Author

Daniel Melia

Date of Graduation

5-2025

Degree Type

Dissertation/Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts (BA)

Advisor(s)

John Davenport

Abstract

The U.S. Supreme Court ruling Citizens United v. FEC, issued in January of 2010, allowed an unprecedented amount of money to enter federal elections by removing spending limits for corporations on independent expenditure (referred to as ‘IE’, and meaning money spent of the proprietor’s accord, rather than directly by or in coordination with a political party or candidate). This paper addresses the lack of research on the outcomes of this ruling; there are few studies on the impacts of Citizens United on the ideological composition of Congress. To test the theory that this ruling led to significant polarization in Congress, it employs a statistical analysis of public campaign finance records for elections in the U.S. House of Representatives dating back to 2000 that demonstrates a significant correlation between spending on elections by ‘outside groups’ in the form of ‘IE-only committees’, known as ‘Super PACs’, and political polarization as measured by Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores, among nonincumbent (that is, newly elected) House members, particularly members of the Republican Party. This analysis is supported by anecdotal evidence of an intent to polarize by certain Super PACs, and lends credence to a theoretical game matrix that the paper proposes to represent the current arrangement of funding incentives for political parties and Super PACs. The paper uses this evidence to argue for further research into campaign finance reform in pursuit of political equality in U.S. federal elections.

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