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Student Activism in Post-Colonial Societies: An Analysis of Egyptian and Indonesian Government Intervention in Student Movements

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Abstract

Student activism is a central component of many political movements against authoritarian hegemony. This paper focuses on multiple instances of student activism in Egypt and Indonesia over the past fifty years. As such, the following questions are considered: how have the post-colonial systems of government impacted legislation that enforces the limits of free speech and mobilization? How has student activism evolved in the digital age? How have governments responded to the changing digital landscape, and how might their tactics evolve in the future? These questions are considered within the framework of violence and its multiple forms, as Johan Galtung, Nancy Scheper-Hughes, and Philippe Bourgois propose. The post-colonial public sphere of each country is assessed through enacted legislation, as contextualized by Nicholas Onuf's work on center-periphery relations. As such, it is argued that violence enacted by the state in their post-colonial forms is not only an extension of the means of subjugation utilized by colonial forces but also evolved in its approach to student activism in the digital age, which has been censored in a variety of ways. This assessment bears relevance as we encounter ever-evolving media and political landscapes, which are increasingly subject to government intervention.

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Introduction

In its many forms, violence enacted by the state can be challenging to point out if not enacted in a predictable physical manner. As such, this paper looks at the myriad forms of violence enacted by the state, its implications for censorship in its varying modes, and its evolution in contemporary times. As such, Egypt and Indonesia's student activist movements over the past 50 years and the evolution of government suppression of dissident voices alongside it are the focus of this paper. More specifically, we assess the emergence of social media platforms as a means of activism and a viable tool for mobilizing in the present and its implications for the future.

In their inception as independent states in modern times, post-colonial Egypt and Indonesia have come with maintaining specific colonial modes of subjugation. Among these are the enforcement of states of emergency and sweeping laws governing the ability to protest, as seen in both countries. Censorship is a pervasive force, both in the state's physical response to protest, student activism on campuses, and, today, online activism. Egypt's 1972 Student Movement, the 1981 Emergency Law, the 2004 Kifaya Movement, the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, and the 2013 Presidential Law Decree on Demonstrations marked the evolution of the strategies of repressive regimes over the past fifty years. Similarly, student activism in Indonesia from the October 30th movement in 1965, the 1998 May Riots, the 2019 Protests and Riots, and the 2022 Demonstrations were also informed by government intervention on campuses, the recent arrest of individuals for expressing their dissent online, among many other elements.

The Digital Age has marked a significant shift in the means of mobilization and the dissemination of relevant information. What this also means is that internet access and social

media applications assist student activists in being able to organize and mobilize better. Since social media and the internet are tools to amplify dissenting voices, we have seen more significant government intervention, suppression, and censorship. As we look at the ever-evolving political landscapes and the adverse impacts on youth, we can reasonably expect to see social media platforms being used as a tool of activism. With that, we can also expect government response to shift in response, with arrests of dissidents, censorship online, and internet blackouts being used more.

As we look to the future, it is worth interrogating how the rapidly changing media and political landscapes may impact personal freedoms, not least of all the freedom of speech.

Methods and Limitations

The following theoretical frameworks and case studies demonstrate the evolution of state-enacted modes of repressing on-campus student activism. Tracking these changes from the immediate post-colonial to the contemporary has made clear that governing forces are always interested in directing the narrative of youth movements and their manifestations. As such, responses to evolving movements have shifted with an urgency. Much of today's youth organizing and activism is incepted online and then manifests physically via demonstrations, rallies, and walk-outs, a novel landscape that has required innovative means of repression by the state. Much of the presented research is rooted in anthropological conceptions of violence and censorship, the applications of which are centered on post-colonial society predicated on preserving an antiquated status quo.

Rooting the contents of this paper in theory and real-life manifestation of said theory has been indispensable in furthering the discussion of censorship in an ever-evolving political, digital, and technological landscape as they inform the formation of dominant narratives.

However, in rooting the following work in theory and case studies only understood second-hand, there will be gaps in conveying the tangible realities that many encountered and lived through. As such, the following research has deliberately been focused on student activism that has been well documented. However, there are common elements that underlie these instances of student activism. Among them are frustrations with economic conditions, poor job opportunities, and limited socioeconomic mobility.

Theoretical Framework

What is Violence?

We begin by contextualizing sociologist Johan Galtung's 'Theory of Peace' as outlined in his seminal work published in 1969, titled "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." Here, Galtung characterizes peace as the "absence of violence" (Galtung 168), but not exclusively so.

However, to understand peace, we need to understand violence. Galtung defines violence as "that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance" (Galtung 168). In practice, this can be taken to explain how violence can be equated to instances when the avoidable occurs (Galtung 168). More succinctly, "when the potential is higher than the actual is by definition *avoidable* and when it is avoidable, then violence is present" (Galtung 169).

Furthermore, Galtung asserts that there are many different kinds of violence, including physical and psychological violence, negative and positive influence, violence enacted by a subject, personal/direct violence, and structural/indirect violence, among others. All of these are forms of violence that can and have been enacted in the tension between the government and the population, particularly as it relates to the suppression of student protest. Furthermore, these

forms of violence can manifest differently depending on the locale in which this violence is enacted. This is clearly exemplified in the analysis of physical violent suppression and parallel online suppression enacted by the government.

This paper will emphasize Galtung's distinction between personal or direct violence enacted by a subject (Galtung 170) and structural or indirect violence not enacted by a subject (Galtung 170). Specifically, Galtung points to power over resource distribution (171) as trending toward violence when not evenly distributed (171). The ability to make decisions in that capacity is primarily rooted in income, education, and health, all feeding into social rank and power holding by proxy (171). As such, Galtung explains social injustice as "the condition of social injustice" (171).

Specifically, Galtung states,

> "We may summarize by saying that too much research emphasis on one aspect of peace tends to rationalize extremism to the right or extremism to the left, depending on whether the one sided emphasis is put on 'absence of personal violence' or on 'social justice'. And these two types of extremism are of course not only formally but also socially closely related and in a dialectic manner: one is often in reaction to the other. When put into practice both may easily develop into well-known social orders where neither of the two aspects of peace are realized: gross social injustice is maintained *by means of* highly manifest personal violence. The regime usually tries to maintain a *status quo*, whether it means forceful maintenance of traditional social injustice that may have lasted for generations, or the forceful maintenance of some new type of injustice brought in by an attempt to overthrow the old system" (Galtung 184).

The relationship between the absence of personal violence and social justice is essential to take note of. The government's forceful maintenance of the status quo has not boded well in many circumstances. Student activism is a prime example of how the forceful upholding of the status quo necessitates the infliction of personal violence in myriad capacities, whether it be the scarcity of opportunity, deplorable economic conditions, or authoritative rule. Student activists often organize in response to personal violence enacted against the collective. The response to being violated manifests as opposition to the very structure that has enacted and indiscriminately upheld such an acerbic status quo.

Understanding Violence in the Context of Post-Colonialism

Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, in their 2004 collaborative work entitled, "Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology," introduce violence as "giving birth to itself" (Bourgois, Scheper-Hughes 1), where violence is both iterative and cyclical, mimetic in its origins and how it manifests. The value of violence is derived from its ascribed social and cultural significance (1), contributing to the difficulty in simply classifying violence. Whether or not violence is legitimate or illegitimate depends on the assessor, per Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes. "Brute force is a misnomer, and it is the very human face of violence that we are trying to unravel here. Sadly, most violence is not "senseless" at all" (3).

This is true when considering the legacy of colonialism, especially as we look at Egypt and Indonesia. The means, modes, and standards associated with the colonial frameworks of subjugation, whether on the part of British, Dutch, or French colonizers, were preserved, maintained, and evolved to protect the status quo. This status quo necessarily subjugated the population's freedom of expression and ability to organize and unite so that the threat posed to the power structure was mitigated before it became a more significant issue. Furthermore, just as

violence occurs in cycles, it evolves with each cycle to address the details relevant to the locale where such violence is enacted more specifically. We see this very clearly in how the Egyptian and Indonesian governments are organized to be very involved in the suppression of free speech on campuses, which, as a form of violence, has evolved to meet the evolution of technology and activist organizing on social media platforms.

Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes refer to Clifford Geertz's memoir "After the Fact," where he laments the belated inspection of "significant political events and … violent upheavals that descended on his respective field sites in Morocco and Java," both of which have extensive colonial histories. His work noticeably omitted the massacre of over half a million Indonesians following the 1965 failed coup. As such, Geertz was unable to denounce the violence against the peoples he had so extensively studied as "he has not wanted to distract attention away from the theoretical points he was making by engaging in a media fray or a politics of advocacy" (7) which helps to paint an image of a field of study both unhurried in their examinations of violence and unabashed in their reticence to make statements that they believe detract from the essence of the literature they produced. They describe this as a "history of anthropology's intellectual complicity" (8) that is exacerbated by the "misuse of anthropological ideas and practices in fostering structural, political, and symbolic violence" (8).

Following that logic, the idea of communal violence does not need to be bureaucratized (13) and can be interpersonal in reality. Communal violence thrives off of terror, where "terror operates quietly and secretly, below and between lines, as it were and in the blatant contradictions between "the official story" and what actually happens on the ground" (17), where the "culture of terror" (17) takes hold in everyday life in a variety of forms. This is made abundantly clear when a minority is made an example to symbolize the violence that looms over

the rest of the population if they choose to engage in similarly oppositional ways. These function as examples of communal violence, where terror is not only implied but is made a clear result of opposition to authority.

Post-Colonial Implications on the Public Sphere

Author Nicholas Onuf, in his work titled "Center-Periphery Relations: What Kind of Rule, and Does it Matter?" takes Johan Galtung's Structural Theory of Imperialism as it pertains to center-periphery relations and suggests that in his accounting for imperialism as a "special case" (Onuf 5), Galtung failed to account for the variety of ways in which direct, structural, and cultural violence may persist. Galtung's argument for an extended concept of violence (Onuf 6) is an important one and assists in understanding Galtung's conception of the "center" and "periphery" (Onuf 7). Galtung states, "The world consists of Center and Periphery nations; each nation, in turn, has its centers and periphery" (Onuf 7). For our analysis, government/authority will be taken to be the center, and student activists will occupy the periphery in their opposition, particularly in how their grievances are vocalized.

To better understand the mechanisms of dominance, it is crucial to understand the concepts of hegemony, hierarchy, and heteronomy (Onuf 12) as they apply to this discussion. Hegemony “is the form of rule in which instruction-rules are dominant, and this results in stratification and associated patterns of deference” (Onuf 12). Hierarchy is the rule-dependent form of social order where directives are carried out according to a chain of command (Onuf 12). Heteronomy is where the established rules manifest themselves in obligations and generate a moral order (Onuf 12). Onuf likens this to Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality as informed by the rule of law, where the “system of rules … disproportionately benefit some members of society” (Onuf 13). These concepts lend well to understanding Galtung’s suggestion

of the center-periphery dynamic. The heteronomous social order often manifests itself as upholding the status quo through the silencing of the majority through the implied force of violence.

More specifically, Onuf classifies the periphery's center as indispensable to understanding hegemonic imperialism (Onuf 14). Here, "collegial practices and egalitarian ideology (the promise of heteronomy) will reinforce the sense that one can be top dog in two worlds – center and periphery" (14). The importance of individual status is made clear and is central to maintaining the dynamic of center and periphery by enforcing limitations on others through what is promoted as normative behavior in order to exert control over their local society; this is complicity, according to Onuf's assertion, that serves to reinforce "modernity as a global status-order" as influenced by the Marxist conception of false consciousness. Student activism, as such, deviates from the pre-established normative behaviors that are state-approved. Student activism, as it deviates from normativity, opens itself up to scrutiny and violently decisive sanctioning from the state.

Onuf points to resistance efforts countering hegemony in center contexts, encountering "nostalgia for old ways, anger over obvious injustices and glaring inequities, and anxiety about the future" (15). Resistance efforts in the periphery often occur in a context where an older iteration of the status quo still holds prominence.

Typology of Violence

Johan Galtung's 1990 work titled "Cultural Violence," a typology of violence, is introduced. This typological classification of cultural violence, in particular, points to violence as "avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to *life*, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible" (Galtung 292). It is important to note that

cultural violence, as it represents insults to the essential elements of one's humanity, may further propagate as student activism through greater organizing.

As such, state-enacted violence in post-colonial societies, especially as enacted in the effort to suppress expression, clearly functions to maintain the hegemonic status quo. We turn to the Egyptian and Indonesian contexts to better understand how state-enacted violence against student activists has evolved over time to become increasingly efficacious and all the more devastating in its consequences.

Literature Review

The following literature review focuses on the varying modes of censorship, from censorship enacted by the bourgeoisie to fear-based self-censorship. Censorship is assessed from the perspective of a public sphere predicated on publicity, where all parties have equal access. As such, censorship is seen as limiting discursive interactions in the public sphere and thus narrative shaping and repressive by extension.

Censorship

Matthew Bunn's 2015 work, "Reimagining Repression: New Censorship Theory and After," draws from Foucault and Bourdieu's conceptions of censorship and free speech. Bunn proposes that the "New Censorship Theory" reflects the common perception of censorship. This New Censorship Theory is constructed in the shadow of Marxist critiques of the bourgeoisie (Bunn 25), much of which is rooted in assessing repressive force by the state. As such, Bunn rejects the idea of a binary of "repressive/authoritative and productive/structural" (Bunn 25). If anything, Bunn argues that there should be no solidified distinction between the types of force

imposed since censorship by the hands of the state functions as the enforcement of internal state communication. This censorship is not accidental (25) but is, in fact, deliberate.

According to Bunn's characterization, "In recent decades, a powerful critique of the dominant paradigm for understanding freedom of speech and censorship has emerged, New Censorship Theory, which stresses the multiplicity of forms of censorship and the generative effects of censorship, [which was] an activity hitherto seen as purely repressive" (Bunn 25). With this comes an associated "internalization of censorship norms" (Bunn 26). This new censorship theory expands far beyond the typical literary texts and extends more broadly to communication in general.

> "The central insight of New Censorship Theory has been to recast censorship from a negative, repressive force, concerned only with prohibiting, silencing, and erasing, to a productive force that creates new forms of discourse, new forms of communication, and new genres of speech" (Bunn 26).

By this definition, censorship is characterized as diffuse (Bunn 27), where the typical actors and structures are not as solidified as they once were. Taking from Pierre Bourdieu's writing, Bunn reaffirms the idea of self-censorship as the more effective mode of repression (Bunn 27).

> "Where critics want to isolate state censorship from the new structural forms, we ought instead to explore how state censorship itself functions using similar grammars of power. Irrespective of how we solve the semantic dilemma of censorship–reserving the word "censorship" for traditional forms may be advisable–it is crucial to rethink how censorship qua repression works. It may ultimately turn out that effective authoritative censorship is not simply external, but insinuates itself into the circuits of communication,

> not simply coercive but also mobilizes powerful social currents, not simply repressive but also generates new forms of speech and thought" (Bunn 43).

State Censorship

Bunn's characterization of censorship as taking a multiplicity of forms and interactions with these forms as trending towards repression is supported by Mehdi Shadmehr and Dan Benhard's collaboration on a work entitled "A Theory of State Censorship." Here, we turn to an assessment of practical applications of censorship.

The authors propose that the strategy behind different modes of censorship is very calculated, particularly the interference and management of information transmission to the citizenry (Bernhardt and Shadmehr 1). Here, "the gains from improving citizens' trust in media may offset those risks by causing citizens to update less negatively following no news … By delegating censorship decisions to bureaucrats and threatening punishment if they deviate from censorship laws, a ruler might be able to commit to censoring slightly more or less than what he otherwise would without those institutions" (Bernhardt and Shadmehr 2).

The authors suggest that leaders benefit from a slightly free press, with the perception of there being some level of free reporting.

In particular, the authors put forth that:

> "When censorship is inexpensive, and (a) the revolution payoff is high, then a ruler prefers a very active media that uncovers almost all news to a very passive media that uncovers almost nothing; but if, instead, (b) the revolution payoff is lower, then a ruler's preferences are reversed. Intuitively, when revolution payoffs are high, a ruler values an active media that might uncover good news about the status quo that then forestalls a revolution; but when revolution payoffs are low, a ruler fears an active media that might

uncover bad news about the status quo that then precipitates a revolution" (Bernhardt and Shadmehr 4).

This sets the stage for how and why the state intervenes in suppressing or allowing media coverage of its governance. This state intervention extends to activism and organizing, especially in student activism. With student activism increasingly taking place online, allowing greater proliferation and visibility among the population, the state is particularly interested in monitoring and controlling the output of such content on online platforms.

Self-Censorship

The afore-outlined analysis of the benefits of a slightly free press assists in contextualizing the phenomenon of self-censorship. Jingrong Tong, in their work titled "Press Self-Censorship in China: A Case Study in the Transformation of Discourse," examines how media entities turn to self-censorship in hopes of mitigating possible repercussions for their reporting. While this work is focused on this phenomenon as it appears in the Chinese news media landscape, it is applicable in many other contexts, among them the Egyptian and Indonesian media ecosystems, which I look to discuss. Tong argues that "self-censorship functions as a mechanism for negotiating power relations … maximiz[ing] both the public and private interests of mass media" (Tong 594).

They derive inspiration from Antonio Gramsci's ' War of Position,' which points to the conceptual and intellectual affray in opposition to the cultural hegemony determined by the bourgeoisie. This illustrates how opposition to cultural or governmental hegemony often comes with the repercussion of 'being made an example.' This is an efficacious means for the government to assert authority and subjugate those who speak out in opposition to the status quo. It also signals to the rest of the population that they must also not organize themselves or speak

out in opposition if they do not want to experience the same consequences as those who have been made to be examples, whether it be through being handed life sentences, being physically harmed, or stripped of one's platform. This is exemplified time and time again on college campuses, where student activists, in their opposition to the hegemonic status quo, find themselves on the receiving end of the repressive forces of the state.

Rethinking the Public Sphere

As such, we turn to Nancy Fraser's "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy." Nancy Fraser pulls from Jurgen Habermas's preeminent 1962 work "Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into Bourgeois Society" in her work "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy" where she repurposes Habermas's foremost concept of the public sphere as "provid[ing] a way circumventing some confusions that have plagued progressive social movements and the political theories associated with them" (Fraser 56).

Habermas's conception of the public sphere is separated from conversations on other spheres relevant to daily life. This is simply an assessment of the ability of the public to engage in what Fraser calls "deliberation." However, one of the pitfalls of the Habermasian assessment is its basis in the bourgeois conception of free and open access to *all*. This is not and was never a reality. As Fraser recounts, many groups were excluded from the so-called public sphere, including those excluded based on gender and race. We see the government's heavy-handed intervention in determining the public sphere through lived life or online manifestations through censorship. This further inhibits the ability of the public to 'deliberate' in the manner that Habermas proposes.

Fraser introduces “intra public relations” (Fraser 65), which encapsulates the essence of “discursive interactions” (65). Fraser “contend[s] that, in stratified societies, arrangements that accommodate contestation among a plurality of competing publics better promote the ideal of participatory parity than does a single, comprehensive, overarching public” (Fraser 66). These alternative publics are what Fraser terms “subaltern counterpublics” which function as “parallel discursive arenas” (Fraser 67). This is reflected in student groups on college campuses that are inspired by myriad ideologies, but all function to work against the status quo and the functioning hegemony.

Fraser cites Habermas’s distinction of the public sphere as a space where the private person engages with public matters (Fraser 70).

Publicity is defined as being (Fraser 71):

1) State-related,
2) Accessible to everyone
3) Of concern to everyone
4) Pertaining to a common good or shared interest

Privacy is defined as pertaining to (Fraser 71):

1) Private property in a market economy
2) Pertaining to intimate domestic or personal life

Fraser explains that the public sphere is “not the state; it is rather the informally mobilized body of nongovernmental discursive opinion that can serve as a counterweight to the state … It is precisely this extra governmental character of the public sphere that confers an aura of independence, autonomy, and legitimacy on the “public opinion” generated in it” (Fraser 75). However, imagining a public sphere without heavy state intervention is difficult. Heavy-handed

state intervention in the public sphere determines the narrative in a way that best supports the vested interests of the state, opposition to which is suppressed.

Digital Dissidence

Aliaksandr Herasimenka discusses the benefits of digital technologies that authoritarian regimes benefit from and use to censor and suppress the population. In their work titled "Adjusting Democracy Assistance to the Age of Digital Dissidents," a focus is placed on the reliance on the digital realm to assist with political and civic organizing in opposition to authoritarian rule, which has proven to be more effective at mobilization and advocacy (Herasimenka 2). As such, a countermovement of "digitized authoritarianism" (Herasimenka 3) has emerged that counter democratic values of "participation, fair elections, and respect for human rights" (Herasimenka 3).

The internet has allowed for more expansive and specific modes of surveillance and censorship that have only been exacerbated by the evolution of social media platforms and the further integration of artificial intelligence (Herasimenka 4). Herasimenka more concisely describes organizing in the digital realm as relying on "the adjustment of organizational structures and visibility management" (Herasimenka 5). This is all to be understood in the context of collective and collaborative network building to challenge the status quo and simultaneously function in a capacity to conceal the real identities of those behind the digital organizing in an attempt to obfuscate the regime's attempt to disrupt the countermoves. However, the choice to publicize or anonymize one's identity remains up to the individual (Herasimenka 5).

Herasimenka explains that this all occurs in the backdrop of:

1. Individualization in light of the personalization of the political

2. Organizational structures deviate from hierarchical modes with the assistance of technology.
3. Censorship and surveillance contribute to movements' fragmentation, which is “a highly adaptive form of organizing” (Herasimenka 6).

The shortfalls of hierarchical movements include relying on central charismatic leaders (Herasimenka 6), as with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., for the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s. More practically, hierarchical movements can be seen in trade unions and civic organizations (Herasimenka 6). The weakness of these movements is reflected in the repression of their leaders, which limits the remaining members’ ability to mobilize.

Connective movements are celebrated for their basis in self-motivation (Herasimenka 7) but are criticized for being short-lived. Connective movements can occur by online information sharing as informed by the pressing issue. As this movement is self-motivated, it needs more overall consistency. Segmented movements are more organized and centralized than segmented movements, with clear objectives and actionable steps.

Additionally, leaders are apparent and may be spokespersons or administrators (Herasimenka 7). Hybrid movements are a cross between hierarchical and segmented movements (Herasimenka 7) to subvert the surveillance and censorship of the government. This functions to reduce the risk of repression and aids in “avoid[ing] tactical paralysis and challenge powerful elites” (Herasimenka 7). These modes of pro-democracy are less familiar but are all the more prevalent and relevant in an ever-evolving digital landscape.

Assessing the modes of censorship in response to the varying manifestations of student activism in post-colonial societies, it becomes clear that how censorship, suppression, and repression, by extension, are enacted are also rapidly changing. As such, it is important to apply

the elements of censorship by state and self to post-colonial societies from the perspective of student activism operating as oppositional to post-colonial structures of hegemony, activism which the state apparatus seeks to quell, as contextualized by academic theory on actualized violence.

Historical Overview

Historical Context of Egypt

The following historical context is informed by Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot's "A History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the Present" and Jason Thompson's "A History of Egypt: From Earliest Times to the Present."

World War II left Egypt unstable; with the baton of authority passed from party to party, the domestic system was unpredictable. This power vacuum is part of the explanation for the Muslim Brotherhood's founding in 1928. This was a period of interwar, where nationalism was front and center as Egyptians lost patience with the deplorable state of their country. The coup Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser led ushered in an era of Egyptian resistance. Inextricable from the 1952 coup is the conception of a collective Egyptian identity, to be taken as nationalism not based on ideological precepts. This was a period of "reform." This was a pivotal period, especially in light of Egypt officially becoming a republic in 1953.

The working class supported Nasser's regime, which had often been sidelined; trade unions were mainly mobilized. However, Nasser's reign was marked by heavy-handed population control via its military. The Egyptian security apparatus continued to evolve and expand its reach, its focus: the average Egyptian. An assassination attempt on Nasser in 1954 was the justification needed by Nasser's regime to pursue the Muslim Brotherhood in an attempt

to quash their influence. This began the decades-long conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood as an oppositional group. Nasser's administration, as mired in contentious politics as it was, ushered in an era of domestic transformation with the explicit goal of establishing Egypt as a leader in the Middle East. By the 1970s, the manufacturing sector was improving, twice as much as it had been in the 1950s. This improvement was paired with significant population growth and a stagnant agricultural sector, mitigating some of those economic gains.

Historical Context of Indonesia

The following historical context is informed by Tim Hannigan's "Brief History of Indonesia: Sultans, Spices, and Tsunamis: The Incredible Story of Southeast Asia's Largest Nation" and Jean Gelman Taylor's "Indonesia: Peoples and Histories."

By the 20th century, the Dutch controlled much of the East Indies. From the late 1870s to the early 1900s, much modernization occurred with the installation of railways and roads and the expansion of shipping services in the same way other colonial economies were modernized. The Dutch intended this as a way of consolidating their power further. In the 20th century, Indonesian nationalism grew due to this new imperialism. Keeping in line with global trends of the time attempts to become independent grew. A new educated Indonesian elite emerged, and that certainly assisted the cause. By the end of World War I, many organizations in Indonesia had nationalist proclivities but vastly different ideological frameworks. Indonesian nationalism in the twentieth century was primarily due to the inequities that persisted due to colonialism.

The prominent party Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) was formed under the leadership of Sukarno, who is now recognized as having been one of the foremost Indonesian nationalists. In 1928, representatives from many youth organizations came together. They produced what is now known as the Youth Pledge, which recognized a single Indonesian motherland, a united

Indonesian people, and the Indonesian language. This was a significant moment, partly because it is seen as the founding moment of the Indonesian language. Things took a turn for Indonesia during World War II when Dutch control of the East Indies was replaced by that of the Japanese, ushering in a new era of Japanese occupation. In 1943, due to Sukarno's advocacy, Putera, also known as Pusat Tenaga Rakjat, or the "Centre of the People's Power," was created. This organization served as a stepping stone for Sukarno's future role as the President of Indonesia, where he was now serving as a liaison between the Japanese and the Indonesians. Indonesians can now voice their views in venues such as the Central Advisory Council, Japanese-established youth groups, or volunteer defense forces. One volunteer defense force, the Sukarela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air (aka Peta, or the "Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Homeland"), would become central in Indonesia's revolution.

The Japanese surrender in 1945 set the stage for Indonesia’s declaration of independence. On August 17, 1945, Indonesia was officially declared an independent republic.

The immediate term following the declaration of independence was tumultuous; with the Republic of Indonesia taking on a presidential system with Sukarno at its helm, it was still a difficult transition. Some of this tumult was due to the Dutch presumption that they could reassert their control over Indonesia post-Japanese rule. Still, they were met with excellent resistance, and the Dutch conceded and transferred sovereignty to Indonesia. 1948 also saw a communist revolt. Indonesia's system of governance was multiparty, with the majority being Muslim parties, with the Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Communist Party (PKI) following closely. The first elections were held in 1955 successfully. In 1956, Sukarno's conception of a Guided Democracy was floated; this would rely on representation beyond party affiliation but extend to a council of critical groups, including rural farmers, religious organizations, youth

organizations, and women's organizations. This, Sukarno posited, would be the best means of moving forward as a nation. The Guided Democracy was made official by presidential decree in 1959.

Case Studies

Instances of Student Activism in Egypt

As such, I would like to focus on the following administrations in contemporary times that were met with staunch opposition from the population, particularly student activists. Anwar El-Sadat's reign marked 1970s Egypt. Sadat's regime sought to pursue economic reconstruction by liberalizing the Egyptian economy. This strategy was supported by extensive American aid, which exceeded USD 1 billion annually. These changes also came with the institution of a novel constitution in 1971, which, on paper, allowed citizens to better engage in the civic process. By 1976, the creation of new political parties became legal. However, the economy continued to suffer, triggering widespread protests in January of 1977. The Muslim Brotherhood regained some footing during this time, especially as Sadat's policy of mass arrests was wildly unpopular. The Coptic Christians also faced persecution from the government.

1972 Egyptian Student Movement

According to an article for the Middle East Monitor titled "The Student Movement in Egypt Over the Last Century," the 1972 Egyptian Student Movement occurred in the shadow of President Sadat's declaration of a year of reckoning with Israel in the aftermath of the October War. The 1972 Egyptian Student Movement was a student-led grassroots movement unlike any

other preceding one. The movement was in opposition to the al-Sadat regime. This movement was one where students in Cairo and Alexandria mobilized in protest.

This is corroborated by Mahmoud Hussein's account for the Middle East Research and Information Project in an article titled "The Revolt of the Egyptian Students," published in August 1972. Hussein explains that the student movement opposed an "increasingly servile subjugation to the wishes of the coalition of the new and old bourgeoisie" (Hussein 10). Students mobilized due to many factors, as outlined in the "Student Document" (10), which outlined a plan for student mobilization that focused on the political, military, and economic (Hussein 10). There was a sense of powerlessness, where the bourgeoisie dominated the political arena. This movement marked one of the many instances of students asserting themselves in politics. The word was spread using newspapers, leaflets, and posters (Hussein 11). More specifically, students organized committees at their universities, including the University of Cairo, Ain Shams University, and Al Azhar University, all of which are prestigious institutions. These committees streamlined operations within the student movement and allowed the youth to voice their views in effective public forums.

1981 Emergency Law

As we continue to unpack the different instances of student mobilization for change, it is essential to understand the legal atmosphere. Emergency Law Number 162, first passed in 1958, falls under the nation's Constitutional Law. The International Commission of Jurists, in August of 2009, issued a submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Egypt for the United Nations Human Rights Council, where Egyptian Emergency Law was discussed. Emergency Law No. 162, as first introduced in 1958, was implemented for the first time in the 1967 state of emergency due to the Arab-Israeli. Although the state of emergency was lifted in 1980, it was

reinstated on October 6, 1981, the day that President Anwar Sadat was assassinated. Since then, the state of emergency has been continuously renewed.

2004 Kifaya Movement

According to an article on "Kifaya" by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, published in September 2010, the Kifaya movement of 2004 was also a pivotal moment in Egyptian student activism, as it was organized in a way that would lend well to future iterations of similar activism organized on social media platforms such as Facebook. 'Kifaya' meaning 'enough' in Arabic, became the slogan of the Egyptian Movement for Change beginning in 2004; a short-lived movement, it was founded in 2004 "called for political reforms and criticized the extension of Mubarak's presidential term, the possible succession of Gamal Mubarak, government corruption, and Egypt's emergency law in place since 1981." Kifaya took place through demonstrations and direct criticisms of the authority.

2011 Egyptian Revolution

2011 was a pivotal moment in the contemporary history of South Western Asia and North Africa. Beginning in Tunisia, with the self-immolation of a fruit vendor in protest of the brutality at the hands of the police and rampant corruption in the country. The Egyptian population took note and mobilized en masse. This movement differed from others, as it originated from a Facebook group and eventually materialized in the streets.

In an article for Al Jazeera by Amr Hamzawy titled "Egypt Campus: The Students Versus the Regime," it is explained that after the Egyptian uprising in 2011 and the subsequent deposition of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, demonstrations occurred again in 2013, Egyptian universities served as the locale. In what Hamzawy characterized as how the military

rulers “subdue student dissidents,” universities were patrolled, and students were harshly penalized for their activism. Student activists (referred to as dissidents in Hamzawy’s reporting) have been tried in criminal court as opposed to civil court, with many students remaining in police custody. The student uprisings of 2013 were especially devastating, with 14 students killed and hundreds arrested and suspended. One thousand six hundred seventy-seven student protests accounted for a single semester of student protests. Ironically, although the government attempted to silence student activists and restrict their ability to mobilize, student protests still proved pivotal.

2013 Presidential Law Decree on Demonstrations

Per the Geneva-based NGO Alkarama's translation of the Presidential Decree on Demonstrations issued in 2013, we understand that there is an acknowledgment in Article 1 of the General Provisions and Definitions outlined that:

> “Citizens have the right to organize and join peaceful public meetings, processions, and protests, in accordance to the provisions and rules stipulated …”

However, a distinction is made where these occurrences must not be political, except those centered on electoral campaigning. This decree then outlines the following means of dispersing crowds in the event of what they term participant “non-responsiveness” in Article 12.

> “Security Forces shall disperse them in accordance with the following order:
>
> 1. Using water cannons;
> 2. Using tear gas canisters;
> 3. Using batons,"

Article 13 outlines the methods of participant dispersal that can be taken if the means outlined in Article 12 fail. It reads as follows:

> “In the case of the failure of the previously stipulated methods in dispersing or breaking up the participants in the public meeting, procession, or demonstration, or in cases in which the participants undertake acts of violence, sabotage, destroying public and private properties, or assaulting individuals or forces, the Security forces may gradually use force, as follows:
>
> - Firing warning shots;
> - Firing sound bombs or gas bombs;
> - Firing rubber cartouche bullets;
> - Firing non-rubber cartouche bullets;”

Students protested the provision in the 2014 constitution that referred civilians to military courts and the passage of undemocratic laws such as the anti-protest and “terrorism” laws. Punitive action taken against students has become more of a commonality, unfortunately, in an all-intensive repression campaign.

Instances of Student Activism in Indonesia

1965, 30th of September Movement

As such, we are looking at student activism under Sukarno's reign to the present day. This paper, by Eric Beerkens, discusses "The Student Movement and the Rise and Fall of Suharto," explaining that Suharto's rise into power began during the 30th September Movement. Official accounts explain this movement as the communist party's unsuccessful attempt at a coup. Others dispute the account, claiming that the transfer of leadership from Sukarno to Suharto was mainly due to the anti-communist student movement of the time, which was backed by the army. One such student organization was *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia* of KAMI. KAMI was a

collective of student organizations backed by the Indonesian army and endorsed by Suharto. Kami led many protests against Sukarno, garnering backing that strengthened Suharto's position as he aimed to depose Sukarno and take over the presidency (supposedly).

Eventually, according to official accounts, this student group not only assisted in Suharto's eventual presidency but also advocated for lowering prices on critical goods and commodities against a 600% inflation rate. One that was not only astronomical but especially devastating for Indonesians already at the margins. Suharto's presidency officially began in 1966, when the New Order declared the new law of the land and the Indonesian political ideal. KAMI's support of Suharto was evident in the first few years of his presidency when he encountered little opposition from student groups. With the New Order, however, came the adversarial response of the government to protests and political activism, especially as they sought the benefits of foreign investment.

1998 May Riots

Specifically, we are looking at the May 1998 riots that marked the end of the Suharto regime. The events in May of 1998 are described in varying ways, either as riots, rebellions, or protests. For the purposes of this paper, the occurrences of May 1998 will be referred to as a movement. As such, the 1998 student-led movement has come to be known as the Reformasi! Movement, where the famous slogan was "reformasi total," which translates to 'complete reform.' The HRW attributes the rise in essential commodities, known as the nine basic commodities (rice, wheat flour, cooking oil, sugar, soybeans, and eggs), as contributing to the onset of the protests in 1998. Much violence was directed at the ethnic Chinese minority, who were seen as contributing to the price increases as they dominated the retail industry. The riots occurred under the grand shadow of economic and political unrest in large part due to the Asian

Financial Crisis of 1997, which brought with it mass unemployment and inflation, which hit the population hard. Many of the protests were student-led, calling for the end of the military's New Order regime, as many were fed up with the subpar quality of life they were subjected to.

Many of these protests occurred outside Jakarta's capital city but eventually intensified in Jakarta. A paper titled "Revisiting the May 1998 Riots in Indonesia: Civilians and Their Untold Memories" by EM Himawan and colleagues collected the recollections of civilians of the May 1998 riots that caused an estimated 1,000 deaths and the targeting of the Chinese community, including mass sexual violence. The riots preempted Suharto's resignation, which followed a few days from the onset of the riots. With the end of Suharto's regime came the official end to the "New Order" military regime, which spanned from 1966 to 1998. These riots were successful, and Suharto stepped down within a week.

2019 Protests and Riots

Fast forward 21 years to the 2019 protests and riots. In what has been described in Reuters as one of the biggest protests since the 1998 protests (also student-led), we saw a heavily aggressive response from the Indonesian government. The protests erupted over President Joko Widodo's draft new criminal code, meant to "replace a Dutch colonial-era set of laws, saying a new parliament should deliberate on the bill next month," according to Stanley Widianto's reporting for Reuters on September 25, 2019, in an article titled "Indonesia Student Protests Against Law Changes Enter Third Day." Widianto states, "Aside from opposing the new criminal code, students say they are against changes to a law governing the anti-graft agency, known by its initials KPK, and the appointment of new agency commissioners that critics say will weaken the fight against corruption." It is fair to say that many students protested against the suggested reforms.

It is also worth noting that these protests occurred the same year as the post-election riots, according to an article written for The Atlantic titled “Deadly Post-Election Riots in Indonesia," published on May 23, 2019. Upon the announcement of President Joko Widodo's reelection came riots. Protesters denounced the contested election results, questioning the integrity of the electoral process. Hundreds were arrested, and six were killed.

2022 Demonstrations

Shortly after that, in 2022, another wave of student protests ensued. This wave of demonstrations was partly due to delayed elections, the rolling back of anti-corruption laws, and absurd levels of inflation—protests in 2022 over the reduction of fuel subsidies. Rizal Ramli's piece for The Diplomat titled "In the Midst of Protest, Hopes of Reform in Indonesia" makes it clear that the impacts of inflation were devastating. Ramli cites the following figures:

> “General inflation is estimated to be only 5.5 percent, food inflation is more than double that amount at 11.5 percent and could quickly increase to 15 percent by the end of this year. Having less disposable income due to higher food costs is not the only problem; one must also remember that most Indonesians, around 240 million people, rely on their motorcycles for transport. These people are most hurt by the government’s decision to reduce oil and gas subsidies partially. Making matters even worse for the average Indonesian are economic policy decisions by the Jokowi administration that have made the cost of living even higher than is absolutely necessary: an increase in electricity prices, higher value-added taxes, hikes in national health insurance premiums, and a cap on increases in minimum wages that is set at a miserly 1.09 percent.”

Ramli speaks to the frustration of the youth with leadership's messaging that they support their people when the reality on the ground is that it does not speak to the democratic values that politicians espouse, especially regarding the extreme limitation of freedom of speech.

Analysis

Egypt and Indonesia, although different societies, are similar in their post-colonial political trajectory as characterized by the student movements in each country. Student movements can be interpreted as necessarily opposing violence, especially as enacted by the state.

Repressive Legislation

We refer back to Galtung's 'Theory of Peace,' where it is suggested that peace needs to include the absence of violence but remain expansive in its coverage. Specifically, Galtung outlines the power of resource distribution and the misappropriation of such power as violence (Galtung 171). We see this in Egypt and Indonesia, with social and economic inequities. However, protests based on social or economic factors are overshadowed mainly by legislation that suppresses activism. This is the same with Egypt's Emergency Law's various manifestations and seemingly endless extensions and Indonesia's rollback of anti-corruption laws.

As Sadiq Reza discusses in his analysis of Egyptian Emergency Law in a law review article entitled “Endless Emergency: The Case of Egypt” for the *New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal,* a state of emergency was declared by the Egyptian government since 1981 and has been renewed virtually ever since. Per Reza's apt characterization, "the effect if not the ultimate purpose of emergency rule in Egypt–to wit, the

consolidation of state power in the presidency and the suppression of popular opposition" (Reza 533). The declaration of emergency rule was codified into ratified elements of the country's Constitution in March 2007. From the perspective of a democratic ideal of governance, there is a standard where the branches of government are balanced, and no one branch usurps or infringes on the powers of the others unless it is to balance them. Unfortunately, this is a case where we have seen the exponential growth of the judiciary's power. Egypt presents "an example of *endless* emergency" (534).

Reza cites the 2007 constitutional amendments enacted by the Mubarak regime as central to the events of the 2011 Arab Spring. For context, of the 211 articles in the Egyptian Constitution in 2007, 34 were amended. Specifically, Article 179, which Reza translated, read as follows:

> "The State shall be responsible for protecting security and public order from the dangers of terror. The law will set stipulations concerning procedures for investigation and identification of suspects that the procedure stipulated in the first clause of article 41 and 44 and the second clause of article 45 of Constitution [shall] not obstruct such an effort. All will be carried out under the oversight of the judiciary. The President has the right to refer any crime of terrorism to any judicial authority under the Constitution or the law."

This is important as we look to understand Article 179; we can see that it strengthened the existing emergency powers. Specifically, as Reza discusses in his article, it strips away the protections against "warrantless arrest and detention, warrantless home entry, and warrantless surveillance or seizure of correspondence" (542). Additionally, this article bolstered the President's power to "refer terrorism offenses to the emergency courts or military courts.

Previously, that power was only statutory, specifically under the Emergency Law and the Code of Military Justice" (542). These amendments are few among the many that exacerbate concerns about undermining human rights protections. As Reza explains, "The future of emergency rule in Egypt is, then, inseparable from the country's political evolution and of unavoidable consequence to student activism. This is reaffirmed by Mahmood Hussein's suggestion in light of the 1972 student movement, where he stated, "Endowed with an inexhaustible potential for generosity and imagination, as well as an exceptional lucidity, the students have always been in the front lines of the anti-imperialist and anti-dictatorial struggle. In the name of all revolutionary classes, they have been able to express the principal target and objectives of this struggle" (Hussein 10). However, as we see, the Egyptian political apparatus functions to suppress such a struggle to the best of their ability.

The draconian nature of such legal infrastructure brings to light questions of human rights violations. The International Commission of Jurists, in August of 2009, issued a submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Egypt for the United Nations Human Rights Council, where Egyptian Emergency Law was discussed. Specifically, Emergency Law Number 162, first passed in 1958, falls under the nation's Constitutional Law.

The commission asserted the following to support their claim of human rights violations under international law:

> "Those include continuing practice of arbitrary detention, including secret and incommunicado detention; use of security courts and military courts to exercise jurisdiction over civilians; and the failure to investigate, promptly and impartially by an independent body, the consistent reports of torture, ill-treatment and other abused of the rights of detainees."

The continuously renewed state of emergency is explained to allow the President or his deputy the following powers in Article 3:

- ➢ The ability to restrict freedoms of movement, association, and residence
- ➢ The ability to order and maintain the prolonged detention of a subject without charge, trial, or due process
    - The subject of this detention can be anyone labeled a threat to public order/national security.
- ➢ Powers of censorship, confiscation, and the closing of newspapers
- ➢ Power to appoint judges to the nation's Security Courts

We saw these provisions in practice with the Kifaya movement protestors who were subjected to detention without charge or trial, in addition to myriad human rights abuses, including sexual harassment and torture. This budding movement was effectively quashed as it encountered pressure from the authorities and members of the larger public.

Furthermore, Bianca Isaias's article for *The International Lawyer* titled "Military Tribunals and Due Process in Post-Revolutionary Egypt" explains that the 2014 Egyptian Constitution limits the application of a state of emergency. A majority vote in favor of the state of emergency in the House of Representatives (Isaias 213) is required, as opposed to the President or the President's deputy holding that authority. Additionally, a state of emergency cannot be declared for a duration longer than three months unless approved by a majority (⅔) of the House of Representatives once again. However, the rights granted to the entities charged with leading the Military Courts are still afforded much more discretion, often in opposition to the human rights acknowledged in the Constitution.

Similarly, in Indonesia, per Beerken's explanation, 1970 was the year that student protests were banned (following protests against corruption). Campus Normalisation Law of 1978, in conjunction with the Campus Coordinating Body, "banned political expression and activity from the campuses and placed all student activities under the supervision and control of the university rectors" and by proxy of the university space becoming a government stronghold, it also became militarized in the sense that it operated to surveil.

> "The economic growth had resulted in sharp increases in overall enrolments and a proliferation of new private higher education institutions to serve the children of an expanding middle class. At the same time, a wide range of Indonesians (including an important segment of the new middle class) was increasingly demanding greater freedom of expression and the opening of the political system to broader citizen participation. Student activists were an important source of pressure, who had been driven underground and radicalized by the repressive campus policies instituted in the late 1970s."

The 1980s were characterized by apathy and resentment of the ongoing repression on university campuses. The 1990s were the era of so-called "responsible openness" when an education law was passed in 1989. A government regulatory decree was issued in 1990 "included guarantees for both academic freedom and scientific autonomy," endorsed by President Suharto himself.

The commonality between the two countries when looking at the preceding examples of laws of subjugation is the undercurrent of government control of dissent. In Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes's assessment of violence, they state, "Violence (like power) corrupts absolutely, except when it is said to "ennoble" or liberate the perpetrator" (Bourgois, Scheper-Hughes 2). The authors do not deny the centrality of colonialism in "shaping contemporary patterns of violence across the world" (5) but lament the belated inspection by anthropologists of ongoing

violence. As such, many years later, “yet again, a “liminal space of death” or “gray zone” obfuscates responsibility from those primarily responsible for the terror that constitutes everyday life” (Bourgois, Scheper-Hughes 19), they characterize this as a ‘culture of terror’ (Bourgois, Scheper-Hughes 17). This culture of terror, as enforced by government actors, is predicated on the conception of hegemonic imperialism, as explained by Nicholas Onuf. It is explained that the dynamic between the center and periphery illustrates established dominance (Onuf 7), where one party necessarily preempts the other in power holding.

Onuf attributes Galtung's proposal of structural violence as a necessary step away from the reductive but dominant view that force-supported domination was the preeminent form of violence. Onuf describes this as aiding "to dissociate violence from coercion" (Onuf 10). To support this, rules are seen as a means of dominance, where they "rationalize(s) social relations" (Onuf 10) and operate as the most dominant example of structural violence and function more optimally than direct violence, as it is a form of domination that is self-enforcing and thus easier to maintain. These rules generate a norm that self-perpetuates. Onuf explains the conditionality of rules as a mechanism of dominance, "where there are rules, there is a condition of rule" (Onuf 10). As such, Onuf outlines three kinds of rules: instruction, directive, and commitment. Instruction rules assign rank based on the assigned value of distinctions between members of a society (11). Directive rules are "enforceable orders" (Onuf 11) that officers carry out. Commitment rules are the obligation to allow others to exercise their rights (Onuf 11) as allowed by the roles assumed, which is attributable to the normative condition.

As such, laws such as Egypt’s Emergency Law (and seemingly permanent state of emergency) and Indonesia’s Campus Normalisation Law of 1978, the institution of the Campus Coordinating Body as an enforcement group, among many other examples, function as rules that

operate to continue to suppress, oppress, and repress. These efforts, in both countries, are primarily focused on youth movements, which pose the greatest threat in terms of their abilities to organize and mobilize.

Attempts at Censorship

In a piece titled "Pemuda Rising: Why Indonesia Should Pay Attention to Its Youth" by Leonard C. Sebastian, Jonathan Chen, and Emirza Adi Syailendra, youth political engagement is discussed. In what the authors describe as a "fragmentary youth-scape" (24), acceptability is predicated on the archetypal "mahasiswa" image of a student that stands in direct contrast with the "Reformasi" image of a student. This evolution in the characteristics of the appropriately identified and idealized image of the Indonesian student bears no resemblance to the revolutionary dissidents on campuses of the decades past. The "Mahasiswa Menggugat" anti-corruption student movement of the 70s took on that name, which translates to "university students unite," as emblematic of their cause. This student group was formed to operate as a moral force to correct the course of action for the government, as opposed to being oppositional and attempting to overthrow the current system of governance and its proponents.

In response to this, the state sought to repress student political interest/involvement by introducing the "Semester Credit System" (through NKK/BKK policies), where students were subjected to burdensome curricular requirements in the hope that the time spent on political activities would be minimized. With that, "putting a halt to student council activities and replacing these bodies with campus administrators that have veto rights, banning and/or suspending subversive student publications and campus political activities without consultation" (Sebastian et al. 25). In addition to this, there were students who were kidnapped for "allegedly cross[ing] the permissible boundaries of political dissidence" (Sebastian et al. 25). The authors,

however, make it clear that this did not deter the students from their activism as "students have always occupied a prominent place in national political discourse, given their historical role in the tumultuous trajectory of Indonesia" (Sebastian et al. 28).

Irrespective of the measures, no matter how creative, put into place by the government, student activism, and protests still occurred and even increased in number.

In their work for the Journal of Linguistics and Literature titled "Johan Galtung's Concept of Peace Culture and Its Implementation in Indonesia," the authors take Johan Galtung's theory of the culture of peace to inform their analysis of Indonesia's cultural conditions; the authors propose schools and campuses as the ideal training ground to continue instilling the values associated with a culture of peace. Conflict in its extreme form is explained to be "carried out not only to maintain life and existence, but also aims to achieve the level of destruction of the existence of other people or groups who are seen as opponents or rivals" (Jondar et al. 231). Galtung's classification of violence in three areas includes direct, social, and cultural violence, a framework influenced by Mahatma Gandhi's work. It is made clear that violence is nuanced and cannot be appropriately understood from one perspective.

More pertinently, Galtung's definitions of peace are described as "the absence or reduction of all types of violence" (235) and as "creative conflict without violence" (235). Here, violence can be taken to mean brutality that need not be physical. As such, Galtung's proposal of the Transcendental Method whereby violence is mitigated is crucial to understanding the concept of negative peace. Negative peace persists when injustice persists past the alleviation of a major inhibition, such as colonialism (241). Conversely, positive peace is rooted in a sense of justice and mutuality, where conflicts are resolved through pre-established and agreed-upon avenues

(241). This culture of peace is maintained through education at schools and campuses as an indicator of fitness, which was undoubtedly present.

In his writing for the Jakarta Post, "Throughout History, Youth Movements Hold a Generational Consciousness of a Better Indonesia," Andre Arditya begins by saying, "Indonesia's youth movements today are the natural heirs to their forerunners. In the arc of the nation's history, the young have always played important and revolutionary roles." Protests reflect a criticality and interrogation of the status quo, a "generational consciousness," if you will, and a willingness to mobilize for change. As such, although these protests have waned to some degree in the past twenty years, they still inform the ethics and politics of young Indonesians.

Arditya interviewed Professor Yatun Sastramidjaja of the Anthropology department at the University of Amsterdam. Sastramidjaja said, "They [the youth] embody the idea that a progressive new era, a better Indonesia, is possible, and that they have a responsibility to lead the way in the ongoing struggle for a better future." For a long time, the university student (*mahasiswa)* was seen as symbolic of the appeal for progression. Eventually, that imagery was phased out in favor of a more inclusive designation of activist (*aktifis*). This new generation of activists was at the forefront of the 1998 student movement spurred on by the 1997 economic crisis, which eventually led to the deposition of Soeharto and his regime. These protests opposed the often touted standard of the 'New Order' and instead took on the slogan of *reformasi*.

As with youth movements that preceded those of today, the youth are weary of older elites who lecture from their pulpits on what "reality' actually constitutes, keeping suspicion front of mind. Sastramidjaja concludes, "This does not make today's youth movements any less

nationalist. Rather, it makes them all the more suited to lead the Indonesian nation into necessary new directions."

Similarly, Egypt's student-led youth movements were influential. Hatem Zayed, Nadine Sika, and Ibrahim Elnur's working paper titled "The Student Movement in Egypt. A Microcosm of Contentious Politics" discusses how student movements came to be. As mentioned, many of these activists' economic concerns are top of mind, as employment opportunities are sorely lacking. The authors state, "The university campus was predominantly the stage on which youth articulated their demands for freedom of expression, for the right to protest and assemble peacefully, and for the liberty to hold public debates on campus, among others" (8). This student movement was made up of students of all political leanings (11). The 2011 revolution was a hopeful period where we saw the rolling back of specific regulations allowing for the "outlaw of any national security apparatus in all public universities … the allow[ing] for further liberty and freedom in student organization" (11). However, 2013 marked the return of the conditions that preceded the 2011 revolution. Once again, student activism was targeted. This was reflected in the increased police presence on campuses and increased clashes.

The authors interviewed many Student Union members from different schools, who shared their perspectives on the condition of anonymity.

They quote a member of the Al-Azhar member of the Student Union, active in 2016, who said, in part,

> “After the revolution, we were not scared to speak, and while some students would get harmed outside of university due to engagement in political protests, we felt safe on campus. There was never a case where we can’t release a press statement or protest. Things improved even more in Morsi’s year, as there was less danger in going to the

> street, even though there were problems in other areas. This all changed in Adly Mansour's year. It was either you express an opinion supporting the regime or you don't speak at all" (13).

The student's account corroborates the trend of the easing of suppression of student voices on campus but then having the suppression return with a fervor, where one faces the choice between voicing support of the regime or staying silent.

Reimagining Dissidence in the Digital Age

However, given the technological innovations of the past decades and an ever-increasing internet penetration rate in both countries, censorship attempts by both governing authorities have taken a turn. According to the World Bank's estimations, as of 2022, 72% of the Egyptian population were internet users. Indonesia stands at 66% as of 2022.

In what has been called "cyberactivism" in the *Internet Freedom and Political Space* by Olesya Tkacheva, Lowell H. Schwartz, and colleagues, Egypt's "Facebook Revolution," also known as the January 25, 2011 uprising, is discussed. Facebook served as one of the primary tools for organizing the protests in what they call "the region's first telecommunication civil war," where social media could operate as a means of political change. However, as the authors assert, social media is just a tool to amplify the voices of people, particularly the youth. For the January 25th revolution, this was seen in the population's ability "to mobilize mass action, maintain a sustained connection with a mass audience, and circumvent a state security crackdown" (Tkacheva et al. 45). However, as the movement gained traction the Mubarak regime began to realize the implications of such traction, and took the drastic action of implementing an internet blackout, completely cutting off internet access in the country for days.

To put this into perspective, by the end of 2010, Facebook had an estimated 5 million active users in Egypt (48). The authors clarify that “Twitter and Facebook do not act independent of people, and the significance of social media and the actions and motivations of Egyptians are not mutually exclusive” (50) in response to the criticism of the Egyptian Revolution being dubbed the “Facebook Revolution.”

Similar comparisons are drawn to Indonesia’s youth, who are mobilizing in more significant numbers online. In a piece called “Youth, Politics and Social Engagement in Contemporary Indonesia” by Nurman Nowak for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, online activism is described as something that Millenials and Gen Z are proficient in. However, Nowak is careful to make the distinction between “pseudo-activism”/”clicktivism” (Nowak 11) and more legitimate forms of online activism. For example, in the 2019 protests, many mobilized around the hashtag #ReformasiDikorupsi (#ReformCorrupted). This came in response to the Widodo administration's attempt to diminish the powers of the previously initiated anti-corruption laws. In an article published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2020 by Usman Hamid and Ary Hermawan, it is clear that the internet was not a functionally safe space for activists. They cite the example of the Save Indonesia Coalition leaders being arrested and charged with incitement according to the 2008 Electronic Information and Transactions Law, which criminalizes the use of social media to organize. It was also reported that administrators "of a WhatsApp group, a Facebook page, and an Instagram account used to mobilize and organize the protests" were arrested. This was to serve as an example to others, effectively limiting free speech by the implicit threat of incarceration if one voiced dissent.

Conclusion

It is clear that censorship has been fortified, as codified into the legal frameworks of both Egypt and Indonesia, via constitutional reform and enacted legislation. The omnipresence of implied violence fortifies the fear of challenging authority, which is costly for the individual. Student activists, although strong in number, are still subject to the heavy-handed suppression of the state. With the advent of technological advancements, especially social networking sites, we have seen government response to digital dissidence be even more decisively violent in their use of raids, arrests, and internet blackouts to suppress dissidence.

As we look to an even more technologically advanced and integrated future, censorship will also advance and become more integrated into the fabric of society and daily life. Self-censorship will also increase as the threat of even more immediate violence becomes a more salient reality. Just as the United Nations acts as an arbitrator between states, will a similarly unified international body emerge to protect and advocate for human rights in the digital realm? This is especially important as dissidence increasingly turns digital, making dissent all the more costly. The applications of the theory outlined in this paper apply not only to Egypt and Indonesia. As physical borders become less and less of a salient feature of activism and transnational identities become more common, how might censorship evolve to respond to transnational instances of activism?

The previous analysis of different student movements in post-colonial Egypt and Indonesia clarifies the contentious relationship between the people and the state, especially as demonstrated by violence enacted on the population via censorship. While each movement's details differ, the essence remains the same: post-colonial structures of control represent the authoritarian status quo of the youth populations on college campuses that have worked so hard

to organize and protest against for decades. The means of upholding said status quo have evolved and will continue to in light of technological innovations that strengthen student movements.

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