew his

Plato), but for Heidegger we always act in this way whether negatively or positively in our solicitous regard for the other. We may ignore the other, we may find ourselves too preoccupied with our own troubles or cares to notice them, or we can be attentively circumspect in our regard for the other and for his or her own projects or possibilities in his or her world. In either case, no matter whether negatively or positively, so Heidegger maintains, we always have to do with a world in which we are with others precisely like ourselves, sharing the same condition as *Dasein*, as *Mitdasein* and whom we encounter peripheral to and in the midst of and sometimes *in the way of* our own concerns and projects. For the most part, and for good reason, solicitude is expressed negatively. It is positive solicitude when we engage others and allow them to appropriate their own possibilities as their own, but even in such explicitly positive modes there are two modalities and hence two kinds of positive solicitude for Heidegger: 'Everyday Being-with-one-another maintains itself between the two extremes of positive solicitude – that which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps forth and liberates [*vorspringend-befreienden*]' (ibid.). In other words, in its positive modality at, solicitude can free the other to and for themselves, in the classical spirit that Pindar celebrated – 'become the one you are' – or and this is by far more common: positively appropriate/alleviate the other's project or task on his or her behalf. It is here that the shoelace example is misleading. The point is not that it is an oversimplification, though it is, but rather that what such a letting-be frees the child *for* is exactly not his or her own *Dasein* or 'having' to be. Heidegger has more in mind.

As opposed to a leaping-in, *vorausspringen* allows the other to fulfil his own tasks, an 'assist', concernfully considered such that the other is brought to his or her freedom for his or her own sake, as Heidegger says 'in his *existentiell* potentiality for Being, not in order to take away his "care" but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time' (§26, 122). What is at stake is more than the niceties of knots (double knots just where one must be sure of them), but it can be about a cup of coffee or tea or a cigarette (think of Daniel and Falk) or a word of human connection and so on. The concernful solicitude of which Heidegger speaks is one that looks (or more commonly that fails to look) to the other. In its positive fulfilment, that is, when it is ventured (mere meaning to be helpful is not enough for Heidegger precisely as, and this parallel is quite instructive, it was not enough for Nietzsche and irrelevant for Kant), that is, when one concernfully brings the other towards his or her own utmost potentiality for being, just where one has a potential involvement with the other and where one's involvement has the potential to make a difference for the other's possibility. More than shoelaces are at stake and more than a mother's loving forbearance: letting a child fumble with his own shoelaces as opposed to the simple intervention whereby 'he no longer has to concern himself with anything' (122). And yet and even then, as Kant already pointed out in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysical Foundations of Morals*, separating one's selfish self-investment in one's sense of oneself as aiding others from the help afforded others for their own sake is hard to do.

This same ethics of concern-for or *assistance* – and note that 'assistance' as a translation of *Fürsorge* emphasizes its relatedness where 'solicitude' foregrounds the essentially hermeneutic dimensionality of *Fürsorge* such that it is less a matter of choosing for a better or a worse translation than it is a matter of attending to *Fürsorge*

as itself as an exemplification of relational hermeneutics – may also illuminate Nietzsche's complicated and ethically challenging dismissal of pity. For Nietzsche, pity requires nothing of the one who pities but pity and offers nothing but pity to the pitied. In English some commentators thus opt to reflect on what they argue to be a more relationally sensitive translation of *Mitleid* using the word compassion, a Latinate English word, feeling with, which could also translate *Fürsorge*.

But it is pity that is at issue, as it is pity that can elicit compassion as compassion has already involved us with the other for whom we feel. It is pity, not compassion, that is problematic. Nothing for nothing, the exchange proffered in pity, whereby the other claims our pity and we in turn pity the other, is productive nonetheless. The valuation of nothing is the engine of what Nietzsche calls the genealogy of morals, and it is, as he says, what makes humanity interesting for the first time. In the process, pity makes the pitier feel superior while being at the same time irresistibly seductive for the one pitied because – this is Nietzsche's most Hegelian moment – it recognizes and confirms the one pitied in what he or she takes himself to be in relation to others. As Nietzsche's Zarathustra asks in third section before the end of the second book of *Also sprach Zarathustra*, entitled (Nietzsche uses no numbers in Zarathustra) *Von der Erlösung* – almost as if it were related in advance to Heidegger's distinction between leaping-in and leaping-ahead – what is the humpback without his hump? Nietzsche has his Zarathustra put the question and the answer in the people's mouth: '*Wenn man dem Bucklichten seinen Buckel nimmt, so nimmt man ihm seinen Geist – also lehrt das Volk.*' In the same section, Nietzsche's Zarathustra poses the question Heidegger himself makes his own, if Nietzsche also sets this question in relation to the people, '*wer ist uns Zarathustra? Wie soll er uns heißen?*' – 'who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?' In Zarathustra's mouth the question is posed with respect to the bodily lacking, the deficient or crippled precisely as occasions for pity which Zarathustra turns around to the ones highly esteemed for the magnification and exaggerations that commonly characterize the supposed great men among the common run of humanity – the example is of a man regarded by the folk as a 'genius' but who is nothing but a giant ear with a wisp of a tiny stem of a body attached thereto, and this exaggeration pains Zarathustra who connects both the cripple, in the eyes of the people, and the genius of the popular crowd-mind's esteem, in his search for a complete human being:

Verily my friends, I wander among humanity as if amidst broken bits and appendages. In my eye this is the most fearsome, that I find humanity shattered and strewn as if across a field of battle and slaughter. And if my eye flees from now to former ages: it finds ever the same: broken bits and appendages and dreadful accident – yet no humanity! Now and in former ages on the earth. (Z II, *Concerning Redemption*)

The parallel to the gospel here is clear and not least for this reason has abundant commentary been dedicated to this parallel. Significantly, Zarathustra does not distance himself from this insight, but declares himself part of all and all, rather like Angelus Silesius, who also intrigued Heidegger: 'A seer, a willer, a creator,

a future itself and a bridge to the future – and ah, at the same time, also a cripple on this bridge: all that is Zarathustra.’ (ibid).

Reactive to this same extent, and in order to demonstrate one’s condition to others, the injured or handicapped person can be inclined to bend into that condition, thereby taking care to ensure that others do not miss it. One feels fatigued: even the teenager slouches to show this fatigue to themselves and to their teachers and parents, or one feels the growing weight of age as one gets older and slumps one’s shoulders into what then becomes all the more permanent. One has a headache, and in order to manifest the pain of this ache to oneself and others, one clutches one’s face or forehead, grimacing and groaning, all the more so when family and friends are around.

Another example of *Fürsorge* may be drawn from sports. The practical terminus I am thinking of is called ‘running interference’, a phrase which is itself not specifically football terminology. But in American football – although soccer and other types of football have clear parallels – when the quarterback has the ball and is running for a goal, rather more is involved than the quarterback’s speed and agility, important as this is. Relative to the other men on the team, quarterbacks tend to be ranged on the small side, thus a good coach, so I am told, will tell the quarterback to ‘lay down’ as soon as he is threatened with interception. To prevent interception, the other players are indispensable, and so too their coordination one with another: anticipating on behalf of the quarterback not only his best course but advancing one another in the joint attainment of that same common project. But if we speak of ‘team work’, the ultimate benefit – and each player feels this viscerally – is to the glory of the quarterback, should he pull it off. The other players, anticipating the moves of the opposing team, taking the hints of the opposing efforts on the part of other players seeking to do the same, advance the quarterback to a goal which works to the benefit of the team as a whole in the context of the game. But – and this is the point of positive *Fürsorge* – in the context of this one sports illustrated moment, the one who comes into his ownmost, utmost possibility as it were, is the quarterback who has thereby been freed through his teammates for just this attainment.

A Heideggerian ethics of solicitude or ‘assistance’ entails that one act for the sake of the other when one has to do with others. But if Kant had reminded us of just how difficult such an action truly is, Irigaray has also emphasized that the ‘question of the other’ remains a question. At issue here is not the question of who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, as Heidegger repeats the popular question, but who is the other? And this is a very old question. The parable of the Good Samaritan, well known and often discussed, illuminates this question in terms of a quite specific hermeneutic of relation. This parable also articulates Heideggerian *Fürsorge*, expressed as a question of what is required of us, what is incumbent on us with respect to others in need of assistance, especially those we do not know:

A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, when he was attacked by robbers. They stripped him of his clothes, beat him and went away, leaving him half dead. A priest happened to be going down the same road, and when he saw the man, he passed by on the other side. So too, a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he traveled,

came where the man was; and when he saw him, he took pity [ἐσπλαγχνίσθη – *misericordia*] on him. He went to him and bandaged his wounds, pouring on oil and wine. Then he put the man on his own donkey, brought him to an inn and took care of him. The next day he took out two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper. 'Look after him,' he said, 'and when I return, I will reimburse you for any extra expense you may have.' (Lk. 10.30-5)

In the citation from Luke given above, I have taken care to include the Greek term, ἐσπλαγχνίσθη, for what is here translated as pity as well as the Latin, *misericordia*. This tracing back through the standard translation already suggests that 'pity', which the famously 'good' Samaritan takes on the man left for dead, is more than what we usually mean by pity. The Greek itself ἐσπλαγχνίσθη refers to the wrenching movement in one's gut (the reference for the Greek term is to the bowel), and thus we are often recommended to translate this as *compassion*.⁵² By contrast with (keeping the *koine* Greek in mind) gut-felt, body wrenching compassion, as Nietzsche reminds us, pity requires no more than feeling sorry for someone, ourselves included. Pity is thus utterly compatible with the behaviour of both priest and Levite, both of whom, even as they physically went out of their way to avoid the man in the ditch, may well have felt sorry for him. Only the Samaritan, however, stopped his own journey and took the time to attend, himself, to the beaten man's wounds, and then personally took the man, interrupting his own concerns and using his own means to do so, to an inn to recover. At the inn, the Samaritan undertook to assign the task of concern for the injured man to one whose remunerated profession it is (*qua* innkeeper) to offer solicitude to strangers. But, and this is key, we speak of the Samaritan as 'good' not only in distinction from the kind of Jew other Jews ordinarily think less of, but also because he did not leave it at that, but in circumspect consideration, gave his assurance, this is a temporal encumbrance, to follow up on the care specifically contracted, saying that he would return to cover any further expense.

In this sense, positive solicitude in its positive mode entails doing whatever is needed for the sake of the other, even where it takes one out of one's own concerns and out of one's way to do so, and time is key to this. Thus, what is at stake is an involvement in care – for the other's cares – and what is important is the perspicacity of this care, a sense of all that it involves: *Fürsorge*. This can be effected also positively by negating the extent of the involvement; this is leaping-in for the other where the time of involvement, one's own time, is minimized. In the case of someone at the edge, one at the edge of being, as we fancifully say, 'past all cares', such a chance to quickly offer assistance is often not an available option. In this case – that of the Good Samaritan – others who usually do step up to the plate (the priest, the Levite) see that here there is an extreme situation and go out of their way not to be involved in what, as they anticipate this very clearly, cannot turn out well. The man robbed and beaten within an inch of his life now has no goods, no horse, nothing. The Samaritan who 'saves' this beaten and abandoned other frees this other for his now precisely encumbered worldly cares. Robbed of all resources, those troubles would have been immense. It is to those concerns and troubles of living to which the Samaritan 'restores him', as Heidegger puts it, 'authentically as such for the first time'.

Yet if the reading offered above, with the illustrations lent from a poetic film fantasy, the sports illustration, and ultimately the example of the Good Samaritan's solicitude,

Kant's reflection, *to help where one can*, also outlines what is required of us in each case. What Heidegger brings to Kant details the obligation still binding on us, in what he calls negative or deficient *Fürsorge*, that is: binding even when we do not otherwise act. For Heidegger, as for Kant, what matters ethically is only what we do as opposed to our personal intentions and as opposed to consequences. What we recognize in Kant is the rule that holds where we do not in fact observe it. If Kant is at pains to argue that he is not merely advocating the golden rule, his categorical imperative is a test that permits us to evaluate our own maxim with respect to its generalizable suitability as universal law, even to the point of disallowing the option of inaction, or compulsion, as a law of nature. Thus, we noted above that the routine focus of philosophical ethics (apart from but sometimes even in virtue ethics) tends to be a focus on the actions of others. By means of ethics, we tell others, quite as Schopenhauer liked to say, what *they* ought to do. Heidegger, by contrast, advances a tragic Sophoclean or Heraclitean ethics, just as he argues in his *Letter on Humanism*. A Sophoclean ethics has to do with one's character, which is not a matter of Aristotelian habit but thrownness into already given circumstances and dispositions. Such a tragic ethics always involves others, as Antigone knew, to the extent that one already knows not only one's own project but its disposition to the other's project as well, and therefore includes a circumspect awareness not only of one's ownmost possibilities but of the other, even, as the example of Antigone again makes clear, in the case of death, as the possibility of impossibility for all time. This is not, as in the case of the Good Samaritan, a matter of reading the other's mind or of knowing better than the other would what would be good for the other. For in the limit case of the burial of one's brother, one does for the sake of eternity for the other and for all time what condemns one to the loss of all time, losing thereby one's life possibilities. In the case of the man beaten and left for dead, the ministrations of the Good Samaritan serve to restore the victim to his life, meaning to troubles he had very nearly left behind. These are not different cases, except to the extent that the other – the unburied brother, the man at the edge of death – makes different claims. In the case of Antigone, her claim is shared by the one person who refused it, for the sake of her own life possibilities, Ismene. Ismene 'chooses life' in that she asks what one can do as a woman and what can be required of a woman to do. Antigone looks to eternity for her brother's sake, conscious of sharing with her brother, in the order of time, here and now, what Heidegger emphasizes as Hegel's *hic et nunc*, but also in the fullness of time in the light of the same eternity to which her brother remains otherwise exposed, in what Nietzsche later articulates as a 'brotherhood of death.'

There are many kinds of circumspect attention to what is around us that do not involve men beaten by robbers and left for dead, or brothers slain and condemned to be left to the destitution of time, including the everyday others in the everyday world that is always with us. One might in a busy intersection notice someone moving more slowly than others in dangerous conditions, and this notice need not mean that one rushes to their side, just to the extent that there are many ways of running interference and hence of solicitude. Teachers and friends have still other possibilities to look out for those related to them and in their charge, on the street, among strangers, *asterisked*, in Agamben's linguistic distinguishing, and claiming our response. Given our shared human condition, when we pass a needy person – and in these days of austerity there

is no urban environment where we are not presented with such needs – our most common response is the non-response. What Heidegger calls (negative) solicitude is a mode of care to be sure, as he also explains, as we carefully look away (this is only one mode of negative *Fürsorge*). We may justify our inattention by assuming that social help or other assistance will attend to this, as Heidegger says. Such organized assistance corresponds to the ‘caregiving’ industry, as these industries exist for the benefit of a profession. Alternatively, we judge that the needy person is likely themselves to blame and ‘ought’ to be left to their own devices (notice that this too is a moral judgement, negative solicitude, as Heidegger describes it). The negative negative modality is another and more extreme deficit that does not simply look away or disattend – to the extent that omission for Heidegger, is already well underway to commission. It can help in this regard to think of Ivan Illich’s (1926–2002) reflection omission, the failure of concern in the parable of the Good Samaritan, not as a breach of rules but mutual relation, one to another, as the (non) response of the priest and the Levite: ‘This denial, infidelity, turning away, coldness is what the New Testament calls sin, something which can only be recognized by the light of this new glimmer of mutuality.’⁵³

In this sense ethics is, as Heidegger says part and parcel of Dasein’s Being: ‘That very potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which Dasein is, has Being-in-itself as its kind of Being. Thus it implies ontologically a relation to entities within-the-world. Care is always concern and solicitude even if only privatively’ (§41, 194). Heidegger emphasizes that what we call ‘empathy’, in an argument parallel to the long-standing ethical debate on altruism, ‘does not first constitute Being-with’ (§26; 125). Instead, Heidegger argues, *Mitsein* is itself already what makes empathy possible. Only on this pregiven basis, as it were, ‘of Being-with does “empathy” become possible: it gets its motivation from the unsociability of the dominant modes of Being-with’ (ibid.). This unsociability, as it were, applies with regard to oneself just as much as it applies with regard to others as Heidegger details in the next section, ‘Everyday-Being-One’s-Self and the “They”’ (§27). For Heidegger, our Being-with Others is always already given or present to us as we make our way in the world. In his prior analysis of the present-at-hand and ready-to-hand of the craftsman (a world he knew well from his father’s workshop), Heidegger observed ‘that along with the equipment to be found when one is at work [in Arbeit], those Others for whom the “work” [“Werk”] is destined are “encountered” too’ (§26, 117). The with-world of this involvement does not require that one be a craftsman or even that one know those who are (as with his example, echoing Plato’s shoemaker example, of judging between suppliers as good or bad), instead he gives the everyday and seemingly innocuous example of walking ‘along the edge of a field; pointing out that we take care as we do so ‘to walk “outside it”, an attentiveness or ‘solicitude’ corresponding to our recognition of the field as it ‘shows itself as belonging to such-and-such a person and decently kept up by him’ (ibid.). Likewise, he gives the more academically universal illustration of ‘the book we have used’ which ‘was brought at So-and-so’s shop and given by such-and-such a person, and so forth’ (ibid.). In an ethico-political example, Heidegger uses the case of a boat ‘anchored at the shore’ (§26, 119) to acknowledge the boat’s signature ‘in its Being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes voyages with it’. Heidegger reflects that ‘even if it is a “boat which is strange to us,” it is still indicative of Others’ (ibid.). The object indicates relation, relatedness; it is for journeying on the sea, it is for, it belongs to, someone. Towards solicitude, that same

ethics also takes into its compass the omnipresence of what Heidegger calls fallenness. Speaking of Being-in-the-world as care, Heidegger emphasizes that Dasein's factual existing is 'a thrown potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world' (§41, 192), as this entails that 'it is always also absorbed in the world of its concern' (ibid.). This presupposes the flight in the face of the uncanny which is always suppressed or 'tranquilized' according to 'the publicness of the "they"' (ibid.).

But it is also clear that the focus on Dasein seems inherently self-oriented, if not selfish: the goal is authenticity, is it not? Dasein is ever mine to be – thus Adorno's joke on the cruelty echoing in *Jemeinigkeit*. This takes Heidegger through a discussion of fear, oriented to the same uncanniness of anxiety that he emphasizes as being annulled or minimized by everyday conventionality. The focus on Dasein would seem to be a focus on the self – for itself, as it were, not Dasein-for-others. Yet the focus of Aristotle's ethics is similarly on the ethical perfection of the individual, which for Aristotle presupposes or takes others as a given, and thus as political, with friendship at its crown, just as Heidegger does being with Others, in a world that is originally a with-world.⁵⁴

Heidegger argues that 'Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one's-Self does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating "I". And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than *Being-in-the-world*? Resoluteness brings the self right into its current concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others' (§60, 298). In this sense, Heidegger's argument parallels Kant; we are with and for one another, and we may not treat those with whom we are in the world, whether in our own person or in that of another, merely as a means but always also as an end. What Heidegger reminds us of is that we always already know that end, and we already know what is asked of us, even as Heidegger also explains the chained and constant mechanism whereby we lose sight of that.⁵⁵

As care ... Dasein has been Determined by facticity and falling. ... Dasein as a they-self, gets 'lived' by the common-sense ambiguity of that publicness in which nobody resolves upon anything but that which has already made its decision. 'Resoluteness' signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the 'they'. ... [But even] resolutions remain dependent upon the they and its world. (§60, 298)

The mutual claim as Illich puts it, the relational focus of Heidegger's 'solicitude' reminds us we are already claimed by and towards and with and for the other and always have been.

Notes

Chapter 1

- 1 Although Karl Jaspers would eventually come to be estranged from Heidegger to some complicated degree, he was one of his closest and oldest friends, and shared parts of Heidegger's intellectual project and trajectory. Indeed, I go so far as to argue that Theodor Adorno's 1964 *Jargon of Authenticity* is directed more to Jaspers than Heidegger himself. I discuss this in part in Babette Babich, 'Adorno on Genocide', in *Adorno and the Concept of Genocide*, eds. Ryan Crawford and Erik M. Vogt (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2014). I focus on Heidegger and Jaspers in Babette Babich, 'Jaspers, Heidegger, and Arendt: On Politics, Science, and Communication', in *Existence* 4, no. 1 (2009): 1–19. For one overview of relevant primary sources, see Bernd Martin, ed., *Martin Heidegger und das 'Dritte Reich': ein Kompendium* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftlich Buchgesellschaft, 1989).
- 2 Some enterprising scholars have 'imagined' what a transcript of Heidegger's deposition before this 'rehabilitation' commission held on 23 July 1945 might have looked like and have published their work in Heidegger's name as if they were translators in 'Heidegger on the Art of Teaching', in *Heidegger, Education, and Modernity*, trans. Valerie Allen and Aris D. Axiotis in eds. Michael A. Peters and Valerie Allen (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 27–45. I thank Miles Groth and Matthew James Kruger-Ross for engaging this question. See too Heidegger, 'The Self-Assertion of the German University and The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts', Karsten Harries, ed., *Review of Metaphysics* 38, no. 3 (March 1985): 467–81. The original Rectoratsrede, which likewise focused on education, was originally published as *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität Rede, gehalten bei der feierlichen Übernahme des Rektorats der Universität Freiburg i Br. am 27. 5. 1933* (Breslau: Korn Verlag, 1933). I take this up in the context of a discussion of Heideggerian questioning and pedagogy (and including further references) in Babette Babich, 'Towards Questioning: On Heidegger and Education', in *Encyclopedia of Education*, ed. Michael Peters (Frankfurt am Main: Springer, 2016), pp. 18–26. The topic of Heidegger's reflections on education in this particular context has been discussed by several authors. I recommend reading in addition to those who focus on Heidegger and the German condition of de-Nazification, Holger Zaborowsky, *Eine Frage von Irre und Schuld?: Martin Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2010).
- 3 In Günther Figal, *Einführung. Heidegger Lesebuch* (Frankfurt am Main: Klosterman, 2006), p. 38.
- 4 William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 678–9.
- 5 Heidegger had taken over to replace Wilhelm von Möllendorf who was eliminated after two weeks as ineligible as ineligible on technical grounds as a social democrat.
- 6 Hannah Arendt, 'Heidegger at Eighty', in *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 293–303.

- 7 See Guido Schneeberger, *Nachlese zu Heidegger Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken* (Bern: Franke, 1962). See for a general overview, Rüdiger Safranski's *Martin Heidegger Between Good and Evil*, trans. E. Osers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) and Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life*, trans. A. Blunden (New York: Basic Books, 1993) as well as Ernst Nolte, *Martin Heidegger: Politik und Geschichte im Leben und Denken* (Berlin: Propyläen, 1992). In addition to Derrida's several reflections on ash and spirit, see Reiner Schürmann's *From Principles to Anarchy: Heidegger on Being and Acting*, (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1987) and see too his already mentioned article, 'Tragic Double Binds' in *Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art and Technology*, eds. Karsten Harries and Christoph Jamme (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1994), pp. 89–105. If Graeme Nicholson's reading in his 'The Politics of Heidegger's Rectoral Address', *Man and World* 20, no. 2 (1987): 171–87 remains the most balanced see Strong's chapter on Heidegger in his recent *Politics Without Vision: Thinking Without a Bannister in the 21st Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), pp. 263–324.
- 8 Joseph Cohen and Raphael Zagury-Orly, eds., *Heidegger et 'les juifs'* (Paris: Grasset, *La Règle du Jeu*, N° 58/59, September 2015), as well as most recently, Ingo Farin and Jeff Malpas, eds., *Reading Heidegger's Black Notebooks: 1931–1941* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016) and the results of a conference held in Siegen, Marion Heinz and Sidonie Kellerer, eds., *Martin Heideggers 'Schwarze Hefte' – Eine philosophisch-politische Debatte* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2016).
- 9 Some of these classic points are reprised and reviewed (already as it were) in the contributions to Harries and Jamme's collection on Heidegger and politics. See especially Alexander Schwann and Reiner Schürmann among the other contributions to Harries and Jamme, eds., *Martin Heidegger* as well as Günther Neske & Emil Kettering, eds., *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*, trans. Lisa Harries and Joachim Neugroschel (New York: Paragon House, 1990).
- 10 See Reiner Schürmann, *Le Principe d'anarchie, Heidegger et la question de l'agir* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1982) in English as *From Principles to Anarchy*, and see too his article, 'Tragic Double Binds' in Harries and Jamme, eds., *Martin Heidegger*, pp. 89–105.
- 11 See, again, Nicholson's 'The Politics of Heidegger's Rectoral Address'.
- 12 See Tracy Strong's chapter on Heidegger in his recent *Politics without Vision*: (cited above) and see too his contribution to 'On Relevant Events, Then and Now' to Farin and Malpas eds., *Reading Heidegger's Black Notebooks: 1931–1941*, pp. 223–38.
- 13 See Jürg Altweg, 'Ein Debakel für Frankreichs Philosophie', *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (13 December 2013) and see too Thomas Assheuer, 'Er spricht vom Rasseprinzip': Nach seinen jetzt bekannt gewordenen Ausfällen gegen die Juden lässt sich Heidegger nur noch schlecht verteidigen, *Die Zeit* (27 December 2013): 48, as well as a parallel contribution from Peter Trawny in the same issue and on the same page although going on to the following page as well: 'Eine neue Dimension' *Die Zeit* (27 December 2013): 48–9.
- 14 I refer to Heidegger's discussion of *Krankheitserscheinungen*, 'symptoms of a disease'. *Being and Time*, 52/29. Such manifestations refer to 'certain occurrences in the body which show themselves and which, in showing themselves as thus showing themselves, 'indicate' ['indizieren'] something which does not show itself'. (Ibid.) Emphasizing that 'this showing itself, which helps to make possible, the appearing, is not the appearing itself' (53/29). Heidegger's point is the heart of hermeneutic phenomenol-

- ogy: 'Appearing is an *announcing-itself* [das Sich-melden] through something that shows itself' (Ibid.). Circumstances make all the difference and in this often cited illustration, Heidegger speaks of the para-phenomenon or pseudo-appearance of such appearances as 'mere semblance': 'In a certain kind of lighting someone can look as if his cheeks were flushed with red; and the redness which shows itself can be taken as an announcement of the Being-present-at-hand of a fever, which in turn indicates some disturbance in the organism' (54/30–1). I discuss this in connection with Ludwik Fleck and the hermeneutic elusiveness of medical aetiology in history and diagnostics in Babette Babich, 'Calling Science Pseudoscience: Fleck's Archaeologies, Latour's Biography, and Demarcation or AIDS Denialism, Homeopathy, and Syphilis', *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 29, no. 1 (2015): 1–39.
- 15 John Derbyshire, 'Heidegger in France: Nazism and Philosophy', *Prospect Magazine*, 13 December 2013. Available on line at <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/derbyshire/heidegger-in-france-nazism-and-philosophy/#.Ur3ohLTWsvY>
 - 16 Note here a not-accidental parallel with the scientific tradition of the Enlightenment and its goal of explaining, predicting, and ultimately, controlling nature.
 - 17 See Martin Heidegger, *Über den Humanismus. Brief an J. Beaufret, Paris* (Bern: Francke, 1954) and in translation, 'The Letter on Humanism' in Krell's edition of Heidegger, *Basic Writings* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977) and the same translation appears in William McNeill's edition of Heidegger, *Pathmarks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
 - 18 I discuss this in an essay included in the published *Proceedings of the Heidegger Circle*, 'Shattering the Political or the Question of War in Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism"' (1 May 2013): 25–49.
 - 19 See, again, for these variations, Strong's exactly titled *Politics without Vision*.
 - 20 Tracy Strong, 'Introduction', in Strong, ed. *Friedrich Nietzsche* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), p. xxvi. Strong reprises this same point more generally, quite beyond Nietzsche alone, to state his own suggestion for his own part in his recent book, *Politics without Vision* and in a sense this earlier editorial paragraph may be read as epitomizing part of the project of his monograph, namely, 'that, instead of writing to make sure "it" never happens again, we have to open some doors that have been closed down in order to explore paths that come after those doors but were not taken'. Strong, *Politics without Vision*.
 - 21 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Erziehung nach Auschwitz'. In Adorno, *Erziehung zur Mündigkeit, Vorträge und Gespräche mit Hellmuth Becker 1959 – 1969*, Gerd Kadelbach, ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), pp. 92–109.
 - 22 See for further references for this assertion and further discussion, Babette Babich, 'Heideggers Widerstand. Nietzsche lesen als eine "Konfrontation" mit dem Nationalsozialismus', in *Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus II. Heidegger Jahrbuch* 5, eds. Holger Zaborowski and Albert Denker (Freiburg: Alber, 2010), pp. 397–415.
 - 23 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Antichrist* (German: Der Antichrist), §19.
 - 24 Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 180.
 - 25 Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, 231/349. Martin Heidegger and Jean Beaufret, *Lettre sur l'Humanisme* (Aubier, Moutaigne, 1957) and R. Munier, édition bilingue, Paris, Aubier, 1983. Yet some authors ask, as we shall see, how concerned could Heidegger be with ethics, especially if he could not give a straight answer to a young man who asked him when he might be writing one?
 - 26 Ibid., 232–3/350.

- 27 Nietzsche names Anaximander 'the first ethical philosopher', in Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. Marianne Cowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), §6.
- 28 Heidegger, 'Der Spruch des Anaximander', in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1994), p. 356.
- 29 Heidegger, 'Der Spruch des Anaximander', p. 363.
- 30 In *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen* (Munich: Beck, 1956), Günter Anders had already diagnosed much of this, focusing on the human as such just where his Frankfurt School colleague in Southern California, Herbert Marcuse, spoke more generically in his *One Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).
- 31 Martin Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology', in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Perennial, 1977), pp. 13–19.
- 32 There are of course many who write on Heidegger and value. In particular, I recommend for an overview, Jacques Taminiaux, not less for his own theoretical background in law. See Taminiaux in English and with specific reference to Heidegger and Nietzsche: Taminiaux, 'On Heidegger's Interpretation of the Will To Power As Art', *New Nietzsche Studies* 3, no. 1 and 2 (1999): 1–22, see for a direct discussion: Babich, 'On Connivance, Nihilism, and Value', *New Nietzsche Studies* 3, no. 1 and 2 (1999): 23–52. Robert Sinnerbrink discusses Taminiaux's analysis in an aesthetic context in his 'Heidegger and Nietzsche on the "End of Art"', in *Heidegger and Nietzsche*, eds. Babette Babich, Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012), pp. 417–28.
- 33 Nietzsche's term in his *Also Sprach Zarathustra* is 'Krämer-Gold'. Cf. Z III, *Von alten und neuen Tafeln*, §21.
- 34 Nietzsche, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*.
- 35 Cf., to cite English titles, Nietzsche's *The Gay Science*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, etc.
- 36 Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, 228/345.
- 37 Michael Theunissen, *Der Andere: Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965.), see here especially with reference to *Mitsein* and *Fürsorge*, p. 177ff.
- 38 John Paley's 'Heidegger and the Ethics of Care', *Nursing Philosophy* 1 (2000): 64–75. In nursing ethics, the (only partially) Heideggerian conception of care may also be traced in different expressions very classically in Jean Watson, *Nursing: Human Science and Human Care. A Theory of Nursing* (New York: National League for Nursing, 1988 [1985]); in Madeleine M. Leininger, 'Die Theorie der kulturspezifischen Fürsorge zur Weiterentwicklung von Wissen und Praxis der professionellen transkulturellen Pflege', in *Erster Internationaler Pflegetheorienkongress in Nürnberg*, ed. Jürgen Osterbrink (Bern: Hans Huber Verlag, 1998), pp. 73–90. On Leininger, see too Cheryl L. Reynolds, 'Zum Ursprung von Leiningers Theorie der kulturellen Fürsorgevielfalt und -gemeinsamkeiten' in *Multikulturelle Pflege*, eds. S. Alban, M. M. Leininger and C. L. Reynolds (Munich: Urban & Fischer, 2000), pp. 276–86. See for a recent discussion, Pawel Krol and Mireille Lavoie, 'De l'humanisme au nihilisme: une dialectique sur la théorie du caring de Jean Watson', *Rech Soins Infirm.* 122 (September 2015): 51–65.
- 39 Paley, 'Heidegger and the Ethics of Care', p. 66.
- 40 *Ibid.* The problem here is that what Paley calls 'congeniality', or what business ethics often reduces to, that is, 'all the ethics one can afford' or all the ethics not grandfathered in by law, is a particularly feeble kind of ethics.

- 41 Analytic readings are, to use Paley's own term here, notoriously 'uncongenial' to Heidegger as such.
- 42 For a discussion of care in Heidegger with reference to Goethe's care, see Ellis Dye, 'Sorge in Heidegger and in Goethe's Faust', *Goethe Yearbook* 16 (2009): 207–18. See also on care, from a Heideggerian and Schelerian philosophical perspective, Daniel Dahlstrom's discussion 'Scheler's Critique of Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology' in *Max Scheler's Acting Persons: New Perspectives*, ed. Stephen Schneck (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), pp. 67–92.
- 43 See for a further discussion, Babette Babich, 'Constellating Technology: Heidegger's Die Gefahr / The Danger' in Babich and Dimtri Ginev, eds., *The Multidimensionality of Hermeneutic Phenomenology* Frankfurt am Main: Springer, 2014), pp. 153–182.
- 44 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §40; cf., §41 191.
- 45 See here, with reference to both Nietzsche and Montaigne, for example, Paul van Tongeren, "On the Friend" in Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, in the journal I edit, *New Nietzsche Studies* Vol. 5, Nos. 3/4 and Vol. 6, Nos. 1/2 (Winter 2003/Spring 2004): xx–xx, as well as Alexander Nehamas, 'Because it was he, Because it was I: Friendship and its Place in Life' (theme of Nehamas' Gifford lectures of 2008 in Edinburgh), as well as Jacques Derrida's humanistically inspired *Politiques de l'amitié* (Paris: Galilée, 1994). Kant himself also invokes the example of friendship as a non-realizable idea in order to illuminate the factic limits of ethics and its ideal: 'daß z. B. reine Redlichkeit in der Freundschaft um nichts weniger von jedem Menschen gefordert werden könne, wenn es gleich bis jetzt gar keinen redlichen Freund gegeben haben möchte, weil diese Pflicht als Pflicht überhaupt vor aller Erfahrung in der Idee einer den Willen durch Gründe a priori bestimmenden Vernunft liegt' Immanuel Kant, *Die Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, Karl Vorländer, Hg. (Leipzig: Dürr, 1906), 2nd section, p. 28.
- 46 See in this context Eileen M. McGee, 'The Healing Circle: Resiliency in Nurses', *Issues in Mental Health Nursing* 27 (2006): 43–57. McGee writes regarding the pressures of the nursing vocation, underlining the dimension of institutionalized caregiving from the side of the patient, particularly the insolvent, particularly those with substance abuse dependencies.
- 47 Thus, one author characterizes Heideggerian solicitude as maternal restraint: 'I do not leap-in and take over this careful struggle to be from him – I hold myself back in a type of restraint that is nevertheless characterized by a hovering attentiveness, a silent co-willing, an expressive encouragement and recognition of his struggle.' Irene McMullin, *Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2013), p. 227. Scott Campbell argues that McMullin's book answers Richardson's desideratum for an ethics that would respond to his own exploration of errancy over the years and beginning with his discussion in his *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967). I share the same sense of the importance of this theme (see my edited collection, Babette Babich, ed., *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire: Essays in Honor of William J. Richardson, S.J. [Phänomenologica]* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), but I am less confident that what Richardson is calling for is to be found here. See for the original context in question John Caputo's 'Dark Hearts: Heidegger, Richardson and Evil', in Babich, ed., *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire*. The same collection also includes Richardson's reply: 'Heidegger's Fall' which was also reprinted in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* LXIX, no. 2 (1995): 229–53.
- 48 I use convivial here in Ivan Illich's elusive and comprehensive sense. See Illich, *Tools for Conviviality* (London: Marion Boyars, 2001 [1972]) a text which may be better

understood as a guide to living together in a comprehensive sense considering where we find ourselves in a disparate world and wishing to share common life-values but also attuned to the differences made by both technologies and techniques as well as institutions.

- 49 Thus, the teacher brings a new scholar who will eventually also be a teacher, to themselves, as Nietzsche once argued, but the difference between Nietzsche's argument for the individual task that is the student's task of finding an educator to free oneself to oneself, is adumbrated for Nietzsche, as it was for Heidegger, by Pindar's 'become the one you are'.
- 50 It can also be giving feedback on a text or the practical life of a scholar; think of Weber's irreplaceable *Wissenschaft als Beruf*.
- 51 Peter Handke, *Lied vom Kindsein*, film quote. Online version here: http://www.wim-wenders.com/movies/movies_spec/wingsofdesire/wod-song-of-childhood-german.htm.
- 52 It is instructive for me as a Nietzsche scholar to hear this distinction as it is behind the translator's efforts to render Nietzsche's *Mitleid* with one or the other term.
- 53 See Ivan Illich in conversation with David Cayley, *The Rivers North of the Future* (Toronto: Anansi Press, 2005), p. 52.
- 54 If the primary import of ethics today, in philosophy as in political theory is to go beyond the self, towards others, towards animal being, even towards the earth itself, Heidegger would not seem to offer us what we are looking for and the allure of Levinas, despite his dependency on Heidegger, is that he makes ethics central to his philosophy, as first philosophy.
- 55 'As care ... Dasein has been Determined by facticity and falling ... Dasein as a they-self, gets "lived" by the common-sense ambiguity of that publicness in which nobody resolves upon anything but that which has already made its decision. "Resoluteness" signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the "they." ... [But even] resolutions remain dependent upon the 'they' and its world' (§60, 298).

Chapter 2

- 1 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956). Hereafter BN.
- 2 Jean-Paul Sartre, *The War Diaries of Jean-Paul Sartre*, trans. Quintan Hoare (New York: Pantheon, 1984), p. 183. Hereafter WD.
- 3 Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, trans. Forest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Noonday Press, 1957). Hereafter TE.
- 4 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'The Itinerary of a Thought', in *Between Existentialism and Marxism*, trans. John Mathews (New York: William Morrow, 1974), p. 33. Hereafter IT.
- 5 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Interview with Sartre', in *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*, ed. Phillip Schlipp (LaSalle, IL: Open Court Press, 1981), p. 8.
- 6 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr*, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Mentor, 1963). Hereafter SG.
- 7 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Search for a Method*, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Random House, 1958). Hereafter SM.
- 8 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, vol. 1, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith (London: Humanities Press, 1976). Hereafter CDR.

- 9 Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Family Idiot*, vol. 1, trans. Carol Cosman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
- 10 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'The Purposes of Writing', in *Between Existentialism and Marxism*, ed. John Mathews (New York: William Morrow, 1974), pp. 30–1.
- 11 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), p. 9.
- 12 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, ed. and trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 190–1. Hereafter *PH*.
- 13 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1994), p. 302.
- 14 Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Family Idiot*, vol. 2, trans. Carol Cosman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 4. Hereafter *FI2*.

Chapter 3

- 1 Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Citadel Press, 1976), p. 74. Hereafter cited as *EA*.
- 2 Louise D. Derksen and Annemie Halsema, 'Understanding the Body: The Relevance of Gadamer's and Ricoeur's View of the Body for Feminist Theory', in *Gadamer and Ricoeur: Critical Horizons for Contemporary Hermeneutics*, eds. Francis J. Mootz III and George H. Taylor (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), pp. 203–25.
- 3 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and David G. Marshall (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 390–1. Hereafter cited as *TM*.
- 4 Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany – Chevallier (New York: Vintage E-Books, 2009). Hereafter cited as *SS* followed by electronic location number.
- 5 Debra Bergoffen, 'Simone de Beauvoir', in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed on 15 November 2015 at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/beauvoir/#PyrCinRadFreOth>
- 6 Bergoffen, 'Simone de Beauvoir'.
- 7 See Gail Weiss, '"Politics is a Living There": The Intellectual's Dilemma in Beauvoir's *The Mandarins*', in *The Contradictions of Freedom: Philosophical Essays on Simone de Beauvoir's The Mandarins*, eds. Sally J. Scholz and Shannon M. Mussett (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005).
- 8 Bergoffen, 'Simone de Beauvoir'.
- 9 See Ernst Cassirer, *The Warburg Years (1919–1933): Essays on Language, Art, Myth, and Technology*, trans. Stephen G. Lofts and Antonio Calcagno (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014).
- 10 Patricia Altenbernd Johnson, 'Questioning Authority', in *Feminist Interpretations of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, ed. Lorraine Code (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003), pp. 307–24.
- 11 Michel Foucault, *On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France 1979–1980*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
- 12 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care of the Self*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 2012).
- 13 Simone de Beauvoir, *She Came to Stay* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990).
- 14 See interview with Simone de Beauvoir, 'Why I am a Feminist': <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9LYx5T1yhqU>